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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
“After taking part in Farmer Field 
School training indeed the rice yields 
increased, and when we introduced 
cauliflower in our cropping systems 
we earned quite a lot of income from 
farming. But should we call this 
‘development’ when my son is not 
interested in continuing farming in 
our fields?” (Male farmer, Sanga 
village, Kavre, 2009) 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The farmer in the quote above expresses his doubts about the meaning of development. He 
conveys his disappointment because he worked so hard in his fields for the benefit of his 
family and now his son has other intentions than he had for the future of his farm. 
 Development projects often show set ideas about the expected results, about their 
development goals, but they do not always work out as planned, there are unintended 
outcomes. Policy makers or project planners in development have scope to influence or 
shape interventions but the circumstances in which they are implemented affect the 
dynamics and process of decision-making which can lead to a range of possible outcomes 
(Grindle and Thomas, 1989). This is also the case with the Farmer Field School project in 
Nepal which is the subject of this book. Our study shows that we concur with Grillo and 
Stirrat (1997) that development is a highly contentious concept with different objectives and 
practices. 
 The Farmer Field School is a participatory approach to agricultural extension, based 
on adult learning principles and was first implemented in Indonesia in 1989 to deal with 
widespread pest outbreaks in rice. In 1997 Farmer Fields Schools (FFS) were introduced in 
Nepal. Thus, the term FFS refers to both a particular approach to agricultural extension as 
well as to the institution, the schools where the training was given. 
 In 1996 I got the opportunity to work on the Farmer Field Schools in the Vegetable 
Integrated Pest Management project in Laos (1996 – 1999) and later in Nepal (1999 – 2002) 1. 
At that time I was working in the irrigation sector and disappointed with development 
projects: too much focus on establishing technical infrastructure, corruption, and little 
attention for farmers’ needs. 
I expected the Farmer Field Schools would be different, more participatory, 
contributing to rural change. I thought FFS was a wonderful method and that it would 
definitely contribute to yield increase, a better environment, empowerment of participants 
and that it was an approach including many farmers from different strata, in other words it 
                                                 
1
  Although the projects were called: Integrated Pest Management Projects, Farmer Field Schools were 
and still are at the heart of the projects. In this study I talk about the Farmer Field School projects, 
indicating the core elements: Farmer Field Schools, rather than the other integrated pest management 
activities which were included in the project. 
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was socially inclusive. I was excited when more women started to participate in FFS and 
thought this was a sign of gender equality. I was proud to be an FAO programme officer 
setting up such a programme in Nepal. 
 
1.2 The Farmer Field School (FFS) 
 
The Farmer Field School as a training institution was established by the UN Food and 
Agriculture Organisation in Indonesia in 1989 in reaction to the failure of technology-driven 
modernisation approach of development. Increasing pest outbreaks, stagnating farm 
production, called for a different strategy of agriculture extension. With a more holistic and 
participatory approach the Farmer Field School was developed to provide an answer. More 
than two million farmers across Asia have participated. It has been considered a great 
success (Pontius et al., 2002; van den Berg, 2004; Mancini, 2006) to be copied in other 
countries all over the world (Braun et al., 2000 and 2006; Dilts, 2001; Pontius et al., 2002; 
Kenmore, 1991; Gallagher, 2003; Braun and Duveskog, 2008). In 1997 the Farmer Field 
School was introduced in Nepal by the FAO in collaboration with the Plant Protection 
Directorate of the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives with the aim to contribute to an 
increased production and to agriculture development.  This was followed by Nepal’s 
participation in the FAO Regional Programme of Community IPM in Asia between 1998 and 
2002 funded by the government of Australia (AUSAID). During this period more than 15,000 
farmers were trained through a total of 633 Farmer Field Schools. The project started with a 
focus on integrated pest management. It was a new approach to plant protection and 
agricultural extension with greater participation of farmers.   
Initially the regional FAO CIPM program was hesitant to start activities in Nepal, 
because of a history of many “constraints and failures” of past projects in the agricultural 
sector there.2 However, the need for an IPM FFS project was clear for four reasons: (1) 
problems with over-dependence on pesticides existed in the grain belt of the terai and in 
vegetable growing areas, (2) a majority of the population depended on farming and were in 
need of improved practices, (3) serious health and environmental problems were associated 
with pesticides, and (4) the government extension service system was weak. Therefore, a 
decision was made by the government of Nepal and FAO to start an IPM program. The 
challenges for the program were fully recognised at the time, and summed up well by a 
comment from Andrew Bartlett: "One thing is clear; developing a program in Nepal would be 
an up-hill slog with no guarantee of a positive outcome" (FAO IPM programme officer, e-mail 
to Peter Ooi, FAO IPM programme officer, May 1997). Due caution was reflected in the 
Project Document, where it says: “It is not expected that large-scale IPM training will take 
place in Nepal during the next two to three years. Priority will be given to assist the Ministry 
of Agriculture in establishing a critical mass of IPM trainers capable of organising Farmer 
Field Schools”.3   
Knowing this reluctance to start FFS in Nepal, the deputy leader of the project in 
Nepal was determined “to prove to FAO and the rest of Asia that her team could do a good 
job!” (Interview, Kathmandu, July 2009). 
                                                 
2 
This view is reflected in the FAO Project document (1997), which cites information from the World 
Bank’s Agricultural Manpower Development Project (1984) about many of the activities of His 
Majesty’s Government of Nepal in the agricultural sector 
3 
FAO, GCP/RAS/172/NOR, Project document, Norway Addendum, 1997. 
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In a FFS a group of 25 – 30 farmers would meet on a weekly basis to discuss the 
situation regarding a particular crop and determine which agronomic practice to undertake 
to solve field problems. Educating farmers, discovery-learning and critical thinking in a 
participatory way were key elements of FFS. The entire process was facilitated by agricultural 
technicians from the government or local NGOs. 
 
Farmer Field Schools have been well studied regarding their cost-effectiveness (Feder et al. 
2004), their impact on pesticide reduction and farmer's knowledge on insects (Björnsen 
Gurung, 2002; Thiele et al., 2001; Rola et al., 2002; Tripp et al., 2005), but there is limited 
evidence of Farmer Field Schools’ contribution to rural development,  social change and rural 
transformation. This thesis intends to fill the gap on the basis of first-hand experience in 
Nepal. 
All over the world FFS has been introduced.  It is interesting to look at the impact of 
FFS in a country where it was introduced more than a decade ago and where I was 
instrumental in the initial establishment of the project. In this thesis I will not evaluate the 
FFS project but reflect on the processes of change that have taken place both inside the 
institution of FFS and in terms of the individual and collective transformation of the target 
group: the Nepalese farmers. 
 
It has been over 14 years since FFS was introduced in Nepal. The FFS or krishak parsyala 
(literally: farmers school), as it is called in Nepalese, was a new concept in the mid-1990s. 
Nowadays it is a familiar concept, all over Nepal organisations and rural people speak of FFS. 
The government has adopted it as its key extension method, many NGOs work with FFS 
techniques. Even the smallest NGO talks about Farmer Field Schools and farmers all over the 
country can talk about the FFS. What has FFS meant for those farmers? After having worked 
in development projects “doing development” (Thomas, 2000; Potter, 2000; Bernstein, 
2006), as well as in development education for 9 years, I was interested to learn if FFS had 
contributed to development in Nepal and been instrumental to social change and rural 
transformation. 
 While working on FFS, the idea for this thesis was born in 2001 amid mid-term 
evaluation discussions with Professor Niels Röling of Wageningen University. He was the 
team leader of this evaluation of the IPM project where I was the programme officer in 
charge. Together we visited several field schools and he was enthusiastic, he encouraged me 
to share this interesting project with the rest of the world. He encouraged me to study 
development and to write about this positive experience, to write about this success story. 
Although I could not start with the PhD right away the idea was planted in my mind. 
 Ten years after the start of FFS in Nepal I went back to update my material as part of 
my PhD research. My intention to write a positive story proved harder along the way. In the 
Netherlands I took up a position as a senior lecturer in Development Studies at Van Hall 
Larenstein4. As part of my job I studied development theories, to keep ahead of the Bachelor 
and Master students I am teaching. As a result of increased knowledge and insights, I started 
                                                 
4
      Since December 2002 I have been a senior lecturer and course coordinator (specialisation social 
inclusion, gender, rural livelihoods) of the Masters Management of Development at Van Hall Larenstein 
University of Applied Science, part of Wageningen University. To prepare my classes, to supervise 
Master students and to stay up-to-date with current development theories I continuously study 
development. 
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doubting if FFS had actually been such a success story contributing to rural development 
after all. 
 After taking up employment in the Netherlands I have visited Nepal on a frequent 
basis, and as part of this research I talked with hundreds of farmers, men and women. These 
farmers said they really enjoyed taking part in FFS (Chapter 6 and 7). They had fun in the 
sessions, learnt new techniques and got new knowledge, sang songs about insects, and were 
hoping that I was once more bringing them another new training opportunity. It was 
pleasant sharing their memories, but I had become critical and realised that I had been naive 
while working in the FFS project. 
 
It was disillusioning that most FFS groups no longer existed, and that farmers wanted more 
services or development project rather than act autonomously on their own development. I 
realised that, despite my assumption that all farmers had an equal chance to participate in 
FFS, the majority of the poor, the untouchables or Dalits and Janajatis, had been excluded 
from FFS. I learnt that farming, in particular food production, was left mainly to the women 
and that the younger generation is barely interested in farming anymore (see Gartaula, 
2011). Also I discovered that talking about empowerment was confusing. I had assumed that 
farmers were not familiar with the Nepalese term for empowerment: sanrakshan 
(protection) or samashakti (powerful together) I thought it to be too sophisticated for rural 
people; I thought it to be a typical term used by development practitioners, not part of the 
local vocabulary. Big was my surprise that men and women in rural villages had a clear idea 
about empowerment. These lessons showed my ignorance about local knowledge, about 
people's own ideas. Studying development opened my eyes for processes that I had 
neglected or ignored while working on development. 
 During this last decade Nepal has been subject to major political changes. In 1997 the 
Maoist movement had just officially declared their revolution and demands. In 2002 there 
was a revolution going on and there were strong fights between Maoists, army and civilians. 
Many men had fled their homes to escape violence and to resist being incorporated by either 
the government or the Maoist army. Migration for jobs or study abroad was increasing and 
female headed households in rural villages were on the rise (Gartaula, 2011). 
 
1.3 What has been written about development? 
 
Even though development seems a word with a positive meaning that we all approve of, it 
hides a number of debates and is subject to changing paradigms and fashions (Allen and 
Thomas, 2000; Edelmann and Haugerud, 2005). To begin with, the definition or concept of 
development has been given different meanings. Basic disagreements exist over questions 
such as: What is meant by development? Development of what? Is it primarily equivalent to 
the economic concept of progress? Should social aspects be of equal or greater importance? 
What aspects should be included? How is desirable defined, and by whom? How is progress 
to be achieved? And how should it be measured? What if development for one group is 
reached at the expense of other groups in society? Should ideals such as equity, political 
participation and so on be included in a definition of development? 
Development is often associated with improved living standards, well-being and 
economic opportunities. Some define development mainly from an economic point of view, 
as basic economic well-being (measured in terms of GNP per capita). Others (Duffield, 2001, 
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2002; Hardt and Negri; 2000) focus on broader notions of economic development including 
social transformation, modernisation, industrialisation and globalisation. Amartya Sen’s 
(1999) call for attention to the complexity of human lives and people’s capabilities, played an 
important role for a move away from the material attempts to include human, social and 
political aspects (Fukuda-Parr, 2003). This has led to a development of comprehensive 
definitions or formulas comprising a number of human needs to be fulfilled. An example is 
the Human Development Index of UNDP. The origins of the HDI are to be found in the United 
Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) Human Development Reports (HDRs). These 
were devised and launched by a group of economists in 1990 and had the explicit  goal of 
“putting people back at the centre of the development process in terms of economic debate, 
policy and advocacy” (UNDP, 1990: 1) and to shift the focus of development economics from 
national income accounting to people-centred policies (Haq, 1995). 
 
Thomas (2000: 48) made a useful distinction between three senses in which the term 
‘development’ is used and which we shall comment upon in the following sections: 
a) a vision, description or measure of a desirable society; 
b) a historical process of social change in which societies are transformed 
over longer periods; 
c) deliberate efforts aimed at improvement on the part of various 
agencies. 
 
1.3.1 Development as a vision 
 
Often it is assumed that there is a common view of what development means, but in fact 
there is a divide between Western thinking about development and how the people affected 
understand it (Grillo and Stirrat, 1997). In Nepal for instance, the word development is 
translated into bikas and has a more profound social meaning. As Pigg states: “a meaning 
that weaves bikas into the fabric of local life and pattern of Nepalese society” (Pigg, 1992: 
496). Development or bikas is often perceived as a commodity that comes from outside and 
is in permanent short supply (Sharma, 2004). Bikas is associated with several things that 
imply notions of being western, improved, or something new that has come from outside, 
non-local, belonging to others, to foreigners.  It is related to new things: new breeds of goats 
or chicken, chemical fertiliser, bikasi bui: improved or hybrid seeds; but also aeroplanes, 
roads, schools, bridges, videos. Bikas has become everyman’s word. It also implies 
unconditional trust in Western technology, expertise and culture, including agricultural 
knowledge. This has been my own experience but is also confirmed by others (Pigg, 1992, 
1996; Bista, 1991). 
During my research I asked villagers to give examples of what they considered 
‘development’: 
 
“For me it is positive changes in education, schools”. (Farmer, Paanchkhal, Kavre, 
2009) 
 “I consider development when we got irrigation, schools and health posts”. 
(Farmer, Devpur, Kavre, 2009) 
“I see development as improvement in facilities: communication, schools, health 
centres, bridges”. (Farmer, Nasikasthan, Kavre, 2009) 
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 “Development is when the road was built; when electricity came to our village as 
well as water” (farmer, Yamdi, Kavre, 2009). 
 
Several studies (Pigg, 1992, 1967; Bista, 1991; Sharma, 2004; Stone, 1989) have shown that 
there are big contrasts between development staff and Nepalese villagers’ views of what 
development should be. In her study in the Tinau watershed in Nepal, Stone (1989) 
discovered that there is a wide gap between the ideas of development practitioners and 
villagers. Development requires behavioural change according to the project staff. Villagers, 
on the other hand, mentioned material aspects and visible structures: schools, a health post, 
an irrigation water system. Messages from development workers related to an improved 
status such as better nutrition, sanitation, family planning and so on, which were not 
considered as bikas by villagers (Stone, 1989).  
As Nepal was never colonised, its outside influence is not directly determined by 
British domination, although indirectly through Nepal's close linkages with India it has been 
touched.  For Nepal, development - rather than the remainders and marks of imperialism or 
colonialism - is the visible link with the West. 
The elite, in particular those linked to the ruling families in Nepal, had more contact 
with the world outside Nepal than the majority of the people who lived in rural areas. 
Nepalese villagers had no idea they were relatively impoverished until a few decades ago 
(Bista, 2001).  Only after the Rana regime was overthrown in 1951 (Gellner, 2008) and King 
Mahendra Shah took the reign, investment in schools and hospitals, and other infrastructure 
was encouraged. Outside influences were accepted and the first donor agencies were 
welcomed. The first development planning process started with assistance in transportation, 
agriculture and infrastructure. India and the United States were the first countries to provide 
aid to Nepal. Since then different donors and development paradigms have influenced 
development in Nepal. (see Chapter 2 for more details). 
Rural people in Nepal now identify themselves as an underdeveloped country in 
relation to the developed world (Pigg, 1992).  This is confirmed by rankings such as in the 
World Development Report or Human Development Indices, where Nepal is listed among the 
Low Income or Less Developed Countries (see Chapter 2). 
Besides the fact that their thinking about development is related to something 
externally initiated, the view on development of many Nepalese is influenced by religion. The 
dominant religions in Nepal, Hinduism and Buddhism, put their stamp on development 
thinking. According to Bista, a renowned Nepalese sociologist, Nepalese think that a life of 
suffering is compensation for earlier misbehaviour or to prepare oneself for some sort of 
spiritual promotion (Bista, 1991). Hindu fundamentalists find that foreigners should not 
interfere in the development of Nepal as it should occur in the course of religious events. 
Responsibility for a miserable life or for poverty is rarely assumed by the individual but is 
placed in the hands of others or on fate (idem). Many Buddhists also believe that people 
cannot be actively involved in changing their livelihood and in rural development. According 
to them development is not a linear progress, but a cyclical movement of the universe in the 
hands of the gods or cosmic forces. Only good behaviour can improve one’s life (idem). 
Consequently, development or social transformation is considered by a majority of 
rural Nepalese as something from outside, related to fate, and not something that can be 
taken into people’s own hands. Recently, the coming to power of Maoist leaders is 
challenging this perception (see Chapters 6, 7 and 8). Historical and institutional processes of 
rural transformation in Nepal are quite different from, for example, Latin America, to which 
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much literature on social transformation refers. But undeniably rapid changes have been 
taking place since the turn of the century in Nepal as well. There is a role for development 
agencies in the creation and maintenance of a ‘desire for development’ (De Vries, 2007), but 
many Nepalese expect their patron or King to provide for them. Many people in Nepal have 
long had faith in their King, who was considered a god himself, a representative of Vishnu. 
People have long believed and still trust that the powerful leader will and needs to look after 
its citizens (Gellner, 2008). The palace was the centre of decision-making power, while 
binding rules and enforcing laws were tasks delegated to local functionaries.  The king was 
held responsible for the well-being of the kingdom, an idea which has not totally 
disappeared today. Politics and religion were interconnected. The sovereignty of the king was 
expressed in ritual and religious terms (Bouillier, 1991). It corresponds to the ‘mystical nature 
of the kingship’ stressed by the British anthropologist Evans-Pritchard (in Quigley, 2000: 238). 
Kingship was clearly less a governmental agency than a ritual office. This view has also 
implications for the meaning rural people in Nepal give to development. 
 
1.3.2 Historical change 
 
The meaning Nepalese people give to development must be seen in the light of socio-
cultural and historical perspectives. That development is associated with something from 
outside, from the West, which might also have to do with the fact that Nepal remained a 
closed society till the 1950s. Nepal has long been run for the benefit of a single family, the 
Rana’s or the Shahs (see Chapter 2). For a prolonged time there was no conscious feeling of 
belonging to a national society, there was no real national economy, and people focused on 
their village or community life. Under the Rana rule (till 1950) the country was basically 
closed to foreign influence The social unit in which decisions and most interactions of 
individuals took place, was the family, within the larger patrilineal line. The elite Rana family 
had no wish and vision to modernise the country and used all resources for their own benefit 
and to maintain power. The Rana’s discouraged education (a literacy rate of 2 % - UNFPA, 
2007) and foreign aid. Only when the age-old autocratic rule was replaced after 1951 by a 
party based political system and a new government, did Nepal open up to the outside world. 
 Nepal’s history books usually start with a reference to the events of the 18th century 
when Prithvi Naryana Shah, one of the Shah kings from Gorkha, united the smaller kingdoms 
and tribal groups or states into one Hindu Kingdom. The  state  Nepal  in  its  current  
geographical  shape  was  formed  at that time, more precisely in  1768,  when the  Gorkha 
ruler, King  Prithvi  Narayan  Shah, merged  several  feudal  states  or  independent  small  
kingdoms,   which were each  governed  by  an ethnic  group.  For  79  years,  this  king  was  
the  dominant  figure  ruling  the  country.  Prithvi Shah managed to unite all the warring 
kingdoms in a strategic way: he placed his kingdom under some lord Vishnu’s patronage and 
portrayed himself as the messenger of god, to legitimise his power (Bouillier, 1991).   
The Shah family remained the ruling force till the mid-19th century, when they lost 
control to the Rana dynasty. In  1847, after  a  big  massacre  of  nobles,  the  then  Prime  
Minister,  Jung  Bahadur  Rana, took  over  all  power,  and  made  it  hereditary. The Rana 
family ruled till 1951, when power went back again to the Shah king(s). The  King  and  the 
Rana’s  were  justified  to  rule:  they  had  a  personal  relationship  with  the  gods  and  
therefore  rulers  by  virtue.  The  ruling King  is  believed  to  be  an  incarnation  of  Lord  
Vishnu.  He is a god on earth (Burghart, 1984; Gellner, 2008).    
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For  a  long  time,  administration  was centred in  Kathmandu  and  there  was  not  
much  feeling  of  involvement  of  rural  people  in  the government’s ruling  in  Nepal.  Due  
to  geographical  problems  (mountains,  poor  infrastructure,  poor  access  in  hilly  areas)  
people  did  not  travel  much  to  and  from  Kathmandu.  The  country  was  ruled  by  the  
King  and  his  followers,  a  bureaucracy  that  was  composed  of  influential  or  educated  
elite,  predominantly  high  caste  and  male,  who  had  little  affinity  with  ‘common  
people’.  Civil servants enjoyed many privileges (Pradhan, 1993; 1996; 2002).  
During the Panchayat time (1960 – 1990) the Nepalese government sought to 
legitimise and impose a Hindu hegemony, a national culture by homogenising the religiously, 
linguistically and ethnically heterogeneous society. The key to the legitimisation of the 
Panchayat rule was the doctrine of ‘development’ or bikas, as a national undertaking. The 
post-World War II drive of development and the Nepalese ruling elite’s need to legitimise 
itself led to massive inputs of foreign aid in to Nepal, to help the ‘poor Nepali’. In the course 
of nationalisation, the Nepali was homogenised, and no attention was given to diversity, 
ethnic and regional differences (Burghart, 1984.)   
Until 1990, Nepal was an absolute monarchy run under the executive control of the 
King, with some experiments in democratic practice in 1959-1960 (Whelpton, 2005). The 
decades after 1990 were marked by a shift from coercive state power to a discourse of 
decentralisation, participation and citizen control, a transformation from feudalism to 
capitalism.  
During the period of my research in 1997, 2002, and 2009, Nepal was subject to 
major political changes. In 1997 the Maoist movement had just officially declared their 
revolution and demands (Lecomte-Tilouine, 2009). In 2002 there was a revolution going on 
and there was fierce fighting between Maoists, army and civilians. Many men had fled their 
homes to escape violence and to resist being incorporated by either the government or the 
Maoist army. The political landscape is currently in transition from faith-directed and feudal 
traditions to a more political nation, from a Hindu monarchy to a secular republic. Today, 
Nepal stands at a crossroad between a brighter future that promises equality, security, and 
sustainable development and a darker scenario of more political turmoil, civil war and a 
growing humanitarian crisis. In today’s Nepal citizens demand inclusion, participation, claim 
more freedom and choices than they have known hitherto. 
 
1.3.3 Interventions by agencies 
 
In Thomas’ (2000) third sense of the term development it does not mean a desired state or a 
historical change process, but “whatever is done in the name of development” (Thomas, 
2000: 4). Many national and international organisations are presently engaged in activities 
for development. The Farmer Field School is an example of such intervention. 
 The contribution of FFS to the development of Nepal cannot be studied without 
reference to the wider political-economic conditions during the last two decades. The year 
1997 when the Farmer Field Schools were introduced in Nepal was also the time that the 
Maoists officially declared their revolution. When data were collected in 2002, as part of a 
mid-term evaluation for FAO and the donor AUSAID of the project that had introduced FFS, 
there was a revolution going on and there was fierce fighting between Maoists, the army and 
civilians. Many men had fled their homes to escape the violence and to resist being taken by 
either the government or the Maoists army. In 2001 King Birendra and a large part of his 
royal family were murdered and the political scene was in turmoil. Migration for jobs abroad 
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was on the rise and female headed households in rural villages had increased. The impact of 
these political-economic conditions on rural transformation is an important aspect of this 
thesis. 
 
In 2007 and 2008 I was able to gather additional data on the social-cultural value and 
practical meaning of FFS for farmers. The last interviews were taken in 2009. At that time the 
Maoists had put down their arms and become part of the government, a peace agreement 
had been signed. The royal family, King Gyanendra had abdicated and president Yadav had 
been elected. His Royal Majesty’s Government or Kingdom of Nepal had been replaced by 
the Federal Republic of Nepal. In 2008, the country voted in a Constituent Assembly (CA), 
named a President, elected a Prime Minister, formed a coalition government, and set about 
the task of writing a new Constitution by 2010, with a new round of elections planned for 
2011. The new Nepal that is to emerge is expected to take on a federal character, vastly 
altering decision-making and administrative processes, challenging power dynamics. Still, 
political leaders are quarrelling and there remains unrest in the country. The new 
constitution has not been written yet: 
 
“A meeting of the Constitutional Committee Tuesday decided to give five more 
days to the Dispute Resolution Sub-committee to resolve the disputed issues of 
constitution drafting at the request of political parties”. (Nepali Times, 18th April, 
2012) 
  
1.4 Doing development versus studying development 
 
Studying development is not the same as doing development. Studying development 
practices in the field can contribute to improved practices but also lead to more realistic 
theoretical approaches (Martinussen, 1999). We can distinguish roughly three groups of 
people: academics who study development, people who combine academic work with 
development work, and development practitioners who do not engage in academics. In my 
case I currently teach development but started a study in development as a young student at 
the age of 19. I studied a BSc course at the Tropical Agricultural College in Deventer, the 
Netherlands with little theoretical grounding. The BSc course I took was focused on 
becoming a development practitioner; someone who could contribute to rural development. 
The course contained a lot of practical knowledge: varying from tropical soils to how to fix an 
engine. We also learnt to recognise harmful insects, and which types of fodder were 
available in the tropics. The thought prevailing at that time (1985 – 1988) was that from the 
West we would be able to contribute to development if we had enough technical knowledge 
about farming systems, pasture maintenance, insects, plants, animals and husbandry 
practices and that we needed to be equipped with practical skills to fend for ourselves, e.g. 
fix a flat tire, dress a chicken, when stuck in the ‘bush’. 
 Like most people who are working in development I did not consciously implement a 
certain development theory or paradigm. For development workers like me, development is 
a goal, an ambition, an ideal. However, development practitioners are not politically neutral 
since – consciously or unconsciously - individuals and organisations follow a particular 
discourse in their intervention. Discourse is being defined as a guiding rationale or story that 
underlies human and organisational socio-political and economic behaviour (Grillo, 1997). In 
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many contexts there does indeed seem to be a certain ‘development gaze’ or, to change the 
metaphor, an authoritative voice which constructs problems and their solution by reference 
to a priori criteria, for example to broad themes which buzz around developmental agencies 
(Grillo, 1997: 19). This is a development discourse which is “institutionally extensive and 
comprises of a stock of ideas that informs the praxis of many groups” (Preston 1994: 4 in 
Kamanzi, 2007:11)). There is usually a certain philosophy in development according to which 
development interventions are planned, implemented, monitored, and evaluated, and within 
which development activities are operated and can be interpreted. In my case, I followed my 
employer’s discourse which was the FAO approach to development in the 1990s (see below). 
A practice-oriented approach to the study of development was introduced at 
Wageningen in the 1980s by Norman Long, and has since obtained wide recognition as a part 
of an international critique on structural approaches to development (Long, 1989; 2001; 
Olivier de Sardan, 2005). Escobar (1991) is positive about those researchers studying 
development who draw on practical development experience. Mosse (2005) and Bernstein 
(2006) also stress the understanding of practice in ‘the development of development 
thinking’ by linking it with theoretical models. In my case, after I studied development for my 
BSc degree in the 1990s, I was subsequently ‘doing’ development as a so-called Project 
Officer of FAO in Nepal (1999-2002). Since 2002 I have been teaching gender and 
development as a lecturer at the Van Hall Institute which is part of Wageningen University, 
while at the same time carrying out a PhD in Development Studies at the Rural Development 
Sociology group of the same university.  
With this research project I want to describe, analyse and understand the different 
dynamics of development interventions, in particular by using the longitudinal experience of 
Farmer Field Schools in Nepal as a case. 
 
This thesis is thus a product of both doing development and studying development. This 
study has given me insights which I did not have and would not have been able to acquire as 
a development practitioner. The outcomes are immaterial as much as material. I have 
obtained new insights that I can use in my lecturing and in ongoing and future development 
interventions, apart from producing an academic publication. 
 
1.5 Assumptions 
 
When we study development, we need a multi-faceted and inter-disciplinary perspective. 
We need to question our frames of reference and re-examine our assumptions. (Allen and 
Thomas, 1992; 2000). In the case of the Farmer Field School in Nepal I had many 
assumptions, to name but a few: 
1. FFS is a reaction to a modernist approach of technology transfer, 
applying farmers’ participation, and a bottom-up approach 
addressing the real needs of farmers; 
2. It contributed to the empowerment of farmers; 
3. The difference between men and women was a cultural matter and 
none of our concern; if women would not participate it was because 
they were not interested in Farmer Field Schools; 
4. With a proper plan and carefully monitoring of procedures planned 
results would follow; 
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5. FFSs have the goal and potential to contribute to agricultural 
development; 
6. The Nepalese government wanted the same development in farming 
as the farmers themselves. 
In the section below I want to elaborate on these assumptions and indicate the concepts and 
literature that has guided my research. 
 
Assumption 1: FFS is a reaction to a modernist approach of technology transfer, applying 
farmers’ participation, and a bottom-up approach addressing the real needs of farmers 
 
Modernisation is a strategy of development which started to become popular in the 1950s 
and 1960s, the post-WWII period as it is often called. This paradigm implies transformation 
from a traditional society, which was considered an underdeveloped situation, to a modern 
way of living, brought about by economic development through industrialisation. Economic 
growth was seen as the way to reach modernity, through technical and economic change 
processes (Thomas, 2000; Potter 2000). The post-war reconstruction or Marshall plan was 
given conceptual support during the 1950s in the form of a modernisation theory promoted 
by Rostow and other American economists. Rostow (1960) argued that development goes in 
stages through which tradition, low income societies move and ultimately reach a take off 
point, based on financial investment, improved governance and improved technologies. 
These steps will set them on a course of self-sustaining growth. This way ‘underdeveloped’ 
countries can, with assistance, be brought to development in the same manner as the more 
developed countries were. This theory held that all societies progress through similar stages 
of development, that poor states are thus in a similar situation today as currently developed 
areas once were, and that therefore the task in helping the underdeveloped areas out of 
poverty is to accelerate them along this supposed common path of development, by various 
means such as investment, technology transfers, and closer integration into the free world 
market (Fukuyama, 1995). 
In the 1980s the rising power of neoliberalism triggered by oil crises and the election 
of right-wing powerful governments such as in Britain, the United States, created an era of 
unprecedented power for the international financial institutions (Cornwall and Brock, 2005). 
The IMF and World Bank’s structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) firmly reinstated 
technical and economic policy solutions to underdevelopment. Structural adjustment was 
materialised in down-sizing public institutions and public service budget cuts. 
 Initially most of these development strategies saw development as a technical 
problem requiring technical solutions—better tools or technologies, better planning 
algorithms, better trade and pricing policies, better macroeconomic frameworks; a so called 
technocratic approach. Although this view on development started in the 1950s-1960s it is 
still widely practised and debated. For example, Bartlett (2007) stated: “The problem, I 
believe, is that the theory and practice of development is inherently technocratic, and 
remains rooted in the ‘high modernist’ period of political thought that existed in the 
immediate aftermath of the Second World War” (Bartlett, 2007:55). 
Not surprisingly, modernisation theory is subject to criticism (Martinussen, 1999). 
Criticism is mainly based upon the fact that there is continued widespread poverty in much 
of the world, several governments are burdened by debt and increased concerns about the 
environmental impact of modernisation. It was realised that a purely technical, top-down 
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approach, with externally imposed policies did not make things better for the poor and 
vulnerable in society. 
 The 1990 the World Development Report (WDR), dedicated to poverty, shows strong 
traces of an adapted policy agenda put forward in reaction to the critique the bank received 
on their structural adjustment programmes. In their report: Adjustment with a Human Face 
(World Bank 1990) they advocated investment in human capital and social safety nets. 
 In the 1970s a growing demand started in many parts of the world for people to be 
involved in decision-making processes which affected their lives. The goals of equality and 
poverty alleviation entered explicitly into the development scene. When the call for more 
people’s participation was raised, the debate started about ‘what is participation’, ‘who 
should and who does participate’ and ‘how can we achieve participation’. Significant in 
initiating this debate has been the influence of Paulo Freire on development thinking. He 
argues in the Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1970) that the “oppressed” needed to unite to find 
a way to improve their own destinies. He also called for action to ‘give voice to the voiceless’. 
The call for people’s participation is part of a broader paradigm shift responding to the large 
body of critical writings about top-down, modernist and authoritarian approaches that have 
dominated development over the last 50 years. (Escobar, 1995; Kabeer, 1994; Scott, 1998; 
1985). 
During the 1980s, people-centred approaches of popular participation were a 
reaction, arising out of neoliberal reforms and the realities of the inadequate state. 
Community participation became a channel through which popular participation began to be 
operationalised in the name of efficiency (Chambers, 1993; Cornwall and Brock, 2005). In the 
process, participation took a rather different shape than that conveyed by the statements of 
intent that preceded it. Rather than seeking people’s engagement in defining and shaping 
their own development, the 1980s community participation largely focused on involving 
“intended beneficiaries” in development projects (Martinussen, 1999). In Nepal I have 
observed this kind of participation in irrigation schemes where project participation of 
people meant carrying stones, digging canals and providing free labour. Cost-sharing and the 
co-production of services emerged as dominant modes of participation; the concept of 
ownership began without any association with people's needs and priorities and a transfer of 
power and control. 
 Around the same period the focus on poverty reduction had shifted to the basic 
needs approach, which suggested that the focus of aid should change from investment in 
capital formation to the development of human resources. People’s participation was 
positioned as key element of this approach. Statements from UN organisations like the one in 
1975 when the United Nations Economic and Social Council urged governments to adopt 
popular participation as a basic policy measure in national development strategy…” [and] 
encourage the widest possible active participation of all individuals and national non-
government organisations in the development process, in setting goals, formulating policies 
and implementing plans” (Cohen and Uphoff, 1980:213; Cornwall and Brock, 2005).
 Participation has remained a strong discourse in development. Nowadays it is an 
inevitable dimension of any project planning and policy-making for several reasons: 
participation results in greater legitimacy with the donors (Vandenabeele and Goorden, 
2007).  Participation means different things to different people on the donor side as well as 
on the side of the receiving or targeted people. The most suitable level of involvement and 
activity will depend on many factors – including the decisions, contexts, participants and 
values of the individuals involved. 
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The literal definition of participation is ‘taking part’. The question: who participates? 
is important, and at the heart of this question are aspects of power. People’s power and 
participation in development activities and citizenship discussions have been analysed and 
different ladders of participation have been designed (Pretty et al, 1995; Adnan et al., 1992). 
Participation in development is also seen as a deliberate effort within government and non-
governmental organisations alike, to increase the access and control over resources and 
related decision-making of the client or target group that is assumed to contribute to 
sustainable livelihoods and increase democracy (Li, 2007). Participation is furthermore an 
inter-active process involving the continuous re-adjustment of relationships between 
different actors in a society in order to increase control and influence over development 
initiatives that affect their lives (Li, 2002; 2006). 
 It is well recognised that there are various levels or degrees of participation ranging 
from simple consultation to joint decision-making to self-management by the actors. As with 
many powerful and popular concepts, participation is used (and sometimes misused) to 
describe many different relationships and activities.   
The academic discussion on participation is mainly limited in order to make a 
distinction between participation as a means to achieve project goals effectively and 
efficiently, and as an end to enable local people or groups to take more control of their own 
lives. Participation as a tool to achieve better project outcomes versus participation as an 
equality or empowerment process which enhances the capacity of individuals to improve 
their own lives and facilitates social change to the marginalised in society. Participation is 
both a strategic and a methodological goal of development (Connell, 1999).  
Sherry Arnstein discusses types of participation and "nonparticipation" in A Ladder of 
Citizen Participation (1969). She grades levels of participation from manipulation (least 
citizen participation) to citizen control (most citizen participation)5. Arnstein continues to 
define citizen participation as "the redistribution of power that enables the have-not citizens, 
presently excluded from the political and economic processes, to be deliberately included in 
the future". 
Multiple other "ladders" of participation have been presented (Pretty et al., 1995; 
Adnan et al., 1992) indicating different levels of decision-making. Adnan et al. (1992) provide 
a typology (see below) whereby most forms of participation are top-down or externally 
initiated, only the last two options are indicating that people take control over their own 
resources and livelihood strategies, put the beneficiaries at the centre of a development 
process that they will lead and continuously adjust, according to their own learning 
processes and needs. 
A further differentiation of forms of participation, put forward by Sarah White (1996), 
offers some insights into the different interests at stake in various forms of participation. 
Unlike Pretty and Arnstein her model is less a strategy to indicate levels, but more meant as a 
way of working out how people make use of participation (nominal, instrumental, 
representative, transformative). This can be a useful tool to identify conflicting ideas about 
why or how participation is being used at any particular stage in a process. 
 Typologies such as these can be read as being normative and hierarchical, implying an 
evolution towards more ‘real’ forms of participation (Cornwall and Brock, 2005). However, in 
most projects there might not be such thing as a clearly demarcated level, or single form of 
                                                 
5
      The complete original text of Arnstein, dates from 1969, but is still referred to and can be found on 
http://lithgow-schmidt.dk/sherry-arnstein/ladder-of-citizen-participation.html 
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participation. In one project or intervention there can be participation both in the form of 
data collection and information sharing and at some stage active engagement. Additionally, 
when these forms of participation are contextualised, they become more ambiguous. 
Participation through information sharing, for example, might limit more active engagement, 
although it could be argued that project transparency about certain kinds of information 
opens up the possibility of collective action in monitoring the consistency of rhetoric with 
practice. Self-mobilisation or empowerment might be considered the ultimate form of 
participation on one of the scales (Pretty et al., 1995), but might not be in line with the 
expectations citizens have of state obligations (de Vries, 2007; Cornwall, 2008). Perhaps 
people prefer to get a flow of information, rather than having to take part in obligatory group 
activities to get agricultural extension? 
These typologies or levels might be helpful for some people to get insights into the 
levels of decision-making or involvement of beneficiaries or clients in certain activities, but it 
implies a very technical approach towards the process of participation, which cannot be 
captured in simple or well demarcated levels. These typologies do not give answers to the 
question: Under what conditions and when does meaningful participation take place? 
 
In the Farmer Field School in Nepal participation was translated in a technocratic way: the 
required number of participants (20 to 25) in a group, the steps to conduct a participatory 
training: in subgroups with assignments. There was little attention for people’s initiatives and 
self-mobilisation. There was little attention for the on-going process that participation could 
enhance, and no attention for power imbalances. Participation in FFS became a technical fix, 
it became something that is a-historical, non-political (Ferguson, 1994) and decontextualised. 
The literature is quite vague on the incentives which will make people decide to participate. 
It is often assumed that individuals will participate when they are convinced that it is for 
their own benefit. Individual interests such as respect and prestige are hardly considered 
(Cleaver, 1999). In some cases people might take part because they feel it is their social 
responsibility. Generally material benefits are counted as the major reasons for participation 
(Büscher, 2010).     
Cooke and Kothari (1997; 2001) challenge the term participation and the 
participatory development orthodoxy. They debate that participatory development facilitates 
tyranny or unjust exercise of power. They show what happens when complex and contextual 
concepts like participation are applied to large development projects on tight time lines. 
Project staff is accused of closing their eyes tor differences and power inequalities, but tend 
to focus on easy deliverable and measurable outcomes. This is what happened to me and 
most of my colleagues in the Farmer Field School project. Participation, or other popular 
concepts, were defined by project parameters rather than applied in a dynamic and 
challenging way. In the FFS project participation became a measurable outcome by 
quantifying the number of farmers that took part, and participation was technically defined 
in procedures which the facilitators learned to follow. The sequence of the steps in FFS 
sessions, the questions to ask farmers, the group tasks: they were all   kinds of ‘tools’ taught 
to FFS extension workers or facilitators in the training of trainers and expected to be followed 
in FFS. 
The mere challenges and dynamics of participation in communities in Nepal are 
further elaborated in Chapter 5. In Chapter 8 the involvement of different actors in 
implementing FFS is discussed. 
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Modernisation theory was once assumed a “homogenous path to development” (Arce and 
Long, 2000:4) based on a Western notion of “modernity” (Arce and Long, 2000:1). In the 21st 
century the concept of modernity was revised. The new modernisation theory not only 
stresses the process of change but also the responses to that change. It seeks to explain the 
process of social evolution (Giddens, 1991). It also looks at internal dynamics while referring 
to social and cultural structures and the adaptation of new technologies. In practice ideas on 
modernity are appropriated and re-embedded in locally situated practices, leading to more 
“fragmentation and dispersal” of modernity (Arce and Long (2000:1).  
In this light it is useful to make a distinction between modernisation and modernity. 
Whereby modernisation entails a comprehensive package of technical and institutional 
measures aimed at technical and social transformation, implemented by cosmopolitan 
administrative and technological elites  ‘modernity’ can be seen as a metaphor for something 
new and contains “self-organising and transforming practices in different strata and sectors 
of society”(Arce and Long, 2000:2). 
  In Chapter 6 the adoption and application of modern knowledge and 
technologies, so called modernisation measures as they have been introduced in Farmer 
Field Schools will be discussed, as well as how farmers apply and adopt these technologies in 
their own local situation and practices, their own modernity. 
 
Assumption 2: FFS contributed to the empowerment of farmers 
 
Participation, empowerment, many argue that these recent development buzzwords, dress 
up old and successful practices in a new language (Cornwall and Brock, 2005; Mosse, 1994; 
2005, Biggs and Smith, 1998; Grillo and Stirrat, 1997; Chambers, 1997). Initially in Farmer 
Field Schools the focus was on integrated pest management and yield increase. Later, one of 
the objectives of Farmer Field Schools became farmer’s empowerment. As Peter Ooi and 
others proudly state in their publications: Farmer Field Schools are vehicles for the 
empowerment of farmers (Ooi, 1998; Pontius et al, 2002; Bartlett 2004; Hounkonnou et al., 
2006).   
Empowerment is an often debated concept in the academic world, but in 
development practice it seems to be used without much discussion, assuming that it is 
always a ‘good’ thing and having a positive impact on farmers. Empowerment is a concept 
which was introduced in the development world in the 1980s and became popular in the 
1990s. It is possible to observe trends in the conceptualisation of empowerment together 
with wider approaches to development. The early explanations are associated with the basic 
needs approach to development and a shift from a top-down technocratic approach to a call 
for popular involvement. In order to understand what empowerment means in practice, in 
Chapter 7 I have considered it as a process of change that requires a transformation of 
ideologies, the invisible power dimension, a structural change (Mayo, 1999). 
  
First I looked at the concept of power in empowerment, and then I discussed different 
academic definitions of the word empowerment. After a theoretical elaboration, I analysed if 
farmers’ experience is in line with Batliwala’s (1994) and Kabeer’s (2001) remarks on 
empowerment, to see if indeed empowerment is an interaction between resources and 
agency, related to transformation of power relations, and the increased ability to make 
choices previously denied to male and female farmers. Kabeer and Batliwala’s experiences 
demonstrate that empowerment should be regarded as a process of change at different 
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levels, from individual to institutional. Instead of attempting to locate, measure or label 
agency, I try to understand how farmers in Nepal as a result of FFS can put agency in practice, 
what leads to empowerment. As farmers are not a homogeneous group and women and 
men have different roles in agriculture in Nepal they have different views on empowerment. 
It will become evident that empowerment in practice for men and women farmers is rather 
different from what development policy makers and FFS facilitators understand it to be (see 
Chapter 7 for more details). 
 
Assumption 3: The difference between men and women was a cultural matter and not of our 
concern; if women did not participate it was because they were not interested in Farmer Field 
Schools 
 
Farmers were the main focus of attention in the FFS project in Nepal. However, it has long 
been established that farmers are not a homogenous group (Pradhan, 2002; Guijt et al. 1998; 
Anderson, 1983) and include many sub-groups of interest and identities. These can be based 
on age, gender, education, language, income, health status, etc. For the purpose of analysis 
in the Nepalese context it is increasingly acknowledged that variables such as gender, caste 
and ethnic identity influence poverty and vulnerability outcomes (Bennett, 2006). The 
interlinkage is not easy to analyse, let alone address. For centuries the issues have been 
ignored but nowadays even the government of Nepal writes openly about caste, ethnicity 
and gender as co-determinants of poverty in its PRSP (Poverty Reduction Strategic Plan) and 
Tenth Plan (2002 – 2007) and Eleventh Plan (2007 – 2012). The data on gender, caste and 
ethnic dimensions of poverty are still very incomplete and dealing with these issues is still a 
sensitive matter (Lecomte-Tilouine, 2009; Bennett, 2002). 
 
It can be stated that in the FFS programme the existing hierarchies6 of caste, ethnicity and 
gender have not been challenged. The FFS programme is not an exception. As Lynn Bennett 
(2002) reported in her World Bank report: 
 
“Many economists working on India or Nepal are reluctant to mention caste or 
ethnicity by name in their analytical and policy writing” Similar experiences are 
found in the FAO IPM programme. Staff seems to avoid talking about specific 
ethnicities or castes. Discussions on these topics are often swept off the table with 
remarks in the vein of: “nowadays caste and ethnicity do not matter anymore; this 
is something from the past. Policy makers and IPM trainers prefer more neutral 
terms such as “poor farmers”, “vulnerable groups” or “disadvantaged 
communities”, thereby avoiding the issue altogether. (Bennett, 2002:1). 
 
In 1997 social exclusion was not considered an issue in FFS, most beneficiaries belonged to 
the upper caste, only in some villages Janajatis were in the majority. With regards to gender 
it was considered normal practice that in the FFS project the key players were men. Under 
influence of the Women in Development Paradigm of 2002 gender received some attention, 
in particular the fact that women should be key participants in the project. At that time it 
was already accepted by many staff and policymakers that the important role of women in 
agriculture in Nepal required to be reflected in the FFS project (Van de Fliert and Proost, 
                                                 
6
     In the Nepalese context, like the Indian, we can speak of a hierarchy of ethnic groups because ethnicity 
and caste are intertwined and developing together in modern Nepal (Lecomte-Tilouine, 2009). 
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1999). Also the donor requested specific attention for gender in the project; this can be read 
in the Nepal’s National IPM Programme Country Report (2001:8): 
 
“The National IPM Programme in Nepal is committed to provide women and men 
equal access to their training. The Programme wants to implement its activities on 
a gender equal basis. That this is not easy and straightforward is the experience 
during the implementation of the programme. “Despite the fact that most IPM 
trainers are male and given little training on gender issues, the participation of 
women has increased in the Farmer Field School. Gender remains an area 
however, that needs attention in the near future”. 
 
There was, however, no elaboration on which action to take and there was no definition or 
clarification of what is meant by gender equality in the project documents. In FFS addressing 
gender issues does not go beyond the objective of having men and women participate on an 
equal basis. This means, once women have gained access. The structural inequity of gaining 
access however, has not been addressed in practice, nor the issue of women belonging to 
different castes/ethnic groups. 
 
In practice, FFS had no gender perspective in its policy and activities. A large number of 
female participants were considered a success in terms of gender. As stated by an FAO officer 
in Bangkok: “we do not need a gender approach, women just come to our FFS without 
specifically targeting them” (interview 2006). In the Mid Term review report by FAO (2006) it 
was concluded that: “In the field neither social nor gender discrimination is a problem at 
grassroots level” (FAO, 2006:6). The fact that lower castes and ethnic minorities were often 
excluded from participation was simply ignored.  
 
That it is not easy to improve the access for women in FFS was the experience of Laila Jasmin 
Banu and Brigitte Bode (Banu and Bode, 2002 in Bartlett, 2004: 68) in a critical review of the 
FFS approach by CARE in Bangladesh. They stated that: 
 
“Problems in working with women are largely due to the highly gendered division 
of labour and the limited mobility that women from landholding households 
enjoy. Just as in other countries of South Asia, women perform the vast majority 
of reproductive tasks and have little time left to take part in training sessions. As 
many studies of South Asian gender dynamics have shown, the greater the 
economic marginalisation of the household, the greater the likelihood that women 
are engaged in productive activities (selling of labour for wages in cash or kind). 
Thus women from poor households have little time and opportunity to participate 
in FFS sessions.”  
 
In Nepal, female participation in Farmer Field Schools varies from 100% in some areas (e.g. 
Bhaktapur district) to 0% in some terai communities. Among the IPM trainers only 7% is 
female (National IPM Programme Country Report, 2002). It has been noted that in the last 
IPM Mid Term Review Report (2006:8) gender issues have been marginalised with the 
following statement: “Field visits and programme documents suggest that neither social – 
nor gender discrimination is a problem at grassroots level” (). 
 Gender is a term introduced to make the distinction between the biological or 
naturally given characteristics of men and women indicated by sex (Oakley, 1972) and the 
psychological and cultural differences between men and women (gender). The argument to 
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make a distinction between sex and gender is not because biological differences between 
men and women do not matter, but because social relations between men and women 
cannot be explained by biological differences or ‘natural facts’ only (Zwarteveen, 2006). 
Gender is an ordering principle, organising and creating relations between men and women 
in a hierarchical way, as well as a process of giving meaning and obtaining recognition or 
legitimation. 
 Gender is still providing a useful lens with which to analyse social institutions and 
processes. Gender remains a central part of the understanding, and the objectives, of 
development; a gender focus has shown new aspects of development understanding. 
Gender provides the basis for deconstructing and understanding the reality of men’s and 
women’s lives and the gendered nature of economic, social and political processes (Pearson, 
2000). 
 Gender is more than emphasising the importance of female participation in the 
Farmer Field School. Gender issues focus on the difference between men and women and on 
the relationship among and between men and women, their roles, access to and control over 
resources, division of labour, interests and needs. Gender relations affect household security, 
family well-being, planning, production and many other aspects of life (Bravo-Baumann, 
2000). Gender can be seen as an organising principle that shapes the processes of 
production and reproduction, consumption and arrangements such as distribution of labour, 
land and other valued resources in a society.   
 Keeping in mind that Nepal is diverse we can make a start by acknowledging that men 
and women experience transformation processes and outcomes differently; a gender 
perspective is a way of looking at and understanding (social) realities. In Chapter 2 more 
information regarding gender issues, and in particular the status of women, is provided. 
 
Too often gender is simplified as relating to women only, rather than as referring to relations 
of power, privilege and prestige informed by situated notions of maleness and femaleness 
(Indra, 1999: xiv in Schrijvers, 1999). With gender I refer to the socially constructed roles and 
behaviours of and expectations regarding women and men in society. “Gender relations refer 
to a complex system of personal and social relations of domination and power through which 
women and men are socially created and maintained and through which they gain access to 
power and material resources or are allocated status within society” (IFAD, 2012: 38). The 
nature of gender relations – relations of power between women and men – is not easy to 
grasp in its full complexity. They are revealed not only in the division of labour and resources 
between women and men, but also in ideas and representations – the ascribing to women 
and men of different abilities, attitudes, desires, personality traits, behaviour patterns, and 
so on (Agarwal, 1997:1) . In any culture, every man and woman is expected to play the 
gendered script as perfectly as possible according to the norms and values of the society. For 
example, if it is expected that one of the good attributes of an ideal wife is submissiveness (a 
script), the wife is expected to become submissive. Deviations from descriptive norms 
usually elicit disapproval, shock or even censure from others. They may affect social 
interactions. Contrary to sex, gender roles are not biologically given but constructed and 
learned, and changeable over time; they differ per society and are shaped by social, cultural, 
economic, political and many other factors.  I consider gender not as a given but what it 
means to be a woman or man as socially constructed and subject to change. Gender roles, 
identities and relations are not tangible and static, but matters of negotiation, debate and 
controversy, and of continuous processes of practice and giving meaning.  
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In this thesis, however, I do not elaborate much on the process of construction of 
gender but merely look at different experiences of men and women in changing agricultural 
practices and empowerment. In the project implementation we might not have considered it 
our concern, but it matters for project management. By getting more insights in the 
experiences of men and women I want to get a better understanding of social constructions 
of reality. The differentiation in the way men and women experience participation in the 
Farmer Field Schools is further elaborated in Chapter 6 and 7. 
 
Assumption 4: With a proper plan and carefully monitoring of procedures planned results will 
follow 
 
When we started with FFS in 1997 we went through the traditional project cycle steps of 
feasibility and planning, and wrote a comprehensible, well structured project document. The 
project document was the result of a rather technocratic approach towards development, 
whereby logical frameworks formed the basis of all the activities to take place, and outputs 
were the focus of our activities. Indicators of the outputs are for instance the number of 
master trainers7 trained, the number of farmers participating in FFS, number of farmers who 
have conducted action research, number of farmer trainers registered, numbers of FFS 
groups or farmers associations registered with the District Development office. For me as a 
programme officer these indicators provided a set of clear targets. With donors wanting 
quick and tangible results, the use of such an international commonly accepted planning tool 
is helpful. The use of a log frame is practical, relatively simple and provided a clear tool to 
communicate intentions to donors and staff from implementing agencies. 
Although this project document guided us through the implementation of the project, 
the results were different from what we had anticipated.  Several outputs did not turn out 
the way they were written in the project documents, and some outcomes were unforeseen. 
The coordination between institutions was not enhanced as planned, farmers groups did not 
function as anticipated, not all farmers adopted the practices introduced in FFS, and 
monitoring and evaluation remained weak during the project duration. Such discrepancy 
between a plan and the final result of a project is not unusual as most interventions work out 
differently from expectations (Grindle and Thomas, 1989; Ferguson, 1994; Malpas and 
Wickham, 1995). 
 Initially the project focused on outputs as concrete measureable results, such as yield 
increase or pesticide reduction. Outputs were defined as the direct product of the project 
activities. Later it was realised that FFS led to outcomes which are more difficult to verify and 
often contain more qualitative attributes such as farmers’ empowerment. Outcomes are 
usually defined as the effects or changes that occur, that are a result of the project, but are 
also influenced by other factors. It is clear that processes are paramount in the long run for 
much of agricultural and rural development, rigid ‘blueprint’ planning is thus inappropriate, 
yet structure is needed to guide actions and the log frame can provide such structure. 
 
Despite acknowledgement of a need for increased complexity of development strategies, 
governments and international agencies still use rational planning and management tools to 
control development interventions to reach their own goals (Rondinelli, 1993). 
                                                 
7
              A senior trainer, who has participated in a training of trainers and subsequently trains other staff to 
become a FFS facilitator or trainer, is called a master trainer. 
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 When we developed the project and designed the log frame we had limited 
knowledge of the situation of the farmers that were our intended beneficiaries, we had not 
anticipated the political turmoil and rapid social changes that would take place in Nepal and 
we also had no clear idea what the outcome of Farmer Field Schools would be. In this we 
were not unique. In reality development planners have attempted to promote social and 
economic development intervention with little knowledge of the conditions they were 
seeking to transform and with little certainty that their plans would produce the desired 
effect. Project planners often do not know the background, the needs and the context 
intended beneficiaries reside (Rondinelli, 1993). This was also the case in the FFS project. The 
project planners followed the simple notion that farmers were poor and in need of improved 
technology to improve their agricultural production.   
In Chapter 6 I discuss how the Farmer Field School, as a project, changed direction 
over the years and instead of focusing on outputs became more process-oriented.  
 
Policy makers or decision-makers in development have scope to influence or shape 
interventions but the circumstances in which they are placed affect the dynamics and 
process of decision-making and can lead to a range of possible outcomes (Grindle and 
Thomas, 1989). Interventions do not work out as planned, they are not linear and 
predictable, and interventions will give unexpected results (Grindle, 1980). There is no blue 
print for development (Grillo and Stirrat, 1997), the involvement of many different actors in a 
dynamic context shows that “Development is a multi-faceted, multi vocal process and a 
complex site of contestation” (Grillo and Stirrat, 1997: VIII). 
 
A concept like the Farmer Field School might be introduced as a blue print, but in the hands 
of different actors the implementation varies and FFS becomes a construct of different 
actors, a conglomeration of different actions, of different actors each with their own agenda 
and strategies. In Chapter 8 I will elaborate how the involvement of many diverse actors 
influenced decision-making and the implementation of FFS. 
These actors involved in the construction of FFS do not act in a vacuum but are 
influenced by the institutional setting in which they move, a dynamic process, changing over 
time, albeit strongly influenced by socio-cultural and historical arrangements (Mosse, 1999).   
In chapter 6 I will explain how FFS in Nepal became embedded in the institutional 
setting and evolved under influence of a changed context.  In chapter 8 I want to provide an 
understanding of this process and how FFS has been adopted and adapted under pressure of 
governance dynamics. Besides the multiple setting and the multi-rationality of development 
actors the multidimensional aspects of power also need to be considered (Olivier de Sardan, 
2005). 
I want to show that the FFS project was implemented differently from our 
technocratic designed plan, that governance is a construct of different actors, a 
conglomeration of different actions, of different actors each with their own agendas and 
strategies, in a dynamic context. In this chapter I want to provide an understanding of this 
process. The different levels of power as introduced by Eric Wolf will be used, in particular 
his concept of structural power. 
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Assumption 5: FFS has the goal and potential to contribute to agricultural development 
 
The focus of the FFS has initially been on concrete measurable results, such as decreased use 
of pesticides, increased yield. After about five years it became clear that FFS was more than a 
project, it became institutionalised in rural Nepal and outcomes such as empowerment (see 
Chapter 7) became more important. These longer term contributions of FFS to rural society 
appeared to be broader than agricultural development and moving more into the direction 
of rural development. 
Here I distinguish between agriculture and rural development. With agricultural 
development I refer to improved agricultural production often indicated by yield increase, 
changed farming practices, and the use of improved technologies.  
While with rural development I point to a more dynamic and inclusive process, a 
social transformation. Rural transformation thus refers to fundamental changes in the 
composition of rural economic life and social organisation – changes associated with 
increased complexity and more linkages outside rural life (Woods, 2011; Koppel and Zurick, 
1988; Gartaula, 2011). This process is always contingent on the coming together of different 
actors, local, international, regional and elements,  including agriculture as well as non-
farming activities. It is an inherently political process, involving constant negotiation and 
contestation. Rural transformation and social change are complex processes, influenced by 
multiple forces. It encompasses individual, organisational and structural levels with the 
representation of the community, and the rural men and women's needs and interests lying 
at the heart of the discussion. It involves a transformation of relations and changing 
prevailing patterns of access and control over resources, of challenging ideologies of top-
down technology transfer and changing the institutions and structures. It can happen as a 
response to economic changes, introduction of new technology, political uprising, and 
migration. 
 
Farmer Field Schools were introduced in Nepal as an integrated pest management project in 
1997 with concrete output oriented goals: increase of agricultural production and pesticide 
use reduction. This was a government policy and the government used FFS as a vehicle to 
introduce vegetables and expand the vegetable production area. Over the years it expanded 
and many farmers received training.  
 Soon it became clear that FFS was not an end in itself (Bartlett, 2002), the training 
that farmers received led to capacity-building and a process of rural development. Over the 
years FFS developed and the intended outcomes became more process oriented, such as 
farmer empowerment, capacity-building. With its focus on participation FFS gave an 
enormous input to agricultural extension, it moved away from the top-down and purely 
technology transfer approach. FFS facilitated a closer collaboration with famers, a more 
practical orientation for trainers and extension workers. Agricultural technicians changed 
their attitudes towards farmers, came to appreciate their knowledge and ideas more and 
started to accept farmers as partners in development rather than people who needed to be 
told or instructed what to do.  
 
It is the involvement of women farmers in FFS, their increased knowledge of farming, 
increased feeling of control over agricultural production that leads to empowerment, to their 
capability to take informed decisions about issues they have not been able to make choices 
about before. Women feel increasingly confident and proud about this capability and their 
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capacity. Simultaneously other political changes that are taking place in their country, their 
village, like the Maoist uprising, the migration of men for jobs abroad, social change or 
transformation have occurred that stimulated them to use their newly acquired power. In 
Chapter 6 the impact of FFS on agricultural and rural development is covered. 
 
Assumption 6: The Nepalese government wanted the same development in the case of 
farming as the farmers themselves 
 
During the discussions at the beginning of the project it was taken for granted that the 
Nepalese government knew what was best for its citizens, that the Ministry of Agriculture 
was most up-to-date with the situation of Nepalese farmers. In the project documents there 
is no explicit reference to farmers’ needs, one can read  between the lines that it is assumed 
that farmers are poor and in need of improved technology to advance their agricultural 
production.  
 Crewe and Harrison (1998) rightly concluded that project implementers might 
wrongly assume that farmers have the same objective in mind as they have. If we look at the 
history of Nepal it has taught us that the ruling elite in Nepal had different objectives than 
the general citizens in rural areas. Until recently farmers were exploited and were considered 
subjects with obligations and duties towards the ruling forces, this has recently changed to 
viewing farmers as clients with citizens’ rights. It is thus, in the light of this history, unlikely 
that the government has the same objectives as farmers in terms of progress. Additionally 
we know that development, or bikas in Nepal, is given a different meaning by policy-makers 
and development agencies than by the intended beneficiaries or so called target group. 
 
People are likely to have different ideas or plans from those that development agencies had 
in mind with their interventions (Arce and Long, 2000). We need to consider the multi-
rationality of development actors (Olivier de Sardan, 2005). Projects are often implemented 
differently than initially planned for, because the intended beneficiaries exploit the 
opportunities at their disposal in keeping with their own particular objectives. For instance, 
micro-credit intended for vegetable production might be used to set up a small shop or 
simply to buy medicines for a family member suffering an illness. In Mauja, a village in Kaski, 
drip irrigation was introduced and dalits were targeted as beneficiaries. Rather than using 
the equipment for drip irrigation, the buckets were used for washing clothes, simply because 
that was their priority and they had no land available for drip irrigation cultivation (Mauja, 
discussions with villagers, 2009). Intended beneficiaries make use of elements of 
development interventions in a way that suits them best, under given circumstances (De 
Koning, 2011). 
 In chapter 6 I will discuss how and which technologies that have been promoted in 
FFS have been adopted by farmers. In chapter 8 I will describe the decision-making 
processes, the various actors and multiple power dimensions that can partly explain the 
outcomes of FFS. 
 
On the basis of all these assumptions we can now reflect on the FAO approach to 
development through Farmer Field Schools. We concur with Li (2006: 6) who elaborates on 
the depoliticisation of development when a project approach is formatted in a way that may 
be ‘rendering technical’ evident social, cultural, or economic inequities. With rendering 
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technical she refers to the way in which the identified problem and the chosen solutions are 
made amenable to available forms of monitoring and evaluation, to measurement, 
calculation and audit. Development was conceived as merely technocratic, leaving social 
issues and politics out of the development equation. A vital point here is that rendering 
technical is a form of depoliticisation or an anti-politics move (Ferguson, 1994) as it ignores 
the social and historical context and personal experience in favour of a formal, universal 
objective” and neutral assessments. Although I was aware of the socio-cultural and historical 
context of the project, I focused on the formal, universal objective of educating the farmers 
by following specific steps in setting up the FFS training. Also, I used project documents with 
elaborate logical frameworks as guidelines as a neutral way of reporting. Moreover, in the 
implementation of FFS in Nepal in the 1990s, evidently socially and economically relevant 
issues of caste and gender were not considered (see Chapters 6, 7, 8). 
 
1.6 Research problem 
 
Farmer Field Schools have been studied regarding their cost-effectiveness (Feder et al. 2004), 
their impact on pesticide reduction and farmers’ knowledge on insects (Braun et al., 2006; 
Björnsen Gurung, 2002; Thiele et al., 2001; Rola et al., 2002; Tripp et al., 2005), but there is 
limited evidence of Farmer Field Schools’ contribution to social change and rural 
transformation. It is not clear how FFS contributes to changes in farming practices, and 
ultimately towards the empowerment of male and female farmers. Also the multi-rationality 
of the various actors and the role of the different governmental and non-governmental 
actors in the implementation of Farmer Field Schools are under-studied. In other words: how 
is FFS used as a governance tool?  
Although FFS started off as a project in the sense of a unique endeavour with a 
beginning and an end on a pre-defined temporal and spatial scale, undertaken to achieve a 
certain goal, in practice FFS turned out to be a longer-term development process. FFS did not 
follow a linear route and it had unintended outcomes. In this research I try to create a 
picture of FFS as a process and its contribution to rural transformation and social change in 
Nepal. I will look at the impact FFS had on farmers, but also how male and female 
participants of different castes/ethnic groups impacted the shape and contribution of FFS to 
more recent political economic and governmental changes. I will discuss the wider 
institutional context and the governance processes associated with implementation of FFS, 
including the decision-making regarding resources and manpower, and the changes over 
time between 1997 and 2011. 
 
Contrary to FFS claims about its contribution to the empowerment of farmers in Nepal 
(Bartlett, 2002), I wanted to see what really happened, who were empowered, how this took 
place, and with what societal consequences. Empowerment cannot be studied in isolation, 
as the ‘giving power to’ or the ‘acknowledgement of agency’ is part of social processes of 
everyday interaction and decision-making of the implementing agencies and their subjects, 
the Nepalese men and women farmers. 
 The technocratic approach discussed above did not address political and economic 
inequities, gender and empowerment of farmers. By looking at different stages of 
contributions of FFS in Nepal, I reflect on rural transformation and gendered empowerment. 
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1.6.1 Research objective 
 
This research contributes to our knowledge of the contribution to development of Farmer 
Field Schools in the rural areas of Nepal. I regard FFS not just a technical intervention but as 
part of a dynamic social process through time and in a particular institutional context. The 
objective of this study is to get a better understanding of the process of rural transformation 
over the last decade, the power play of actors, at multiple institutional and societal levels, 
and the political-economic and social changes that have taken place during this period. In 
this longitudinal research I reflect upon the practice of ‘doing development’ through my 
active involvement and leading position in the implementation of FFS in Nepal in the 1990s, 
and the way FFS as a tool for development became embedded in Nepalese governmental 
structures and institutional setting and contributed to social change over the past 15 years. 
With my study I wish to provide insights in the FFS as means for development for the benefit 
of both development practitioners and scholars. 
 
 Research questions: 
 
1. What is the contribution of Farmer Field Schools to rural transformation? 
2. How did Farmer Field Schools contribute to the empowerment of male and 
female farmers in the long-term? 
3. How did FFS become embedded in the Nepalese governmental structure 
and for who is the Farmer Field School a tool of governance in Nepal? 
  
Sub-questions were formulated as follows: 
• How did the implementation of FFS as a development process take place? 
• Which are the relevant multiple level processes taking place? 
• How is the Farmer Field School, particularly ideas about empowerment, a 
construct of different actors? 
•  How did FFS become embedded in Nepalese governmental and non-
governmental structures and in social institutions? 
• What are the unintended outcomes of FFS implementation in rural Nepal 
between 1997 and 2009? 
 
1.7 Methodology 
 
This is a longitudinal study for which I was able to collect data at three different moments: at 
the time when Farmer Field Schools started, in 1997, during the mid-term evaluation of the 
FFS project, at the end of the first project phase in 2002, and in 2008-2009.   It enabled me to 
study the Farmer Field School both as a concept or tool for development by international 
agencies (FAO) and national government agencies, as well as the contribution of Farmer Field 
Schools in rural settings to development as a process of change over time. When I refer to 
the concept or the institution of FFS, I will use the singular term (FFS), while the term Farmer 
Field Schools (in plural) applies to them as organisations with a curriculum and activities 
targeting male and (later) female farmers. 
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For this research both qualitative and quantitative methods have been used, varying from 
participant observation and observational participation during my years as FFS trainer to 
focus group discussions and in-depth interviews with male and female farmers who were 
included or excluded from FFS, during the subsequent research phases. Also, secondary 
sources like project documents and government reports were studied and their data 
compared with my own results. 
In line with Praneetvatakul and Waibel (2006) and Mancini (2006) I recognise that 
assessing the contribution of FFS to development requires a mixture of approaches and 
disciplines. Therefore I applied a multi-sited approach speaking with professionals from 
different disciplines (agriculture, pest management, sociologists, planners, multimedia, 
education), policy makers from the national government and NGOs, international 
organisations like FAO and CARE, project officers, donor agencies and facilitators, staff from 
the Plant Protection Directorate, the Department of Agriculture, the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Cooperatives (MoAC), district offices (DADO= District Agricultural Development Office), 
junior technicians from agri-service centres, and male and female farmers. 
 As an FAO programme officer I kept records, wrote reports of FFS in 1997 till the end 
of my contract in August 2002. During that period I visited many FFS groups, went to many 
FFS sessions, talked with hundreds of farmers and agricultural staff from NGOs and 
government offices. I have trained many of the FFS facilitators and observed many farmers’ 
fields and practices. 
 For this study I used my field notes and back-to-office-reports from several field visits 
to Nepal in summer 1997 and spring 1999. I stayed in Jhumka in the Eastern terai in 1998 
during the first training of trainers (TOT) for several weeks and visited 7 Farmer Field Schools 
that were conducted parallel to the TOT. After about five years of conducting FFS the project 
team wondered: What is actually the contribution of FFS to farming? To find the answer, in 
2002 the project was evaluated by staff of a local NGO (REGARD, 20028). This was a pretty 
technical evaluation with some assessment of the impact of FFS. The information collected 
was mainly quantitative, related to easy to measure outputs such as yield increase, number 
of trainees, reduction of pesticide applications. It was done with a survey among 764 
farmers.  424 farmers who had taken part in FFS training were compared with a 'control 
group' of 340 farmers who had not taken part in FFS. Among the respondents 146 (43 %) 
were female among FFS farmers and 102 (30%) among non-FFS farmers. There was no 
distinction made between the replies from women or men, nor was there any differentiation 
on the basis of caste or class, they were all just ‘farmers’.   
 
An evaluation of a project is not neutral, like the one conducted by REGARD in 2002 on FFS, it 
depends to a large extent on the organisation and individuals who organises or determines 
the survey content (See Chapter 4 section 4.6). Thus if success is claimed it can be because it 
fits with the donor and implementing organisation’s criteria. First of all the survey questions 
were designed by staff from FAO, Plant Protection Directorate and the Ministry of 
Agriculture. These questions reflect their position and interests of their institutions. The 
focus on yield and agricultural practices is very much in line with their policies. The reporting 
is in line with regular progress reports and formats such as the logical framework. It reflects a 
                                                 
8 
REGARD: Research, and Extension Group Acting for Resource Development – Nepal, based in Dhading 
district and with a small office in Kathmandu. 
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technocratic approach (Li 2007; Mosse, 2005). The outcomes such impact assessments are 
likely to be “as much a product of the personal attributes of the team, the social relationship 
with others, as the formal terms of reference for the review.”(Biggs and Smith 1998: 1754) 
The interviews in 2002 were conducted by NGO staff who had not been involved in FFS. They 
were all educated male and Brahmin. This was not a conscious decision, but just practice as 
usual in those days (see Chapter 5).  
  The project evaluation of 2002, one of the key documents that is used in this thesis, 
had an emphasis on quantitative data and achievements related to project objectives written 
in the project documents. This presented a snapshot of the situation at that particular time. 
It did not give information about the process that FFS had started. However collection of 
data at three moments in time does give a picture of a process that has been set in motion 
by FFS. 
 
In the summer of 2008 I conducted semi-structured interviews with 79 farmers (42 women, 
37 men) who had not taken part in FFS (later referred to as non-FFS farmers). These non-FFS 
farmers came from places where they did not have a Farmer Field School. I used the same 
key words in semi-structured interviews with 74 farmers (54 women, 20 men) who 
completed FFS training. I compared these two groups to get an insight into the difference FFS 
participation made in farmers’ views on empowerment. In 2008 the interviews focused on 
empowerment aspects, while the interviews in 2009 dealt with the other research questions 
(above). In contrast to 2002 I realised in later years that differences between men and 
women are important to consider and therefore in 2009 men and women were interviewed 
separately.  
The information collected in 2009 is based on semi-structured interviews with a total 
of 94 men and 53 women who took part in FFS from 5 mid-hill districts conducted from June 
– August 2009 and in December 2009. In this period I have visited 23 villages. I conducted in-
depth interviews with these farmers, but also with 22 non-FFS farmers (16 men and 6 
women), to determine the impact of FFS over time and to get a better insight in social 
aspects. Additionally, three focus group discussions were held with FFS women only 
(Sundarbazar in Tanahun district, Chautara in Sindhupalchowk district, and Bhajrayogini in 
Bhaktapur district), six focus group discussions with mixed FFS groups (Syampathi, Sanga , 
Khatri gaun, Sunthan, Jyamdi in Kavre district, and  Bimalnagar in Tanahun district), and two 
focus group discussions with FFS men only (Kushadevi, Kavre district and Satrasayphant, 
Tanahun district). I also conducted three focus group discussions with non-FFS farmers 
(Bimalnagar, Tanahun and Kushadevi in Kavre district).  
In 2009 I also considered caste and ethnicity, even though from the statistical data I 
already knew that particularly lower castes had hardly participated in FFS. I have used data 
registered by the DADO in Kavre on 19 FFS (total 400 participants) in 2007 that covered the 
period of 1999 – 2007. It was more difficult to interview farmers who had not taken part in 
FFS than former FFS-farmers, because the former were not much interested in taking part in 
an interview about a topic that they found did not apply to them. 
 Additionally in 2009 I conducted several focus group discussions: two with district 
agricultural office staff and two with junior technicians of the District Agriculture 
Development Offices (DADO) of Kavre and Tanahun. Additionally I had a focus group 
discussion with NGO staff members. I had two focus group discussions with NGO FFS 
trainers. They were all men, because the DADO and the local NGO office are dominated by 
men and there was no female staff present. They had all been involved in FFS. 
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 Among NGO staff I conducted a total of 19 interviews, and 24 interviews among 
government staff. To get information from farmers who were facilitating FFS as farmer 
trainers I held 9 interviews in different locations (Kavre, Bhaktapur, Tanahun districts). Table 
1.1 gives an overview of the different methods used in this research. 
 
Table 1.1 Research questions and methods used 
 
    
 1.What is the 
contribution of Farmer 
Field Schools to rural 
transformation? 
 
Project documents, 
observation, personal 
communication 1997, 
1998 
Impact assessment 
(2002) 
 
observations 
2009 Semi-structured 
interviews. 
 
Focus group discussions 
Observations 
 2. How did Farmer Field 
Schools contribute to 
empowerment of male 
and female farmers in 
the long-term? 
 
 2008 
Semi-structured 
interviews: 79 non FFS 
farmers (42 women, 37 
men) and 74 FFS 
farmers (54 women, 20 
men) 
 
2009 
Semi-structured 
interviews (94 FFS men, 
53 women; 16 non FFS 
men, 6 non FFS 
women), 9 farmer 
trainers. 
Focus group discussions 
Observations in 2009 
3. How did FFS become 
embedded in the 
Nepalese governmental 
structure and for who is 
the Farmer Field School 
a tool of governance in 
Nepal? 
 
Project documents, 
observation, personal 
communication 1997, 
1998 
2009 
Semi-structured 
interviews (94  FFS men, 
53 women; 16 non FFS 
men, 6 non FFS women) 
 
Semi-structured 
interviews 19 NGO and 
24 government staff, 9 
farmer trainers 
 2008, 2009 Semi-
structured interviews: 
 
Focus group discussion 
  
1.8 Outline of the thesis 
 
The outline in this thesis is as follows. In the first chapter I have introduced the background, 
the justification for this research. I elaborate on the difference between studying 
development and doing development. I have also presented the problem statement of this 
study: the unknown effects of Farmer Field Schools on empowerment and rural 
development, and the relative unpredictable way male and female farmers use the 
knowledge and skills acquired in Farmer Field Schools. Also the question is raised if FFS is 
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actually a tool of governance? I also describe the methods and techniques used for this 
research, which are based on a collection of longitudinal qualitative data and a variety of 
methods. 
In the second chapter I will describe the scene where the research took place. I create 
a picture of Nepal, the diversity of the country, the history of governance. I will provide 
insight into gender issues, and explain about caste and ethnicity. I will share information 
about the agricultural sector and discuss the turbulent political changes that are currently 
taking place, particularly related to the Maoist movement. 
In chapter 3 I elaborate my position in the Farmer Field School, in Nepalese society 
and in this research. My multiple identities and roles during the last two decennia have had 
an impact on the outcome of this research. I was a so called ‘outsider-in', because I was 
involved in establishing Farmer Field Schools in Nepal and I occupied a special place in 
Nepalese society through my marriage to a Nepalese. I explain how my work in both the 
institution and the organisation of Farmer Field Schools, and also this research project were 
influenced by fluid, dynamic phenomena in society, such as caste, gender and nationality, 
how they created obstructions as well as opportunities for myself. I argue that being an 
outsider-in has definitely had its advantages for conducting qualitative research. 
In chapter 4 I describe the concept of the Farmer Field School (FFS). How FFS was 
introduced into Indonesia as an alternative to conventional agricultural extension and pest 
management. I show how the global discourse on and practices in FFS have been influenced 
by different development paradigms and that different actors apply different views. I 
describe the shift from FFS as a project to FFS as a process. 
In chapter 5 I analyse rural development in Nepal, in particular community based 
development, with the use of case studies from community forestry and farmer managed 
irrigation. This analysis provides a background for the study on FFS, because it describes the 
dynamics in the communities where also FFS took place and continues to take place. I 
demystify the concept of community, I describe endogenous development initiatives, explain 
how changing development paradigms, feudal history, elite capture and a diverse array of 
interests among community members influence and shape the outcome of community 
development interventions. 
The introduction of FFS as a project in Nepal and its impact are described in chapter 
6. I explain the involvement of different stakeholders and discuss the impact of FFS on 
farming, thereby taking into consideration the differences between male and female 
smallholders. I show how FFS is more than just a project, but a process that has contributed 
to agricultural and rural development in Nepal. 
In chapter 7 the concept of empowerment is elaborated. I researched how FFS contributes to 
the empowerment of men and women farmers. Empowerment is an often debated concept 
in academia but in development practice it seems to be used without much discussion, 
assuming that it is always a ‘good‘ thing having a positive impact on the target group. In the 
FFS programme too there is the assumption that everybody has the same understanding of 
the concept of empowerment. This research provides evidence that empowerment is a 
process that challenges our assumptions about the way things are and can be. This study 
shows that male and female FFS participants say that they experience empowerment, but 
not in the way FFS technicians and policymakers had planned it. In chapter 8 I examine how 
FFS is used as a governance tool. The different actors are discussed and their views on FFS, as 
well as the way decision-making takes place and how the actions of actors are embedded in 
the institutional setting of Nepal.  Looking at strategies that are key to FFS, such as farmer 
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participation, group formation and farmers-training-farmers, there is evidence that they may 
be employed by the state to make their citizens, including farmers, more governable. While 
FFS might be part of a technique of the state to influence the behaviour of its citizens to 
achieve increased agricultural production, the farmers for whom FFS is intended also actively 
influence the implementation of this intervention. Seeing FFS just as a governance tool does 
not do justice to the complexity of the dynamic environment in which development 
interventions like FFS are embedded. 
Finally, in chapter 9 I reflect on the research, answer the research questions, present 
the conclusions of the findings, and reflect on the theories and methodologies used. Finally, I 
look at the research outcomes in the light of the recent changes in Nepal and in FFS. 
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Chapter 2 Setting the Scene 
 
Nepal (4 times the size of the Netherlands) is a beautiful country, visited by many tourists 
every year. At first glance it looks like a peaceful spot in the Himalayas with people living 
happily in predominantly rural areas. Behind this picture of a paradise in the mountains, lies 
an enormous complex society, characterised by a rich social, geographic and physical 
diversity, strongly shaped by history. This research took place in Nepal, in particular in the 
mid hills (see Figure 2.1).  
 
 
Figure 2.1 Map of Nepal with districts indicating where this research took place. (See 
Chapter 1 for details about the locations) 
 
In this chapter I will give some more insights in this diversity and describe the setting in 
which the research took place. I will start with an explanation of the meaning of the name 
Nepal. Then I will show that the images that are created of Nepal reflect the interests of the 
organisation or person creating those pictures and that the reality is more diverse as well as 
complex. 
Not only is the country complex and diverse, it is also dynamic. The political situation 
has undergone rapid changes during the last 10 – 20 years. Nepal is currently in a flux, 
undergoing rapid transformation. The political landscape is, at the time of writing, in 
transition from faith-directed and feudal traditions to a more political nation, from a Hindu 
monarchy to a secular republic. Today, Nepal stands at a crossroad between a brighter 
future that promises sustainable development, security and equal opportunities for 
disadvantaged people and a darker picture of further political turmoil, civil war and a 
growing humanitarian crisis (Srivasta and Sharma, 2010).  
I will present some basic facts of Nepal and give an historical overview which is of 
relevance to understanding governance in Nepal. This will include the uprising of the Maoist 
movement. Further I will elaborate on some major socio-cultural issues, in particular gender, 
caste and ethnicity. I will describe the agricultural sector and highlight the important role of 
women in farming.  
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The first impression of the diversity that characterises Nepal I got when I wanted to  explain 
the meaning of the name Nepal. Rather than a simple explanation internet search resulted in 
an endless list of different explanations, many (groups of) people claim to know the origin of 
the country. 
Numerous scholars have tried to explain the name Nepal.9 To give an impression of the 
different explanations, I present a selection of them below: 
 
1. A sage called 'Ne' lived in penance on the confluence of the Bagmati and 
Bishnumati rivers. He was the sole advisor of the King. So, the word 'Nepal' was 
derived from the name of the sage 'Ne'.  
2. "Nepal" may be derived from the Sanskrit nipalaya, which means "at the foot of 
the mountains" or "abode at the foot", a reference to its location in relation to 
the Himalayas. Thus, it may be an Eastern equivalent of the European toponym 
"Piedmont." 
3. It has also been suggested that the name comes from the Tibetan niyampal, 
which means "holy land". 
4. Long, long ago, the kings of the Gopala dynasty ruled over the area. They were 
called 'Nepa', so, after the name of the dynasty who ruled, the country was 
named as 'Nepal'. 
5. The name Nepal is also supposed to be derived from the Sanskrit word "NEP", 
with the suffix "AL" added to it; though still under controversy, NEP were the 
people who used to be cow herders - the GOPALS - who came to the Nepal valley 
for the first time from the Ganges plain of India. 
6. In the Gandaki Mahatmya, it is mentioned that a king called 'Nepa' ruled over the 
area. He conquered many kingdoms and established Shanker as his deity. He 
founded a country and called it 'Nepal', after his own name.  
7. In the Tibetan language 'Ne' means 'home' and 'pal' means 'wool'. Sheep were 
reared in Kathmandu valley and much wool was produced. So, it was called the 
home of wool, i.e., Ne Pal.  
8. In the Newari language 'Ne' means 'centre' and 'pa' means 'country'. So, 'Ne pa' 
means a country situated at the centre. Nepal is situated in between the two 
great countries, China and India. So, it was called a central country, i.e., Nepal.  
9. In the Limbu dialect 'Ne' means 'plain area'. Kathmandu valley is a plain, so it was 
called 'Nepal'.  
10. In the dialect of the Lepchas, 'Ne' means 'holy' and 'pal' means 'cave'. As it is a 
holy place - the centre of pilgrimage of Hindus and Buddhists, it was called a holy 
cave or Nepal.  
11. In the language of the Tibeto-Burmese 'Ne' means 'cattle' and 'pa' means 'people'. 
Kathmandu valley had good grassland for cattle and the main occupation of the 
people was to rear animals. So, it was called the land of the people who reared 
animals, i.e., Nepal.  
12. Kiratas, the earliest known inhabitants of this country, had a clan called 'Nepar' 
living in Kathmandu valley. So, Nepal might also be derived from Nepar.  
 
As one can see from the list above there are many interpretations or explanations of the 
name Nepal. This reflects that there are many different groups in society that claim this 
country as theirs for different reasons. This reflects some aspects of the diversity of Nepal, 
diversity in terms of people and their conditions, their interests. 
                                                 
9
  (Infoclub, 2009) available at: http://www.infoclub.com.np/nepal/history/history_ancient.htm#title; 
www.wikipedia.org/historynepal 
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2.1 Basic facts 
 
In a tourist guide Nepal is generally presented as a beautiful country, a “Shangri-la” or kind 
of “heaven on earth”. Renowned for its diversity of attractions: Himalaya peaks, lowland 
jungle with wildlife, smiling people in colourful dresses, as is illustrated below from the 
Lonely Planet Tourist Guide website: 
 
Draped along the spine of the Himalaya, Nepal is a land of sublime scenery, time-
worn temples, and some of the best hiking trails on earth. It's a country, rich in 
scenic splendour and cultural treasures. The kingdom has long exerted a pull on 
the Western imagination. (Mayhew et al., 2010)  
 
Like most commercially created images this does not tell the entire truth. Nepal is one of the 
poorest countries in the world with a population of about 26 million  with a per capita 
income of $560 per annum, low human development indicators (see Table 2.1) , and where a 
large section of the population have poor access  to basic social services.  
Located between Tibetan plateau and Indian plains, the small land-locked country of 
Nepal has a great variety of topography ranging from high mountains, the Himalaya, in the 
north, the hills in the middle, to a narrow strip of flat land, the terai, in the south. The 
country is divided into three ecological zones on the basis of altitude, north to south. Nepal 
is a country of physical extremes, from the mountainous belt of the Himalayas in the north 
to the subtropical plains in the south. Due to this topographical variation the country is rich 
with climatic and - as a result- bio-diversity. This diversity is also reflected in ethnicity and 
cultural practices. In this context the so called founder of the state Nepal is often quoted:  
Pritivhi Naryana Shah called Nepal: a "Char Jaat and Chhatis Barna Ko Phulbari" (garden of 
four varnas or castes and 36 ethnic groups or sub-castes).  It is a given fact that in the 
country many different ethnic groups reside. The number of these groups, their origin, their 
traditions and languages are still under debate.10  The 1991 census recorded 35 languages 
and 59 ethnic groups. Ten years later (and again in 2011) the census data revealed more 
than 100 ethnic/caste groups and more than 92 languages and dialects (CBS, 2002b; CBS 
2011). These different figures do not mean an increase of caste or ethnic groups but it 
indicates that over the years there has been more recognition of ethnic diversity. Figure 2.2 
gives an overview of the distribution of caste and ethnic groups in Nepal. 
 
                                                 
10
  For more information see Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities at the website: 
www.nefin.org.np 
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Figure 2.2 Distribution of caste and ethnic groups in Nepal 
 
Source: World Bank and Department for International Development (DFID), 2006 (joint publication)  
 
Nepali is the official language, while the next two most commonly spoken languages are 
Maithali and Bhojpuri, both found in the terai, the southern part of the country. The majority 
of the people are Hindus (86,5%), followed by Buddhists (7.8%), Muslims (3.5%) and others 
(2.2%) (DFID and World Bank, 2006). Being a multi-ethnic and multi-lingual country, each 
cultural group has its own customs and traditions. Nepalese practise various rules and 
regulations defined by the customs and cultures in their daily life. 
For many years this picture of tolerance and pluralism held some truth because Nepal 
remained relatively free from open ethnic, religious, linguistic and caste violence. However, 
the subordinate groups have begun to query this image and started to raise their voices 
against oppression and dominance by high caste and dominant ethnic and religious groups. 
The geography is such that some villages are still accessible only on foot or by air and it takes 
days to reach them. Population density varies widely across the regions with the high 
mountains being the least populated and (after the eradication of malaria in 1960s) terai 
now being the most densely populated regions. The difficulty of terrain along with varied 
density of population influences both decisions related to the provision of infrastructure and 
many remote areas remain isolated from participation in the national economy. Being a 
mainly mountainous country it is prone to landslides, especially in the rainy season (July – 
August). 
The country is heavily dependent on India for transit facilities to outside world, as 
India borders Nepal on three sides, while it borders China in the north. The per capita 
income gross domestic product (GDP) for the year 1999/2000 was US$244, in 2012 it was 
reported US$560 (CBS, 2012)11. The share of farm income that comes from agriculture was 
61 percent in 1996, 48 percent in 2001 and is now reported 28 percent of all household 
income comes from agriculture. The non-farm income has increased and is reported 37 
                                                 
11
  http://www.cbs.gov.np (accessed 08.06.2012) 
Brahmin/ 
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 36 
 
percent from non-farm enterprises and 17 percent from remittances (CBS, 2011). Economic 
growth comes primarily from the non-agricultural sector. The marginal growth in agricultural 
productivity is predominantly due to the fragmentation of land, poor access to technology, 
and poor rural accessibility. The share of agriculture in total gross domestic product (GDP) 
has declined in recent years. An important income sector of Nepal is export of labour to 
other countries, particularly Malaysia and in the Middle East. The remittances sent back has 
significantly affected Nepal’s economy and changed the social landscape, leaving more 
women behind to manage households. The census data of 2011 showed that 44 per cent of 
the Nepalese household have at least one absentee living abroad or working (29 per cent) 
and living elsewhere in the country (CBS, 2011).  
The census of 2011 indicated that the country has a population of 26.6 million (CBS, 
2012). The average density of the population is 157 persons per square km, which is one of 
the highest in the world. Nepal is registered as one of the poorest countries in the world but 
Nepal has made significant progress in human development and in reducing poverty in the 
past decade. Poverty incidence is estimated to have declined from 42% in 1996 to 31% in 
2004, although the situation is remarkably better in urban than in rural areas. Among Dalits 
and hill Janajatis poverty rates are highest12 (DFID and World Bank, 2006). The poverty status 
measured in terms of GDP has risen, mainly by an increase in remittances (Gartaula, 2011; 
World Bank, 2006; Seddon et al. , 2002). Similarly, social and human development indicators, 
such as life expectancy, infant and maternal mortality rates, adult literacy rate, and primary 
school enrolment have all improved significantly in the past decade (see Table 2.1), 
especially for girls and people living in remote areas (UNFPA, 2007). Communication and 
road access also improved in the period 1995 – 2003. Social mobilisation increased, with 
especially the number of forestry users groups growing significantly (World Bank, 2006).  
 
Table 2.1 Nepal – Development Indicators 
 
Development Indicators 1995/1996 2003/2004 2010/2011 
GDP 3.6 5.5 15.7 
National poverty rate  30.9% 31% 
Under 5 mortality rate per 1,000 live births 145 76 41 
Adult literacy 28% 48.6% 57% 
Population with access to improved drinking water sources 69% 84% 89% 
Average number of children born to women 5.3 3.6 3.4 
Percentage of households receiving remittances 23.4% 31.9% 55.8% 
Source: CBS (2011) and World Bank (2010) at http://devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/npl_aag.pdf, accessed 
08.06.2012 
 
There are some signs of improvements in terms of decreased social exclusion, because the 
younger generation has a more open attitude towards disadvantaged castes than the older 
Nepalese, improvements in literacy has empowered women and disadvantaged castes and 
ethnic minorities, and participation in community groups has given the vulnerable and the 
                                                 
12
   Dalits were previously referred to as lower caste, untouchables. The dictionary definition of a "Janajati" 
is a "jungle tribe living on wild fruits and plant roots," one that is "totally cut off from the development 
process". In the Gazette in July 1997, the socio-economic status of a community is used to decide if it 
qualifies as a Janajati. It defines "Janajatis" as communities having their "original and distinct language 
and culture" that are "socially backward in comparison to other caste groups" (DFID and World Bank, 
2006). 
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poor some voice. Still, the legal system fails to treat all groups equally and political 
representation of women and minorities is significantly lagging behind. 
According to the United Nations’ Human Development Index (HDI), Nepal was ranked 
140th  out of 177 countries in 2002 and rose to 138th  in 2009 (UNDP, 2009) Notwithstanding 
this progress, Nepal faces immense challenges in achieving stronger growth and sustained 
poverty reduction. In particular, the country’s difficult topography, restricted infrastructure 
base, weak institutions and poor governance. In addition, the persistent political instability is 
undermining Nepal’s development and poverty reduction efforts.  
The Government’s Poverty Reduction Strategy (Tenth Plan FY2003–2007) recognises 
that the root causes of the conflict are poverty, in-country regional disparity, and social 
exclusion. The Three Year Interim Plan (2012/11-2012/13) aims to: achieve sustainable 
economic growth and generate dignified and gainful employment opportunities; build on 
economic strength with wider participation of the people; reduce economic inequalities; 
achieve regional balances and eliminate social exclusions (National Planning Commission, 
2010 page 16). The strategy aims to increase agricultural production by 3.6 % and the non-
agricultural sector by 6.5% annually. It intends to reduce overall poverty incidence to 21% by 
2013 (NPC, 2010). 
The country’s rapidly increasing population exacerbates the deterioration of its 
natural resources, mostly through deforestation (Joshi et al., 2003). Infrastructure, such as 
transportation and communication is limited. Nepal has relied heavily on international aid 
for its development and its foreign debt has increased considerably over the last 40 years. 
 
2.2 Socio-cultural situation 
 
Nepal’s geography contributes to social exclusion; there are differences between urban and 
rural, far west and central regions, mid-hills and terai citizens. Yet, however important these 
differences may be, they are not the focus of this thesis. In the Nepalese context ethnicity, 
caste and gender are closely connected social constructs. It is increasingly acknowledged 
that the variables of gender, caste and ethnicity are the main categories to influence power 
relations, access to resources, capabilities, poverty and vulnerability outcomes (Bennett, 
2005; 2006; Lama and Buchy, 2002).  In Nepal, a higher caste ‘Brahmin’ carries different 
values in social interaction than a lower caste ‘blacksmith’. Women carry different values 
than men because Nepal is a patriarchal society where females are dominated by their male 
counterparts. People born in the high mountain areas interact differently than people born 
in the middle hills and terai. Given the current conditions we can argue that socio-
economically and culturally Nepal is still mainly dominated mainly by male, high caste people 
originating from the hills. 
 
2.2.1 Gender 
 
Keeping in mind that Nepal is diverse we can make a start by acknowledging that men and 
women experience transformation processes and outcomes differently; a gender 
perspective is a way of looking at and understanding social realities.  
Men’s and women’s roles are socially and culturally determined (Pyakuryal and 
Suvedi 2000; Giri, 2009). In Nepal, a common understanding is that men are responsible for 
earning economic resources (such as income, land, livestock etc.) to support the family. 
Most of the work that requires public contact (e.g., attending public meetings, agricultural 
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extension or demonstration sessions) is performed by men. Also, some activities such as 
ploughing, fixing a roof, slaughtering animals and felling/splitting large trees are performed 
exclusively by men. Women are responsible for maintaining food security, the household 
chores and rearing of children (Acharya and Bennett, 1981). Although in sociology such 
dichotomies are often criticised, even a recent study by Bhadra (1997 in Giri, 2009) states 
that women perceive themselves as nurturers and men as providers despite spending more 
time than men in productive activities. 
Nepalese society is patriarchal, male dominated, and most ethnic/caste groups are 
patrilineary organised. Women’s economic and social positions are generally dependent on 
those of their husbands, fathers and/or fathers-in-law (Gartaula, 2011). Women are 
traditionally disadvantaged with regard to education, health, labour force, economic 
conditions and social welfare (Tiwari, 2007).   
There are clearly gender disparities in Nepal, as can be seen from the formal reports 
on male-female differences with regard to mortality, schooling and illiteracy. In 2007 UNFPA 
reported a higher mortality rate for girls under 5 years of age, being 75 per 1,000 for women 
as compared to 71 for boys (UNFPA, 2007). In earlier years Nepal was one of the few 
countries on earth which had fewer women, due to discrimination of girls right from birth 
(CBS, 2002b). In Nepal and other South Asian countries researchers have estimated that 
there are millions of women "missing" from the population. Failure to report the birth of 
girls, sex-selective abortion, neglect of daughters and female infanticide may all play a role 
(Leone et al., 2003). Nepal’s Human Development Index13 has risen by 171 points in the last 
two decades (Tab. 2.2). The gain was slightly faster during the 1980s than during the 1990s. 
The rate of progress in human development seems to have slowed down further in the first 
half of the last decade, in which the gain was only 0.27 points, probably due to the civil 
conflict (Seddon and Hussein, 2002).  The Gender Development Index (GDI) comparing 
male/female indicators shows that male and female disparities decreased faster than the 
overall increased during the 1990s. Increase of women’s life expectancy seems to indicate 
progress towards gender equality, and achievement in the educational fields has been 
greater for women than for men. Still, in 2005 the GDI was 15 points less than the HDI.  
 
Table 2.2 Overall indicators of human development in Nepal (1991- 2005) 
 
Indicator  1981 1991 2001 2005 2007 
HDI  0.328 0.416 0.499 0.526 0.53 
GDI   0.312 0.452 0.511 0.5214 
GEM   0.391 0.496 0.581 
Sources: UNDP - HDR, 1995, 2005, 2007; UNFPA, 2007. 
 
                                                 
13
  The Human Development Index (HDI) is a combined indicator of per capita income, life expectancy, and 
educational attainment, the GDI is the HDI with a gender dimension.. The Human Development Report 
introduced in 1995 the Gender related Development Index and Gender Empowerment Measure to 
measure inequality between women and men (HDR, 2009). The GDI measures gender disparity by 
adjusting average achievements to reflect inequalities between female and male in the three 
dimensions of HDI. The GDI focuses on capability. GEM shows the use of these capabilities in taking 
advantages of opportunities in life. Focusing on women’s opportunities GEM captures gender 
inequality in three key areas: participation and decision-making power in economic and political affairs 
and power over economic resources. 
14
  Compare with Iceland that ranks first with a GDI of 0.962. Nepal ranks 128 out of 157 countries. 
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However, these achievements are not distributed equally between the urban and rural 
populations, nor are all development and ecological regions prospering at equal rates. In less 
developed regions, the gender disparity along these indicators is higher, and differs across 
regions, whereby the far western region in Nepal has still high gender disparities.  
 The GEM has increased due to the recently imposed provision of 33% female 
participation in the Constituency Assembly. In the Human Development Report of Nepal 
from 2009 it is confirmed that there are big disparities between regions and caste and ethnic 
groups. (UNDP - HDR, 2009). The literacy rates have improved but are still lower for women 
than for men. The Gender Gap reports of 2007, 2009 and 2010 show an increase from, 35% 
to 45% among women and an increase from 63% to 71% for men.  Women's participation in 
politics has increased. In 2006 parliament was made up of only 6% women  this had risen to 
33 % in 2010. However, the number of women in ministerial positions has decreased: in 
2008 and 2009 20% of the ministerial positions were taken by women, against only 8% 
women in 2010 (World Economic Forum, 2011). Nepal traditionally patriarchal system also 
applies to governmental structures, which are predominantly run by men.   
 
Certain Nepali proverbs demonstrate a negative perception about women, some given here 
below mirror these views.  
 
Chhora paye swarga jaane (“The birth of a son paves the way to heaven“);  
Chhori ko janma hare ko karma (“A daughter is born with a doomed fate“);  
Chhora bhaye sansar ujyalo, Chhori bhaye bhanchha ujyalo (“Son brightens the 
whole world, whereas daughter brightens only the kitchen“)  
 
These proverbs reflect the general societal valuation and position of women in Nepal and 
indicate that women have not only a low status, but also a low self-esteem. Though such 
proverbs are less commonly used nowadays in educated urban households, they still reflect 
widespread views on women in Nepal. 
Marriage has an overwhelming importance in a woman's life. The event of marriage 
determines almost all her life options and subsequent livelihood. According to Hindu 
tradition, marriage is essential for all, whether man or woman. Early marriages are rooted in 
both the concept of purity of the female body (Bennett, 1983) and the need for helping 
hands in farm households in general.  So parents prefer to get their daughters married 
before puberty. Although this practice has changed over the years, the ideology of women’s 
sexuality still prevails. 33,5% of girls marry between  the ages of 15-19 , as opposed to only  
11.8% of boys at the same age (CBS, 2002a). Marriage is a social contract between two clans 
rather than the personal affair of the bride and groom. Among urban educated so-called love 
marriages often take place, but in rural areas women and also men rarely have any role in 
the choice of their own life partners. Women’s status in society is mostly dependent on their 
husbands' and parents' social and economic positions. According to legal experts, there are 
over 20 laws that discriminate against women (CEDAW, 2004).   
Due to the dependency on men in daily life, Nepalese women face problems like 
domestic violence, psychological harassment for dowry, and low opportunity in finding jobs 
(Dhakal, 2008). Women's lives are centred around their traditional roles of taking care of 
children and most household chores, fetching water and animal fodder and doing farm work.   
In the past, women could only share their views among themselves and received little 
information from their husbands on economic and social developments. They were not 
allowed to participate in public meetings or discussions and were not informed of outside 
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activities. These days, the situation is changing. Women are increasingly participating in 
‘platforms’ for decision-making and other common fora (Upreti, 2001; Agarwal, 2009, 2001, 
1997; Banjade et al., 2006). However, the actual significance of their contribution in these 
meetings remains limited (Agarwal, 2001).  
One tangible measure of women's status is their educational attainment. In the early 
1990s, a direct correlation existed between the level of education and status. Educated 
women had access to relatively high-status positions in the government and private service 
sectors, and they had a much higher status than uneducated women. This general rule was 
more applicable at the societal level than at the household level. Within the family, an 
educated woman did not necessarily hold a higher status than her uneducated counterpart. 
Also within the family, a woman's status, especially a daughter-in-law's status, was more 
closely tied to her husband's authority and to her parental family's wealth and status than 
anything else. Although the constitution offers women equal educational opportunities, 
many social, economic, and cultural factors contribute to lower enrolment and higher 
dropout rates for girls.  Youth literacy rates in 2010 were reported 87% for boys (age 15-24) 
and 77% for girls (age 15-24); primary school attendance 86% for boys and 82% for girls. 
Secondary school attendance was only 46% for boys and 38% for girls (UNICEF, 2012). 
It is a fact that women also, participate in the process of maintaining the structure 
and the discursive practices that caused their secondary positions. One way in which they 
participate is through using and maintaining perspectives that marginalise them or articulate 
their subordinate position. The way women treat their daughters or maintain their son’s 
preferential treatment contributes to keeping women’s inferior position intact.  
Property rights to land are inherited through the male line, but a father can give the 
right to a particular plot of land to his daughter during his life. Even though men own the 
land, women are the ones who do most of the labour related to agricultural production, such 
as digging, planting, weeding, harvesting and storage.  
DFID, World Bank, FAO, ADB and other organisations express their concerns that there is an 
increased participation of women in agriculture. This is a phenomenon worldwide but also 
observed in Nepal. Women’s increased participation is partly due to the fact that their 
contribution was not reported or officially acknowledged due to biased data collection 
(Gartaula, 2011). The economic contribution of Nepali women is substantial, but still remains 
largely unnoticed because their traditional role is taken for granted.    
Due to male migration from rural areas to other parts of the country or overseas for 
employment, agriculture in the hills and terai is now primarily dependent on women 
(Gartaula, 2011). Also the percentage of households that are headed by women has 
increased to 26.6% in 2011, from 13.6% in 1996 (CBS, 2011). The 2011 preliminary report 
shows a population of 12.9 million men against 13.7 million women, an increase of 15% 
(CBS, 2012). FAO has reported the following: 
 
“Over the recent years (2002-2005), the agriculture sector recorded a rather low 
growth rate of 3 percent a year on average. The negative impact of this low 
performance on the living conditions was reduced by substantial increase in non-
farm incomes, especially remittances. The increase of migration (and thus 
remittances) could be a result of the long-standing conflict and low economic 
performance in the country. However, migration and displacements may have 
created new forms of vulnerabilities, especially for women head of households. 
The conflict opened an opportunity for women to be empowered, though at the 
cost of overwhelming economic responsibilities in many cases. Women have 
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taken additional responsibility on household management, crop production, 
livestock rearing and decision on marketing of their livestock, horticultural and 
agricultural products. The findings indicate that women have relatively greater 
participation in petty trade and road side sales of vegetables and fruits which are 
more disrupted by frequent blockades and strikes.” (FAO, 2007:5) 
 
The same FAO has reported that 90.5% of women are engaged in agriculture against 74.9% 
of men (FAO, Sustainable Development report)15. 
 
This trend has led to changes in social relations and structures, leading to the feminisation of 
communities (Giri, 2009). The changes include the availability of remittances, an increased 
workload for women, as well as a shift in women’s responsibilities and their participation in 
the public sphere. Feminisation of agriculture refers to an increase in the number of women 
involved in farming or the time spent by women on agriculture. The feminisation of 
agriculture can be differentiated  between labour and  decision-making or managerial tasks 
within the rural household. In rural Nepal both have been observed, although the latter is 
less visible. In absence of their husbands, there is an increased role for women in agriculture 
and they have taken up additional ‘male’ tasks such as ploughing, pesticide application, and 
feeding livestock (Gartaula, 2011). Women living with their in-laws have less decision-making 
power than de facto female headed households (idem).  
Women emphasised this development in interviews: “Men have left: for Maoists, for 
jobs outside this village, some went abroad”. (Focus group discussion, female FFS farmers 
Sindhupalchowk, 2009).There was not only migration in search of jobs, but also many men 
have left Nepal to study abroad. In 2002 this was still a rare opportunity, in 2009 many 
farmers informed me about family members who studied in the USA, UK, Australia or Russia. 
What was unusual in 2002 had become common practice in rural areas in 2009. 
It appears that some of these perceived changes are logical extensions of earlier 
practices rather than new departures. This may be particularly so in J anajati communities, 
where men have long been engaged in outside activities. Although the immediate cause may 
now be the ‘people’s war’ rather than Gurkha/Gorkha recruitment, the salt-grain trade, or 
labour migration, this is not the first time that village women have had to make do alone and 
take on stereotypically ‘male’ gendered roles. In interviews this was also stressed: “We are 
used to dealing with the household by ourselves, we are used to living without our 
husbands” (Tanahun, interview, 2009).  
 
2.2.2 Caste: Structural system or permeable boundaries through agency? 
 
While caste as an official hierarchy has been abolished, the influence of caste as a 
discrimination practice still continues in daily life. Worldwide, caste as a social institution 
affects the lives of over six million of the global population (Jeffrey, 2001:218), and this 
counts for the majority of the inhabitants of Nepal. Ethnicity, on the other hand, has 
emerged as an important factor in analysing political change processes (Gellner et al., 1997; 
Pfaff- Czarnecka, 1999).The terms ethnicity and caste are often confused in Nepal and the 
interrelationship is not easy to analyse, let alone address; the word Jat in Nepali is used for 
caste as well as ethnicity. People sometimes use the word Jat to indicate their family name 
                                                 
15
  http://www.fao.org/sd/WPdirect/WPre0110.htm, Sustainable Development Dimensions Fact Sheet, 
accessed 12 January 2012 
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or ethnicity group. Thus it can happen that a Nepalese asks a Westerner: “What is your Jat?” 
referring to the surname.   
Analysis of Nepal’s ethnic groups is complicated by the sensitive (political) nature of 
ethnic and linguistic identity and the fact that no anthropological or linguistic survey of the 
population has ever been conducted (Poudel, 2000). The problem of describing social 
categories in Nepal starts with the fact that data on gender, caste and ethnic dimensions of 
poverty are still incomplete and dealing with these issues remains sensitive (Bennett, 2005; 
Pfaff-Czarnecka, 1997; Gurung, 2006).  
Available evidence on Nepal’s early history is limited, but the earliest inhabitants 
were likely of Tibeto-Burman ethnicity (physically Mongoloid, e.g. Rai, Magar, nowadays 
often called Janajatis) and lived in small tribal settlements with little political centralisation.  
Nepal started from a nucleus and has grown through conquest and expansion. In 
1816 the present border was demarcated by Prithvi Shah, one of the Gorkha rulers who 
unified several small states consisting of two main population groups with distinct 
characteristics: the Caucasoid and the Mongoloid people. The Gorkha fighters belonged to 
the Caucasoid people, a caste-stratified Hindu group speaking an Indo-Aryan language (Khas 
and Madhesis, whereby Khas originate from the hills and Madhesis from the plains), while 
the Mongoloid people were egalitarian tribal people speaking Tibeto-Burmese languages 
with distinct territories (Gurung, 2003).  
Prithvi Naryana Shah is often depicted as a great ruler who wanted to unify people 
(Bista, 1991) by bringing everyone under one religion, culture and language but also 
respected their diversity. Gurung, (2006) on the other hand states that Pritivi Shah started 
with the act of Hinduisation, the first step in creating official inequalities among several 
groups in society. Hinduism was declared the state religion and the Nepali language the 
official mode of communication. Tribal communities were ordered in hierarchal castes 
through Hinduisation. In the name of national integration, small ethnic groups have been 
subordinated; their languages, culture and religion were denied.  
In Nepal, the Muluki Ain, the national legal code of 1854, officially enforced 
Hinduisation and created a legally sanctioned hierarchical social order based on Hindu caste 
ranking. Within this set of laws all ethnic groups and religions were kind of forced into a 
Hindu system of castes. This legal code classified penalties for crimes according to caste, 
determined laws over land tenure and trading privileges and institutionalised dominance of 
upper caste elites over other social groups from  Janajatis to Dalits. For a long time 
“Brahmins were not subject to the death penalty and were instead given the same high 
status as cows in the Hindu religion” (Krämer, 2008: 17). In a caste society, all the social, 
legal, economic, religions, and political activities are prescribed by sanctions that determine 
and limit access to land, position of political power and command over human labour. In 
Nepal economic and political power was consolidated by interlinking it with the Hindu caste 
institution (Bennett, 2006).  
Right from the beginning of its unification the modern state of Nepal has been an 
affair of elites belonging to some high caste Hindu groups. At the same time, the numerous 
ethnic groups and the lower Hindu castes became marginalised and were prevented from 
any kind of participation. Many of the problems Nepal faces today in ushering development 
have their roots in the crucial decision taken long ago: whether the Gorkhali unification or 
the civil code. The basic social climate is still based on feudal relations, on power and 
patronage; this social climate has not been changed (Gyawali, 2002). 
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Bhattachan et al. (2007) listed a total of 205 existing practices of caste discrimination. 
Dahal (2002) also refers to discrimination against Dalits in social and office. In 2003, it was 
still reported that Brahmins dominated the public service sector: The Brahmins who 
represent 13% of the total population, hold 74% of the public service positions. Dalit 
comprise 13% of the population yet did not have access to high civil service positions until 
2004 (Department of Civil Personnel Record, 2004). Brahmins/Chettries and Newars 
dominate participation in secondary and higher education. Among low castes, less than 5% 
of 17 to 24 years-olds attend university; among high castes, the figure is more than three 
times as great. Newars have the highest rate of attendance of higher learning institutions 
starting from secondary education (DFID, 2006). 
Several authors (Bista, 1991; Bennett, 2006; Gellner et al., 1997) claim that the Nepali 
caste system is unique and not a copy of the Indian classical Varna or Vedic model. It is 
admittedly a highly complex phenomenon, but the basic elements are based on the Hindu 
Varna system. This system divides the population into 4-5 groups (4 Varnas originating from 
the Varna in Hinduism): Brahmin (priests, scholars), Chettri or Kshatriya (rulers, warriors), 
Vaisya (traders and merchants) and Sudra (artisans, occupational caste, labourers). 
Additionally there is a fifth group with the so called untouchables or lower caste, presently 
most commonly called Dalits.  
Caste, as portrayed by historians and social scientists since the late 19th century, is 
governed by division and hierarchy. Some classical studies on caste are Srinivas (1962; 1975), 
Béteille (1997), Dumont (1980), and Mandelbaum (1970). These authors describe caste as it 
is represented in the classical or structuralist view. Dumont, a French anthropologist, states 
that caste is a system characterised by a rank order of values, and rituals linked to purity and 
pollution. As social units castes are endogamous groups with a traditional occupation and a 
hereditary membership. The basic criterion for ranking these groups is ritual purity. Purity 
and pollution of castes follow from their traditional occupation and stick to castes as a 
whole. Most polluting are death and bodily emissions. Castes whose traditional occupation 
entails contact with these elements, for instance slaughters, cleaners, washer men, 
leatherworkers and barbers, rank lower. All members of a caste - regardless of whether they 
follow its traditional occupation - share its rank in the hierarchy. Caste is considered a 
system with specific rules with regard to food, marriage etc. and specialisation in certain 
occupations appears to be pre-eminently suited for the purpose of avoiding, or at least 
regulating, contact with the impure (Kooiman, 1996). Caste can only be recognised in 
contrast to other castes whose members are involved in economic, political or social 
relationships or networks.  (Leach, 1960 in Subedi, 2008:164). 
Dumont argues that caste determines individual behaviour, obligations, and 
expectations. All social, economic, religious, legal, and political activities of a caste society 
are prescribed by sanctions that determine and limit access to land, position of political 
power, and command of human labour. The way in which people perceive their value of life 
depends on the caste they belong to. Most of the lower caste people believe in fate. They 
think that they occupy a lower status in the society because of their previous life. Higher 
caste people, on the other hand, believe they deserve their high status, because of merits 
achieved in a previous life. By believing in fate, those belonging to a particular caste continue 
their traditional occupations and culture, which results in the domination of high caste in 
every sphere of Nepalese society. For instance “for a long time Brahmins were not subject to 
the death penalty and were instead given the same status as cows in the Hindu religion” 
(Krämer 2008: 17). This social-cultural institution socialised people from birth onwards with 
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certain privileges and obligations with respect to the education they could seek, the 
occupation they could pursue, and so on. Likewise it shaped government institutions. By 
believing in fate, those belonging to a particular caste continued their traditions and culture, 
which resulted in the domination of higher castes in every sphere of Nepalese society. This 
structure is still reflected in everyday social interactions, for example in the structural 
exclusion of the lower castes from participation in FFS.  
In the field I experienced that lower caste people rarely make eye contact with higher 
caste people. I have observed that in many villages when I worked in Nepal, but also as 
recently as July 2009 in the Kavre district. Similarly lower ranked staff, such as peons seldom 
look their boss in the eyes.  They always seem to bow a bit, to show respect to their superior 
and demonstrate their own inferiority. Subordinate staff do not sit in the boss´office , unless  
told or given the sign to do so. 
The subtleties of rank within a caste cluster are often unknown or unrecognised by 
people outside it. For instance, washer men can simply be identified by others as Dhobi. But 
to Dhobis things look different. As Mandelbaum writes: “Those whose jati occupation is to 
wash clothes that are not only soiled, but soiled with the exudation of sweat, are therefore 
consigned to low jati rank” (Mandelbaum 1970:190).   
 
Simply said: One has a superior or inferior status, which is already determined by birth.  As 
one can see in Figure 2.3: Bhramins and Chettries, and high caste Newari were at the top 
and considered pure, also called Tagadhari or Wearers of holy cord. The middle rank was 
accorded to indigenous groups, generally belonging to the Mongoloid race speaking Tibeto-
Burman languages and following Buddhism or various animist/shamanist religions. They are 
classified by Hindus as Matwali, or liquor consumers. This classification is based on their 
division of work or the two categories: pure and impure; the caste(s) whose water is allowed 
to remain pure' and `the caste(s) whose water is defiled'. See Figure 2.3 
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Figure 2.3:  Caste pyramid in Nepal  
 
Sources: DFID and World Bank, 2006 
 
The above classification is often challenged. Subedi (2008) challenges the vision of caste as a 
rigid structure. Quigley (1993) and Gellner and Quigley (1999) deny the principle of ranking 
based upon ritual purity.   Many studies show that given time, means, organisation and a 
favourable political climate, castes and sub-castes (not individuals) can rise or otherwise 
challenge the status hierarchy (Subedi, 2008; Holmberg, 1989; Mandelbaum 1970; Jeffrey, 
2001). These studies confirm my view that caste is a social phenomenon, a set of 
understandings, and dynamic dispositions with permeable boundaries that are negotiated 
through agency. I concur with Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice (1990) which offers a fluid, 
reflexive notion of social phenomena such as caste, or any ordering principle that manifests 
itself in culture, lifestyles and identities (see Chapter 5 of this thesis). He explains how caste 
as an institution is reproduced through habitus and the employment of different kinds of 
resources in their interaction with others, in particular symbolic and social capital. The 
concept of habitus is used by Bourdieu to give a clarification how caste differences “become 
immanent in daily practices and encounters” (Jeffrey, 2001:221). People can only become a 
real privileged upper caste when individuals identify with one another and act together 
collectively. 
In Nepal caste is a unique and highly complex phenomenon Bista (1991). It has 
evolved from Hinduism, Shamanism, Buddhism and other religious traditions and adapted 
and adjusted to a socio-cultural system that already existed in the diverse geographically 
dispersed communities. The caste system as it exists in the Hindu religion and in India could 
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not be adopted easily in Nepal as it involved humiliation of certain groups in society, and 
putting others in a superior position. No one volunteers to become a member of a lower 
caste (Gurung,2005; Bennett, 2005; 2006; Gellner et al., 1997; Levine, 1987; Bista,1991 ). In 
contrast to what is often believed, caste is somewhat flexible, it is even possible, over 
several generations to improve ones’ caste status (Bista, 1991). For instance the Tamang 
(Höfer, 1976 who studied them intensively) were traditionally Tibetan speakers and long 
considered Bhotiya. Some decades ago government officials changed their jat in Tamang. 
This was a political move of the government to circumvent Tibetan claims to Nepalese 
territory, and the change in jat was presented as being to the advantage of Tamang, in  
making them   superior to Bhotiya. This process unified a heterogeneous group,  in this case 
the Tamang community,  whereby their incorporation into the caste system had the effect of 
social inclusion. Later Levine (1987) found that many Tamang had altered their status to 
Lama or Gurung which were both conceived as being even more prestigious. While caste is 
constructed by law to classify people into a group, individuals also actively create caste as a 
socio-economic, political tool in a social transformation process.  
 
At the start of the Panchayat system (1961 – 1990) the state abolished the legally sanctioned 
hierarchy and discrimination based on case, ethnicity and religion. The new code of 1963 
talked in terms of nationals rather than castes, and Nepalis for the first time began to think 
of themselves as citizens rather than subjects (de Sales, 2008; Bennett, 2006), however 
discrimination based on caste, ethnicity and gender continued (de Sales, 2008; Pradhan, 
2005). During this period the ruling elite and many development experts viewed cultural and 
linguistic diversity as hampering modernisation and development. The best approach to 
diversity was considered assimilation around a national standard, which favoured the male, 
high caste, Nepali speaking, educated Brahmin (Pradhan, 2007; Pfaff-Czarnecka, 1997; Bista, 
1991). 
The 2011 census (similar to the 2001 census) of Nepal showed the existence of more 
than 100 caste/ethnicity groups in the country. However, only seven of them have a 
population of more than 2.5 percent of the total population and only two of them have a 
population of more than 10 percent. They range from large caste/ethnic groups with more 
than 3 million people down to some very small groups having fewer than a thousand 
members (CBS, 2011). This shows the existence of several minor caste/ethnic groups. Among 
the dominant caste/ethnic groups none has a strong localised population concentration 
within anyone district. 
 
Caste dynamics are changing. Due to changes in the peasant economy and society through 
globalisation, the jobs that occupational castes traditionally perform have become obsolete 
(Nightingale, 2005). Much of the work done by cobblers and tailors or blacksmiths is no 
longer required because of increased availability of new products in the market, e.g. sport 
shoes from polyester, made in China. Many lower caste people found work as labourers in 
for instance, agriculture and construction. Traditional economic and social relations are 
under pressure and changed. The opening up of the transnational labour market has created 
possibilities for job migration for occupational castes and upper castes. Education has 
broadened the horizons of people and contributed to questioning caste relations. The inter-
dependence of castes and patron-client relations that have persisted from generation to 
generation are now subject to change. Occupational castes and dalits are no longer 
dependent on the goodwill of their feudal village leader or Brahmin landlord, as their 
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options for livelihood sustenance have broadened. Although discrimination still continues 
today (UNESCO, 2006), the rules are not as rigid as they were in the past. Nowadays, 
economic, class or political considerations tend to divide people rather than caste 
distinctions. 
In current society people use the concept of ethnicity and caste in a flexible way. 
While in the past people changed their names to get a higher status, now this happens the 
other way around; a Dalit name gives more opportunities, opens doors that were previously 
closed to them (Kathmandu, interview 2009).  
According to Act 11(4) of the Constitution of Nepal (1990), caste discrimination has 
been made punishable. The civil code has also been adapted accordingly. Nevertheless there 
is still plenty of evidence that the caste system continues to play an important role in 
society. Open up a newspaper and the dating ads are full of references to caste preferences. 
Look at internet sites and notice that typing in the word Bahun (upper caste), leads to 
weblogs full with abusive language against Brahmins by lower caste or ethnic minorities. In 
other words caste as an identifier and a form of social organisation remains significant 
(Jeffrey, 2001). In an interview an NGO staff member complained:  
 
I was working in an NGO and the majority of the staff was Brahmin. We got on 
very well and I felt respected. However, one evening all left the office for a party: 
a Brahmin only affair, and me being from Dalit caste I was the only one from our 
organisation not invited. I felt so sad and excluded (Lalitpur, December 2009). 
 
In 2007 the government again appointed mostly Brahmins, as can be read in the newsletter 
message below:  
 
Nepal Govt appoints 27 ministry secretaries: 20 are Brahmins, outrageous 
exclusion continues to prevail 
Kathmandu, October 11, 2007- The Government of Nepal has appointed 27 
secretaries (Special class officers) to head various ministerial bureaucracies in the 
country. Not deviant from the past non-inclusive practice in the governance, 
74.1% secretaries hand-picked by the current so called pro-inclusion government 
are from Brahmin caste, which accounts for only 16% of the country’s total 
population. There is a total absence of representation from the Dalit community 
in both the executive and judiciary branches of the state. 
(Nepaldalitinfo.net, 2007) 
 
Within the caste ideology only endogamous marriage is accepted, not inter-caste marriage. 
This is changing but still many people are reluctant to accept the ‘other’ within the family. As 
is illustrated by the following quotes from my interviews: 
 
Four years ago it was not thought of in our family to marry outside Newari caste, 
now my cousin married a Magar. We are all accepting her, but not during religious 
activities. Times are changing (Lalitpur, Newari woman, December 2009). 
 
My husband’s brother just recently married someone from a lower caste. She is 
very nice. I wanted to invite her to our house but my mother- in- law stopped it. 
She said: if you invite her, I will never come in your house again. So I gave in, 
because my mother- in- law is a strong woman (Gurung woman/officer. Lalitpur, 
December 2009). 
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Many lower caste citizens feel disappointed by the subsequent governments and realise that 
they themselves have to shape their future rather than wait for the rulers to be concerned 
about them. The interview fragment below gives the example of the experience of a Dalit 
man: 
 
Kumar is a Dalit man, age 45. He set up his own carpentry business in his village. 
“We Dalit are lucky we have many skills, we can get many types of work”. He also 
admits that Dalits in his village are not serious about education, many drop out 
after class 5 and look for a job in the city or nearby the Melamchi construction 
site.  “ One year ago life   became easier for us. We can sit with the Thulo Jaat 
(upper caste), we do not have to wash our tea cup anymore”.  He has been 
appointed the treasurer of the drinking water committee by an NGO. His friend 
Shiva, who is a blacksmith, and also Dalit, became the president of this 
committee. The NGO was willing to install a drinking water system in their village, 
in particular for the benefit of the Dalit community. One of the project 
requirements was a Dalit president and treasurer in the drinking water 
committee.  Brahmin dominate the village but there is a large Dalit community 
too. The Brahmin are also interested in drinking water, because water is a big 
concern in this village. The Brahmins are not happy that the Dalit man had to 
become the head of this committee, but they had no choice. The other members 
and thus the majority of the committee are from the upper caste. The Brahmins 
organised the construction in such a way that the tank is built in their area and 
thus gave them more access to drinking water. During the meetings the Dalit men 
have a hard time because the upper caste people never agree with them and 
always create tension or conflict: complain about lack of water for farming, saying 
that water does not reach their house etc. This way they boycott smooth 
functioning of the drinking water system. To insist on Dalits chairing the drinking 
water committee antagonised the dominant caste, and as a result the project 
might not be successfully completed.  (Kumar. Yamdi, 2009) 
 
During the war, Maoists gave a lot of attention to vulnerable excluded groups such as Dalits. 
Kumar adds: 
 
Thanks to the Maoists we learnt to raise our voice. They stayed with us and we 
discussed during many late nights about changing our position. We felt they 
fought for us and we took their sides. But now the war is over and the political 
leaders have all returned to Kathmandu. If we really want change we have to do it 
ourselves, we cannot rely on the Maoists fighters and political leaders”.  (Kumar. 
Yamdi, Interview, 2009) 
 
 
2.2.3 Ethnicity 
 
Caste is often referred to as vertical social differentiation and ethnicity as horizontal spatial 
differentiation. This is not entirely a clear division in Nepal since ethnic groups have been 
(forcedly) included in the caste system.  
Similar to the discussion related to caste, ethnicity is approached in various ways. 
Some consider ethnicity from an essentialist point of view (Geertz, 1973) as if ethnicity has 
always been an aspect of social identity, and persisted over long periods of time.  
 49 
 
Instrumentalists, on the other hand, treat ethnicity as ‘a social, political and cultural resource 
for different interest and status groups´ (Subedi, 2008).  
The ethnic situation we face in Nepal today is a mixture of governmental attempts to 
grapple with the country’s unique ethnic diversity and people’s responses to the system the 
government created (Levine, 1987). Nowadays there is an increased sense of ethnic 
solidarity as a result of the defensive reaction against the intrusive and dominating activities 
of the Brahmin – Chettries (Bennett, 2006). 
In Nepal efforts to define ethnicity have been numerous (Pfaff-Czarnecka, 1997; 
1999) and the views have changed from a constructed identity to an imagined community 
(Anderson, 1991). Recently it has become a highly politicised concept, as a result of conflicts 
over resources and internal politics. In Nepal, academics, government and other 
organisations use the word Janajati, indicating ethnicity is synonymous with indigenous/ 
national/tribal identity (Subedi, 2008). This is confusing because indigeneity and ethnicity 
are not identical. Indigeneity is related to specific historical continuity (Nair, 2006), whereas 
ethnicity is a social phenomenon (Gurung, 2005). Not only academics, also ordinary people 
in Nepal debate about the term Janajati, as one taxi driver said: “I do not like to be called 
Janajati, I am a Limbu, not just part of a big anonymous group with whom I do not share 
anything” (Kathmandu, 2009).Others say: “I like the term Janajati, it makes us smaller groups 
united against the Brahmin/Chettries” (Magar, interview, Kaski, 2009) 
 
Despite the differences of opinion regarding the term Janajati, I will use the term in this 
thesis to indicate all Nepalese ethnic groups as it is defined in the Interim Constitution of 
2007 (page 36). In this Constitution they elaborate: “it is a person who is not a Brahmin or a 
Chettri, a Dalit or a member of the Madhesi community (Interim Constitution, 2007:36). For 
ethnicity I use Gellner’s definition: “Ethnicity is commonly understood to be the social 
differentiation derived from cultural criteria such as a shared history, a common place of 
origin, language, and values of a given territory or at least a historical link to these shared 
features which there constitute of an ethnic group”. (Gellner, 1997 in Subedi, 2008:175). For 
me ethnicity, like caste, is a social construct. It is not a rigid structure, but can be shaped by 
people. Ethnic boundaries are flexible and can sometimes be applied to people’s own 
advantage. 
Analysis of Nepal’s ethnic groups is complicated by the sensitive nature of ethnic and 
linguistic identity and the fact that no anthropological or linguistic survey of the population 
has ever been conducted. The names of ethnic groups often are derived from the language 
they speak, and ethnic identity is based on various combinations of national origin, region, 
language, religion, and caste. The broadest classification of ethnicity is national origin, which 
includes three major groups: Indo-Nepalese, who originated in India; Tibeto-Nepalese, who 
are of Tibeto-Mongol origin; and indigenous Nepalese, whose habitation predates the other 
groups. Nepal’s census provides more specific ethnic classifications, including more than 100 
ethnic and caste groups that are classified into five larger groups on the basis of shared and 
prominent cultural traits. The government acknowledges, however, that these categories are 
provisional and arbitrary. (See also Figure 2.2) 
Subedi (2008) showed how Duras became Gurungs in the process of modernisation 
and adaptation, because being recognised as Gurung was considered a better option for 
many people from the Dura community (Subedi, 2008). He showed how Dura constructed 
their identities and set out to make their own lives under the circumstances given. Dura can 
“secure opportunity, security and empowerment if they are bound with the larger 
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community” (ibid:177). This larger community is found among the Gurung which has similar 
rites and ritual practices.  Like caste, ethnicity matters, but it is a not rigid institution. 
In accordance with these authors, some of the respondents in my own research 
admitted pretending to use another caste or ethnicity identity to their own advantage. For 
example: 
  
I am a Magar. Our reputation is that we carry the Khukuri (sharp knife), fight and 
steal and are more backward than Brahmins. Nowadays you see that people 
change their names. They want to pretend to be a Dalit instead of a higher caste.  
Sometimes in the past I pretended that I was Chettrie, because of my surname 
(Thapa), nowadays I proudly say that I am a Magar or Janajati. (NGO staff, 
Kathmandu, 2009) 
 
Nepal does have ethnic problems. The democratic mobilisation of the 1990 movement saw 
mass participation of Nepal’s ethnic groups or Janajati  and other marginalised groups but 
once multi-party democracy was established under King Birendra, they were excluded from 
decision-making positions (de Sales, 2008). The Constitution ratified in November 1999 
ambiguously defined Nepal as a ‘multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, democratic, independent, 
indivisible, sovereign, Hindu and Constitutional monarchical Kingdom (Gellner et all, 2008 
:13). The fact that Hindu was stated to be the only religion was controversial and indicated 
the lack of recognition of other beliefs and created doubts about genuine acceptance of 
cultural and ethnic differences.  
The different 'people's movements' provided several groups with the room to 
express their opinions openly and to assert their identities and rights as citizens. Since then, 
various ethnic and indigenous groups have begun to express their grievances. The waves of 
discussions and debates over the issue of ethnic conflicts and cultural, religious and lingual 
discrimination are holding the nation in its grips. While the 1990 Constitution expressed a 
strive for unity and Hindu as the only religion, the present interim constitution of Nepal 2007 
however, states that in "recognising the mandate of the Nepali people expressed, from time 
to time prior to 1951 until now, through historical struggles and people's movements for 
democracy, peace and progress," the nation is the "common aspiration of multiethnic, 
multilingual, multi religious, multi cultural characteristics…" (Interim Constitution 2007: 
article 3, page 56) Hence the heterogeneity of nation has been finally recognised to provide 
opportunities for historically marginalised people i.e. ethnic people, Dalits, women and other 
minorities. 
The recognition of a separate identity of ethnic groups can contribute to strengthen 
the process of national integration but also fracture the country. Some grieve the downfall 
of a harmonious Hindu kingdom, the flower garden of four varnas and 36 jats which speak a 
common language, follow a common religion, share a heroic past and are led by a divine and 
caring king. Others express relief that this false idyllic is no longer artificially maintained, and 
describe Nepal’s past as one of oppression and see opportunities for a better society if only 
it finds a way to appreciate and deal with its religious, lingual and ethnic plurality (Fisher, 
2008).  
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2.3 Administrative system 
 
Apart from ethnic and cultural values, constitutional and legislative rules and regulations 
play a role in specifying rights and duties of men and women. At the time of writing this 
thesis the constitution was being revised and legislations amended. The administrative 
system is under debate and is likely to change. At the time of my research, Nepal was 
administratively still divided into five development regions spread over 14 zones (headed by 
appointed commissioners)and 75 districts(under the charge of district officers responsible 
for law and order, collecting revenues, and setting development priorities. The districts are 
further divided into smaller units— into municipalities and village development committees 
(VDC). Until 2008, there were 3,913 VDCs and 58 municipalities in the country. A VDC 
consists of nine wards, while the number of wards in the urban municipalities depends on 
the size of the population as well as political considerations.  The chiefs of municipalities and 
VDCs are directly elected. This division was made as part of the panchayat reforms and 
remains largely in place  today, although panchayats as a unit were abolished in the early 
1990s, but it is subject of current political discussions.  
Decision-making processes in the government system are increasingly decentralised. 
Currently more and more central government funds are directly transferred to VDCs and 
district government offices.  Still,  decision-making  on  major  issues  remains  largely top-
down in a governance structure in which  the  centre  exercises  disproportionate  and  
sometimes inappropriate influence.  
The  District Development Committee  Act  specifies  that  the  Local  Development  
Ministry  shall  execute, supervise,  monitor  and  coordinate  the  development  program  of  
the  district  formulated  by  the District  Development  Project  Coordination  Committee.  
Such  control  over  the  process  of  decision-making  enforces  an  upward  accountability  
and  disables  the  local  authorities.  The organisation  process  of  coordination  and  control  
among  central  government  and  ministries,  DDCs, constituencies, municipalities  and  
VDCs,  are  not  well  defined. At  the  local  level  VDC,  municipality  and  ward  levels  there  
is  no  equity  in  participation  or  representation  of  women, Dalits  and  marginalised  
people. DDC authorities are indirectly elected by people's representatives.  Therefore,  they  
are  not  as  sensitive  to  the consequences  of  their  actions  as  are  the  VDC  and  
municipal  authorities  who  are  directly  elected.   
VDC  roles  involve  agriculture  development,  drinking  water,  construction  and  
transport,  education  and  sports,  irrigation, soil  erosion,  river  control,  physical  
infrastructure,  health  service,  forest  and  environment,  language  and  culture,  tourism  
and cottage  industry,  etc.   
The  secretaries  of  VDCs  have  to  work  under  the  direction  of  the  Chairman  
(Mayor  in  the  case  of  municipality  and President  in  the  case  of  DDC).  The  functions,  
duties  and  powers  of  the  VDC  secretary  are administrative, such as book-keeping, 
maintaining records of the population, but also attending VDC meetings. 
 
Before we look at the present governance situation, it is good to go back to the early days of 
Nepal, because it tells us where Nepal has come from. The  context  of  the Nepalese  
governance system has  its  own  characteristics  that  create  changing  opportunities  and  
challenges.  Institutional arrangements have been passed down from history.  These  
institutional aspects determine  the  overall  governance  arrangements,  more  specifically  
the  equity  distribution  between  citizens,  and  the  power  relations  between  state  and  
 52 
 
citizen  and  how  the  current  arrangement  got  in  place. According to Louise Brown 
(1996:1) the current political system has the same characteristics as the earlier political 
system. It continues “to be hierarchical, centralised and riddled with conspiracies and 
dominated by a complex patron-client nexus”. 
 
2.4 Brief historical overview of governance in Nepal 
 
Originally the Himalaya area, the present Nepal territory, was inhabited by people from 
Tibeto- Burmese origin in small autonomous states. Nepal’s history books usually omit the 
early years of Nepal and start with a reference to the events of the 18th century when Prithvi 
Naryana Shah, who initiated Nepal as a Hindu Kingdom. For  79  years,  this  king  was  the  
dominant  figure  in  ruling  the  country.  Prithvi Shah managed to unite all the warring 
kingdoms in a strategic way: he placed his kingdom under Vishnu, a Hindu deity’s patronage 
and portrayed himself as the messenger of god, to legitimise his power (Bouilier, 1991). 
During and after the formation of the state Nepal, the ruling class was composed of the 
military hierarchy of Gorkhas (Thakuri and Chetri) and Brahmin attendants and advisors. 
During the conquest, Magars and Gurung were involved in the fighting, but were gradually 
marginalised. The rulers lacked administrative and financial skills and invited Newars to 
become members of the ruling elite. These high castes supervised the political system and 
extracted surplus and labour from low caste artisans.  
The  palace was  the  centre  of  decision-making power,  while  binding  rules  and  
enforcing  laws  were  delegated  to  local functionaries.  The king was held responsible for 
the well-being of the kingdom, an idea which has not totally disappeared today. Politics and 
religion were interconnected (Bouilier, 1991; Quigley, 2000).  
The country was virtually isolated from outside influence till 1950, although it 
remained a de facto protectorate of the British from 1816 till 1923. All the land belonged to 
the King, and individuals could only use land under various forms of conditional tenure. 
Agriculture  production  was  the  major  economic preoccupation  to  sustain  the  peasant  
households,  landowners,  the  state  and  the  state  class.  The  surplus  generated  by  the  
farmers  went  to  pay  for  the  administration and military  campaigns  of  the  country 
(Regmi,  1978).   
Land  and  land-based  resources  have  been  the  principal  source  of  economic  
surplus  generated  by  the  ruling  classes.  Prithvi  Narayan  Shah started with this practice, 
his  officials  were  granted  land  in  lieu  of  salary.  The  king  gave  his  land  (but  it  
remained  his  property)  for  military  (jagir),  political  rewards  (birta),  or  to  set  up  
institutions  (guthi)  (Regmi,  1978; Wiley et al., 2009).  Up to today Jagir is still a term used 
for employment.  With  no  direct  relationship  to  the  state,  the farmers,  living and 
working  on  these  lands  were  basically  subjected  to  their  landowners (Gautam, 1991).  
The land tenure  system  has  been  consistent  with  the  predominant  patron-client  
relationship  between  the  state  and  its  citizens.  A  patron-client  relationship  means  a  
mutually  obligatory  arrangement  between  a  person  who  has  authority,  social  status,  
wealth  or  some  other  personal  resource  (patron)  and  another  person  who  benefits  
from  his  or  her  support  or  influence  (client).  
For  a  long  time,  administration  was  held  in  Kathmandu  and  there  was  not  
much  feeling  of  involvement  of  rural  people  in  government  ruling  in  Nepal.  Due  to  
geographical  problems  (mountains,  poor  infrastructure,  poor  access  in  hilly  areas)  
people  did  not  travel  much  to  and  from  Kathmandu.  Up  to  this  day,  it  is  felt  that  
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politicians,  policy  makers,  government  officers  and  international  NGO  workers  remain 
focused on the Kathmandu  valley. It  is  a  stereotypical  remark  but  the  large number  of  
blue-plate  four-wheel  drive  vehicles  in  the  valley confirms  this  view. 
 
The Shah family remained the ruling force till the mid-19th century when they lost control of 
Nepal to the Rana dynasty. Under their rule, the countryside was drawn into a national 
political-economy through the extraction of resources, a system of personal reward and 
punishment, and forced labour (Riaz and Basu, 2007; Regmi, 1978).  The  government  at  
that  time  was  not  concerned  with  promotion  of  ethnic  or  national  homogeneity,  just  
minimal  respect  for  Hindu  norms  (Gellner  et all.,  2008). The  Rana’s  only  employed  
their  own  family  or  people  who  they  could  trust. People  who  were  seeking  
employment  had  to  give  a  certain  amount  of  money,  called  chakari.  A term that is still 
in use but expanded more freely to indicate seeking a favour in general. 
The  country  was  under  the  strict  rule  of  the  Rana  family  for  over  a  century.  
The Ranas did verything to prevent opposition.  They discouraged education,  suppressed  
any  attempt  at  political  change and  spent  little  on  public  welfare  (Regmi,  1978;  Riaz  
and  Basu,  2007; Gellner et al. 2008). 
Nepal has never been colonised, but was  a  de  facto  protectorate  of  the  British  
from  1816  till  1923.  The  British  turned  a  blind  eye  to  the suppressive  affairs  in  Nepal  
(Riaz and Basu, 2007). The Ranas restricted access to foreigners.  They did not want 
outsiders to influence their ‘sovereign’ status.  They  could,  however,  not  prevent  people  
from   leaving  to  study  in  India,  which  is  what  some  ‘better  off’  people  did.  The  Ranas  
regarded  education  as  a  privilege  for  the  elite,  and  considered  knowledge  as  a  symbol  
of  social  status  as  well  as  a  tool  for  dominance  over  the  society.  They  were  also  
concerned  that  if  the  general  public  would  get  education  their  superior status  might  
get  challenged. 
In 1951 the Rana’s were overthrown, by an armed movement led by Nepali Congress 
members, mostly educated in India. King  Tribuvhan Shah, a  direct  descendant  of  King 
Prithvi  Shah, reclaimed power with  support  from  India (Gellner  et  al.,  2008). There  was  
no  constitution  and  no  elections  were  held,  the  king  became  the  head  of  the  state  
and  restored  all  power. 
During  the  1950s,  efforts  were  made  to  frame  a  constitution  for  Nepal  that  
would  establish  a  representative  form  of  government.  In  1952  with  assistance  from  
the  United  Nations,  Indian  administrative  experts  were  invited  to  introduce  a  proper  
administration  system.  The  result  of  this  can  still  be  seen  today,  the  Nepalese  
administration  is  similar  to the Indian system,  designed  with  British  colonial  influence. 
 
A  period  of  quasi-constitutional  rule, a period of democratic experimentation followed,  
during  which  the  monarch (first  Tribuvhan,  later  Mahendra) assisted  by  the  leaders  of  
young  political  parties,  governed  the  country.   
In 1960, the  parliamentary  system  was  criticised  by  the  king  as  being  unable  to  
make  their  leaders  responsible  to  the  people  rather  than  their  own  parties.  In 1961, 
King Mahendra dismissed the cabinet, dissolved parliament, and banned political parties. A 
1962 constitution created a non-party panchayat (council) system of government. This was a 
four-tiered system of representative government with traditional village-level councils at the 
local level and the National Panchayat at the national level.  NGOs were banned because 
they would increase internal conflict.  The  Queen  headed  the Social Welfare Council,  
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where  so  called  welfare  organisations  could  register,  approved  by  the  state  (read:  
Royal family). Unity  of  the  nation  and  nationalism was promoted,  summarised  with  the  
slogan:  “one  language,  one  dress,  one  country” (Gellner  et  al.,  2008). This system 
stayed in place for more than 30 years.  The country was ruled by the King and his followers.  
The  1950s  and  1960s  were  important  for  present-day  development  in  Nepal.  At  
that  time  the  foundations  for  bilateral  relations  were  laid  and  political  structures  
changed. During  the  Panchayat  era  education  and  health  service,  as  well  as  
development,  were  brought  to  the  country.  Social change was set in motion.  
In this period, the labour migration of men, first to India and later to Malaysia, and 
“Arab” states started. Men from the Tibeto-Burmese ethnic groups (e.g. Gurung, Rai, Magar) 
were recruited for the Indian and British Army, and are popularly known as the Gurkha 
fighters.   
 
2.4.1 Multi-party (1990 and beyond) 
 
A  pro-democratic  people’s  movement  brought  down  the  Panchayat  system  in  early  
1990.  King Birendra Shah agreed to large-scale political reforms by creating a parliamentary 
monarchy with the king as the head of state and a prime minister as the head of the 
government. The  constitution  of  1990  transformed  Nepal  into  a  constitutional  Hindu  
monarchy  and  established  a  multiparty system. Political parties agreed that the monarchy 
would remain to enhance political stability and provide an important symbol of national 
identity for the culturally diverse Nepali people.   
The new political leaders in the 1990s, who were mainly from the urban Brahmin, 
Chettries, and Newar elite groups, were widely seen as being corrupt, and reinforcing 
discriminatory power relations and traditional hierarchies in political, social and economic 
organisations. Most of the population felt excluded and were dissatisfied with government 
decisions and remained politically and economically marginalised (Stevenson, 2001). The 
ruling parties did not provide stable governments.  Patron-client  mobilisation (Mishra, 2007) 
and  internal  party  squabbling  led  to  collapse  of  their  reign (Mishra, 2007).  UML  has  a  
strong  organisational  network  in  rural  areas,  gets  support  from  unskilled  labourers,  
organises  peasant  movements  and  urban  artisans,  but  leadership  is  dominated  by  
central  hill  Brahmins (Mishra, 2007).  
The  period  after  1990  is  marked  with  a  shift  from  coercive  state  power  to  
decentralisation,  participation  and  citizen  control.  A  Maoist  movement,  which  was  
violently  declared  official  in  February  1996,  caused  increasing  problems  for  the  
government  over  the  years. Up until 2004 thirteen governments came to power (Riaz and 
Basu, 2007). The 2001 massacre at theRoyal Palace added to the unrest. The  entire  royal  
family  was  murdered  on  1  June  2001  under  mysterious  circumstances,  and  the  dead  
king’s  brother,  Gyanendra,  was  crowned  king  on  4  June  2001.  
In  2005,  King  Gyanendra  declared  a  state  of  emergency,  and  with  the  
assistance  of  the  army,  seized  power.  A  comprehensive  peace  agreement  with  the  
Maoists  opened  the  way  for  the  new  interim  constitution  that  came  into  force  on  15  
January  2007.  A  new  parliament  was  formed  that  included  representatives  of  all  
parties,  including  the  Maoists.  On  28  May  2008,  the  CA  abolished  the  institution  of  
monarchy  and  declared  Nepal  a  federal  republic.  Ram  Baran  Yadav  (NC)  was  elected  
to  be  the  first  president  of  Nepal  in  July  2008. Kingship might have been abolished but 
it no doubt survives in several institutions such as patriarchy, divine sovereignity. 
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 At  the  time  of  writing  Nepal  is  in  a  state  of  political  turmoil,  with  no  
constitution  yet  (June 2012),  the Constituent Assembly dissolved (27 May 2012) and  with  
the  Maoist  still claiming to be ready  to  go  back  to  the  jungle,  to  continue  their  
revolution  and  to  take  up  arms  again. Current political discussions boil down to whether 
Nepal should have federal provinces named after indigenous groups or  a few provinces with 
neutral or geographical names as it is now.  
The remarks by Karin Landgren Special  Representative  of  the  Secretary-General  
and  chief  of  UN  Mission  in  Nepal  (UNMIN)  show that among the international 
community there is also still cautiousness regarding the fragile peace process. During  a  
briefing  to  the  UN  Security  council  on  Nepal’s  peace  process  she said  that  although  
Nepal’s  “dramatic  political  gains”  were  not  likely  to  be  reversed,  she  warned  of  a  
prospect  of  a  “people’s  revolt”  which  she  said  remains  an  explicit  Maoist  threat  and  
of  the  President  stepping  in  an  Army  backed  coup.  “Any  such  measure  would  sorely  
threaten  peace  and  Nepal’s  fragile  democracy,”  she  concluded.  (Nepalnews website, 
2011)16 
 
2.4.2 Present situation 
 
The current government system is in place due to Maoist pressure, with more attention for 
inclusion of ethnic minorities and lower caste people. At international level however, there is 
donor influence, with budget constraints, donations and development paradigms. But also 
the fact that Nepal is so called ‘bolder between two giant powers’, China and India, has an 
influence on governance in Nepal (Gyawali, 2002). Since early history ruling families in Nepal 
had close ties with leaders in India. Nowadays, most of the exports from Nepal occur via 
India, most common good arrive from India, and increasingly the market receives consumer 
goods from China. Politicians from India have a direct influence on the government of Nepal. 
This becomes evident for instance in border discussions, but also in development of 
hydropower plants and river management. Nepalese politicians frequently visit India for 
talks over internal and external affairs. Many politicians have received their education in 
India. The political collaboration with China is not as close as with India, probably because 
Nepalese leaders and citizens feel more associated with India (ethnicity, language, culture, 
etc.) and part of the South Asian subcontinent. 
Additionally Nepal  is heavily dependent  on donor funds  and its policies  are  
strongly  influenced  by  the  agendas  or  prevailing  paradigms  of  aid  agencies. Sixty-five 
percent of its development expenditure comes from foreign aid. About 30 percent of the 
regular expenditure goes for debt servicing (Dahal, 1996).   Nepal´s dependence  on  foreign 
aid  for  its  development  goals  has  made  donors important  actors in  the  country’s 
overall governance.  
After 1990 and even more so after 2006 many political but also administrative 
changes occurred.  The  government  focus  shifted  from  a control and force system to a 
more  development-oriented  approach  through  peoples’  participation  and  
decentralisation,  by  reduced  state  involvement  in  service  delivery.  This  was  
accompanied  by  structural  adjustment,  in  which  expenses  for  government  services  
were  cut  and  positions  removed.  All  these  changes  were  imposed  on  the  Nepalese  
government  by  the  external  community  and  donor  agencies  such  as  the  World  Bank.  
                                                 
16
  http://www.nepalnews.com/archive/2011/jan/jan07/news05.php (accessed 7 Jan  2011) 
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However,  they  fitted  progressively  with  the  view  of  the  people  that  the  government  
was  ineffective,  not  addressing  their  needs  and  that  the  voice  of  the  common  people  
needed  to  be  heard. 
Recently  there  have  been  more  reforms  in  the  governance  system  to  make  
services more socially inclusive, administration  more  efficient,  effective  and  responsive  to  
popular  demand,  thereby  making  reservation  for  women,  Dalit  and  ethnic  community  
representatives.  However,  this  is  still  in  an  early  stage,  the  effective  implementation  is  
yet  to  materialise. 
During the interviews that I conducted in 2009, people expressed that their present 
impression of the government is not very positive.  People  in  the  village  where  the  
interviews  took  place  do  not  feel taken  seriously  by  the  government.  When  asked  
what  they  think  about  the  government  system  they  react  negatively:  “Our  government  
is  not  good,  the  leaders  are  selfish,  the  government  is  not  responsive  to  us  people  in  
the  villages”  (Interviews, 2009).   
MacFarlane  (1994)  confirmed  that  there  are  constant  complaints  about  the  
working  of  officers,  who  need  bribes,  are  rude,  and  are  usually  absent  from  their  
desk.  Villagers  commonly  experience  that  even  for  the  most  insignificant  business  they  
are  told  to  come  back  another  day,  unless  they  produce  extra  cash.  There  are  fears  
of  the  police,  who  can  be  brutal,  discriminating, reliable  and  not  accountable  for  their  
behaviour. 
Government officers and NGO staff acknowledge that the government system is 
changing in a positive direction but that many weaknesses remain:  
 
“The  government  has  changed  a  bit,  the  system  has  become  a  bit  more  
transparent,  we  have  started  to  consider  the  needs  of  the  people  a  bit  
more,  but  still  there  is  a  long  way  to  go  to  improve  the  system”  
(Kathmandu, Interview  with  government  officer  Dec 2009) 
 
A situation commonly found in government offices is described below with a fragment from 
observations during my research (Research notes, July 2009) 
 
Current  impression  of  government  organisation  in  Nepal. 
   
The district agricultural office of Tanahun looks empty.  It  is  an  ordinary  Tuesday  
afternoon,  2pm,  the  sun  is  shining,  some  peons  sit  in  the  shade  outside  
under  a  tree.  The place seems deserted.  Five, six offices are unoccupied.  The 
walls  are  grey  and  dirty.  In  one  of  the  corner  rooms  there  is  a  group  of  4 
men,  all  Brahmin,  sitting  together,  drinking  tea,  gossiping, or exchanging the 
latest news items.  The chief of the office is not in.  His  whereabouts  are  
unknown,  and  nobody  seems  to  be  the least bothered  about  that.  The  office  
desks  are  almost  empty,  just  a  few  papers  on  a  heap  here  and  there.  Just 
1-2 computers, with a secretary typing away.  A typical situation in any district 
government office. 
(Personal observation July 2009) 
 
There  are  several  reasons  that  citizens  express  negative  feelings  about  the  
government  and  politicians  in  general.  First  of  all  there  is  the  history  of  the  state  and  
an  elite  ruling  the  country  without  considering  the  needs  or  addressing  priorities  of  
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ordinary  men  and  women.  Additionally  there  are  also  several  factors  why  the  
government  is  not  functioning  well.  Some of these reasons are: 
 
Heavy, hierarchical bureaucracy   
 
“Working  in  the  government  is  heavily  bureaucratised,  decision-making  is  a  
lengthy  administrative  procedure.  This  hampers  effective  work  and  is  a  
reason  for  some  officials  not  to  bother  with  some  activities”.  (Government 
officer,  interview  2009) 
 
The existence of the ‘tippani’ or the paper trail illustrates the lengthy bureaucratic ways 
decisions are being made in government institutions. One government officer explained 
what tippani means: 
 
“Bureaucrats in Nepal are safe players. Nobody wants to take risks even when it is 
not so dangerous for them. Let’s share the risk is their motto, that's why tippani is 
a safety tool for everybody  and popular among decision-makers .There is  some 
logic in the tippani, it is based on rules and regulations which need to be followed 
before a decision is taken. This is the positive point. But the bureaucrats can play 
and interpret the rules and thus take the decision as they like .It’s quite 
hierarchical (from lower rank officer to secretary) and sometimes takes a few 
months to decide. I can give you an example – One of my friends got an offer for 
training from abroad and he applied in his department for approval. Now the 
tippani process started and when he finally got the ok from the secretary the 
training was over. This is a very common case for us. 
 
Many of our colleagues  just leave the tippani on their desk and block the process. 
They say: ”You are enjoying yourselves in Europe or America and earning as well, I 
remain stuck here, why  should I bother with your work?”Many officers keep it 
shelved in cupboards.  “Why  work for you, if you are not doing anything special 
for me?” "(Government officer, Department of Agriculture, interview, 2009) 
 
Frequent transfers 
 
“Government  staff  gets  transferred  every  2-3  year,  so  staff  do  not  care  if  
they  do  a  poor  job.  If  they  make  a  mistake  they  will  not  actually get  
punished  ,  they  get  transferred  to  another  place.  There  is  no  
accountability.”  (Government officer, interview  Dec  09) 
 
 Lack  of  accountability 
 
“Government  trainers  are  not  so  motivated  to  work  in  the  field.  They  have  
a  permanent  job,  so  why  bother  to  make any  extra  efforts,  when  you  can  
get  a salary  by  doing  nothing.  They also have not much interest in improving 
their knowledge.  Monitoring and evaluation is weak, almost  non-existent”. (NGO 
staff, interview 2009) 
 
For many government officers their tasks are not always clear, especially when they get 
involved in a new project.   
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“Many tasks are not incorporated in the terms  of  reference. When a new project 
comes, tasks are simply added to your workload. This is  also  the  case  of  Farmer 
Field Schools.  This  activity  is  not  included  in  the  TOR  of  staff”  (government 
staff, interview 2009) 
 
Neo-patrimonialism, patron-client, nepotism  and  corruption 
Neo-patrimonialism17  influences politics  in  Nepal.  Rather  than  representing  the  interests  
of  Nepal  as  a  whole,  people  who  are  elected  or  appointed  to  positions  of  power  
tend  to  exercise  that  power  to  benefit  the  interests  of  the  group  that  installed  them  
in  their  post. This goes back to the time of the Shah or Rana ruling, when relatives and 
trusted people where appointed. Government positions are governed by persistent patron-
client relationships (Gyawali, 2002; Malla, 1996). Nepotism also plays a role in the working 
system  of  Nepal.  People  with  relatives  in  positions  of  power  and  influence  expect  
those  individuals  to  direct  resources  (public  spending,  jobs,  contracts)  towards  the  
interest  of  the  family  or  kin,  rather  than  to  the  country  as  whole.  “If we do not do a 
favour while we are in power, we will lose respect from our ahpno manche18”(Interview, 
female officer, Tanahun, 2009) 
Corruption is common practice in Nepal. The country scores high on the global 
Corruption Perception Index (146 out of 178 countries)19 . The Economist also reports 
widespread corruption and misuse of funds: 
 
Accounts of rampant corruption from the provinces are echoed by officials at the 
Ministry of Finance , at the government’s anti-corruption bodies and the National 
Planning Commission, and by members of the donor community who would only 
speak off-the-record.  
The only sustained denial comes from some senior aid officers and donors who 
insist there is only “low-level”, “petty” and “isolated” corruption in local bodies. 
(Source The Economist 31 May 2011) 
 
Knowing  that  their  time  in  power  might  be  short-lived,   individuals  have  a  short  term  
horizon  and  a  narrow  vision  of  what  they  hope  to  achieve  (Hagmann,  2005).  Whether  
people are  personally  corrupt  or  not,  is  beside  the  point  –  the  consequence  is  a  
distorted  governance  process.   
Evaluation  and  job  performance  mechanisms  have  been  developed  but  the  
implementation  is  weak.  Personal  linkages  with  higher  authorities  play  a  vital  role  in  
personnel  matters.  Employees  tend  to  please  their  bosses  rather  than  focus  on  
excellent  performance. Placement, promotion and transfer rules are flexibly implemented.  
Some  postings  are  considered  as  a  reward,  others  as  a  punishment,  e.g. remote 
mountain  districts.   
Despite the negative image getting a government job remains popular.  People like 
working for the government for several reasons: it provides one with security, status and 
financial benefits. As one government officer said:  
 
                                                 
17
 Neo-patrimonialism,  is  a  term  that  describes  political  regimes  in  which  the  collective  interests  
of  society  as  a  whole  are  subordinated  to  the  much  narrower  interests  of  people  in  power  and  
their  patrons  and  clients.   
18 
 Aphno manche means ‘own people’, indicating relatives in the broad sense. 
19 
 http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/regional_highlights, accessed 
02.03.2012) 
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 “I  like  working  for  the  government  because  it  gives  me  status,  and  good  
provision  for  a  pension,  medical  insurance.  I  also  like  it  because  it  is  well  
structured.  Wherever  you  go,  in  each  district  the  structure  is  in  place  and  it  
is  the  same.  There  are  the  same  procedures  in  all  government  offices.  
When  I  worked  in  the  NGO  sector  it  was  not  like  that,  the  procedures  
changes  when  the  donor  changed,  it  was  more  project  based  and  at  
random”  (interview  with  senior  government  officer,  Dec  2009) 
 
“When I get a job in the government, it is for sure that my future is guaranteed. I 
know that I can provide for my family” (Nepalese Master student, interview 2010) 
 
 
2.5 Maoist people’s war 
 
The Maoist insurgency or People’s War, as the Maoists prefer to call their fight, began in 
1996, six years after the restoration of multiparty democracy (most likely the unrest started 
much earlier20). One key aim of their fight or revolution was: to establish "The People's 
Republic of Nepal." This they have achieved, but still their struggle is continuing.  
 
2.5.1 Cause 
 
The Maoist insurgency in Nepal has been viewed from different perspectives: as a 
consequence of failed development, as an ethnic uprising, and a result of bad governance 
(Hachhethu, 2004).  
Frequent government changes and inside party conflicts have shaped the political 
scene since the 1990s. Power grabbing, internal quarrelling, corruption, nepotism, 
favouritism and political leaders who were more interested in personal gains than 
government stability have contributed to widespread dissatisfaction with politics in Nepal 
and can largely explain the fast growing support for the Maoists’ cause. (Khatri, 1992; Upreti, 
2006; Hutt et al., 2004). 
Poverty, unemployment, regional disparities, dependency on foreign aid, unequal foreign 
trade relations, slow and unequal development has been considered a reason for expansion 
of the support base for the Maoists (Khatri, 1992; Upreti, 2006).  “...Persistent economic 
deprivation’ is the ‘key factor that explains why the mid and far western regions provided a 
fertile breeding ground for rebellion” (Deraniyagala, 2005:53). 
Mancours (2006) showed that access to land has a significant correlation with Maoist 
recruitment. In other words, “…relative deprivation of the (near) landless has contributed to 
salient support for – or at least lack of resistance against – the insurgency” (Mancours, 2006, 
pp.17). 
Notwithstanding differences in argument, there seems to be a common consensus 
that Nepal’s conflict can be adequately explained by relative inequality.   21  It is undeniably a 
combination of factors that have contributed to the uprising of the Maoist movement and 
                                                 
20
  When I stayed on the campus of the Institute of Agriculture and Animals Science in 1986 there was 
already unrest among students and strong involvement in Maoist Party politics. 
 
21
  See studies by a.o. Lawoti, 2003; Deraniyagala, 2005; Manandhar, 2004; Mancours 2006; Sharma 
2006; Hutt et al., 2004; Hatlebakk, 2008; Hachhethu, 2004. 
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the failure of successive governments has added to its spread. In the period between 1997 
and 2002 I frequently heard: “Let the Maoists get a chance, because the others have already 
had their opportunity and wasted it” (interviews 1997, 2002) 
 
2.5.2 History/background 
 
The Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) was formed at the end of the 1940s by the communists 
of Nepal who had a close affinity with communists in India (Upreti, 2006). At that time they 
lacked sufficient strength to start a movement.  
In 1990 four hardcore communist parties made a first attempt to unite, they formed 
the CPN Unity Centre with Pushpa Dahal as Chairman (Upreti, 2006; Thapa, 2007). The 
United People’s Front of Nepal (UPFN) was the political front of this Unity Centre. In 1995 
UPFN split into two factions, one  was renamed as CPN (Maoist). The CPN party started with 
the preparation for a violent movement. The ‘people’s war’ was first officially declared in 
February 1996, when the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) presented a 40-point 
list of demands to the Nepali government, including the formation of a constituent 
assembly, the declaration of Nepal as a republic and secularisation of politics. When in 1997 
their demands were not addressed the Maoists went underground. Chairman Pushpa Dahal 
(nickname Prachanda) introduced a new strategy named the Prachanda Path. The Prachanda 
Path assumes a kind of revolution that would be a fusion between Mao’s war strategy of 
villages expanding to weapons and the Lenin model of armed insurrection (Sharma, 2004). 
With their initial strongholds in the mid-western districts of Rolpa, Rukum and Jajarkot, the 
Maoists slowly began to establish “base areas” elsewhere in the country. The conflict 
escalated after major police operations in 1998, with frequent clashes between Maoists and 
police throughout the country. The Maoist used several approaches in their fight over 
control of area and people. The Maoist collected (often forcefully) taxes from everyone, to 
support their cause. In some cases ‘feudal’ landlords were forced to give some of their land 
to landless people.  
  As far as I remember, since 1993 we have paid contributions to the Maoists. Before I 
got married I was thoroughly assessed by the Maoist party leaders: Was I supportive for 
their party? Or: was I a capitalist, the imperialist enemy? Could the party benefit from me? I 
was interviewed by one of the top leaders and information regarding my background was 
collected by the party. Over the years my dealings were continuously monitored by the 
Party. 
Initially, the Nepalese government did not undertake much action against Maoists. 
This situation changed dramatically in 2001.  After the royal massacre and addressing the 
rebels as ‘terrorists’ (a frequently used term following 9/11) the government and army got 
support in the global War on Terrorism and with the stated goal of averting the development 
of a "failed state" that could serve as a source of regional and international instability, the 
United States, European Union, and India, among other nations, have provided extensive 
military and economic aid to the Nepalese government.   
In 2005 the Maoists signed a 12 point agreement with the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) 
and changed their strategy from a revolutionary agenda to a democratic one (Nayak, 2007).  
As Prachanda in the Kathmandu Post on 7 February 2006 said: “The unfavourable 
international power balance and the overall economic, political and social realities of the 
country did not allow the CPN-M to use military means to seize power in Nepal” (Nayak, 
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2007:930). The Maoists and the political parties needed each other to fight against the 
autocratic King Gyanendra. 
 
2.5.3 What do the Maoists want? 
 
Explaining the ideology and objectives of the Maoist struggle, Babu Ram  
Bhattarai, one of the top leaders of the Maoists, said in 1996 in a daily newspaper:  
 
“We want to overthrow the present state and establish a new democratic republic 
which will be neither communist nor socialist. In our new democratic republic, 
they will be no place for feudal, comprador, bureaucratic and capitalist forces, 
which are now flourishing under the protection and influence of foreign 
imperialist powers. We want to form a joint government of patriotic and 
democratic forces. The new system need not be a one party system but can also 
be a multi-party system “ (Rising Nepal 1996). 
 
The main concern of the Maoists is the feudal structure of Nepalese society and the 
exploitation and absolute dominance of the leaders of Nepal. It is a class struggle. Also the 
Maoists are against the external influence, and want to drive out the so called imperialists 
(Karki and Seddon, 2003). According to them the emancipation of the Nepalese citizens can 
only happen through armed struggle, which they call the People’s war. They fight for 
equality and rights of marginalised groups, but they consider all forms of inequality a result 
of feudal relationships and dominance by the so called bourgeoisie (Yami, 2007). 
A major difference with other communist groups in Nepal concerns the fight against 
feudalism. Other communists (non-Maoists) assume that strengthening the democratic 
process will automatically put an end to feudalism. 
 
2.5.4 Who support the Maoists? 
 
The Maoists slogans against Brahmins, Hinduisation, caste system and class hierarchies are 
appealing to ethnic communities, particular Magar, Gurung and Limbu belonging to the 
Mongoloid society, who were forcedly squeezed into the caste hierarchy when the Muluki 
Ain was declared. After the democratic elections in 1990, a lot of ethnic dissatisfaction came 
into the open. Various ethnic groups felt unrepresented in decision-making. Several 
ethnicities expressed that they experience discrimination and social exclusion not only by 
caste but also on the basis of religion, language. If you look at pictures of the Maoist army 
you see mostly young men and women, students and Janajatis. These are the groups that 
are attracted to the Maoist ideologies. 
Initially, the insurgents chose the Mid-western hills to begin their war because the 
location is remote and far from the capital and an oppressed ethnic population, the Magars, 
as an easy recruitment option for the Maoists existed in this area. In this Western region of 
Nepal, people have long felt excluded from development (Lecomte-Tilouine, 2008).  
In response to the question who supported the Maoists, Babu Ram Bhattarai in his 
Politico-Economic Rationale for the People’s War (1998) stated that the indigenous people  
have been oppressed by certain groups. He does not specify which groups but limits himself 
to general terms, and not well-defined categories which is not applicable in this multi-ethnic, 
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multi-caste society. The large amount of ethnographic work on Nepal since the 1960s22  
showed that the diverse population cannot be reduced to general terms as ‘indigenous 
groups’ or ‘oppressed groups’, as expressed by Bhattarai. Many people who faced 
oppression under the past government or by the royal rulers, feel sympathy with the Maoist 
cause. Educated, unemployed youth, frustrated and having little hope on  other political 
support, frequently joined the Maoist forces. The Maoists had a poor support base in urban 
areas due to their extremely violent activities, forceful financial contributions of government 
officers and traders (Nayak, 2007). In urban areas where many people get their income from 
working with internationals, many who could be regarded ‘imperialists’ by the Maoists, 
there is less support for the Maoists. There is conflicting information about the numbers of 
victims23, but it is clear that the insurgency has directly and indirectly affected the lives of all 
people of Nepal. 
In the interviews taken during summer 2009 in the foothills, after the Maoists 
insurgency, it was clear that most people had experienced the war as a period of dread and 
trouble. They were fed up with fear for the government and the people’s army. They told 
stories of hiding from both parties and worries about paying money, providing grain or killing 
their chickens for the fighters. They also told stories of being afraid that their sons or 
daughters would be taken. In Yamdi there was a clear difference between the Brahmins and 
Dalits in the village.  
 
“We had to hide ourselves and our rice from the Maoists, because they were 
against us”(interview with Brahmin woman, 2009)  
“The Maoists gave a us a lot of support. We gave them food and shelter during 
the war. They helped us raise our voice, to fight against discrimination and 
oppression” (interview with Dalit man, Yamdi, 2009) 
 
In a good number of places, people felt torn between the army and Maoists.  During the 
visits for this research in Sindhupalchowk district (Chautara VDC) an entire village was still 
facing the results of the aftermath of the fight. Many men had been killed in the area, 
women were left to fend for themselves and their children (Sindhupalchowk, interview, 
2009). In Mauja VDC, a Gurung village in Kaski district, people welcomed the Maoists, they 
found Maoists more convincing than any other political party, and were willing to give them 
a chance. People were already used to being exploited, a visit of a government officer or 
police to their village in the past meant ‘cutting a chicken’, preparing an elaborate meal. 
(Mauja, Gurung man, interview 2009) 
Not all army or Maoists behaved correctly. Some  misused their position. Many 
fighters were given a gun after a short training and felt powerful, but also misused their 
                                                 
22
  To name a few: Holmberg, 1989 for Tamangs; Messerschmidt 1976 for Thakalis; Gellner for Newars 
23
  "So far we have recorded at least 17,265 deaths during the armed conflict, while the previous estimate 
was around 13,000," said Dhurba Gaida, secretary of the task force.( Nepalnews.com accessed 22 Sept 
2011) 
"The death toll has increased because more people in the villages have lodged complaints about losing 
relatives during the conflict."  (BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8268651.stm, accessed 9 Sept 
2011) 
The task force also found that 70,425 people were displaced by the conflict, although most have now 
been able to return home. (sources: Reliefweb, 2009)  
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power. In rural areas not only Maoists but also so called “caoists” (kind of ‘cowboy- Maoists’) 
became active. In absence of law and order, a kind of anarchy arose where people took the 
law in their own hands. 
This chaos and anxiety we experienced in our family too. An example is given below:   
 
One day X (my husband) got in a taxi; he wanted to get a regular ride into the city 
for an appointment with one of his friends. However, the car was not driven by a 
regular taxi  driver, X got kidnapped, was blindfolded and driven to a place out of 
town in a rural area. There he was beaten up and forced to pay a lot of money. As 
he did not have much money and because he was reluctant to pay for reasons 
that were unclear, he asked: who is behind this action and why am I forced to 
pay? What have I done wrong? It worked out that a former farm labourer, who 
was frustrated that he had lost his job (he had left, because working on our farm 
did not include a ticket to Europe), took revenge on X. He had hired a gang, who 
pretended to be Maoists fighters, to beat X and force him to pay money. With a 
payment of Rs24 10.000 on the spot, X was brought back to town. (diary notes July 
2005) 
 
The Maoists have made the government, but also NGOs, more alert. The NGOs were often 
requested to show their funding sources and to become transparent about their ways of 
spending. In 2001 in Kavre district I witnessed that a German research project was 
terminated because the Maoists could not see any benefits for the local people, but only 
observed data collection for the benefit of a German research institution. 
The conflict has forced the young and able men to seek employment abroad in order to 
avoid the violations committed by both the Maoists and Government forces. These 
labourers work predominantly in the Gulf (Qatar, Saudi Arabia, etc.) and in Southeast Asia (in 
particular Malaysia).  Mass out-migration has taken place in the last 10-15 years (Gartaula, 
2011).  
 
“Depending on the income status men went to different countries. If you could 
not afford a loan, one went to India to find a job in security services, in the Indian 
army or as a labourer. People with possibilities to get a loan, or to pay for a ticket 
and visa requirements went to Malaysia or Qatar, Dubai or other so called ‘Arab’ 
states. If you had more money to spend then Korea or Japan were options: more 
investment initially for the work permit, but also to earn higher salaries . If money 
was not the biggest obstacle and men also had  a higher educational background, 
then opportunities were sought in the USA, or the UK.”(Kavre, interview, 2009) 
 
2.5.5 Women in the Maoist movement 
 
Men and women have experienced the Maoist movement differently, both in their roles as 
victim and as actor. Men were often targeted to join the fight and either approached by the 
government or the Maoist army. Many men have fled the rural areas, to escape the fighting 
and found job opportunities abroad. Men in the Maoist movement were observed in their 
traditional roles.  Most leaders are men, and the party’s ultimate leaders Prachanda, Babu 
Ram Bhattarai are both from the upper caste, dominant ethnic Brahmin group in 
                                                 
24
  1 euro is approximately 100 NRs 
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society.  The male leadership is ambivalent, and kind of reluctant about redefining gender 
relations, claiming all inequities down to feudalism and class oppression(Yami, , 2007)..  
In Nepal the dominant—and often state-supported—ideologies towards women are 
based upon conservative Hindu concepts of femininity. However, in the country reside over 
60 non-Hindu ethnic groups who speak Tibeto-Burman languages, who practice a different 
religion and together form a substantial proportion of the population.  It is common 
knowledge that gender relations among these groups vary widely from the normative Hindu 
image, often with more egalitarian kinship and economic structures. The Maoist leaders 
tend to gloss over this diversity and refer to the Nepalese women (Tamang, 2002). 
The website of the Maoists (www.cpnm.org), remarkably show many pictures of 
women who joined their army. Often of Jjanati origin, stern-looking with roughly cut short 
hair and dressed in green fighting fatigues and sport shoes. The women look like an extreme 
make-over version of the traditional Nepali women with their customary colourful (often 
red) sari, slippers, jewellery, and long flowing dark hair. Women were involved in the Maoist 
movement especially as guerrilla fighters, but also as propagandists, mobilisers and to some 
extent as party cadres and district secretaries. According to different sources there are about 
30 – 40% women in the Maoist force (Sharma and Prasain, 2004) although there are no hard 
data. These are mostly women from Janajati and Dalit groups (Yami, 2007), but also many 
upper caste women, district schoolgirls and just literate women joined the movement 
(Gautam et al., 2001). Prachanda frankly admitted to have been surprised by the 
overwhelming response of women (Onesto, 2000). 
The active involvement of women has been one of the most discussed aspect of the 
Maoist insurgency (Sharma and Prasain, 2004).  
Women support the Maoists for several reasons: they see it as a chance to break with the 
oppressive traditions of the Hindu family rules (Sharma and Prasain, 2004). 
Yami (2007) suggests that women are motivated to join the Maoists because they believe 
that the Maoists will help them fight their oppression:  
 
“Women’s social oppression is firmly rooted in state sponsored Hindu religion which upholds 
feudal Brahminical rule based on caste system, which disparages women in relation to men” 
(Yami, 2007:15) ” Parvati25 links this suppression of women to the feudal system, as other 
Maoists do: The feudal patriarchy headed by the King not only denies women’s dignity but 
also robs away her labour by denying her right to parental property “(Yami, 2007: p 108) 
 
Parvati takes a more subtle approach by suggesting that the effects of the Maoist movement 
have been different for women from each group, depending upon their existing relative 
freedoms. She writes that the revolution has assisted Hindu women “… to break the feudal 
patriarchal restrictive life imposed by the puritanical Hindu religion, by unleashing their 
repressed energy” (Parvati, 1999).  She suggests that the people’s war has had a particularly 
important impact on those from the most exploited Dalit communities by “…unleashing their 
hatred against the state” (Parvati, 1999:2). 
In most cases women joined for the same reasons as men from their own community 
Kampwirth in Lohani-Chase (2008). The Maoist platform is clearly appealing to many rural 
women, both Hindu and otherwise. Women’s political awareness and motivations for 
getting involved in the guerrilla force was shaped by intersecting lines of poverty status, 
class, caste, ethnicity, religion, gender and history (Pettigrew and Shneiderman, 2004). It is 
                                                 
25
  Comrade Parvati is Central Committee Member and Head of Women’s Department of CPN (Maoist). 
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the first movement in Nepal in which women and men openly have been observed to fight 
together.  
The Maoist have encouraged women, and in particular rural girls, to sign up, the 
leaders have shown some ambiguity towards participation of educated, urban women, who 
were considered to be bourgeoisie (Parvati in Yami, 2007; Parvati, 2003). 
The Maoist movement has potential for transforming women’s roles and gender 
based ideology but not without contradictions and paradoxes. In the Maoist army women 
were usually given stereotypical roles such as food management, mending clothes, singing 
and dancing, collecting donations and recruitment, and carrying loads. Women are absent in 
higher ranks, and in decision-making (Sharma and Prasain 2004:165). This was also admitted 
by Hisila Yami, 2007 “There is still a problem in accepting women leadership in the People’s 
Army (Yami, 2007:7). Parvati confirmed this when she was interviewed by Yami:  “young 
women  were very active, but once they got married they eventually became either the 
wives of leaders or vanished into oblivion”(Yami 2007:108)  
 The contribution of the Maoist to women’s empowerment (as Yami and Parvati 
(2007) proudly claim) is disputable. If we may believe Hisila Yami, the wife of Babu Ram 
Battarai then women are indeed empowered:  “Today the image of tired malnourished 
women carrying children at one end and rearing cattle at the other end has been 
transformed into image of dignified fighting women with gun” (Yami, 2007: 11) These 
images of armed women are evidence of the movement’s egalitarianism and “empowering” 
effects for Nepali women (Yami, 2007). The ‘people’s war’ has certainly precipitated new 
experiences for Nepali women of all backgrounds, whether in learning to use guns for 
combatant women, or negotiating the fine line of safety between state forces and the 
Maoists, for civilian women. Joining the Maoists was a chance to break free from established 
positions. However, it is questionable whether it will bring changes for women in the long 
run (Pettigrew and Shneidermann, 2004). Members of Kathmandu-based feminist 
organisations are particularly unimpressed and accusing the Maoists of “…behaving no 
differently than our ‘men-stream’ political parties. We never expected our male-dominated 
government to involve women in the peace process, but we thought you were going to be 
different” (Pettigrew and Shneiderman 2004:2).  
Since Nepali Maoist models for women’s “empowerment” must negotiate between 
all-embracing Maoist ideologies and the existing evidence of gender discrimination in Nepali 
society embracing conservative Hindu cultural norms, there are noticeable gaps between 
rhetoric and practice. Maoists see gender inequality mainly related to feudalism. In the 
feudal patriarchal outlook first of all women are not treated as individuals (Parvati in an 
interview in Yami 2007), secondly it sees them in the light of their reproductive function.  
Women are generally considered as a homogenous group by the Maoist leaders, 
regional, religious, caste and ethnic differences ignored. Among the Maoists there seems 
acceptance of the notion of a universally, stereotypical image of disempowered Nepali 
woman and not acknowledging the diversity among Nepalese women (Tamang, 2002).  
As elsewhere, the reality for Nepali women lies in the specifics of lived experience all along 
the continuum between these two extremes. Julie Bridgham’s film Sari Sisters (2009) gives 
an impression of women living in different realities influenced by the Maoist movement.  It is 
important to adopt a more nuanced approach, which acknowledges both women’s multiple 
existing scripts for agency and the constraints within which they exercise it. 
Before and during the civil war many men had left rural villages to work abroad, join the 
Maoists or the government army. Women were left behind and forced to take up roles 
 66 
 
earlier carried out by men, such as ploughing. Feminisation of agriculture and the rural 
economy took place.  Although women already did the bulk of the farming activities, a lot of 
decision-making for instance related to crop selection was still in the hands of the men. Now 
women had to do land preparation, which is traditionally a men’s task. In many areas, 
women are reported to be ploughing fields, running forestry groups, and administering 
schools and other institutions. 
However, this was not the first time that women were alone in rural areas. The  
Gurkha/Gorkha recruitment, the salt-grain trade, or labour migration, were all reasons in the 
past that village women have had to make do alone and take on stereotypically ‘male’ 
gendered roles. The insurgency has now provided those circumstances, but by accident 
rather than design. Rather than successes of the Maoist movement, then, these shifts in 
practice might be seen as instances of the “unexpected dynamics and spaces of 
ambivalence” that anthropologist Andrew Kipnis identifies as central to the formation of 
Maoist states (Pettigrew and Shneidermann, 2004: 7).  
Ultimately, the fundamental changes in gender relations that the Maoists assert may 
not be the intentional result of their policies, but rather the largely consequences of the 
conflict that emerge in relation to women’s agency.  
 
2.5.6 Challenges for the Maoists 
 
The Maoist movement has potential for transformation but not without contradictions and 
paradoxes. Overall, the emerging picture of Maoist attitudes towards caste and gender 
relations is contradictory. The movement faces a rift based on caste: the top leaders, are 
men from higher caste, the lower cadres are mostly from ethnic groups such as the Magars 
and Tharus.  While some women state that they joined the movement in search of more 
egalitarian gender relations, Maoist women face a complex set of struggles within a party 
whose understanding of their past, and commitment to their future, is incomplete and 
ambivalent. Additionally the return of women fighters to civil society is not without 
problems. 
False hopes, failure of the present government, continuation of strikes (bandh), 
violence, economic suffering, fear (Pfaff-Czarnecka, 2004). The leaders are threatening to go 
back to the jungle and take up their fight again. They have not been able to set a good 
example. The ‘people’s war’ has certainly precipitated new experiences for Nepali men and 
women of all backgrounds, but these shifts cannot be claimed entirely as the intentional 
achievements of Maoist policy. Still it is clear that the Maoist movement introduced men 
and women in rural Nepal to potentially transformative possibilities. 
 
2.6 Agriculture in Nepal 
 
Historical facts show that the rural economy of Nepal changed rapidly after unification in the 
late 18th century (Seddon and Adhikari, 2003). Settlement was encouraged at that time, and 
slash-and-burn shifting agricultural practices abandoned. Government policies stimulated 
land clearance and cultivation, which increased production of dry-land farming of maize and 
millet on the upland slopes and paddy rice farming in the valley bottoms. Pastoralism 
gradually diminished in importance and consumption patterns changed. Overall population 
levels and population density increased significantly at the same time, as did crop 
production. 
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Already from that time development showed regional and social differences (Seddon 
and Adhikari, 2003). In the far western regions, at high altitudes there was less progress then 
in the centre of the country, around the Kathmandu valley. As investment in land increased 
through terracing and improvements of other kinds such as irrigation, the value of farm land 
rose too. With increased population pressure land became a scarce resource. In areas where 
land transactions were possible, it is likely that patterns of land ownership and even of 
access to land for farming became increasingly unequal, with some households (particularly 
of the so-called occupational or lower castes) finding it hard to get land. 
Nepal’s population continued to grow, the agrarian economy slowly evolved, and the 
structure of the economy as a whole too transformed gradually into a more diversified 
picture. In the 1970s food production increased rapidly. Eradication of malaria in the terai, 
construction of the Mahendra Highway, the East-West Highway along the southern foot of 
the hills, and the land settlement programs in the plains contributed to a large expansion of 
farm land and a significant increase in overall agricultural output (Blaikie, Cameron and 
Seddon, 2001). However, this positive trend was not lasting long. Nepal was a net exporter 
of food grain in the 1970s and early 1980s, but turned into a net importer of increasing 
quantities of food grain (HDR, 2002; Seddon and Adhikari, 2003) by the turn of the 
century.The pressure on natural resources has increased in recent years due to population 
pressure. During the past two decades, agriculture grew only at 3% a year against a 
population growth rate of 2.5%  (MoAC, 2010). Thus it could do very little to enhance overall 
per capita income or to promote economic development.). An increased demand for food 
and a stagnating or declining food production has resulted in a food deficit for many people. 
Food deficiency has become a big problem, especially for small and marginal farmers in 
remote areas (Seddon and Adhikari, 2003).  Nepal was ranked 54th of 81 ranked countries 
(those with GHI > 5.0) on the Global Hunger Index in 201126, between Cambodia and Togo. 
Nepal's current score of 19.9 is better than in 2010 (20.0) and much improved from its score 
of 27.5 in 1990. 
 
Nepal is still predominantly a rural agricultural society, where more than 80% of people live 
in rural areas and depend on farming as a source of livelihood (Lancker and Nijkamp, 2000; 
World Bank, 2006; Seddon and Adhikari, 2003). Much of the farming is of a subsistence 
nature, and large families depend on small parcels of land whose fragmentation is 
continuing, along the lines of son inheritance practices. About half of the population of 
Nepal consists of small farmers who have between 0.2 and less than 1 hectare of land 
(World Bank, 2006; CBS, 2011)  
Agriculture contributes almost 36% to the national income (GDP) in 2012 (MoAC, 
2012) (in 2003-04  this was 40% and 50%, in 1992) which makes Nepal very dependent on 
this sector (NPC, 2010; World Bank, 1992; World Bank, 2006) Even though the share of 
agriculture has been declining, by world standards it is still high.  The country features a 
relatively fragile and unstable environment. The Himalayas are still rising, due to the Indian 
plate pushing towards Tibet. The movement of the Indian plate makes this region seismically 
active, leading to earthquakes from time to time.  The rugged terrain is prone to erosion and 
frequent landslides. Access to remote and high mountain areas is difficult and construction 
of infrastructure expensive.  
With altitudes ranging from less than 100 m in the terai to over 8000 m in the 
Himalayas, different climates and different types of farming systems exist within Nepal. As a 
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  IFPRI, 2011 available at http//www.ifpri.org/publication/2011-global-hunger-index 
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result a wide variety of crops, vegetables and fruits are produced. The Himalayas or 
mountain region has a low population density and agricultural production is limited due to 
the cold climate and limited rainfall. Here farmers grow one crop of potato, buckwheat or 
barley each year or every two years on sloping fields.  
The research took place in the central or also called mid hills (Figure 2.1) in a region 
that forms the central belt of Nepal under the Himalayas. Here, 42% of the total land area of 
Nepal contributes one-third of Nepal’s food production and is the home of 44.3% of the 
country's population (Ministry of Population and Environment, 2002 in Iversen et al., 2006). 
Subsistence agriculture is the primary mode of production in Nepal, and consequently much 
generated in this sector is consumed at home and not clearly reflected in the national GDP.  
 
FFS started in the mid hills and the plains or terai. The survey data from 2002 cover the terai 
and some districts in the mid hills. The interviews and FGD in 2009 took place in the mid hills. 
Although the situation of farmers in the terai differs from the mid hills, the data collected can 
be compared, in particular because the FFS participants in the terai were mostly migrants 
from the mid hills so they shared a socio-economic history. The main difference can be found 
in cropping patterns (the terai has more rice, less millet cultivation) and the land size, which 
is on average larger in the terai (> 05. ha/hh) than in the mid hills (0.2 – 0.5 ha/hh) (See Table 
2.3). 
Table 2.3 Cropping system differences terai and mid hills 
 
 Terai Mid hills 
Main crops rice Rice in summer, wheat, barley in winter 
Other crops Wheat, barley, pulses, oilseeds, 
jute, cotton, tobacco 
Vegetables, mustard, millet 
Climate tropical Sub-tropical 
Average farm 
size 
1.5 ha 0.5 ha 
Source: own research; Pandey et al., 2009 
 
Actually each Farmer Field School had its own peculiarities, not only as a result of location 
but also due to its socio-cultural context, like ethnicity or caste. Even within mid hills or 
within the terai there can be large differences. For example in Kavre (mid-hills) there are 
tropical and temperate areas; villages dominated by Tamang or Brahmin or Chettries and so 
on. The data collected for this research provides a general picture and does not account for 
situational differences. 
In the mid hills, rice is produced on terraced hillsides during the summer where water 
is available (khet land). In drier fields (bari land) maize and millet are grown in this season. 
Winter crops are: wheat, barley, oilseeds, potatoes, and vegetables. Most farms are involved 
in livestock production. Generally farmers keep buffaloes and cattle for milk and manure, 
nowadays also used for household methane gas production, oxen for draught power, goats 
and chicken for meat and eggs. Yaks are kept at high altitudes for meat, power, manure and 
milk. Pigs are popular among certain ethnic groups such as Magar, Gurung, but the higher 
castes neither keep nor consume pork (only wild boar). Livestock raising is second to crop 
production in Nepal's economy. Farmers use farmyard manure to maintain the soil fertility, 
supplemented with chemical fertiliser. 
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Rice, maize and wheat are the main staple crops, whereby rice is the most important. 
In Nepali there are several words indicating rice: dhan (the crop), chamal (the grains), bhaat 
(boiled rice). Rice is a metaphor for food in general. If you have not had rice, you have not 
had a proper meal (Gartaula, 2011). Rice is grown in the terai (70%) and in the mid hills, of 
which 79% under rainfed conditions (World Bank, 2006). According to the season of 
cultivation rice can be grouped in three types: Chaite rice, Bhadaiya rice and Asadh or main 
season rice.  
In the research area in Bhaktapur the cropping system on khet land is: rice – wheat – 
fallow or rice – potato – vegetables. On bari land this is maize/ wheat – vegetables. In Kavre 
this can be: rice – potato – potato (khet) and maize – potato –vegetables (bari). Rice, maize 
and wheat are the common cereals grown by the  farmers in both the FFS while finger millet 
as minor crop was grown by a limited number of households in FFS areas. In diverse pocket 
areas one can find a concentration of crops, e.g. around Paanchkhal in Kavre district many 
farmers produce tomatoes, in Paunati (in the same district) one can find a belt with citrus 
crops. 
Vegetables are grown in kitchen gardens for local consumption throughout the 
country and with concentrations of market production around the major cities, in the mid 
hills and in the terai. Although agriculture in Nepal is still largely subsistence oriented and 
semi-commercial, production of cash crops has increased in recent years (MoAC, 2010).  
Nepal is increasingly self-reliant in vegetable production. Vegetable demand is rising 
due to change in people´s food habits, rapid urbanisation and an increased level of 
education among the population. The government strongly promotes vegetable production 
in rural areas. 
Bhandari’s study (2007) reveals that majority of the farmers in FFS in Kavre and 
Bhaktapur district have gradually shifted towards commercial vegetable production. Farmer 
Field Schools have emphasised vegetable production in recent years.  Farmers of Bhaktapur, 
due to their nearness to the markets in Suryabinayak and Kalimati (Kathmandu) are much 
more attracted to vegetable production than the farmers in Kavre. In remoter districts such 
as Sindhupalchowk vegetable production has not taken off as a cash crop but farmers do 
increasingly grow vegetables in their kitchen garden for home consumption. 
 
Land distribution remains unequal, and the average size of land holdings is very small - less 
than a hectare for an average family size of six. (MHHDC, 2003; World Bank, 2006, Wiley et 
al. 2009) Their first concern is how to increase crop production, food security and income 
(Giridhari et al., 2004). 
Land reform has been a political issue for decades. Even though the legal mechanisms 
for land reform such as placing limits on the size of land owned do exist, in practice most 
farmers still have low productive, small holdings. Predictably, land reform has been the 
mandate of every political party in Nepal, particularly the communists.  
The census of 2011 revealed that the country had an economic growth of 3.5%, but 
largely in the non-agricultural sector (5.1 versus 1.5 in agricultural sector)27. It is important to 
recognise that this reflects not merely the slow growth in agricultural output, but also a 
relatively rapid rise in other sectors of the economy, and a gradual transformation and re-
structuring of the economy. Recently, some decline has been observed: In 1995 80% of the 
population was employed in agriculture, in 2010 this had declined to 66% of the population 
(MoAC, 2010). 
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  http://www.cbs.gov.np/index.php, accessed 24.06.2012 
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 The rural area is mostly characterised by subsistence farming, with low and 
sometimes even declining yields. Farms are getting more diversified but crop production of 
cereals remains the main output, especially paddy: In 1995 76% of farm production were 
cereals, while in 2003 this had dropped to 69% (NLSS, 2003-04).  
Nepal’s economy and society experienced major transformations during the two 
decades from the late 1970s, through the 1980s and into the early 1990s from a primarily 
agricultural economy to a non-agricultural economy. (a.o. Seddon and Adhikari, 2003; 
Blaikie, Cameron and Seddon, 2001). Rapid urbanisation, also, has motivated some farmers 
to sell their farmland for higher prices. Such land is then used for housing, especially in 
urbanising areas (Gartaula, 2011). Neither unskilled and nor educated youth appear to be 
interested in farming anymore, trying to avoid the hardships their parents and grandparents 
faced (idem).  
In recent years, I learned that the youth were less interested in agriculture. This can 
be observed in villages, were one sees mostly elderly people and women working in the 
fields. Rampur agricultural college used to be one of the most popular universities in Nepal 
until the 1990s but with the increase of private educational institutes the market for 
education has changed. The new generation has more options and shows less interest in 
studying agriculture. Among the hundreds of new higher education institutes only one 
agricultural college has opened in Kathmandu. This decrease in interest in farming among 
youth worries the farmers with whom I have interviews. As one farmer said: “Can we talk 
about development, have we achieved progress when our children are not interested in 
working on our land anymore?” (Sanga, Kavre, 2009). 
 
Interviews and discussion with the FFS participants show that the view of rural people on 
agriculture, in particular land and labour has changed over the years. For the older 
generation agriculture and farming is something we do to get food, while the younger 
generation is somewhat ambivalent: they like having land for status and want to build their 
own house, but they do not want to work on the land. On the other hand, also the younger 
generation affirms that land and farming are needed for food security, but they just do not 
want to get involved themselves in the ‘dirty job’(interview in Jhumka, 1998; Gartaula, 
2011). “Farming is not my thing, why should I get my hands dirty when I studied for SLC” 
(Jyamdi, Kavre, 2009). 
Agriculture is still an important source of income for many people in rural areas but 
increasingly farm households have additional incomes from other jobs or remittances. This is 
in- line with the national trend for remittance flows over this period. The proportion of 
Nepalese households that received remittances rose from about 23% in 1995/96 to about 
37% in 2010/2011, contributing to 23% of GDP in 201128.  
 
2.6.1 Women in agriculture 
 
Men and women perform different tasks in agriculture. Bhandari ‘s gender analysis using the 
so-called Harvard Analysis (March et al., 1999) of the labour division in farming in the mid 
hills of Bhaktapur district in a farming system with vegetable production indicates the 
different roles of men and women (Tables 2.4 and 2.5).This analysis provides a glimpse of 
different tasks but does not indicate the number of hours that is spent on each task. 
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   World Bank’s new report ‘Migration and Remittance Factbook 2011’ 
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Table 2.4 Labour division according to gender in vegetable production  
 
Activities 
  
Men Women 
Crop Selection ٧  
Nursery bed preparation  ٧ 
Seed sowing  ٧ 
Mulching of the vegetable nursery bed ٧ ٧ 
Watering  ٧ 
Field Observation  ٧ 
Organic Manure application  ٧ 
Chemical fertiliser application ٧  
Fungicide application ٧  
Insecticide application ٧  
Land preparation ٧  
Transplanting  ٧ 
Weeding and hoeing  ٧ 
Staking  ٧ 
Harvesting  ٧ 
Marketing ٧  
Sales and revenue handling ٧  
   
Source: Bhandari, 2007 
 
In addition, Regmi’s Master’s thesis (2010) shows the gender division in farming systems 
with mainly rice production in Lalitpur (below). 
 
Table 2.5 Labour division according to gender in rice production 
 
Activities   
Men Wome
n 
Seed Selection ٧  
Seed purchase ٧  
Land preparation ٧  
Transplanting  ٧ 
Irrigation ٧ ٧ 
Water users meeting ٧  
Chemical fertiliser application ٧  
Insecticide application ٧  
Weeding and hoeing  ٧ 
Harvesting  ٧ 
Storage  ٧ 
Selling products ٧  
Source: Regmi, 2010 
 
In general, agriculture in Nepal is labour intensive and women play a significant role in 
various crop production activities. Men are in charge of land preparation and marketing 
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aspects, as well as providing and applying inputs such as chemical fertiliser and pesticides. 
Women are responsible for a large part of the subsistence economy, but their contributions 
have been overlooked as they rarely become visible in the cash economy (Bhadra and Shah, 
2007). The contribution of women is underexposed partly because their work is not 
economically valued and reflected in statistics (Joshi, 2000). The different terms used in 
Nepal’s census survey (2001) such as holding what, head of household, main farmers, 
economically active,  subsistence unit, and primary and secondary activity, are gender 
insensitive and insufficiently cover the important contribution of women’s work (Joshi, 
2000). Additionally, census surveys define head of household as the chief decision-maker in 
the household. This biased definition does not explicitly mention female-headed households 
and women’s role in agricultural work and intra-household decision- making tends to be 
ignored in the census data (Joshi, 2000). 
Research in Lalitpur and in the Central region (Joshi, 2000) shows that women’s 
involvement in rice production activities exceeds that of men’s. Ploughing, irrigation, and 
threshing were mostly done by men but all other rice agronomic practices were primarily 
done by women. On their own farms, women did most of the levelling, fertiliser application, 
transplanting, weeding, harvesting, winnowing, and storing of grain and rice straw. In 
exchange labour with other families, fertilising, transplanting, weeding, and post-harvest 
activities were primarily done by women. In all, women contributed 65% and men 
contributed 35% of all activities of family rice production (idem, 2000).  In the winter crop 
wheat and maize, the gender division of labour in wheat production closely followed the 
pattern found in rice production. 
 Women work 12 or 13 hours a day while men work only eight or nine hours a day, 
depending on the season. Women work both outside and inside the household and have less 
leisure time than men (Giri, 2009; Tiwari,2007; Bhadra and Shah, 2007; Joshi, 2000) 
Nepalese societies are patrilineal, which means that the line of descent is traced 
through males. Marriages were traditionally almost always arranged by the parents, and a 
"mediator"  or priest was used to complete the formalities. These days there is more ‘free 
choice’ or as Nepalese call it: ‘love marriage’. But as one informant said: “Even when we 
were in love before we decided to marry we will always look what is behind this person that 
I like, what is her family like, who is her father, what relations does he have”. (urban woman, 
Kathmandu, 2009) 
 The basic social unit in a village is the family, or paribar, consisting of a patrilineary 
extended household and predominantly dominated by the men, but the mother plays an 
important social role. Unmarried sons normally do not separate from their parents; if the 
parents are deceased, unmarried sons usually stay with their older brothers. Because family 
separation always results in a division of family landholdings, landholdings have become 
extremely fragmented, both geographically and socially.  Beyond the immediate family, a 
larger kinship network exists that guides social interaction. This can occasionally involve 
sharing food. This network also was an important means of meeting farm labour needs, 
especially during the planting and harvesting seasons, when labour shortages were common.  
Over the years many changes have taken place in rural areas. Some were reported in 
a PRA exercise with villagers in Yamdi, Kavre district, in 2009. 
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Table 2.6 Changes that have taken place over the last 30 years 
 
Changes 30 years ago 2009 
Agricultural 
production 
Food crops, maize and millet, most 
months just sufficient for own 
consumption 
Food crops: maize, but also potatoes and 
some cabbages. Not sufficient for 
household consumption. 
Family planning Men decided number of children, no 
family planning 
Women decide with husband, family 
planning is easily available from health 
centre 
Number of children 5-8 3-4 
Land use Agriculture on small fields. Some land fallow and some for building 
houses, other land for farming. Many 
scattered small fields. 
Access Half day walking to Dhulikhel Road access with transport possibilities, but 
not in rainy season. 
Nutrition Rice and maize and millet are the main 
staples 
Rice with vegetables in daily menu 
Marriage Arranged marriages at young age, 17-
18 years. 
Marriage took place within families in 
the vicinity. 
No inter-caste marriage. 
Marriages decided by children in 
consultation with parents and 
grandparents. 
People marry not only with people from 
neighbouring villages anymore. Inter-caste 
marriages happen. 
Migration Not thought about. Most families have someone (male) abroad 
to earn money or to study. 
Child mortality  High, in each family at least one. Children do not die at early age as in the 
past. 
Water Drinking water needs to collected 3 
hours walking from village by women. 
Drinking water tank in the village, in the 
Brahmin area. 
Electricity no In most houses available. 
Social hierarchy in 
village 
Big separation between castes. 
Occupational castes serve Brahmins. 
 
Less segregation between castes, but still 
not much communication between 
separate groups. Political affiliations are 
replacing caste differences. 
Women’s social space Women not allowed outside their 
home without husband or other male 
family member. Women’s name is 
never mentioned. Women expected to 
behave docile and treat their husband 
as a representative of god. 
Women have joint groups and have become 
more mobile with use of mobile phones 
Source: PRA, timeline in Yamdi, Kavre, 2009) 
 
People have observed better access and improved facilities, and also more freedom. Women 
in particular have benefitted from less discrimination and more decision-making power and 
mobility. Social relations in villages have changed, shifting from caste to political divisions. 
 
2.7 Overview of government strategies for agricultural development  
 
As agriculture is still the dominant sector in Nepal's economy, it has been getting priority in 
budget allocations.  The institutional set up of the agricultural sector headed by the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Cooperatives has seen different organisational structures, with separate 
divisions or departments for e.g. extension and research. These departments over time were 
merged and then split up again. These re-organisations have contributed to a dynamic but 
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not always well-organised agricultural public service system, with a relatively large number 
of levels in the management hierarchy. Although de-centralisation is in process still many 
decisions are taken at central government level by the highest authority in each office. 
Information reaches the farmers in the district only after a long process of decision-making 
via several governmental levels. Over the years the government has adopted various 
approaches towards agricultural development at various times. An overview of these 
changing paradigms is given below:  
 
Mid-‘50s to mid’60s: Community Development and Extension Approach  
This approach was based on the trickle-down strategy of the diffusion theory used in 
extension in the 1950s-60s with Indian and USA support in 1951 soon after the fall of the 
Rana Empire. Nepal's agricultural extension is the first public service established for the rural 
population. The planned efforts for agricultural development started in 1952 with the 
establishment of Tribhuvan Village Development Department (TVDD) under the Point Four 
program of the USAID. TVDD introduced the Block Development Approach in extension.  
Village development workers were the grass-roots change agents to distribute 
improved agricultural inputs and information to the farmers; this information would trickle 
down to their fellow farmers. But this trickle-down theory did not materialise for several 
reasons, one being the technologies not appropriate for diverse and complex farmers’ 
conditions in Nepal. 
 
Training and Visit (T &V)  
The T &V approach was introduced in 1975 in the World Bank-funded Narayani Zone 
Irrigation Development Project (NZIDP) in three districts of the terai. This approach was 
gradually extended to all agriculture and irrigation projects funded by the World Bank.  It 
was a routine and disciplined program with a focus on model farmers and extension through 
trained extension personnel who became subject matter specialists. The Training and Visit 
extension system has been criticised for being top-down, top- heavy, inefficient and 
ineffective.  
 
Mid-‘60s to mid-‘80s:  Commodity Development Approach   
Following the programs of the international research centres such as CYMMIT and IRRI, and 
in line with the Green Revolution theory, Nepal launched the Integrated Cereals Project with 
American assistance. It was a research-based approach with a focus on cereals. Regional 
research centres were strengthened, but at the centre, back-up facilities were not developed 
and extension was neglected, and the diversity of agro-ecological regions and farmers were 
not considered. 
 
Integrated Rural Development Projects (IRDP)  
During the 1970s and ‘80s, the impact of this project was seen only among resourceful 
farmers. The Integrated Hill Development Project and subsequent IRDPs during mid- 
seventies continued high input technology-based extension benefiting rich farmers. These 
IRDPs assumed that existing technology of production was adequate and the major limiting 
factor was institutional, more specifically needed coordination between different disciplines, 
such as livestock, crop and social issues.   
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 Block Production Program 
This approach was initiated at several cropping systems research sites in Nepal to provide 
necessary technical support services to the farmers in a coordinated way: in ‘blocks’,  to 
facilitate the adoption of technologies generated through cropping systems research during 
the 1980s.  
 
Farming Systems Research and Extension (FSRE)  
FSRE evolved during 1980s out of the USAID-funded Integrated Cereals Project implemented 
during the 1970s. This was an approach that involved farmers in all the steps of technology 
generation.  With British funding a lot of investment in off-farm trials was established. This 
funding was part of a scheme to provide livelihood opportunities for ex-Gurkhas who had 
fought in the British army. 
 
Group Approach 
This emerged as a dominant approach of extension and mobilising farmers since 1990. 
Under the World Bank’s structural adjustment programmes the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives were forced to lay off staff and cut costs in the 1990s. This was a concrete 
reason to introduce the so called ‘group approach’, in agricultural extension in Nepal. This 
approach would be more efficient, easier for the extension workers to reach more farmers 
frequently and give more responsibilities to communities, assuming that it would also be a 
better reaction to farmers needs. The eighth five-year plan of the government also adopted 
this approach. Additionally, the Ministry had found the prevailing T&V system not to be 
effective. Worldwide dissatisfaction with T&V had called for more participatory approaches, 
for more involvement of farmers in extension, and Nepal was no exception. Farmer field 
schools could fit in with the ‘group approach’ and provided an alternative extension, more 
participatory method for the agricultural sector. 
 
Pocket Package Strategy 
This pocket package strategy assumes that in a certain geographically defined pocket areas 
there are common factors of production, which can be improved with a certain package of 
inputs. This pocket package idea is still a common strategy. “We select different areas that 
are suitable for a certain crop or other agricultural activity. In remote areas in this valley 
(Kathmandu) we promote bee-keeping. In more accessible areas we work on vegetable 
production for the market” (DADO chief, Kathmandu, interview 2009)  In other DADO offices 
this was also stressed:  
 
“In remote areas where people can grow vegetables we focus on seed production. 
This can be a good income for poor farmers, who have no market access to 
produce fresh vegetables. We look at climatic circumstances, and other 
conditions, for instance if facilities such as roads and irrigation are available”. 
(DADO Chief, Kavre, 2009) 
 
Between 1980 and 1990, agricultural extension changed, got decentralised and more 
holistic. The government was no longer the only organisation involved in agricultural 
services. NGOs, civil society, private sector, and other kind of organisations  somehow got 
involved in extension. Research and extension became more oriented towards farmer's 
needs. Farmer’s Organisations were strengthened and established as potential institutions at 
grass roots for technology verification, transfer, and input-output marketing. Farmers, 
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recognised as beneficiaries of the extension and development services, were placed in the 
centre of a development strategy and were made proactive in participatory planning and 
implementation. 
During the first years of the FFS project the Tenth Five Year Plan and the Agricultural 
Perspective Plan were leading in the government policy. 
 
2.7.1 The Agricultural Perspective Plan (APP) 
 
Agriculture received much attention in most of the Nepal’s five-year plans. During the mid-
1990s, an Agricultural Perspective Plan (1995-2015) was developed and endorsed by the 
government of Nepal. The APP, supported by the ADB and other donors, is a series of long-
term (1996-2016) plans in the agricultural sector but focuses on a smaller number of 
priorities than previously to produce tangible impacts and to realise economies of scale for 
commercialisation (APROSC/JMA, 1995).  To implement the APP policy makers are 
challenged to identify immediate, short-term and long-term strategies for periodic plans, 
such as the Intensive Pocket Package strategy (IPPs). The Agriculture Perspective Plan (APP) 
forms the backbone of the government’s development strategy (In Development Group 
Limited, 2005. 
The several APPs have gone through different paradigms: from technical and 
institutional approaches to agricultural development, and from a top-down to a more 
participatory approach. Nevertheless the main direction of the APP remains on economic 
growth through transformation from subsistence to commercial agriculture and a “ Green 
Revolution” in the terai. In trying to increase agricultural production and diversify the 
agricultural basis, the government in its APPs focused on commercialisation of cash crops, 
irrigation, the use of fertilisers and insecticides, the introduction of new implements and 
new seeds of high-yield varieties, and the provision of credit. The effects were disappointing: 
as reported in the first and second Five Year Plan (1956 – 1961; 1961 - 1965) overall results 
were not satisfactory (Seddon and Adhikari, 2003). The economy of Nepal is best summed 
up by the Ninth Agricultural Perspective Plan (1996 – 2001) that states: “Nepal is growing 
but not developing” (In Development Group Limited, 2005).     
The Tenth Plan (2002 – 2007) stressed a role for civil society, the private sector and 
NGOs in order to reach the poorest of the poor and disadvantaged groups. Also participation 
of women is emphasised. It was realised that Nepal should concentrate on fewer 
development sectors that were important for rapid agricultural growth. Irrigation, fertiliser, 
technology, roads and power were identified as the most important factors for enhancing 
agricultural growth. In addition, the decentralisation of responsibilities demanded that the 
institutional capacities and capabilities of the VDCs and DDCs needed to be strengthened, 
hence a local monitoring plan was scheduled. In this Tenth Plan, but also in the subsequent 
11th Plan (2007-2012) integrated pest management through the Farmer Field School was 
recommended (In Development Group Limited, 2005).   
The 1990s also saw changes in government policy, with reforms moving the economy 
towards a more market-oriented system. The second major change that has affected the 
agricultural system over the past decade is the move towards decentralisation, with the Self-
Governance Act 1999, providing for greater devolution of power to the local government. An 
increased emphasis on participation and on partnerships between the public sector and 
other service providers has been embodied in the formulation of recent projects in the 
agriculture sector. 
 77 
 
 
2.7.2 The Agricultural services system  
 
The agricultural services system operates through regional directorates, district offices and 
agriculture/livestock services. At the district level there are district offices and within each 
district there are agricultural service centres. An agricultural service centre covers several 
VDCs. Altogether there were 932 agricultural service centres and 999 livestock service 
centres in Nepal in 1997, but many closed during the conflict period and remained closed 
due to financial constraints and decreased relevance or reduced responsibility. Junior 
technical assistants/junior technicians (JTAs and JTs) work at the Ilaka level including several 
village development councils. JTs report to the person in charge of the district agricultural 
development office (DADO). DADO is based at the district headquarter and a senior 
agriculture officer assisted by several subject matter specialists is in charge of the district 
office.  
 The milieu for agricultural extension is changing fast, particularly due to increased 
globalisation and a changing social-economic environment. Several processes contribute to a 
rapid rural development:  
- Farmers have become more educated, vocal, aware and sophisticated, due to 
exposure and knowledge about their competitive role in national and international 
markets. A broader extension agenda is emerging, addressing diversified farmers’ 
needs: appropriate technologies, marketing and agribusiness, natural resource 
management, farm mechanisation, bio-diversity conservation etc.  
- Extension service providers are diversifying. More NGOs (international and local) and 
the private sector play a role.  
- Feminisation of agriculture due to male out-migration for non-farm and off-farm  jobs 
(Giri, 2009; Gartaula, 2011) 
- Decreased interest in farming among youth (Gartaula, 2011) 
- Privatisation of services and a larger competition on the market is hoped to improve 
the effectiveness and efficiency of agricultural services. The role of the public sector 
extension is changing from a “service provisioner” to a “service provider” with more 
emphasis on support for quality assurance, monitoring and regulatory services. Public 
services need to become more demand-driven. As one DADO staff member explained 
to farmers in his area: “We do not do house to house visits anymore. You have to 
come to us with requests; when you need us you have to indicate this. We work on 
your request not on our interest.”(DADO staff in Focus Group Discussion with farmers, 
Kavre, 2009) 
 
In this chapter I have given a broad overview of historical, institutional, and social conditions 
that are relevant to the implementation of FFS, the participation of Nepali men and women 
of different caste/ethnic groups, and their contribution to social development in Nepal.  
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Chapter 3 Outsider ‘in’ and Multiple Identities 
 
3.1 Introduction: insider/outsider 
 
In ethnographic research there are debates related to who are the ‘insider’ and the ‘outsider’ 
in carrying out research. Insider research is usually defined as the study of one’s own social 
group or society. Advocates of insider research assert that non-natives may be unable to 
grasp the deeper understanding of cultural practices and beliefs that are available to insiders. 
Advocates of outsider research, on the other hand, insist that non-natives can be more 
objective in observing and analysing social contexts and cultural beliefs (Geertz, 1983; Naples 
and Sachs, 2009:207). 
This debate suggests an either-or representation which is problematic, because the 
notions are static, bipolar and over-simplistic. A researcher in today’s world may be 
simultaneously an insider and outsider, being familiar and being a stranger (Coffey, 1999). In 
my case I was neither a full outsider nor an insider, I was always a bit of both.  I was the 
programme officer who set up the Farmer Field School project which is the subject of this 
research, and in my private life I was married to a Nepalese man.  To some extent I was an 
insider in Nepalese society, I belonged to a certain family, I resided in a Nepalese 
neighbourhood, I had family in a rural village. I spoke Nepalese, dressed in kurta sarwals or 
local cloths, obeyed certain rules, rituals and traditions, I ate rice with my hands. But still in 
this family I was an outsider, even after 19 years. The signs or notions that I was an outsider 
were not always obvious, most were subtle: the way Nepalese saw me, my walking style, the 
way I moved about, the mess I made of the rice dish, the ‘wrong’ jokes I made. Some 
indications of being an ‘outsider’ were clearer: my white skin, blond hair, blue eyes, the fact 
that I was not wearing the Hindu tika, a red dot on my forehead, not wearing golden 
jewellery, and so on. In this chapter I refer to myself as the “outsider in”, indicating my 
position in Nepalese society, while remaining an outsider.   
 
The nature of being an insider/outsider is changeable and context-related. In meetings with 
other international staff I might have been considered an ‘insider in Nepal’ because of my 
Nepalese connections, while at the same time I was an outsider among Nepalese staff in my 
office, because of my international background. In the project I had colleagues and 
colleagues who were also friends. By actively participating in the setting, it was impossible to 
separate my identity of a researcher with my identities as teacher, friend, programme officer, 
colleague, family member and so on.  
Although the distinction of being an ‘insider’ or ‘outsider’ might not be relevant, the 
outcome of this research is influenced by this ambiguity in performing my role in the project 
and my position in Nepalese society. To conduct research one depends on others. Who I am 
in relation to the FFS, to Nepalese society and this research matters. The researcher’s 
position, but also his/her identity such as determined by gender, race, ethnicity, class and 
residence, influence the kind of questions we ask, the responses we get, whom we approach 
in the field, how we make sense of our fieldwork experience, and how we analyse and report 
our findings.  
In this chapter I want to reflect on these aspects. I want to lay out my personal history 
and stakes in the Farmer Field School and subsequently in this research. This involves figuring 
out how my identity, my position in the project, Nepalese society and my interactions might 
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have had an effect on my conceptualisation of, and involvement with Farmer Field Schools, 
empowerment, governance and other key concerns of this study.  My life in Nepal started 
over 20 years ago, in 1986, with an internship as BSc student tropical agriculture at the 
Institute of Animal and Agricultural Science in Deventer. During my long-term stays and 
frequent visits I was able to experience a lot of Nepalese society and observe many changes. 
‘Doing development’ (Thomas, 2000) by way of projects and doing research are 
political acts in the sense that they involve power differentials. Researchers’ words and 
activities always carry power with them (after Foucault in Mills, 2003). The 
acknowledgement of research involving power differentials demands reflexivity : the 
researcher should be aware of, and reflect on, his/her  own position in the society of ‘the 
other’ on the way how the others interpret their presence and behaviour, and respond to the 
research questions (Marcus and Fisher, 1986). The researcher is not the objective outsider, 
but is a part of the research situation (Bourdieu, 1990; Coffey, 1999). Reflexivity refers to the 
“inter-change between sociological research and human behaviour”‘(Giddens, 2006:94). It is 
important to take into consideration the effect of the personality or presence of the 
researcher on the investigation. More broadly speaking, reflexivity is considered to occur 
when the observations or actions of observers in the social system affect the very situations 
they are observing,  Thus, for example, as project manager married to a Nepalese, and as a 
researcher living in Nepalese society I may have affected the village and the behaviour of the 
subjects of my study. The observations are not independent of the participation of the 
researcher. In this chapter I will reflect on the positions I had in Nepalese society as 
programme officer, researcher and the effect this has on this research. I will present the 
personal setting in which this research took place, which has implications for the 
interpretation of the research outcome. I will explain that being an ‘outsider in’ has 
advantages in conducting qualitative research as I did in Nepal.  
Reflexivity has come to have several meanings, one that refers to the researcher's 
awareness of and analytical focus on his or her relationship to the field of study, and the 
other that attends to the ways in which cultural practices involve consciousness and 
commentary on themselves. The social scientist is inherently laden with biases, and only by 
becoming reflexively aware of those biases can social scientists free themselves from them 
and aspire to the practice of an objective science (Bourdieu, 1990). 
The call for self-reflection in anthropology came as the outcome of disciplinary crises, 
beginning in the early 1970s. The first sense of reflexivity in anthropology is part of social 
science's more general self-critique in the wake of theories by Michel Foucault and others 
about the relationship of power and knowledge production. Others were based on 
recognition and subsequent critique of the discipline's complicity with structures of 
inequality wrought by European (post)colonialism.  The other crisis was produced by the 
feminist movement, critiquing the notion of the objective, neutral observer hiding the 
discipline's androcentric bias. The feminist intervention in particular led to an emphasis on 
positionality—that is, a reflexivity that is enacted through the explicit acknowledgment and 
theorisation of the "situatedness and partiality of all claims to knowledge" (Marcus, 2005:  
10 and p. 23) and the ethnographer’s position in relation to his or her interlocutors.  
Reflexivity was called for to counter the reproduction of inequalities in research. While 
reflexivity has become regular practice in anthropology and ethnographic research, few 
wrote about the position of the development worker in the development aid processes 
(Eyben, 2004; Crewe and Harrison, 1998; Mosse 2005).  
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As a researcher one is involved in several interactions, building relationships to conduct the 
study. The so- called impartial, neutral position of the researcher is a myth. The outcome of 
the research is influenced by the position of the researcher, his/her gender, age, or other 
identity traits and relations. Doing research means interaction with people, for instance 
through arranging focus group discussions, meetings, conducting interviews. These 
interactions involve power dynamics that have an impact on the outcome of research, of 
which social scientists in particular need to be aware. The experience of power influences 
action in subtle and complex ways; sets limits or opens up possibilities to what people can 
do. 
 This experience of power is clearly linked to social position and resources, or social 
and material conditions, influenced by, for example, class, gender and race. The interactions 
with others involve processes of shaping, negotiation, imposing and are further complicated 
by the different identities a researcher has. A male researcher is usually attributed more 
power than a female researcher, a lower caste is usually less powerful than a Brahmin, and a 
white person has a different position and status when compared to a black researcher in 
Nepal. 
The researcher is influenced by the context in which he/she moves. The landscape of 
power is far more complicated, fragmented and unstable than some critiques of 
development assume (e.g. Escobar, 1995). It is not just the dominant white researcher who 
extracts valuable information from passive locals. 
 These reflections create a messier view of reality, but arguably a more accurate one. I 
will describe certain aspects of practice, and social relations which, I propose, are an 
indication of wider patterns the inter-relationships between context, identity, position and 
research bring. 
 To understand the complex nature of my position as a researcher I will first give more 
information about the different roles and positions I have occupied in Nepal over the last 25 
years, the period that includes my involvement with FFS and this research. Roles are socially 
defined expectations that a person in a given social position or status follows (Giddens 2006: 
142).  A position is a social value other people give to a certain position, and is relative, in 
relation to other positions. For instance, a position as a director gets a higher status in 
comparison with lower level staff in the same office, but a low UN position might get a 
higher status then a high position in a national government office in some societies. In Nepal 
UN positions are definitely valued more than a governmental or NGO position. Employment 
with an international NGO is considered superior over employment with a local NGO. 
 
A position comes with certain rights and responsibilities, certain capacities or expertise 
(values) are required, a certain way of dealing with the associated tasks (institutional 
behaviour), all in line with certain expectations or norms (Adapted from de Jager et al., 
2009). Table 3.1 gives an overview of some of the main positions I had in Nepal over the 
years. 
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Table 3.1 Author’s positions in Nepal 1986-2011 
  
Period Position 
1986 - 1987      Internship at Institute of Animal and Agricultural Science, at Rampur in Chitwan 
district as part of  my study BSc Tropical Agriculture 
1993 - 1996        Development worker with German Development Service, working in the 
Western Regional Irrigation Directorate with water user groups 
1992 - 2007        Married to Nepalese  
1993 -  
present   
Mother 
1996 - 2002        FAO expert, programme officer of IPM Farmer Field School project 
2003 -  
present 
Lecturing Nepalese students in the Netherlands, Van Hall Larenstein, 
2008 – 
present   
Researcher at Wageningen University, Rural Development Sociology  
Source: this research, 2011  
 
Although the positions are presented as if they are separate entities, in practice they overlap 
and they are all interwoven (Coffey, 1999).  In particular being someone’s wife or mother co-
exists and interacts with being a researcher or programme officer. Additionally I was a 
colleague and friend. Moreover, these positions or social roles are interlinked with identities, 
determined by factors such as age, gender, race, education etc. This inter-linkage not only 
influences behaviour but also how others value you.   This created sometimes confusion for 
me, as well as for those with whom I engaged, in carrying out the FFS project and, later, in 
conducting this research.  
 
Rather than talking about roles or positions I prefer to use the concept of identity, in which 
roles and positions but also other factors and characteristics of a person play a role, such as 
sex, religion, age, nationality, caste and so on. I will use the concept of identity, 
notwithstanding it is a not a clear concept (Escobar, 2008) and frequently debated (Prins, 
2006). Identity is a dynamic concept, shaped by actors in interaction with others; it is 
contextual and varies in different situations (Allen, 2011).  It articulates difference and it can 
be used as a social ordering principle. Identity is a broad term used throughout the social 
sciences. Since identity is a virtual thing, it is impossible to define it empirically. Discussions 
of identity use the term with different meanings, from fundamental and abiding sameness, 
to fluidity, contingency, negotiated and so on. According to Hall, cultural identity “is not 
something which already exists, but transcending place, time, history and culture; identities 
are the names we give to the different ways we are positioned by, and position ourselves 
within, the narratives of the past”. (Hall, 2003: 225). I will not elaborate on the psychological 
aspect of identification. Identity, as I define it is expressed in social situations and is used as a 
way or strategy to realise a certain goal. Identity construction is a socially creative, interactive 
and contextual process. Gender, caste, racial, ethnic identities do not exist in isolation but 
maybe emphasised or combined differently. 
 I want to stress that the nature of one’s identity is complex and multifaceted. I will 
show how communication helps constitute social identity and I explore relationships 
between social identities. Finally, I apply these notions to my own multiple identities through 
the years in Nepal and my involvement with FFS. 
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Identity is conceptualised as a relation of difference (Gupta and Ferguson, 1997).  It relates to 
the understandings people hold about who they are and what is meaningful to them, the 
self-image and the image that society has of a person. In the course of life everybody 
develops a sense of identity in a particular social-cultural environment. We can call this 
socialisation: the interaction with others conditions our personalities, the values we hold and 
the behaviour we engage in. Yet through socialisation we also develop a sense of identity. 
This process starts at birth and continues during the course of life.  Identity is influenced by 
gender, race, ethnicity, religion, and so on and one individual can hold multiple identities that 
are acted out sequentially or simultaneously, like being a woman, being Hindu, being 
Nepalese. Gender, ethnic, racial identity are neither predetermined nor the result of some 
linear, uni-directional socialisation process. Identities are relational which means that they 
are created by the social process of fulfilling a certain role in interaction with other people 
and their identities. A person is associated by their identity, but also individuals use identities 
to their advantage. Ethnic, gender, racial and other identities cannot be isolated but may be 
combined or emphasised differently depending on who is present and how people assess the 
situation. In some occasions I stressed my professional background, in others my 
motherhood; in some instances I was the friend in other situations the teacher. 
 How then did my multiple identities influence my research? Of the multiple identities 
my being white and European was the easiest to observe for Nepalese. Being regarded as a 
white European gave me advantages as well as disadvantages, as do most Westerners 
experience in developing countries. On the one hand, it is related to my origin from a world 
considered more historically more advanced and dominant than theirs. On the other hand, it 
was a disadvantage because a white European is assumed not to understand Nepalese 
culture, traditions, history, values and so on. Nepalese people are proud of their culture, 
their history, and their traditions.  
Also as European you are assumed to be non-Hindu, non Buddhist, in other words 
ignorant of their rich religious background. Religion is more part of Nepalese daily life than it 
is in mine. There are religious rituals to be performed each day and if you do not take part in 
these rituals or if you do not perform these religious acts correctly you are 
considered ’uncivilized’.   
 Being European also creates the image that one is well-off. In short conversations in 
teashops people would quickly go past the first introductory questions: “Where you from, 
are where do you work, do you have brothers and sisters”, to: “What do you earn?” A 
question that I learned to answer with: “Enough to live in Nepal”, but still it made me feel 
uncomfortable. As working for the UN I obviously did earn more than most of the people 
around me, and it raised questions: did I deserve all these means? Why me and not them? 
People would approach me almost daily with requests to adopt their children, to give them 
money, to pay for their medical expenses, to send them abroad, to pay for school fees. Many 
people offered their children: “Please take them with you”.  Some have explained this as a 
part of patronage tradition (MacFarlane, 1994), others from the perspective of a dependency 
syndrome (Bista, 1991), but whatever theoretical explanation is given, for me it meant that I 
was always considered to be in a position having more resources than others. I helped a lot 
of people, but I disappointed even more. Then again I experienced pressure to create 
innovative interventions or ideas to justify my involvement in international development. 
 Field work or interactions with people as programme officer or researcher engages us 
in identity work, which can be productive as well as problematic. In the following section I 
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discuss the implications of multiple identities as programme officer, as spouse and as 
researcher. I selected these three positions because they are relevant for the Farmer Field 
School project, my experience in Nepalese society and this research. 
 
3.2 My position as programme officer 
 
When I came to Nepal, the Southeast Asian regional Farmer Field School or IPM programme 
had already been running in several countries for about 10 years and extension to other 
countries was an option, one of them being Nepal (see Chapter 1). Right from the start I was 
involved in the discussions regarding the programme in Nepal. First as FAO staff (junior 
professional based in Lao PDR, working on vegetable Farmer Field Schools) visiting Nepal as 
an adviser, later (December 1999 – August 2002) as a programme officer based in Nepal. I 
was given these assignments because of my knowledge of Nepali culture, having worked in 
Nepal, being married to a Nepali, my background in agriculture and development, familiarity 
with FFS and the ability to speak the Nepalese language. After my contract with FAO ended 
in 2002 I kept visiting Nepal to see my family and I stayed in touch with FFS through many 
Nepalese agricultural professionals from NGOs and the government who had become my 
friends or who came to study for their Masters in Wageningen. Due to my continuous 
involvement with FFS and Nepal, I was able to conduct a longitudinal study, and in a position 
to observe changes over time.  
 
My position was initially, in 1997/1998 (as junior professional based in Laos, working for 
Vegetable IPM FFS), to advise on the Training of trainers and monitor the project. In 1998 
and 1999 I went on several missions and attended the first training of trainers in Jhumka, and 
visited the first field schools on rice in the terai and mid hills. In 1999 I moved to Nepal as 
FAO officer and became in charge of planning the project, budget distribution, reporting to 
FAO and the donor.  I was responsible for the implementation of the project, to oversee that 
activities in the project document were pursued, to coordinate collaboration with all 
stakeholders, to assure that basic principles of FFS were followed, and that people felt 
inspired to do a good job. It was not difficult to be enthusiastic about Farmer Field Schools, 
because organising them was just great fun. Farmers enjoyed doing the drawing exercises, 
the trials, the discussions and the singing or the games. Their enthusiasm inspired me and 
the staff involved in the programme.  I felt responsible for using the budget wisely, which was 
to benefit as many farmers as possible in an effective way, with good quality training. 
Whereby good quality meant that training was participatory, involved farmers, addressed 
their needs in relation to the crop dealt with in the training, that FFS were well organised 
(timely, good learning exercises, special topics that reflected farmers’ interests, and not top-
down determined by trainers with lectures or demonstrations from district office subject 
matter specialists, in other words not a session with farmers in the ‘old style’).  
I was responsible for providing feedback to headquarters in the regional programme 
office of the project, which was located in Jakarta, Indonesia. With my Nepalese counterpart 
I designed plans for training of trainers (TOTs) and FFS, monitoring and evaluation and other 
activities. Initially mainly government staff implemented the programme but later, under 
pressure from the donor and international staff at headquarters in Jakarta, increasingly NGOs 
took part. NGO involvement led to expansion of FFS, in particular in more remote areas, but 
also inclusion of more marginalised people.  
In the beginning all management decisions were taken at central level, but after 
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expansion of FFS, decision-making became more decentralised. In the districts, coordination 
units were established in which farmers, district government and NGO staff discussed 
planning, budget allocation and monitoring and evaluation. Monitoring and evaluation of the 
programme and policy-making took place at central level. At the outset the central office 
decided the location of FFS, after some years the district office and later farmers themselves 
were involved in decision-making regarding allocation of budget and venue of FFS. 
As a programme officer I did not work alone, but my views on the project and notions 
on terms such as participation and empowerment had an impact on the implementation. My 
ideas regarding certain key concepts of the project, which I have included in this research, 
have changed over the years. As this research reports on events or data collected over a 
period of time, is a longitudinal study, my personal views that changed over time are 
important to consider. In Table 3.2 I give a brief overview of some of these ideas. 
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Table 3.2 Changes in personal views on some concepts in development 
 
Concept 1997 2002 2009 
Farmers 
participation 
Information from the 
farmers is necessary to 
make the FFS curriculum 
appropriate for farmers. 
Participation of farmers 
can be achieved in a 
rather technical way: PRA 
with mapping and 
cropping calendars at the 
start of FFS, discussion 
and drawing pictures of 
the crops during FFS. 
Self-mobilisation in 
communities will 
lead to elite capture. 
To avoid this it is 
important to focus 
more on inclusion of 
‘real farmers’ in this 
project. 
Participation is a complex. 
We need to consider 
diversity and differences in 
FFS, not make social 
divisions bigger. 
Governance The government of Nepal 
is in charge of governance. 
They need to be our key 
players in implementing 
FFS. NGOs might take a 
role in remote areas 
where government 
officers do not visit. 
The government and 
NGOs are key 
stakeholders in 
governance. They 
should be equal 
partners in FFS 
implementation. 
The government, the NGOs 
and citizens play a role in 
governance. 
Gender If women want they can 
take part. That they do 
not participate is assumed 
out of their own choice. 
Women are the key 
producers, their 
involvement is 
crucial to the success 
of FFS. Women in 
Development! 
Gender is relational. FFS can 
contribute to gender 
equality if it addresses 
invisible power dynamics, 
and works on social 
transformation. 
Empowerment Empowerment is a means 
to development. 
FFS contributes to 
empowerment, it is 
an outcome of FFS 
participation 
FFS can contribute to 
empowerment of farmers, 
but more as a catalyst in a 
process that is already on-
going. Just the provision of 
knowledge and skills, as is 
the case in FFS is not 
sufficient for empowerment 
of men and women farmers. 
Empowerment is a process 
of change, relational and 
context specific. 
Project 
implementation 
Technical project 
approach: A project will 
work out mainly as 
planned, just follow the 
steps. During the 
monitoring some 
adaptations might need to 
be made 
Technical project 
approach 
Developmental project 
approach: Take into 
consideration that 
development is a fluid, 
creative, process, things go  
unplanned. 
Source: Field data and research notes (2009) 
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The views on key concepts such as participation, governance, gender and empowerment 
have had an impact on the implementation of the FFS project, although I was only one actor 
among many (Chapter 6 and 8). In the implementation of the project I followed an approach 
that Li (2007) calls: “rendering technical” in the sense that a project is approached as being a 
technical problem with an unambiguous result, neutralising or negating inherent power 
inequities. I followed the project document and made sure we achieved the set targets, the 
outputs as described in the logical framework. In the back-to-office reports it is clear that I 
focused mainly on technical aspects: the condition of the fields, whether the FFS trainers did 
include all the FFS components: insect zoos29, special topics, AESA, whether they followed 
the steps in the FFS. I registered mostly quantitative data: The number of farmers present, 
the number of women and men, the age and education level of FFS participants, but not the 
caste or ethnic composition of the group. Several excerpts from my Back-to-Office Reports 
and research diary may clarify my point:  
 
We visited today FFS in Kapil Vastu district. There were 20 women and 5 men. The 
farmers were all very enthusiastic. The district agriculture officer who is the 
facilitator of this group is also enthusiastic. The fields were in good condition. They 
had three trials going on: fertiliser trials, simulation of leaf cutter and simulation 
of insects that damage the shoots. (Back-to-Office Report, May 1997) 
 
In the farmer fields (Bhardiya district) we noticed that farmers do not weed. In the 
FFS we introduce weeding as a compulsory practice. We have conducted field 
trials to prove that weeding gives an increase in yield. This gives more income and 
the DADO and famers are pleased with the results. (Back-to-Office Report,  July 
2000) 
 
During the visit of FFS in Jhapa, I noticed the presence of brown plant hoppers, but 
they are just a few in numbers. The FFS facilitator wants to spray insecticide and is 
worried to use alternative means. He is not following the FFS principles: growing a 
healthy crop, frequent field observations.(Back-to-Office Report,  October 2000) 
 
In my work I followed a structured and technical approach and did not know well how to 
react to corruption, or misuse of funds: 
  
When I was on holiday in the Netherlands X tried to embezzle project funds. He 
manipulated the national FAO office to transfer funds of the project to his private 
bank account. (E-mail communication with FAO IPM FFS headquarters, August 
2000) 
 
Today Y put 25,000 rupees in her bag. An amount she received from over-charging 
on stationary for the training. She just made a fake bill. I was shocked. I did not 
know what to say. I kept quiet. She earns 5,000 rupees; I earn 500.000 each 
month. Y is also my friend. Who am I to judge? (Diary, October 2001) 
 
These aspects have had an impact on the implementation of the FFS report, in which I took a 
leading role. This has had an impact on my relations with my colleagues and partners in the 
project. In the interaction with people, not only one’s own role and identity play a role, but it 
is also influenced by the relations one has with other actors and the entire interaction.  A 
                                                 
29
  In FFS an insect zoo is a small pot or cage in which the behaviour of a particular insect is observed. 
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fragment from my diary gives an example: 
 
In my work people judge me negatively because I work in the same office as Y. She 
is my counterpart or colleague, whatever you want to call this relationship. In fact 
I have no choice in the matter. Luckily we get on well, and working together goes 
smoothly. But I know that not everybody likes her, and some people treat me 
hostile because I work with her. And I thought naively that I could be 
neutral....Bizarre.(Diary, January 2002) 
 
Another example:  
 
We ( my friend and I) are walking on the road and a man meets us halfway. He 
greets my friend. He is a village leader or political leader, anyway he is introduced 
to me as an important person. He started talking with my friend about FFS. The 
man expresses that it was a useless project, with not much impact. He did not pay 
much attention to me. This changes when he is informed that I was the project 
coordinator and am doing a study about the FFS programme. Suddenly he is all 
praise and enthusiasm:  “FFS was a wonderful programme and farmers learnt a lot 
and he would like to have more programmes like that in the nearby future”. 
(Tanahun, research notes, August 2009) 
 
It is clear that some information that I got during this research is not unbiased, that people 
gave positive feedback on a project when they knew that I had been the project officer and 
when they thought there was a slight chance I could give them more projects. 
 In my position as programme officer I made active use of certain identities. I stressed 
my education and experience in agriculture and Farmer Field Schools and my experience in 
Nepal. I made use of the network I had, the Nepalese colleagues, friends and students. I was 
often in doubt whether to make my marital status known, because my husband belonged to 
the Janajatis and not to the Brahmin/Chettris who dominated the office where I worked. My 
husband was known in the agricultural sector, because most of the staff had graduated from 
the same university. He supported the Maoist movement and I was never quite sure that it 
was a good thing for me to be associated with his political views. On some occasions his 
Maoist background was useful, in particular when the movement got stronger, but on other 
occasions it was wiser to be distanced from Maoist activities. 
I purposefully tried to downplay my race, whiteness, European background, my class 
status. This was not easy of course, because the traits of these identities are so obvious. I 
tried to be ‘one of them’ to get accepted in the Nepalese government office where I was 
situated. I spoke Nepalese, ate the same snacks as my colleagues and dressed Nepalese. 
With men in the office or in DADOs it was easy to become friends. For them to be friendly 
with a woman, a European was a kind of novelty. Interaction between Nepalese men and 
women is not always easy, and in agricultural offices there are mostly men employed. I 
gained trust and this helped me in the implementation of the project and later in conducting 
research. 
 Being an ‘outsider in’ had advantages, especially in the field. My multiple identities 
did not interfere negatively with the Farmer Field School and the topics or issues that were 
addressed (insects, farming, water management). Farmers opened up more easily due to my 
language skills and dress, my obvious familiarity with customs and traditions, with culture, by 
being a mother of children with Nepalese roots. They were interested in being involved in a 
project led by a white woman who ‘understood them’.  
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 These relationships, interactions, identities played a role in the formation and 
implementation of the project and ultimately has an influence on the outcome of this 
research. 
 
3.3 My position in society 
 
Most researchers can avoid speaking about their private life in their reports or thesis. In my 
case it is necessary to mention that I was married to a Nepalese man, from Gurung ethnicity, 
a Janajati. Nepalese in general, but Gurung in particular, place enormous emphasis on 
people’s relatedness to each other (Pettigrew, 2008). Marriage gave me a position in 
Nepalese society, a ‘home’ and I became a kind of ‘insider’. It gave me relatedness to kin, 
which guides social interaction (idem). It provided me with several advantages in my work 
and my research because I learned about Nepalese culture, I learned about Nepalese intra-
household dynamics (not so much our own, but I frequently visited friends or relatives), I 
learned about norms and values, ideologies. I learnt how to behave, how to express myself, I 
learnt to speak Nepalese in a proper way with niceties for the correct audience, I learnt to 
make the right jokes. I learnt how to serve dinner, how to sit, how to prepare nice Nepali tea. 
 Generally speaking people respected my efforts to adapt, to speak the language, to fit 
in. At the same time many people laughed at me, I never ate in the right way; I seemed to be 
unable to avoid making improper remarks. 
 As soon as people knew I was married to a person they knew (or had heard of) I was 
bhauju or bahari (the wife of respectively an older or younger brother). “Namaste Bhauju, 
When did you come? How is your husband doing?” (field visit DADO Kapil Vastu, 2000). The 
first step in knowing a person in Nepal is to work out their relationship to you, a relative, a 
former student a residential area can all be aspects that can link you to the other. 
 This aspect of my life was something I could never separate from my work or doing 
research. This is normal in Asia where there is a lack of separation between public and 
private sphere. Sometimes this was productive: I gained respect and trust, sometimes it 
created problems; I was married to the wrong ethnic group, to a person with the wrong 
political colour or people were simply not happy that I knew too much. 
 People react in a different way when they know you are someone who is married to a 
Nepalese, speak Nepali, and who is familiar with customs and traditions. “Be careful we 
cannot speak freely because she understands Nepali” was a remark I was confronted with on 
the first meeting with my Nepalese project colleagues and which I overheard on many more 
occasions in different situations. 
This position in Nepalese society became stronger when I got children. As said earlier: 
positions come with rights and responsibilities, a Nepalese mother and wife has to comply 
with certain duties and comply with particular norms and values. This was not always easy 
for me. I was struggling how to behave, how to be polite, how to live up to expectations. This 
led to conflicts, with my husband, with his Nepalese family members, with Nepalese friends. 
Life in a Gurung family was one of constant juggling with niceties and high level diplomatic 
and strategic skills. 
This can be read in the excerpt of my diary below:  
 
According to X I am not a good wife. I do not jump out of bed to make tea for his 
father early in the morning (4 am!). Also his mother complains that my daalbhaat 
is not very tasty (I am better at making spaghetti) . He feels embarrassed when I 
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make jokes with the men and do not chitchat or gossip with his aunts or with the 
wives of his friends. I really try my best to act feminine, dress in the right Nepali 
clothes, eat delicately with my hands, but talking with the wives of his friends or 
the women from his village in the mountain is ok for a few minutes but in the 
long-run just so boring. They talk about food, marriage ceremonies, jewellery, 
sarees and lots of other 'homey' things that do not interest me. His male friends 
on the other hand have often seen more of the world, enjoy talking politics and 
are interested in my work. (Diary, 1999) 
 
Over the years life in Nepal has become strongly influenced by politics. This became quite 
pronounced with the start of the Maoist movement in the early 1990s. My political views or 
political colour started to matter; this is revealed by the fragments from my diary in 1993, 
2000 and 2007: 
 
Today E came to our house. He has a high position in the Maoist party. He talked 
for hours with X. The main topic apparently was ' me'. The Party wants to know 
more about my background, my political views. If I am not supporting the Maoist 
way of thinking X is not allowed to marry me. The Party will not give their 
approval. Also if we marry then we have to support the Party each month with a 
certain amount of money, because they say that I am from a capitalist country, 
therefore I am wealthy. I find this all quite unsettling. (Diary, 1993) 
A couple of times stern looking men have visited our house and discussed things 
with X. They are Maoist. I am not supposed to know about their visits. They want 
to use our house to hide some of the Maoist leaders. Apparently one of the top 
leaders needs a hiding place and our house seems to be ideal: me working for the 
UN and driving a blue number plate, my husband a fervent Maoist supporter. The 
house situated just outside the ring road of Kathmandu, in the vicinity of the 
capital in a middle class residential area. Also they want to hide some guns in our 
house. X asks me what I think of this plan. I am worried. I do not want armed 
people in our house. I do not want to get actively involved in the struggle between 
Maoist, the government and the army. X says that we have no choice: he has to 
support the movement otherwise they will harm him and us. I tell him: ok we can 
have someone in our house, but only when you are present, not when I am alone 
with the kids. I know that this gives me some space, because out of the 365 days 
in a year, X is maybe one full day at home. (Diary, 2000) 
 
In November I came home from a field trip to the far Western region. X had left 
the house. This is the first time for years really that the house was left unattended 
for just 1-2 hours. The Maoists have used this particular moment as if they were 
on the look-out? They have moved a person into our house. A person, who has 
been fighting at the front and who is being searched for by the army and the 
police, has been placed in our house, in the top room. Nobody asked our 
permission, or maybe X was forced to agree to this? The refugee is from the higher 
caste, and he makes me quite anxious. He was supposed to stay 1 week but he has 
been here now for over 2 months. We have to feed him and hide him. No one is 
supposed to know that he is in our house. He enjoys talking to me it seems 
because he grabs every opportunity to start a conversation but he always puts me 
in the position of the capitalists, the bad guys. Despite explaining that I am Dutch 
he still thinks that I am American, and thus the enemy. He is very demanding. 
Capitalist should pay for their sins... During his stay I have already arranged for his 
daughter to go to the dentist (she really had terrible dental problems) and his wife 
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to go to the hospital. Bills of over 2000 euro!! Whenever I speak Nepali, he speaks 
English and then says: this is the language of the enemy. I avoid him. I want him 
out of the house. My job with FAO will finish in August and I think it is time to 
leave Nepal. (Diary fragment March 2001) 
 
We were in D. this weekend to celebrate X's birthday. Normally in Nepal you do 
not celebrate your birthday. It is a kind of Western thing. Lots of people do not 
even know when they are born, maybe the year but certainly not the day. Anyway 
we fixed a birthday party for X. His parents were there and some friends and, of 
course, all our children. I bought a cake and some presents.  
During the celebrations suddenly a group of Maoist comrades turned up, easily 
recognisable in grey uniforms; one lady and three men. They all looked stern. The 
woman avoided eye contact to all extent. Why were they here? What did they 
want? Had we done something wrong? X talked with them. He was very pleased 
that such high level Party members were visiting our farm. At one stage I was 
invited into their discussions. The opening sentence put me immediately in an 
awkward position: “Bhauju probably does not approve of our movement eh?” I 
responded: “Why do you think this way about me?” The guy laughed and did not 
answer. I continued saying: “I support the ideas of change the Maoists want for 
Nepalese society, but that I am worried about the future, I am not sure which way 
things will go”. And I asked: “What are the plans for the future of the Maoists?” He 
replied: “The party is the future”. I decided to smile and keep my mouth shut 
because I had no idea what to say to this, and suspected that any words would get 
me into more trouble. This Maoist movement is tricky for us. (Diary, 2006) 
 
The political background of my husband is something I tried not to draw attention to in my 
work and in my research. The inside knowledge though has been useful for this thesis. 
 In my private life it was not always easy to deal with my identities. In the kinship circle 
of my husband I felt more an outsider than an insider in society. I tried to fit in, but did not 
manage well. Speaking the language I mastered well, and I could dress the right way. 
Notwithstanding my efforts, I was not considered a good mother or wife according to 
societal norms because I worked full-time, travelled a lot for my work and did not prepare a 
decent daal bhaat, did not wear golden earrings and did not perform daily religious rituals. 
Sometimes I used my Western identity as an excuse for my deeds, my performance: my 
ignorance was accepted. In larger society however, I was more often treated as an insider, 
because of my familiarity with Nepalese culture. I used being a women and mother to bond 
with other women. I put my education and job to use in interactions with men to get their 
trust and respect. 
 
3.4 My position as a researcher  
 
The position of researcher sometimes caused confusion about the way   for me, and for the 
people involved in my study, to behave. I had come back to meet the same people whom I 
had known for about a decade, some even longer. Many people in the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Cooperatives, Department of Agriculture and DADOs had been students at the time I did 
my internship as BSc student at IAAS in Rampur. Some I knew as participants in the training 
of trainers in 1997 in Jhumka and then met again in DADOs or at the Ministry or in the 
department of Plant Protection. Some were my colleagues, some my friends.  
 Although our respective positions had changed over time, for many government staff 
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and NGO staff, I remained associated with the FAO office, the FFS programme; for others I 
was known as their lecturer or course coordinator in the Netherlands, and many knew me 
as ’ the wife of’ X.. None knew me as ‘the researcher’. But mostly people reacted positively 
and gave me support in my job and in my research. In Nepal one cannot just go into the field 
and interview people. One needs an introduction by an official who is familiar with the area, 
a DADO officer or a junior technician. The fact that I knew a lot of people gave me many 
openings to ask for support for field work, which I got. During the summer of 2009 it was not 
busy in government offices and several people were interested in joining me in the field.  
 Most people in the villages, assumed, that I, like most white tourists and 
development workers, would bring money or new projects. When I proved to have little 
control over projects, the question arose: What I could offer? In a similar fashion government 
officers hoped I could give scholarships or guarantee them a position in a PhD or Masters 
course, and when I had to disappoint them doubts arose about their contributions to this 
research. As a result I never managed to get an interview with some people, but as I have a 
large network of contacts in Nepal this did not hamper my research. I was not dependent on 
the support of one particular person. Some thought that helping me with their research 
might create a win-win situation, as is shown by some of the remarks below: 
 
“Hello Anna my friend, how are you? Oh you are doing research now? Please write 
something positive so we get more donors to support us”  (Kathmandu, interview, 
2009, former colleague at PPD) 
 
“Namaste Annemarieji. Oh you are doing research for you PhD. Oh well I was 
thinking can you help me to get a PhD position at your university?” (Kathmandu, 
FAO staff, interview, 2009) 
 
“Hi Annemarie. How are you doing? Nice to see you again. I have tried to get a 
scholarship for a master degree at your university but no luck so far. Maybe you 
can help me (Kathmandu, interview, 2009, INGO staff) 
 
“Sure Bhauju I can help you with your research. You just tell me what you need. 
Maybe when you have time you can help me to submit some project proposals 
that I have written. (Kavre, local NGO staff interview 2009) 
 
In the cases I was able to help people, I did. In ways that are common in Asia I exchanged 
information in reciprocity, exchanged information with mutual help. I helped Nepalese 
students with their research, provided FAO staff with network contacts or academic 
information and so on.  
Even though people might have expectations which I could not meet, they were still 
willing to respond to my questions regarding this research. The above selection of remarks 
that were made during the interactions in the research illustrates that doing research is 
intertwined with interactions in which interviewees have certain expectations and objectives 
other than the researcher. Overall, many people did not ask any favours, but were happy to 
assist.  
 I had several meetings and interviews with FAO staff. Somehow the project officer 
was reluctant to give me information: 
 
When I started working here, there was no single documentation, there was no 
information about FFS and no reporting was done. I had to start from scratch 
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(referring to his predecessor, who was me). I cannot give you much. The only thing 
I had was the project document. (Kathmandu, interview, 2009) 
 
On my request to get some basic reports, like field visit reports that are not confidential he 
responded:  
 
Please give me more information in writing before I can give you some 
documents. Give me a list of things you need and we can see if it is there for you. 
Also he wanted more clarity about my motives and plans ‚”Tell me your 
programme”.  All the same then he let me return to his office on several occasion 
without ever giving me information about the project. Come back next week. End 
of next week give me a call: and so on. (Kathmandu, research notes, 2009) 
 
In the end I did not get any reports from him. It is clear that he had different objectives than I 
had, but also that he was under certain pressures. At some stage he showed me the pressure 
he was under to perform. He said that he was interested in a prolongation of his contract and 
he wanted to show the world around him that he was doing a good job. “As you know, 
donors are supporting but they are saying this is very narrow field. I am trying to survive this 
project” (Kathmandu, interview, 2009).  He requested that I made my research interesting for 
future donors:  
 
“Please go deeper, so you can convince the donor, if we demonstrate this is 
working then maybe more donors are coming.” (Kathmandu, interview, 2009). 
 
With this question he counted on my loyalty, and I doubt if he would have asked this to an 
‘outsider’. I really wanted to do  research that would be useful for him, not only to contribute 
to the FFS programme but also as a kind of reciprocity, which is common in Asia, in exchange 
for his support.  
 
During the meeting(s) I used language, symbolic capital and other ‚’tools of agency’. I was 
constantly negotiating behaviour. I tried to be friendly, collegial, professional and academic. I 
wanted his cooperation and preferably some data. From his side there were reservations, 
maybe he had reasons to be cautious about how much to reveal to outsiders, or me in 
particular. 
This interaction influenced my research in that I did not get all the information I 
wanted from FAO, but it made me creative in getting data via other sources, like DADO, 
Department of agriculture and NGO staff. 
 
3.5 Methodological consequences  
 
In the same office as the FAO programme officer there was also the PPD chief. He interrupted 
my meeting with the FAO officer saying:  
 
“You should focus on economic impact. Just what we need: a socio-economic 
impact study, social but especially economic impact. In the PPD office they also 
strongly advised me to go to certain districts. E.g. Do not go to Lalitpur, but go to 
Kavre. PPD Chief and FAO programme officer: Go to Kavre for your study. There 
are good groups there.” (Kathmandu, interview, 2009) 
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As a result I followed their advice and went to the districts they recommended me. As I 
wanted to get information from districts that were not so much ‘ model’ districts, I also 
visited other areas.  
 
To deal with the multiple identities I talked to FAO staff but also with NGOs, people who 
were not involved in FFS, government officers. I talked to a variety of people, to get multiple 
insights in the impact of FFS. I worked with former students who were willing to support me. 
I selected farmers that the district agriculture staff wanted me to talk to. Still I also talked to 
farmers that were not selected by the DADO, I also talked to more women than the DADO 
had intended me to talk to, I talked to more lower caste people then the government staff 
wanted me to talk to. I continuously made choices based on the influence of the 
environment and people around me, but also with the experience and knowledge that I had 
obtained during my studies of rural development, trying to avoid or widen a primarily 
technical approach to the FFS project. With my academic background I was now more 
conscious about social exclusion processes, empowerment and governance issues.  
 Interviews with NGO staff were cordial, especially with World Education with whom I 
had had a good working relation in the past. However they were short of funding and also 
wanted to see if they could get some funding through me. They were generous with the 
provision of information for this research. 
 Some interviews were disturbed or did not go as planned. This is shown by the 
example below: 
  
On Tuesday morning we left early to conduct some interviews with farmers in 
Tanahun district. X said that he would like to help me with my research. He said he 
had contacted some farmers and that we could meet them on this particular day. 
We drove 12 km from his farm to a small village. We stopped at the highway to 
Pokhara, although I had said that I wanted to walk and not take interviews near 
the road. He ignored my requests. There were a few men sitting at a teashop, they 
said that they were not farmers, but X insisted we talk  to them, as they were 
important people of this village. They had heard about IPM FFS. One of them was 
a veterinarian, a local JTA. They were all Brahmin men. X dropped me and said: “I 
will be back in a minute". I requested him to introduce me to these people”. His 
response was: “Yeah right you can start I will come back  and do that”. Off he went 
for about 20 minutes to drop a message at a friend’s house. 
 
In the meantime I introduced myself as a researcher doing a study on the impact of FFS. I 
asked if they were familiar with the FFS programme. They nodded. One of them had been a 
participant. He was a leader among the farmers and told me that he had been on many 
excursions organised by DADO.  
On purpose I did not tell them that I had been the officer-in-charge of the project, 
because that would raise their expectations of funding or a similar project, I knew by 
experience. 
 
After 10 minutes X returned. He interrupted the conversation. He told the men 
that I had started this FFS programme and was now doing research. That stirred 
their interest. One said: “Maybe we can get another project like this from FAO via 
you? X knew all these men vaguely, and they had heard about him. X was keen to 
make himself known to these men.”Ah you are the owner of that farm where you 
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have fishponds, vegetables and some development project, is not it?” X started 
talking about all his farming activities and tried to promote his coffee business. No 
chance to steer the discussion in the direction of my research. The farmers were 
friendly enough but also had other interests to talk about. They interrupted me 
and said: “What do you think about the climate change. Is the fact that we do not 
have rains yet, due to climate change? And what are the causes of this? (research 
notes, August 2009) 
 
The above situation shows that I could not always conduct the interviews as I wanted it, I 
could not select the site and participants as I had planned. I was dependent on cooperative 
staff of DADOs, friends and so on. I was subjected to power exercised by actors that were 
part of my research. The actors had different agendas to  me and different objectives. The 
fragment shows that all actors create their own space for manoeuvre whenever they can. Me 
too, I was not just a passive researcher, I had room to manoeuvre. Interviews are often the 
product of such negotiation.  
 On that same occasion, I walked off and left the men talking with X. I met up with a 
couple of women in a milk collection centre. Two of them had been participants of an FFS, 
the other three had heard about it. They were impressed by my language skills and they 
provided me with a lot of information.  
 Being familiar with the country, having the ability to speak and understand Nepali, 
and having a large network gave me possibilities to visit many places and to talk to almost 
anyone, even people who were not selected by the FAO, government or NGO to be included 
in the research.  
 Overall I had a lot of support from Nepalese women and men in my research. In the 
office but even more in farmers’ villages, men and women were happy to share their 
experiences with me. My identity as woman and mother helped me to bond with women, to 
create a relationship albeit short that provided trust and made them open in their interviews 
with me. Men helped me because they trusted me and because they enjoyed my company 
or maybe because they thought I could help them with something in the future. Although 
some of my identities worked counter-productive, like being a white European, because they 
raised false expectations, most identities I could put to good use in conducting qualitative 
research.  
The biases that might have crept in my research as a result of being the ‘outsider in’ I 
have tackled through triangulation of the data I obtained through interviews and focus group 
discussions. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
A researcher comes to a setting with multiple identities constructed and shaped by social 
experiences that are sometimes part of the research process, like in this research. The 
complexity of my multiple roles and identities in Nepalese society and the FFS project 
implementation influences both the practice of doing interviews and observation,  and the 
interpretation of the results. Being a white European woman in Nepalese society was 
sometimes problematic but for my work and research it proved productive, in particular my 
in-depth knowledge of Nepalese culture, and my familiarity with ‘the rules of the game’ in 
Nepalese society. The problems I encountered in the multiple identity clashes in my private 
life, did not interfere systematically with the FFS topic. As an ‘outsider in’ I had many 
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opportunities to make selective use of identities to gain the trust of men or bond with 
women in particular situations and get more information required for qualitative research.  
Thus my long-term involvement with Nepalese society as the ‘outsider in’ gave me 
the opportunity to learn a lot about culture, norms and values, but also gave me the 
opportunity to observe the changes in Nepal and the (rural) developments that have taken 
place over the last 25 years. Despite some drawbacks, my longitudinal research project has 
greatly benefited from it. 
  I have tried to answer the question: How is the research outcome is influenced by the 
position of the researcher and the multiple identities associated with it? As a researcher and 
as an FAO programme officer setting up Farmer Field Schools in Nepal I had multiple 
identities. These identities co-existed and interacted, and I have emphasised a particular one 
or combined them in a strategic way to reach the objectives of this research.  
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Chapter 4 Introduction to the Farmer Field School 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Farmer Field School (FFS) is currently a well-known concept in the agricultural sector all over 
the world, but what is actually meant by a Farmer Field School in its practical 
implementation? In this chapter I will introduce the concept of the Farmer Field School . I will 
describe the history, how FFS was initiated in Indonesia in reaction to a pest problem and the 
failure of the traditional agricultural extension approach. I will describe   the principles and 
objectives of FFS, but also why there is no such thing as a standard FFS in real life. Although 
the FFS often gets presented as a clear and generally agreed extension approach, there are in 
fact different views of what FFS entails. There are even more different practical ways of 
implementing the FFS concept in real life in Farmer Field Schools in rural areas all over the 
world, as FFS is constructed by different actors in different ways. Throughout this thesis I 
shall refer to the concept and extension approach and to particular training sites as Farmer 
Field Schools. 
FFS is a learning platform, a research strategy as much as an agricultural extension 
approach. Besides differences in method used or focus applied, the FFS approach is also 
dynamic, and it has evolved over the years. In this chapter I will show the changes that have 
taken place over the years. FFS started off as an integrated pest management project in 
Indonesia and moved to community based activities and rural development. FFS began as a 
project with concrete outputs but developed into a process with outcomes. It started as a 
project activity, turned into a programme30 and became an institution. FFS started as a 
technical tool to contribute to agricultural development but it gradually embraced 
community development, and became a platform for participation and rural development. 
Initially I also believed that there was a standard FFS and that FFS had to meet certain 
established criteria and follow certain steps. I believed in following a certain ‘blue print’ for 
FFS with planned objectives (debated by several authors like Rondinelli, 1993, Grindle and 
Thomas,1989, Grillo and Stirrat, 1997, Mosse, 2005; Li, 2006), to achieve success, but I 
changed my view over the years. I thought about FFS as a technical project. In practice FFS 
appeared to turn out like this, and standardisation of project implementation was impossible 
to achieve (neither to be desired). This chapter is a technical introduction to the following 
chapters where I will explain why the outcome of FFS worked out differently than planned in 
terms of impact on rural development (Chapter 6), empowerment (Chapter 7) and 
governance (Chapter 8). 
 Most organisations involved in FFS claim that it is a success. However, claims for 
success or failure need to be critically looked at. This chapter will finally discuss some of the 
difficulties encountered in measuring the impact of FFS. 
 
 
                                                 
30
      In this study the terms project and programme are used interchangeable, because it is not always clear 
at what stage the initial IPM or Farmer Field School project turned into a programme. It started as a 
project in Nepal as part of an inter-regional programme. People involved speak about FFS as a project, 
a separate activity but also as a programme. 
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4.2 History 
 
The Farmer Field School originates from the Integrated Pest Management (IPM) programme, 
which started in Indonesia about 20 years ago in 1989 (Pontius et al., 2002).  It was initiated 
in a reaction to problems associated with the Green Revolution in Asia. 
• The Green Revolution is a term referring to a technical, engineering approach aimed 
at small-scale farmers, assuming that agricultural production could increase if farmers 
had access to a certain input package, including high yielding varieties, irrigation and 
chemical fertilisers. The model was launched about 40 years ago and was introduced 
in many parts of the world. In Asia it started with improved varieties in rice and 
wheat, developed by research institutes in the Philippines and India. Farmers located 
in well- irrigated areas with suitable soils responded positively to the use of high 
yielding varieties (HYV) and other inputs. Agricultural productivity increased 
considerably. The average rice yield in Asia doubled between the 1960s and 1980s. 
The Green Revolution was part of a technology transfer approach which is based on a 
five key assumptions: A positivist view on science; science is key to finding new 
solutions to problems and can lead to progress. New technologies developed at 
research stations will lead to better farming (Van den Ban and Hawkins, 1988, 1996); 
• Agriculture is the main drive to agricultural development (Ellis  et al., 1992, Röling and 
Wagemakers, 1998). “Agriculture first” determines the view, with the small farm 
considered as the main platform for rural poverty reduction (Ellis, 2000); 
• The diffusion of innovations as the key mechanism for large scale impact (Rogers, 
1995; Van de Fliert, 2003). Farmers who adopt new technologies will benefit, others 
will see the effect and soon follow, or be left out and leave farming altogether (Hazell 
and Ramasamy, 1991). A seemingly logical process that fuels expansion, 
intensification and specialisation; 
• Green Revolution technologies are scale-neutral; they can raise yields and income for 
small- and large-scale farmers (Hazell and Ramasamy, 1991). Technology is universal 
and exists independent of the social context (Pretty, 1995); 
• Agricultural industrialisation can solve the many persistent, technical and social 
problems of agriculture (B. Harriss-White and S. Janakarajan, 1997). Farmers are a 
homogenous group. 
 
Agricultural policy makers and international organisations such as FAO loved this approach 
because it sounded logical and promised self-directed diffusion processes that would provide 
a high internal rate of return to investment in research and extension (Evenson and Collin, 
2003), reduce food prices for consumers, make agricultural industries more efficient and 
competitive, and generate a free labour force away from agriculture. 
 However, the Green Revolution and technology transfer in general appeared not to be 
the success story the technicians hoped it would be (Van den Berg and Jiggins, 2007; Pontius 
et al., 2002). New problems quickly emerged. Agricultural development took place under 
centralised systems unable to take the realities and variation of the small-scale farmers into 
account. The Green Revolution’s success depended heavily on external inputs such as high 
yielding varieties, chemical fertilisers, and irrigation techniques. The dependence on 
dominant corporations and external inputs reduced the profitably of the entire farming 
sector, created rural unemployment and undermined the capacity of rural communities 
(Pretty, 1995; Van de Fliert, 2003). Farmers were regarded as passive recipients and not as 
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active actors in the agricultural sector. The inclusion of routine pesticide application within 
input packages often caused severe ecological problems, such as loss of ecological balance, 
pest resurgence and resistance31. For instance, in Indonesia the use of chemical pesticides in 
rice was heavily promoted during the 1980s. The Indonesian government subsidised inputs 
to increase rice production under the Green Revolution. Around 40 per cent out of the 
subsidy was allocated for pesticides (Barbier 1989; Conway and Barbier 1990). The use of 
broad-spectrum insecticides led to massive insect outbreaks (Brown Plant Hopper), creating 
big losses in rice production (Kenmore, 1991) and negative effects on the environment 
(Pretty and Hine, 2001) and human health (Kishi, 2005; Kishi et al., 1995). Murphy et al. 
(1999) empirically showed that farmers had manifested the signs and symptoms of 
insecticide intoxication after spraying. All this demanded a revision of plant protection 
approaches (Kenmore, 1996; Matteson, 2000). The problems associated with the Green 
Revolution showed the need for a new approach to agriculture and extension (Van de Fliert, 
2003; Dilts, 1999; 2001; Röling and Van de Fliert, 1994). 
 In this light the FFS was a response to a serious and imminent problem. Integrated 
Pest Management with a participatory approach based on non-formal education principles 
through the Farmer Field School was considered the answer (Kenmore, 1991; Dilts, 1999; 
2001; van den Berg, 2004). 
The first practical move towards the development of a Farmer Field School approach 
was taken in the Philippines in the mid-1980s with a farmer training programme (Matteson 
et al., 1992). This was a collaborative effort by a team of social scientists and entomologists, 
to train farmers in integrated pest management. Many of the innovations introduced during 
this training programme were incorporated in the Farmer Field Schools later to be initiated in 
Indonesia. Such as: the rice field was used as a classroom, a focus on farmers rather than 
insects, a season-long training, experiential learning rather than classroom lectures, and field 
experiments. The principles of adult learning (Knowles, 1984; Van den Berg and Jiggins, 
2007) and the experiential learning cycle (Kolb, 1984) formed the foundation that inspired 
the process of social learning-by-doing and self-discovery which lies at the root of FFS. 
 Although the IPM programme entailed more activities than just the Farmer Field 
School, in this study I focus on the Farmer Field School, being the core activity of the IPM 
programme. Like Bentley expressed: “In recent years, IPM became to mean FFS (Farmer Field 
School)” (2009:333). 
 
Since the first FFS experiments were designed and managed by the UN Food and Agriculture 
Organisation in Indonesia in 1989, more than two million farmers across Asia have 
participated. It was considered a great success (Pontius et al., 2002; Van den Berg, 2004; 
Mancini, 2006) to be copied in other countries all over the world (Dilts, 2001; Pontius et al., 
2002; Kenmore, 1991; Gallagher, 2003; Braun and Duveskog, 2008). 
The dominant agricultural extension approach prior FFS  was the Training and Visit 
system (T & V).  The T&V system has been one of the most influential extension 
organisational developments in the last decades (Van den Ban and Hawkins, 1996). It was 
introduced in the mid- 1970s with investments by the World Bank.  The system tried to 
achieve changes in farming methods through advice from extension agents who had close 
links with agricultural research stations. The T&V system had a hierarchical organisational set 
                                                 
31 The history of the IPM is well documented. For example see the Community IPM web site: 
www.communityipm.org  and the Farmer Field School website: www.farmerfieldschool.net  
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up with one village extension worker (VEW) for about 800 farmers (idem). The extension 
workers were supervised by higher level extension officers who were assisted by Subject 
Matter Specialists (SMS).  
A major difference between FFS and the Training and Visit system is that the FFS 
requires active involvement of farmers rather than experts. The T&V system of extension 
follows a linear transfer of technology model, mostly top down, with information provision to 
selected contact farmers. In this model a trickle-down approach is assumed through the 
application of uniform extension technologies. FFS on the other hand fits into a broader 
education and extension picture and can be used as a tool for empowerment, education 
and/or adult learning, innovation as well as extension (Braun et al., 2006).  Kevin Gallagher 
has compared the traditional training and visit system with FFS (Table 4.1) 
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Table 4.1  Differences between T&V/technology transfer and FFS 
 
Subject: Training and Visit: Farmer Field School evolution: 
Field-level 
extension 
officer’s job 
Deliver pre-packaged ‘messages’ 
from a research-extension 
linkage. Primary job is 
information transfer, not 
technical expertise, which is 
reserved for specialists not at the 
field level. 
Technical facilitator: Every FFS-facilitator should 
have basic technical skills (at least able to grow 
the crop, or rear animals, etcetera). Secondly, 
every FFS-facilitator should have group oriented 
training and management skills. These skills are 
typically learned in a season-long Training of 
Trainers where they learn what and how they can 
teach. 
Experience of 
trainers 
Variable, but most often lacking 
basic farming skills and 
experience. Field level staff given 
communication skills. 
Master trainer with farming experience gained 
during Training of Trainers when each person is 
required to grow crops and carry out field studies 
so that they test what they will use in Field 
Schools later. 
Information Primarily top-down messages 
from distant research stations 
about situations presumed to be 
representative of farms. 
Recommendations are tested against conventional 
practices and new information about the site 
emerges. Promotes local creativity. 
Contact point Contact farmers who are 
supposed to train other farmers 
by passing on external 
information. 
Groups of interested farmers who farm on a daily 
basis through generating local study circles. 
Time frame Continuously, forever, on a two-
week regular cycle not based on 
any natural phenology. 
A pre-defined period. Usually on a weekly basis 
over a season. FFS may be longer than a season, 
but never less than one season integrated with 
the crop phenology. 
Pedagogy Training: Use of static pre-
determined demonstrations and 
in field examples to show and 
tell. 
Education: A focus on underlying principles that 
allow farmers to derive and adopt 
recommendations within their own dynamic their 
ecological, social, and economic realities. 
Evaluation At best indirect: based on 
measuring delivery and funds 
spent. 
Pre- and post-testing. Community self-surveying. 
Identifiable indicators defined in terms of system-
critical factors. Internal rates of return. 
Training site Demonstration field, training 
centres, home of contact farmer, 
static not revisited in time or 
observed in terms of any on-
going process. 
A shared field in which the FFS uses to dynamically 
validate and test new management methods over 
the entire season (for example decisions during 
one part of the season can be verified by yield 
cuts) 
Long term 
objectives 
Increase food production, 
etcetera: ‘Farmer’s attitudes, lack 
of knowledge, and practices are 
an object/constraint of a 
development process.’ 
Nurture groups that will continue to address 
agricultural and community problems on their 
own and with technical backstopping: ‘Farmers as 
the subject of development.’ 
Research Primary source of information is 
research stations assumed to 
develop representative models 
that are widely applicable. 
A process and consequence of local testing and 
within-community/ ecosystem learning. 
Source: Gallagher, 1999. 
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4.3 What does a Farmer Field School look like? 
 
In a real life Farmer Field School villagers form groups of 25-30 farmers, men and women 
ranging from 20 – 60 years of age. These farmer groups meet regularly to learn on an 
experiential basis with a facilitator, usually staff from the agricultural office or an NGO. This 
happens often in a physical environment that is called a ‘school without walls’, nearby a 
farming field. The main requirement to become a participant in FFS is to be a farmer. 
Although it is not an official requirement, generally these are farmers who have some land. 
The origins were in rice and integrated pest management. See Box 1 for the general 
characteristics of a Farmer Field School in rice. 
 
 
Box 1: A rice Farmer Field School 
 
The basic feature of a ‘typical’ rice IPM rice based Farmer Field School are as follows: 
• A rice FFS meets once a week and covers a full cropping season 
• The primary learning material at a Farmer Field School is the farmers' field 
• The field school meeting place is close to the learning plots, usually outdoors, a ‘school 
without walls’’ 
• FFS educational methods are experiential, participatory, and learner centred. 
• Each FFS meeting includes at least three activities: the agro-ecosystem analysis, a “special 
topic”, and a group dynamics activity. 
• In every FFS participants conduct a study comparing IPM with non-IPM treated plots. 
• An FFS often includes several additional field studies depending on local field problems. 
• Between 25 and 30 farmers participate in an FFS. Participants learn in small groups of five to 
maximise participation. 
• All FFS’s include a Field Day in which farmers make presentations about IPM and their studies, 
for neighbouring farmers and officials 
• A pre- and post-test is conducted for diagnostic purposes and for determining follow-up 
activities. 
• The facilitators undergo intensive season long residential training to prepare them for 
organising and conducting field schools. 
• Preparation meetings precede an FFS to determine the curriculum, learning needs, recruit 
participants, and develop a learning contract. 
• Final meetings of the FFS often include planning for follow-up activities. 
 
Source: Pontius et al., 2002; Bijlmakers, 2005. 
 
 
Farmer Field Schools were based on the following “integrated pest management” principles: 
1. grow a healthy crop 
2. conserve natural enemies (these are beneficial insects such as predators) 
3. conduct regular field observations 
4. innovation through experiential learning 
5. farmers are considered to be experts. 
The first principle implies that farmers have to understand plant biology and apply proper 
agronomic practices. The second principle means that farmers need an understanding of the 
ecology of the crop and its environment. The third principle demands that the FFS participant 
learns to observe and analyse their crops regularly and to make informed decision based on 
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the conditions of the agro-ecosystems. The fourth stresses that farmers can experiment and 
introduce innovations based on their own skills and knowledge gathered through discovery 
learning. The fifth asserts that farmers know their local specific circumstances better than 
‘outside’ experts. 
 The FFS curriculum follows the natural cycle of the crop, rice or vegetables. This 
approach allows all aspects of the subject to be covered, in parallel with what is happening in 
the FFS member’s field. For example, rice transplanting in the FFS takes place at the same 
time as farmers are transplanting their own crops - the lessons learned can be applied 
directly. By paying attention to the ecology of the plot, FFS encourages an understanding of 
the agro-ecosystem and its natural processes. It stimulates preventive rather than curative 
measures and the use of natural processes rather than external chemical inputs and other 
quick fixes. Hence it seeks to reduce farmers’ dependency on external inputs and 
corporations, and fosters an agro-ecosystem approach that leads farmers to be managers of 
self-organising complexity (e.g. use of natural enemies, recycling of wastes, etc.) rather than 
of simple mechanical systems.   
 Farmers are experts. FFS mobilises farmers’ combined intelligence. Instead of being 
an ‘end user’, the farmers themselves learn to conduct experiments independently, create 
opportunities for innovation (Dilts, 2001). The farmers no longer rely on blanket 
recommendations, on uniform technologies; they seek instead to optimise diversity and local 
opportunity.  One key factor in the success of the FFS has been that there are no lectures – 
all activities are based on experiential (learning-by-doing) participatory, hands-on work. This 
approach builds onto adult learning theory and practice. Each activity has a procedure for 
action, observation, analysis and decision-making. The emphasis is not only on “how” and 
“what” but also on “why” (Braun and Duveskog, 2008). This way farmers master a learning 
process that can be applied continuously to a dynamic situation: the ecology of their field or 
their livelihoods. 
Innovation through the FFS and discovery learning is not limited to agricultural production 
technologies. It can also be extended to include innovative, ecological management (e.g., 
integrated nutrient management), community life and livelihoods, institutional and 
organisational development. As Braun and Duveskog state: “Experience has shown that 
structured, hands-on activities provide a sound basis for continued innovation and local 
adaptation, after the FFS itself has been completed. It is also one of the main reasons that 
farmer facilitators can easily run FFSs - once they know how to facilitate an activity, the 
outcomes become obvious from the exercise itself” (Braun and Duveskog, 2008:6). In an e-
mail discussion we had (12th March07), Deborah Duveskog stressed that FFS is all about 
learning how to learn, meaning that the initial technical topic is of less relevance and it is the 
skills in experimentation, innovation, reflection that matters. 
 
4.4 Different views and practices 
 
While it seems that nowadays a Farmer Field School is a common phenomenon in Nepal, in 
particular in the agricultural sector, it is clear from the different reports, articles and 
discussions with actors in the field that different practitioners hold different views on FFS.  
A discourse analysis of the use of the term Farmer Field School showed that there are 
different ideas and meanings attached to the concept of FFS. This has an impact on the 
implementation of FFS. By discourse analysis in this paper I looked at texts in reports and 
other related papers but also held interviews with people involved in FFS. The technique 
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gave an interesting insight into the ideas and ways of thinking of people related to FFS. As 
dominant discourses set out ways of classifying people and defining problems, they have 
serious material consequences on the process of policy making or project design. Certain 
dominant discourses or views of ‘reality’ serve the interests of some groups over others. 
 In the literature there are different views varying from seeing FFS as an extension, a 
learning or training method, or a research platform, as shown in the following synopsis I 
made: 
 
Extension 
Farmer Field Schools train farmers to strengthen their decision-making capacity with respect 
to the use of agro-chemicals (Gerster, 2006). FFS is participatory approach of diffusing new 
science-based knowledge and information to farmers (Hakiza et al, 2004). Pretty (1995) 
refers to extension workers and not facilitators conducting field schools, implying that the 
Farmer Field School is an extension tool, and that knowledge transfer is the basis of the FFS. 
Quizon et al. (2001)  state that the FFS is a method to deliver new knowledge and 
techniques. “IPM FFS is the model for farmer education across the world. Other extension 
methods have been exposed as lacking the capacity to provide the education that farmers 
require in the increasingly complex agricultural systems that they manage” (Niels Röling at a 
Regional meeting with the FAO Community Programme, Ayuthaya, Thailand, 1999) 
 
Learning 
Others in the FFS movement reject the notion that FFS can be an extension tool. Van den 
Berg (2004) clearly states that the FFS is not an extension method. He explains that extension 
sets out to deliver, to teach to do a certain technique, and that its effects are measurable by 
the level of adoption of specific practices or technologies. Conversely, the Farmer Field 
School sets out to educate local people with practical knowledge, to enhance their capability 
for informed decision-making in response to what are always context-dependent pest 
problems, and thus they are also taught adaptive management.  When I asked farmers in 
Nepal in 2002 they almost unanimously told me that the farmer fields school is a training in 
which they learn about satrojib (insect pests) and mitrojib (natural enemies or beneficial 
insects) while they always thought that all insects were harmful to their crops. 
  
Research 
Van de Fliert et al. (2003) consider FFS as a platform for participatory research and/or farmer 
learning, mainly related to potato, sweet potato and disease management, whereby two-way 
learning takes place: researchers and farmers learn from each other and from their 
experiments. 
 
To summarise, FFS is not a conventional extension method but a platform for group-based 
learning and knowledge creation and dissemination, where there is room for participatory 
research, based on the experiential-learning principle, where farmers are seen as equal 
partners in development. In practice the emphasis will be on research or technology transfer, 
on learning, depending on the interest of a group, the facilitator or the mandate of the 
organisation one works for. This will influence the allocation of resources. Depending on the 
different discourses of agricultural change and rural development, those who consider FFS a 
platform for research will focus on research activities, on trials and action-research. Others 
will put technology transfer in the curriculum, and use FFS to promote new varieties of farm 
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technologies. There will also continue to be different practices of implementation or 
constructs of FFS as both academic debates and practical fieldwork conditions change over 
time. Practitioners often assume FFS to be a structure or model, while in practice there is 
no such thing, as FFS is constructed in different ways. The construction of FFS is a result of 
agency, self-oriented practices and complex arrangements of both the implementers and the 
farmers involved. (see Chapter 6)  
 For me structure is too much identified with conditions, context, driving forces rather 
than agency, self-oriented practices and complex arrangements.  “What might appear to be 
relatively stable structural features ... can be understood as highly specific, self-transforming 
configurations of actor projects and practice” (Long, 2001:62, 63). In this study I prefer to use 
the concept of social construction to indicate the role of the various actors in a field of 
interactions and processes to stress the dynamic situation individuals live and respond to. 
Following Long (2001: 2) I focus on the “making and remaking of society through the on-
going self-transforming actions and perception of a diverse and interlocked world of actors”. 
(see Chapter 6) 
 
4.5 FFS evolution 
 
Not only are there different views and practices concerning FFS, but also FFS has also evolved 
over the years. This evolution can be seen in several ways, through diversification, expansion, 
institutionalisation, and by the shift from a project approach to a process approach. 
Originally the topic covered in FFS was integrated pest management in rice as a single 
crop. After a while the FFS programme diversified moving from its single-crop focus to 
include secondary or rotation crops within the rice-based systems and also including 
vegetables in both low and highland systems. Nowadays one can find Farmer Field Schools 
on tea, coffee, cotton, livestock, soil management, organic agriculture, agro-forestry, 
groundwater management, and so on. More and more topics are incorporated outside the 
agricultural field, which include integrated vector management (Van den Berg and Knols, 
2006), HIV/AIDS and other human health issues, and income-generating activities such as 
handicrafts. 
From 1991 to 1994, with support from the FAO Inter-country IPM Programme, rice 
IPM-FFSs spread from Indonesia to Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, India, Lao PDR, Philippines, 
Sri Lanka and Vietnam. In 1997 the Farmer Field School concept was introduced into Nepal 
by FAO as a pilot project.  A season-long FFS approach was conducted through TCP/NEP/6712 
Implementation of Integrated Pest Management in rice.  
As a result of the popularity of the IPM-FFSs in Asia, there was a strong movement to 
copy and expand the approach to other situations. Farmer Field Schools are now active in 
Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, Near East and North Africa, and 
Central and Eastern Europe, and recently also in the United States and Western Europe 
(Denmark), reaching a total of 87 countries by 2008. (Braun and Duveskog, 2008). In the 15 
year period from 1989 – 2004 approximately $100 million was granted in Asia for Farmer 
Field Schools under the guidance of FAO (Bartlett, 2005). 
 At the time when the Farmer Field School was launched in Nepal the overall aims 
formulated in the Agricultural Perspective Plan (APP) were to accelerate agricultural 
productivity through transition from subsistence to commercial agriculture, crop and farm 
diversification. FFS was adopted as one of the initiatives aimed to contribute to agricultural 
development and food security. In the project documents it was also written that:  
 109 
 
 
“The overall goals of the Integrated Pest Management programme with its FFS in 
Nepal is to reduce poverty and increase food security, while protecting the 
environment”. (FAO Project document, 1997: 1)  
 
In 1997, the project became based in the Plant Protection Directorate (PPD). This happened 
because Farmer Field Schools in the Asian FAO IPM programme were based on integrated 
pest management. The IPM Programme started with its main focus on training trainers and 
conducting Farmer Field Schools. Right from the beginning the PPD chief wanted to train all 
the PPD district staff and launch the programme nationwide, to cover all the districts. This 
was unusual for the Asian regional programme, where countries had started with FFS on a 
pilot base, small-scale. 
In Nepal, the project started with a survey and PRA study – conducted by a Filipino 
IPM FFS expert, in Chitwan, the district were pesticide misuse was reported. This was kind of 
standard procedure, followed in all countries where FFS was introduced. This study formed 
the basis for the curriculum in the training of trainers that was to follow. The first training of 
trainers (TOT) took place in the Eastern terai, and the 35 participants were plant protection 
staff from various district agricultural offices and central level. The training covered all 
aspects of rice production and lasted the entire rice growing season.  
For many officers it was the first time they had to plant and weed their own rice crop. 
Parallel to their classroom and field training the officers conducted Farmer Field Schools in 
villages. This way they learnt to conduct FFS and became familiar with participatory 
methods. It was an eye-opener for most participants. Many had never spent so much time 
with farmers before. As one participant said:  
 
“I used to find it boring to spend one hour with farmers, now in FFS I feel I am 
lacking time, it is so interesting and fulfilling to work with farmers” (Tanahun, 
agricultural officer, interview 2002).  
 
After all the plant protection officers in the country had been trained in conducting FFS, NGO 
staff and also government officers from other disciplines such as vegetable production and 
agricultural extension were trained. Gradually lower level staff got involved in conducting 
FFS. What happened over the first four years is summarised in the following table.  
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Table 4.2 Evolution of FFS activities 1997 – 2001 
 
Year  Key Activities  
1997  Field studies to collect information about rice production 
practices and problems 
1998 First ‘Training of Trainers’ course for 35 staff of Plant Protection 
Directorate, with facilitators from Philippines 
 Graduates of the TOT conduct the first 30 FFS 
1999 Second TOT is conducted, with some NGO staff, facilitators from 
Philippines and Indonesia 
 Total of 63 FFS conducted in two cropping seasons  
2000  A start was made with farmer trainers 
 Participatory planning workshops are carried out 
2001 Third rice TOT, this time managed by an NGO using Nepalese 
facilitators.  
 Vegetable IPM in response to farmers demands.  
 More than 50% of FFS are now being conducted by farmer 
trainers 
 By the end of the year, IPM farmers had formed their own 
organisations in 26 Districts. 
 Government decides to increase allocation for IPM Programme as 
part of the next 5-Year Plan. 
Source: own research and Bartlett (2002) 
 
Soon it became clear that FFSs were not an end in themselves (Bartlett, 2002). As in other 
countries, it was found that FFSs could be the starting point for the sustainable management 
of agricultural and ecological resources in a given locality. FFS gives farmers an introduction 
to experimenting, participatory training and non-formal education methods based on 
ecological principles. Once this foundation is laid, farmers typically move on to take 
initiatives, make decisions, experiment and communicate for the development of their 
community. This evolution within the programme occurred in all the member countries after 
ten years of programme implementation. However in Nepal this occurred much sooner. The 
Nepalese government central team wanted to start with follow-up activities after FFS and 
with farmer trainers already after 2-3 years in the project. 
In a previous account of the early history of the programme this approach is 
described as follows:  
 
“This short history should not be viewed as a “project”, or a pre-determined 
sequence of activities. In 1997, the Plant Protection Directorate and FAO reached 
agreement on a set of broad goals and plans for the initial activities (training of 
trainers, number of Farmer Field Schools in all rice-growing districts). Subsequent 
activities were planned year by year, taking account of the results, which had been 
achieved, and the emerging needs and opportunities. But the Nepalese team also 
looked at the processes in other Asian countries and wanted to be part of that. In 
this way the IPM program in Nepal has evolved at a rate which was quicker than 
anybody had expected, and it has taken a shape which could not have been 
predicted five years ago.” (Bartlett, 2002: 16)   
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As the Deputy director of the National IPM Programme said: ”We want to show the world 
that Nepal can be the best with FFS”(Interview 2002). 
In the first 4 years the development of the programme went really fast. It expanded almost 
nationwide. Figure 4.1 gives the growth in the number of participants in IPM Farmer Field 
School from 1998 to 2001.    
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Annual numbers of participants in the IPM Farmer Field Schools in Nepal (1998-
2001) 
Source: Westendorp and Biggs, 2003 
 
The story of the Nepalese IPM programme did not stop in 2001. The following year saw the 
launch of The IPM Trainers Association of Nepal (TITAN) with government officials, NGO staff 
and farmer trainers as members. By 2003, TITAN was being contracted by CARE International 
to provide consultants for a large rural development programme in Bangladesh. In 2005 two 
trainers went to Tajikistan as international FFS trainers (personal communication, 2007).  
 
The focus of FFS changed over the years. In the first FAO project document (1997) the 
objective of FFS project was defined as follows: To contribute to sustainable broad-based 
poverty alleviation and food security while contributing to environmental protection. In 2003 
the objectives were to: (i) to contribute to institutionalise a sustainable national IPM 
Programme in Nepal by strengthening the capacity of the PPD; and strengthening the 
capacity of National, Regional and District Level training and extension institutions, and (ii) to 
empower farmers to increase production and productivity efficiently. As an immediate 
follow-up to this project Norway provided financial support to the government for a 2008-
2013 project through UTF/NEP/059/NEP with FAO technical assistance, the Support to 
National IPM Programme in Nepal: consolidation, up-scaling and institutionalisation, Phase 
II. The major objective of this last project is to strengthen the organisational and managerial 
capacity of IPM farmer groups and associations. 
While FFS was started as a project it gradually turned into a programme through a 
process of institutionalisation. Institutionalisation is a process through which new ideas and 
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practices are introduced, accepted and used by individuals and organisations so that these 
new ideas and practices become part of ‘the norm’ (Sutherland, 2000). We can talk about 
institutionalisation when an intervention or activity or approach has become “part and 
parcel of regular programmes and activities”( van Veldhuizen et al. (2002:376). Thus FFS has 
become a familiar concept in Asia and later in other countries, in Nepal, among all classes 
and across the rural-urban divide.  In this sense FFS is both an institution and an organisation 
with a strong normative flavour (Uphoff, 1986:9). 
 In line with Leach, Mearns and Scoones (1999) I view institutions not just as ‘rules of 
the game in society’ but as regularised patterns of behaviour (Leach, Mearns and Scoones, 
1999: 237). “Regularised practices, performed over time, eventually constitute institutions” 
(Leach, Mearns and Scoones, 1999: 238). In addition, the authors make a distinction 
between formal and informal institutions. On the one hand they acknowledge the formal 
regulations, which can be the elements that donors or government require to be part of FFS 
or guidelines to be followed, issued by FAO or governments or NGOs. On the other hand, 
there are also informal rules legitimised by social norms and codes of behaviour, including 
gender division of labour, class hierarchies, kinship networks. For example, locally adopted 
land tenure arrangements are “more in the nature of customary practices carried on over 
time than a set of rules or norms” (Leach, Mearns and Scoones, 1999: 91).  
This distinction between formal and informal is convenient but misleading (Cleaver, 
2006b) because the dichotomoy does not apply; the terms are not mutually exclusive. 
Formal has the connotation of modern, bureaucratic, organisational, official and more likely 
to be ”robust and enduring” (Cleaver, 2006b:789) than informal (social, traditional) 
institutions. Often, the formalisation of informal institutions is sought to make an informal 
institution more visible and open to interventions (Scott, 1998). I therefore like her notion of 
a ‘socially embedded’ institution (Cleaver, 2006b), indicating the social acceptance of FFS. 
A similar critique comes from Nuijten (2003:11) who rejects the simple dichotomy 
between institution and organisation and introduced the term ‘organising practices’. With 
organising practices she refers to the different actions and strategies that people follow to 
sustain and develop their daily livelihoods and other life projects. Organising practices can 
develop into established patterns through processes of institutionalisation. (Appendini and 
Nuijten, 2002:73). 
 
As an institution, FFS has become such regularised practice, performed over time. On the 
other hand, as several organisations have adopted the so-called FFS approach, they have also 
adapted them into their regular activities as organised practices.  FFS is institutionalised 
because farmers, extensionists, policymakers, and donors speak about FFS as a familiar 
concept, even after the project has been terminated, and people know what FFS means 
when they have not even taken part in FFS. FFS has become an institution because of the 
values that have been attached to it over time. In Chapter 6  I will show that this certainly 
applies to the situation in Nepal. 
 FFS practices were not only determined by official rules and regulations but were 
shaped as well by cultural, social, historical and political processes. FAO project staff might 
have developed rules or steps to follow in FFS, but local norms determined who would be 
the participants or the leaders in an FFS, which behaviour was accepted from FFS facilitators, 
while cognitive influences determined the extent to which social and cultural beliefs or 
traditions were adopted or imposed on the actors. Hence the FFS model that was developed 
in Indonesia would be shaped differently in Vietnam or Kenya.  
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In Nepal, an FFS run by Brahmins is different from a Janajati FFS facilitated by a Tharu 
farmer, while an FFS with a mixed gender group has a different shape or content than a 
women or men only FFS. These socially constructed characteristics vary over place and time. 
In Nepal FFS started as a project, with a given procedure or framework to follow, with rules 
imposed by the donor and intervening agency such as Ministry of Agriculture, the District 
Agriculture Development Office and Plant Protection Directorate. FFS evolved through 
different practices, which over the years were influenced by social norms and cultural factors 
in a dynamic way (Scott, 1995; Munir, 2002).  
 
Finally, the approach to FFS evolved from a project into a process,  transforming FFS from  a 
product. In Indonesia and Vietnam, Farmer Field School graduates continued to remain 
active in their FFS group and initiated development activities, such as more trials on pest and 
disease crop management, or other agricultural related activities such as setting up an 
irrigation system with the community (Pontius et al, 2002). Their FFS training became a 
vehicle for other activities, initiating processes of change. Thus a shift could be observed 
from field-based activities to community-based activities, a shift from output to outcome, 
from product to process.   
 FFS gives farmers an introduction to experimenting, participatory training and non-
formal education methods based on ecological principles. Once this foundation is laid, 
farmers can move on to take initiatives, make decisions, experiment and communicate to 
address problems for the development of their community. In Indonesia, and later in other 
countries, it was found that FFSs could be the starting point for the sustainable management 
of agricultural and ecological resources in a given locality (Ooi, 1998). The move to 
"community" in IPM emphasises a strategy from field activities to community or village 
development, and a move  to institutionalise FFS (Pontius et al., 2002), but also indicates an 
awareness that FFS is not just a project with a clear start and a predefined end with set 
outputs, but a process leading to further development with broader outcomes. 
 When FAO changed the project name from Integrated Pest Management to 
“Community IPM” in 1997 this change was formalised in a project phase - first in Indonesia 
and later in other countries in Asia that were part of the inter-regional FFS activities.  The so-
called “Community IPM” is a strategy in which the Field School is a first step in the 
development of the sustainable management by a community of its shared agricultural and 
ecological resources. Under this programme follow-up activities were undertaken, and 
farmers were encouraged to become ‘planners’ or ‘researchers’ in community development 
after they finished FFS, looking beyond their individual agricultural fields. Braun and 
Duveskog (2008:8) view these changes in FFSs as a natural group process “as the natural 
progression of the FFS; the phasing or timing by which particular FFSs would evolve to multi-
dimensional and/or higher-level concern is for the groups themselves to determine.” 
 
I regard this development in FFS, or evolution, as part of the bigger picture in which FFS took 
and takes place, a picture that is influenced by a series of prevailing development paradigms. 
For instance ‘empowerment’ became an issue in FFS when it was fashionable in development 
circles. In a similar vein the farming systems’ focus was replaced by rural livelihoods when 
‘livelihood-thinking’ became popular among donor agencies at the end of the last century. 
 The evolution of development approaches is subject to continuous debate and 
review, in which FFS also participates.  Ellis and Biggs (2001:239) have developed a timeline 
that includes substantive theories, minority discourses and development approaches. The 
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changes in approaches regarding FFS from product to process fit into this scheme as shown 
in Table 4.3 
 
Table 4.3 Rural development ideas timeline 
 
 Ideas, Themes, Paradigms, Approaches and Objectives in Rural Development 
1950-
1960 
Modernisation, dual economy model, backward agriculture, community development, lazy 
and backward peasant 
1960-
1970 
Transformation approach, technology transfer, mechanisation, agricultural extension 
growth role of agriculture, green revolution, rational peasants, farming systems research 
1970- 
1980 
Redistribution with growth, basic needs, integrated rural development, state agricultural 
policies, state-led credit, urban bias, induced innovation, green revolution, rural growth 
linkages, farming systems research-extension, project approach 
1980- 
1990 
Structural adjustment, free markets, getting prices right, retreat of the state, rise of NGOs, 
rapid rural appraisal, food security and famine analysis, rural development as process not 
product, women in development (WID), poverty alleviation, poverty with a human face, 
process-approach. FFS linked to integrated pest management. 
1990-
2000 
Micro-credit, Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA), actor-oriented rural development, 
stakeholder analysis, rural safety nets, gender and development (GAD), environment and 
sustainability, poverty reduction, territorial oriented sustainable rural development, 
empowerment of rural poor, capable peasants, FFS under the umbrella of the Community 
IPM project 
>2000 Millennium Development Goals, sustainable livelihoods, good governance, 
decentralisation, critique of participation, sector-wide approaches, social protection and 
poverty eradication, multiple dimensions of poverty, getting service right, privatisation of 
extension services, PRSP, social inclusion, equity, climate change, partnership diversification 
of FFS in other crops and inclusion of topics such as HIV/AIDS. Linking FFS with rural 
livelihoods. Expansion of FFS in Latin America and Africa. 
Adapted from Ellis and Biggs, (2001:239) and World Bank World Development Reports (www.worldbank.org) 
 
Clearly the evolution of both the development agenda and development approaches is much 
more complex than can be captured in the outline below, but it indicates the changes in 
general terms, and periods in which FFS occurred.   
 Despite the changes in perspective and evolution of approaches since the 1950s there 
is arguably a common theme underpinning thinking on rural development: Faith in 
agriculture as a central driver of rural development and the persistence of a small-farm 
model as the key focus in rural development. Since the late 1990s, there have been some 
significant changes in the structural context of the development agenda and with it a change 
in the focus of development approaches. Essentially, the faith in agriculture as the 
cornerstone of rural development and the small farmer as the main point of entry has been 
severely shaken. The reason for this is the emerging empirical evidence on the nature of rural 
poverty and livelihood strategies which have evolved in response (Bernstein et al., 1992). 
Ellis and Biggs (2001: 238) note that “ideas that first appear in one decade often gain 
strength in the following decade, and only begin to affect rural development practice in a 
widespread way ten or fifteen years after they were first put forward”. If one places FFS 
changes or evolution along with these development paradigms,  it appears that indeed the 
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changes in academic thinking and writing about development were put in practice a while 
later in the approaches to FFS, so there was  a certain  time lag.  
 
In the period 1990 - 2000 most FFS initiatives still had a focus on agriculture as the engine for 
rural growth and, although there was an increasing trend to support livelihood diversification 
and acknowledgement of the increasingly complex rural reality, household level agricultural 
growth remained the emphasis in FFS. Women were increasingly encouraged to participate, 
following the WID approach. Real attention for unequal gender relations was not a point for 
attention in this period. During this time FFS programmes changed from using a project to a 
process approach in most places. Instead of yield increase, farmer empowerment, capacity-
building and other development processes were increasingly emphasised in FFS. 
Modernisation policies and structural adjustments from the World Bank and IMF in 
the 1980s put a strain on classical agricultural extension and research services with budget 
cuts and job losses. This transformed the roles of extensionists and researchers and placed 
greater responsibility on rural communities. While challenging for professionals and their 
institutions, improving agricultural research and development has demanded approaches 
that are more responsive and better suited to local agro-ecological and socioeconomic 
conditions. FFS are often seen as an effort by institutions to re-think how to organise 
themselves for greater and more effective agricultural innovation. This way FFS, with its 
group approach and focus on capacity-building, gained popularity from an efficiency point of 
view. Budget cuts in government extension approaches have also speeded the move to 
involve farmer trainers in several countries simply because they are cheaper and often more 
effective than government extension officers. (see also Chapter 6 and 8) 
 After 2000 FFS approaches came under pressure of poverty eradication policies and 
were influenced by the establishment of the Millenium Development Goals. In particular in 
Africa FFS has included topics that address food security and income generation (see remark 
on FAO website below). Here, the field schools are becoming the foundation of field-based 
food security programmes, specifically in Kenya, Sierra Leone and Nigeria  as health and 
nutrition problems were more apparent than in Asia (Okoth et al., 2002). Diseases such as 
HIV/AIDS and malaria are destructing many rural communities and have been taken up as key 
topics by FFS projects. NGO and health officers have been involved in conducting these 
Farmer Field Schools with classes on hygiene, internal parasites and safe bodily practices. 
 
Millenium Development Goals are brought into play in FFS success stories as stated in a 
recent report by FAO (Settle, 2010)32:  
 
“ Capacity building at community level (such as is done in Farmer Field Schools) is 
key to the sustainable intensification of food production, which will contribute to 
increased food security and improved livelihoods in the region, an important step 
towards achieving the first Millennium Development Goal, reducing hunger and 
poverty.”  
 
In Nepal FFS was also strongly influenced by global development theories (see chapter 1).  
Table 4.4 below gives a brief overview of the key changes in paradigms and the FFS approach 
or focus at different periods, as conducted by the Nepalese government. I have not included 
the NGOs in this table because that would make it more complex, and NGOs are highly 
                                                 
32
   http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/48883/icode/ (accessed 5.5. 2011) 
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influenced by their international ‘mother’ organisations  like CARE and World Education in 
the USA.  Such international NGOs in my experience are usually more progressive in putting 
new development thinking into practice than government agencies. CARE were already 
talking about livelihoods while in the Ministry of Agriculture no one had heard  the term, 
World Education wrote about empowerment in their policy proposals while in the Ministry  a 
growing awareness of the women-in-development discourse had only just started. 
 
Table 4.4 Dominant development paradigms that influenced FFS in Nepal  
 
Dominant 
development 
paradigms 
1997 2002 2009 
Technology 
transfer 
Technology transfer is strongly emphasised in the curriculum 
 
Agricultural 
growth 
The objective of FFS by 
MoAC is agricultural 
production increase 
Transition from subsistence to commercial agriculture 
NGO 
involvement 
MoAC collaborates with 2 
international NGOs 
A few international and some 
local NGOs involved in FFS 
implementation 
MoAC collaborates with 1 
international NGO and 
several local NGOs 
Group approach FFS group formation Many groups registered Most groups dissolved 
Rural 
development as 
a process not a 
product 
Product or output focus Start is made with follow-up 
activities 
FFS considered entry points 
for long-term community 
development, without 
external support. 
Women in 
development 
Focus on male farmers Increased participation of 
women, due to government 
policy and commitment 
female farmers 
Most FFS participants are 
women 
Food security Focus on rice as food crop Rice production and 
introduction of vegetables as 
cash crop. 
Focus on commercial crops 
rather than food 
Participatory 
Rural Appraisal 
(PRA) 
PRA exercises prior FFS to 
determine training content 
PRA as standard (technical) 
exercise before start FFS 
PRA not included anymore 
in FFS procedure 
Commercialising 
agricultural 
production 
Focus on rice as food crop FFS in commercial vegetable 
production encouraged.  
 FFS in vegetables and tree 
crops (e.g. citrus)  
Linkage with markets 
Farmers 
empowerment 
- not yet considered Action research or village 
planning (participatory 
planning); registration of FFS 
groups 
No longer supported by 
project activities 
Sustainable 
livelihoods 
Single crop focus Acknowledgement of 
multiple crops in farming 
system 
Attention for soil 
improvement and compost-
making 
Decentralisation All decisions made at central 
level 
DADO and district 
committees established to 
coordinate FFS 
DADO can allocate funds 
for FFS, VDC can allocate 
fund for FFS 
Social Inclusion Brahmins dominant at all 
decision-making levels in 
FFS, social exclusion not 
considered an issue 
Brahmins dominant at all 
decision-making levels in FFS, 
social exclusion not 
considered an issue 
Social inclusion is part of 
the present government 
policy and of many donors, 
but not many changes yet 
in FFS 
Source: own research and Five Year Plans Nepalese Government 
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As is clear from these examples, FFS has been influenced by prevailing popular development 
paradigms.  Donors who determine the funding sources, organisations who are involved in 
FFS implementation, they all somehow carry  the impact of development thinking with them 
and put their mark on the construction of FFS. 
The table reflects mainly the impact on government-run FFS. FFS organised by government 
staff are influenced by national policies and national aims, such as agricultural growth and 
national food security. National policies change but are slow to adapt in comparison to local 
NGO policies. The procedure is more rigid, the prevailing hierarchy and bureaucracy make 
that government administration is not very flexible. There are development theories that 
have  had little to no effect so far on government policies in the agricultural sector, such as 
the right-based approach. NGOs in Nepal do use a rights-based approach and focus on social 
inclusion of vulnerable groups, such as Dalits and ethnic minorities. NGOs also focused more 
on strengthening rural livelihoods and diversification of farming through income-generation, 
where they can apply a more holistic approach than the government who is prioritising 
particular sectors.  
 
In 2002 PPD was actively promoting follow-up after FFS. This was not their policy anymore in 
2009. Many farmers were disappointed when this stopped. In 2002 and in 2009, all farmers 
that I talked to would like to have follow-up activities after FFS, and in fact were expecting 
continued services from DADO. The FAO programme officer also wanted to do more than just 
FFS; he thought that not a one-off effort like FFS, but continuous support was needed. He 
sighed that this would require more funding and more commitment from the government 
(Kathmandu, interview, 2009).In 2002 farmers said that their relationship with DADO had 
improved and they were happy about this. Also DADO staff was pleased about  the better 
working relation with their farmers. In the past they only knew  a few model farmers or 
contact farmers, now they had got familiar with many more farmers. Unfortunately, this 
positive trend was reversed in 2009 when the farmers I talked to  all (n=101) complained that 
the district officers did not pay much attention to them anymore after FFS. There was no 
follow-up after FFS, as they had hoped. They were very positive about FFS and the 
contribution of the junior technician or DADO at that time, but they would have liked to have 
seen more. Their expectations from DADO were high in 2002, likewise their disappointment 
in the following years was high.  
 
“DADO has no time and funds for us”. (Farmers group, Sindhupalchwok, 2009) 
 
4.6 Measuring impact or evaluating FFS results 
 
Farmer Field Schools have been constructed with different objectives by various actors. 
Notwithstanding the different views or objectives, most practitioners, each with their own 
agenda and objectives in mind, assert that FFS is a success. Whether FFS has success or 
impact is a continuous debate, mainly done by development practitioners and less by 
scientists, like Sherwood, Braun, or Bartlett who discuss or analyse Farmer Field Schools from 
an academic perspective. Since its origin in Indonesia, FFS have been perceived as a highly 
successful extension approach. FFS has shown remarkable impacts in terms of pesticide 
reduction, increases in productivity, knowledge gains among farmers and empowerment 
(Davis, 2006). Masses of data have been generated, but these are mostly presented in 
unpublished project reports that have a limited circulation and are not peer-reviewed (Van 
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den Berg and Jiggins, 2007). Most reports on impact have been written with a positive bias, 
and are used to improve a project or to entice a donor into more funding. Given the 
substantial donor investment into FFS since the 1990s, clearly donors do see FFS as a positive 
investment (Bartlett, 2005; Braun and Duveskog, 2008). The claim of the positive impact of 
FFS is made by the implementing organisation to show their donors that they have met their 
targets, that their investment has resulted in a positive contribution to development. 
Development actors in the field assert success when they get positive responses from 
farmers. FFS facilitators who have conducted field school sessions, want to prove that their 
training efforts had the desired effects, and stress this in their reporting.  There are, however, 
a few critical papers and researches that question the success of FFS. In particular, World 
Bank staff questioned the expected effect of the diffusion of knowledge from trained farmers 
to non-participants, which is essential for achieving a large-scale impact of FFS (Rola et al. 
2002; Feder et al., 2004). Also the cost-effectiveness has been subject of a fierce debate (Van 
den Berg and Jiggins, 2007). 
Measuring the impact of FFS has been problematic and a variety of methods have 
been used to evaluate FFS (see Chapter 1). Methods used vary from hiring independent 
technical consultants,   collecting yield data to focus group discussions and PRA sessions with 
farmers. One of the problems is that what is seen as the result of FFS depends on the 
objective of a project or organisation. What do FFS initiatives attempt to achieve? Is it an 
output or an outcome? With output I refer to concrete project objectives such as increased 
yield, increased profits or reduced pesticide use. I understand outcomes as going beyond the 
tangible outputs to include the long-term and often less visible real-life changes which 
happen between the delivery of outputs and the desired impact (UNDP, 2002) such as 
sustainable livelihoods, empowerment, and institutional development.  
This output versus outcome debate is also reflected in the way the FFS has changed: 
initially a focus on concrete output, like pesticide reduction and yield increase, later a move 
towards more development-oriented objectives such as empowerment and broader 
community development. That FFS sets out to “educate local people to enhance their 
capability for informed decision-making in response to context –dependent problems” (Van 
den Berg and Jiggins, 2007: 668) does not really make measuring impact easier. Changes in 
inputs are relatively easy to calculate, but anybody who has been closely involved with FFS 
will know that there are a wide range of other benefits which are difficult to quantify and 
which are manifest only after some years, being more a process than a product. This has 
consequences for measuring success, for evaluating progress. A meta-analysis of 25 impact 
studies (mostly conducted in Indonesia and other places in Asia) commissioned by FAO 
concluded: 
 
“The majority of studies… reported substantial and consistent reductions in 
pesticide use attributable to the effect of training. In a number of cases, there was 
also a convincing increase in yield due to training…. Results demonstrated 
remarkable, widespread and lasting developmental impacts. It was found that the 
FFS stimulated continued learning, and that it strengthened social and political 
skills, which apparently prompted a range of local activities, relationships and 
policies related to improved agro-ecosystem management”.  (Van den Berg, 
2004:18) 
 
Evaluating the impact of FFS is complex. Firstly it is not easy to determine what to measure: 
is it crops yield increase, pesticide reduction or the more complicated change in knowledge 
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or attitude towards sustainable farming? Do we measure output or outcome? Do we 
evaluate short-term or long-term effects, in other words rigorous impacts versus 
comprehensive”? (Van den Berg and Jiggins, 2007: 668) Furthermore, assessment depends 
on who defines impact:  the farmers themselves, practitioners, donors, pesticide sellers, 
organisations? A project can be successful in terms of farmers’ participation but it can be a 
failure from the point of view institutionalisation; it can be a success from donor point of 
view, but a failure according to farmers. Project designers might wrongly assume that 
farmers have the same objective in mind as they have (Harrison, 2002). Maybe for a farmer 
increased agricultural production might not be the outcome he wished for, it could be that 
he had other aims in mind when enrolling for FFS. There are several other reasons why it is 
difficult to make generalisations about the impact of Farmer Field Schools. The conceptual 
and methodological problems associated with assessing the impact of Farmer Field Schools 
have resulted in disagreements among economists (Feder et al. , 2004) and  FFS practitioners 
about the advantages of this intervention. It is known that farmers do not respond 
equivocally to such questions as: Has FFS been beneficial to you? Was it a success or a 
failure? The facilitator, evaluator or district agricultural agent are part of the social and 
political environment in which their own and farmers’ behaviour is framed (Harrison, 1996), 
and the valuation of their interactions becomes part of the evaluation of FFS.  Understanding 
the complexity of the social, cultural, historical, and political environment, of the 
implementation of FFS, and how decisions are made might provide a more differentiated 
picture of the decision-making process and motivation of the various actors to become 
involved with FFS. 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
The Farmer Field School was first developed in Indonesia in 1989 as a response to problems 
associated with the failure of the Green Revolution and in particular with misuse of 
pesticides. Since then FFS has been implemented by several organisations, each with 
different objectives and interests. FFS has evolved from a concept and activity focused on a 
single crop, through a learning and field-based extension methodology to a community-
based approach to rural development. It is still a popular approach in many countries all over 
the world, although its success is heavily debated. It is, however, not easy to determine its 
impact because of the variety of methods applied, the diverse and changing interests of the 
actors involved, and the time frame in which FFS evolved.  
In Nepal FFS started as a project in 1997, with a given procedure or framework to follow, with 
rules imposed by the donor and intervening agencies such as the Nepalese Ministry of 
Agriculture, the District Agriculture Development Office and Plant Protection Directorate. 
Organisations and individuals shaped FFS in various ways. It evolved through different 
practices, and became structured by social norms and processes of embedded 
institutionalisation (Scott, 1995; Munir, 2002; Cleaver, 2006a and 2006b). Due to differences 
in motivation, scope of analysis and methodology, it is unlikely that experts and academics 
will reach any agreement on the advantages and disadvantages of the Farmer Field School.  
One problem seems that FFS is taken as a blue print and not as suggestions for actions to be 
taken in particular historical, social, cultural and political contexts. Often, practitioners speak 
about a standard FFS while in practice the context and the actors determine a different 
implementation of FFS.  The outcome is thus not so much a result of planned and predictable 
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steps, but more a series of often unintended outcomes as the result of a dynamic social 
interaction.This thesis does not intend to provide an evaluation of FFS in Nepal over the last 
decades in terms of success or failure, because the dichotomy does not make sense: what is 
a success   for one actor can be a failure for another, and neither success or failure can be 
learned only from technical, visible results. Therefore, this thesis has followed several of the 
people involved over the years in this longitudinal research in order  to analyse how FFS has 
evolved, how different actors play a role in the construction of FFS and how FFS has 
contributed to a process of change and rural development in Nepal. 
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Chapter 5  The Myth of the Community 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The title of this chapter is taken from a book by Irene Guijt and Meera Kaul Shah (1998), 
which aims to provoke discussion about current participatory approaches and to improve the 
understanding and implementation of these approaches. In this chapter I concur with the 
authors of The Myth of Community and I intend to demystify the concept of community, and 
discuss community development approaches in rural Nepal to create a better understanding 
of the context where the Farmer Field Schools took place.  
 Farmer field schools have over time developed into a form of community 
development with its group based approach and its broader aim to help communities solve 
their own problems. As is explained on the FAO website: 
 
“[T]he FFS are not considered an end in themselves but a foundation for the 
development of the farmer’s own sustainable agricultural practices in their 
respective communities. In addition, this facilitates the formation of concerted 
farmer and community groups, local leadership and community-centered 
initiatives on sustainable agriculture.” 33 
  
Farmer field school activities are stimulated to continue in the form of an FFS group. The 
groups were expected to remain active and keep working on agricultural development, but it 
was also assumed that FFS farmers would get involved in broader community activities, 
addressing particular problems that are prevalent in their community. As one senior 
agricultural officer expressed in a report: Farmers can “solve their problems using local 
knowledge and resources” (PPD and FAO, 2004:50). It was assumed that the problem-solving 
capacities that farmers learned in the Farmer Field School training would be used to address 
farmers' own needs and deal with problems in daily life in the community, taking 
development in their own hand. The Farmer Field School is expected to become embedded 
in the community. 
  In Nepal the FFS project management underscored this view. Our strategy was to 
create FFS groups, to encourage registration at the district office and in several cases give 
them (albeit limited) additional support on community development, mainly facilitating 
participatory planning or action research. In our approach we believed that: 
 
 “Farmers emerge from field schools ready to engage in further discovery 
processes to find solutions to crop protection and production challenges, as well 
as to address a broader set of problems which confront their 
communities....Community development through FFS is anchored on the theory 
that with knowledge comes empowerment, the recognition of what people want 
to achieve and the drive to work on it”. “the initial FFS experience evolves into 
                                                 
33
   Source: (http://www.fao.org.vn/Uploaded/ngocdiep/What_is_Community_IPM.pdf, accessed 11 
August 2011) 
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community ownership, planning, management and implementation of Community  
Programmes”. 34 
 
In Nepal community participation is not a new concept. Before the inception of FFS there 
were already many community development projects in Nepal. Several  of these activities 
have been initiated by external forces but there are also endogenous development initiatives 
in Nepal. In this chapter I will provide insights into community participatory development 
and in particular community based organisations in natural resource management in Nepal, 
using case studies from farmer managed irrigation and community forestry. I selected 
farmer-managed irrigation systems (FMIS) and community forestry because Nepal is known 
for success stories or ‘good practices’ in community forestry and farmers managed 
irrigation35. As reported in the Nepali Times (24 Feb 2012): 
 
Nepal's traditional systems of managing local forest and water were recognised 
when Elinor Ostrom was awarded the Nobel Prize for Economics in 2009 for her 
study in Nepal of the management of the commons. Ostrom has often said that 
the prize actually belongs to the farmers of Nepal whose management of irrigation 
for long-term sustainable yields she researched 30 years ago. 
(http://www.nepalitimes.com/issue/2012/02/24/Editorial/19031 accessed 
27.04.2012) 
 
Unlike community irrigation and forestry, FFS does not focus on common property resource 
management, but on agricultural development. The Nepalese government supports these 
initiatives in irrigation and forestry out of concern for the maintenance of resources to 
improve agricultural production. With FFS the government's interest is more in the field of 
agricultural production. Aspects that community forestry, FMIS and FFS share is that they 
follow participatory approaches, focus on community mobilisation and are a reaction to 
modernisation and technology driven development.  
 
In line with Uphoff (1992a) I thought that locally embedded or community organisations, 
such as irrigation water users groups or community forestry users groups, were important 
for sustainable development for a number of reasons. They would mobilise and regulate 
resource use with a long-term view for future generations; resolve local conflicts; locate 
specific knowledge to be put to most efficient and sustainable use; regular monitor and be 
able to adapt quickly to resource status changes. I further assumed that participation in 
collective resource management would have a unifying effect: community members would 
join forces for a common cause, and community management would lead to social 
equity. This chapter reflects on some of these assumptions on community involvement from 
case study experiences with farmer-managed irrigation and community forestry and FFS. My 
argument does not imply criticism of a community development approach, rather I want to 
                                                 
34  
www.vegetableipmasia.org/Concepts/CommunityIPM.html, accessed 11 August 2011. 
 
35  
 For more information on community forestry see a.o. Shrestha and Mc Manus, 2007; Acharya, 2002; 
Dev et al., 2003; Yadav et al., 2003; Schoubroeck, 2006; Lachapelle et al., 2004; Ostrom 1990; 2007; 
Varughese and Ostrom, 2001;Springate-Baginski et al., 2007; Platteau, 2004; Baland and Platteau, 
1996; Agrawal, 2001. For more background reading on farmer managed irrigation: Esman and Uphoff, 
1984; Uphoff, 1992; Bhattarai et al., 2002; Van Etten et al., 2002; Pradhan,  2000;  Shankari and Shah, 
1993; Wijayaratna (ed.) 2004; Zwarteveen, 2006. 
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show the limitations of the ideals and models of community and collective action in terms of 
which policy is conceived and practice is interpreted. 
First I will give an overview of the changing paradigms of community development in 
general, which also have an impact on development in Nepal. Then I will discuss community 
development in Nepal. Next I will describe the cases of community forestry and farmers 
managed irrigation and draw lessons for FFS.  I will provide answers to the following 
questions: 
1) What does community development in Nepal involve?  
2) What do we understand by the community? Which lessons can we draw for FFS from 
community dynamics in Nepal? 
 
This study draws on my experience and a collection of recent literature on participatory 
community development, FMIS and community forestry.  The cases are selected from the 
mid hills in Nepal, as that is the area where I worked, thus am most familiar with and from 
where I got most material. Also the data collected on further impact of FFS (Chapter 6, 7, 8) 
took place in the mid hills. Cases on FMIS and community forestry from the terai would 
provide a slightly different picture, because the forests and irrigation systems are larger, 
there is a difference in bio-diversity and there are other ethnic mixtures in communities. Not 
only are there different ethnic groups in the terai, than those in the mid and high hills, but 
also  for many people settlement took place there  more recently (after eradication of 
malaria about 40-50 years ago), whereas in the mid hills communities have been established 
for centuries. However the socio-historical context in which community organisations are 
established is similar in the mid hills and in the terai. 
 
5.2 The history of community development worldwide 
 
As many other countries in Asia and Africa, Nepal has been subject to a series of 
development approaches. Among these approaches or paradigm shifts community 
participation in development is a frequently mentioned term. In fact this has outlasted many 
other development “fads” (Stone, 1989).  Basically community development, is about 
‘progress’ and the ‘community’ and it implies that it takes place in a participatory way with 
community involvement in decision-making processes. However, like all ideas about 
development, the term community development is contested, reflecting the differences in 
interests that play a role ‘when theory meets practice’. Community involvement, community 
development were words first used in the Cold War period in the 1950s and 1960s, a strategy 
aimed at preventing European post WWII liberated countries from adopting a communist 
regime. This was a real top-down, technocratic approach, in which community initiatives and 
target population needs were not considered. This approach was also adopted for expansion 
of activities in so- called colonial countries to prepare them for independence (Carmen, 
1996). Community development at that time was about involving people in a community 
which encouraged them to educate themselves to improve their life conditions through 
health, agriculture, education and mass literacy schemes (Smith, 2004). The original United 
Nations view on community development in 1958 was a method ‘for improving the levels of 
living, particular in underdeveloped areas'. It was defined as a process to create conditions 
for economic and social progress for the whole community. (UN 1958, In the Charter of the 
United Nations, article 55, page 16) 
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 When quick results did not show, aid agencies soon dropped community 
development for new initiatives such as the ‘green revolution’. Technology transfer, 
agricultural extension and the dissemination of innovations became a focal point. After a 
while it was realised that a purely technical and top-down approach, with policies imposed 
from outside did not make things better for the poor and vulnerable in society. 
 In the 1970s the call for more people’s participation begun. Community development 
as a trend also has gained renewed global interest since that time (Guijt and Shah, 1998). 
Significant in initiating this debate was Freire (1970). He argues in the Pedagogy of the 
Oppressed that the “oppressed” needed to unite to find a way to improve their own 
destinies. He also called for action to ‘give voice to the voiceless’. 
 In the 1980s this urge for community development and participation was further 
elaborated with an increase of grassroots activities by local NGOs, seeking alternatives for 
outsider-driven development activities. Demanding more respect for local knowledge and 
participation of local people. Chambers’ call for ‘Farmers First’ highlighted the way in which 
development was carried out by development planners who were not listening or taking the 
voice of local community’s seriously (Chambers, 1983; 1997; 1993; Chambers et al., 1989a 
and b). Chambers is criticised for his over-optimistic view about the potential and capabilities 
of local population with their local knowledge. He does not mention the tensions that occur 
in local communities, he avoids discussions about how to deal with situations in which 
certain groups within society are oppressed by local culture (Cleaver, 2001a; 2006). Olivier de 
Sardan (1992) warns for projection of clichés and prejudices and idealisation of the poor. 
 At that time government run or state induced development was criticised by many: 
(Escobar, 1995; Scott, 1998; Hyden, 1983; Rondinelli, 1993). Cernea (1985) in his “Put People 
First” showed how organisations like the World Bank could work systematically at community 
level. Beneficiaries were considered the main actors, key decision-makers and encouraged to 
define their own development. The role of the external agents was limited to financiers and 
facilitators. 
  The limitations of central government management of environmental resources and 
need for more community involvement was stressed by many (a.o. Kothari, 1989, Guha, 
1989; Ostrom, 2007; 1990).This assessment created a renewed interest in the local 
management of resources. The concept was embraced by governments and funding 
agencies, such as the World Bank, from the perspective of efficiency: cost-saving, when 
people manage the common resources they are using themselves. 
 Community management was seen as the solution for mismanagement by the state, 
corrupt governments and excesses of expensive inflexible bureaucracies (see World 
Development Report 1992: Development and the Environment, World Bank 1992). Greater 
community involvement guaranteed efficiency and effectiveness of investment and a 
contribution to empowerment and democratic decision-making (Cleaver, 1999; Uphoff, 
1986). The discourse on the need to respect traditional knowledge and management systems 
in the 1980 and 90s (Agarwal and Narain, 1989; Ostrom, 1990; Shankari and Shah, 1993) 
further supported a requirement to include community members in development 
approaches. 
After the 1990s NGOs and government agencies increasingly wanted to involve 
communities in taking control of their own development.  This had arisen from 
dissatisfaction with the up till then often externally initiated forms of local development and 
the ineffectiveness of the externally imposed interventions.  This was also the period that 
Farmer Field Schools were introduced. 
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Around the same time gender issues started to get attention, mainly because it was 
acknowledged that women play a crucial part in the conservation, management and 
safeguarding of water, forests and other natural resources. In the mid 90s the concept of eco-
feminism was introduced. Maria Mies and Vandana Shiva, two prominent eco-feminists, 
argue that the capitalist and patriarchal systems that predominate throughout the world 
reveal a triple domination of the South, women, and nature (Mies and Vandana, 1993). In 
practice these concerns were poorly translated. At best a gendered approach is translated as 
the participation of both men and women. Increasingly women were forced to take part in 
water users group and forestry meetings or sit on committees, often with quotas like one 
third, or 25%. This happens with the idea that eventually women would benefit from, but 
also contribute to, better irrigation and/or forest management. 
 
Currently the term broadly used is: Community driven development (CDD), indicating 
interventions that increase community decision-making power over their own development 
process and outcomes (Dasgupta and Beard, 2007), community-based development projects 
in which communities have direct control over key project decisions, including management 
of investment funds. This is in contrast with community-based interventions, which can be as 
limited as information sharing. The underlying assumption of CDD projects are that 
communities are the best judges of how their lives and livelihoods can be improved and, if 
provided with adequate resources and information, they can organise themselves to provide 
for their immediate needs.  
Community- driven development is part of a broader paradigm shift responding to 
the large body of critical writings about top-down, modernist and authoritarian approaches 
that have dominated development over the last 50 years. (a.o. Escobar, 1995; Kabeer 1994; 
Scott, 1998).The World Bank’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Sourcebook (Dongier and 
others, 2001) promotes community-driven development as enhancing sustainability, allowing 
poverty reduction efforts to be expanded, building social capital, strengthening governance, 
and improving market and public sector activities. CDD can be seen as empowering by the 
left, but also as cost-effective, more efficient, delegating responsibilities, by the more neo-
liberalists or extreme right. For an indication of its popularity the World Bank alone has 
increased its lending from $325 million in 1996 to $2 billion in 2003 for community-driven 
development projects (Dasgupta and Beard, 2007). 
 Community-driven development is assumed to reduce information problems (by 
obtaining development priorities directly from communities and giving target groups the 
opportunity to identify projects and indicate potential recipients), expanding the resources 
available to the poor (through credit, social funds, capacity building, and occupational 
training), and strengthening the local capacities of communities by fostering organisations 
that represent the local people.  Among donor organisations there is generally an optimistic 
view of the possibilities of working with local organisations, among academics there is a 
more nuanced and pessimistic view. Timsina, 2003; Shrestha and McManus, 2007;  Malla et 
al., 2003; Platteau 2004, Cleaver, 2002; Nygaard, 2008; Iversen et al., 2006 and others in 
particular emphasise that elites capture the benefits and the poor or weaker groups are 
missing out. 
 It cannot be assumed that community-driven approaches to development will per se 
increase the possibilities for broader-based participation in political, social and economic 
processes – and that indeed, in certain instances, they may worsen the exclusion of locally 
 127 
 
disempowered groups from access to public decision-making processes and public resources 
(Hickey and Mohan, 2004). 
 
5.3 The concept of community 
 
The word community is a term readily adopted by politicians and academic, but also by 
development practitioners. A concept with almost infinite elasticity (Carmen, 1996). The 
word community is typically used to indicate different types of target groups or the larger 
context in which they live. The ‘community’ is generally defined as a local or small group of 
people, living in a particular area, characterised by ‘face-to-face’ relationships (Kingsbury et 
al., 2008). Community is also considered as a group of people with common interests, living 
in the same geographical area, and frequently feeling a sense of 'community spirit (Shortall, 
1994 in Shucksmith, 2000: 209; Berkes, 2004). Community is often seen as some kind of ideal 
or natural, social entity (Cleaver, 1999). 
The suggestion that a community consists of people living in the same area is being 
challenged by Geschiere and Gugler (1998) who explain how urban migrants in Africa remain 
involved with their community of origin and feel they remain part of the community even if 
they have moved from their village to the city or beyond. They keep in touch through 
sending money, constructing houses or burial sites, and keeping land. This is also the case in 
Nepal. While many people have moved abroad they keep in touch by internet, phone and 
support families by sending remittances. Even when people have lived abroad for years  they 
still feel part of their birthplace community and keep land in their name.  
Gupta and Ferguson (1997) question too the spatial assumption or the physical 
demarcation of community. People in communities move around, have connections, even 
reaching beyond national borders. A vision of a community with individuals not living in one 
location per se, not in isolation but interacting, such a vision offers space for imagined 
communities (Anderson, 1991). People are members of different communities for different 
reasons (Harrison, 2002): by kinship, religion, residence, caste. 
Definitions of community generally disguise less genuine and egalitarian attitudes. 
There seems to be a tendency to ignore the complex relations, to deny legitimacy and 
gender, class or caste politics (Cleaver, 1999; Kapoor, 2002; Briggs, 2005; Nuijten, 2005). The 
concept of community often simplifies real-life conditions, not meeting the needs of the 
entire community as is implied (Guijt and Shah,1998) . Inequalities, discrimination, 
oppression, power inequalities are often overlooked or not taken into account because 
policy making by the state, international organisations, even NGOs, requires simplification 
(Scott, 1998). Gender is usually hidden in seemingly inclusive terms, ‘the people’, or ‘the 
community’ while in most cases what is referred to as ‘the community’ actually means ‘male 
community’ (Guijt and Shah, 1998). It is not realistic to generate an image of cooperation 
and harmony by talking about ‘the community’. Its heterogeneity and complexity makes a 
community difficult to conceptualise or measure.   
Bista (1991) explains that in Nepal, rural communities are made up of a complex 
social web, consisting of a hierarchical social structure that includes different social and 
economic classes, a variety of ethnicities, unfair caste systems and gender discrimination. In 
Nepal, communities face several hierarchies, such as elderly dominating over young, male 
dominating female, Brahmin/Chettries dominating Janajatis or Dalits, Hindus dominating 
Muslims (Bennett, 2002; 2006) that link people within, but often outside their place of 
residence. 
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 Bourdieu explains this process of position-taking in society by the concept of habitus 
(Robbins, 2000:31). “Habitus is both a system of schemes of production of practices, and a 
system of perception and appreciation of practices” (Bourdieu, 1989:19). One’s social 
position within a particular social group, such as caste, informs one’s ‘caste’ habitus, “a sense 
of one’s place and a sense of the place of others” (Bourdieu, 1989:19). This results in the 
internalisation of specific personified characteristics, which comprise hierarchical boundaries 
and, consequently, structure relationships with other castes or social groups (Bourdieu, 1990, 
1993). Hence habitus relates to power: “The power to impose and to inculcate a vision of 
divisions, that is, the power to make visible and explicit social divisions that are implicit, is 
(political) power par excellence” (Bourdieu, 1989:23) 
   
Communities are not homogenous in composition, needs and priorities. Mosse (1994), 
Kothari and Cooke (2001), Guijt and Shah (1998), and Cleaver (2001) have all criticised the 
indiscriminate use of the concept, the assumption of a homogenous unit. They stress that 
simplifying the term will obscure the complexities and ignore the power dimensions. Yet, its 
centrality in daily life means that it cannot be ignored or dismissed. Moreover, policy makers 
need a simplifying, inclusive concept to target the lowest societal level: the community. It is 
still a useful unit to work with, as long as we are aware that there inequalities, power 
differences, flexibilities in demarcation of space, and providing we consider the complexity, 
the socio-historical background and diverse nature of the context the community is situated.   
 
Individuals inherit a concept of community and live with this idea in a strategic way (Robbins, 
2000). This way it is easy to explain why in Nepal people belonging to a certain caste feel 
more comfortable interacting with people from the same caste. This already starts  from an 
early age, in the family and community where one is brought up.  For example, in Brahmin 
families for generations it was normal to go to school, to read books, to listen to religious 
texts, but in a Gurung or Dalit family this was not part of common practice and not part of 
their symbolic or cultural capital. Whether or not they form a real class, individuals who 
share a similar position in social space are likely to live in similar places, forming families and 
neighbourhoods. People who work in government offices are usually educated male from 
higher castes. For them it is more comfortable to communicate with people from their caste, 
and sex, this seems ‘natural’ to them. This has been going on for generations, so Brahmins, 
but also other caste groups, feel that it is kind of 'normal' that Brahmins are the leaders in 
villages and contact persons for the government and NGO services. People from Brahmin 
caste origin have more connections in the government, social capital, which are a product of 
history and the principle of its subsequent history (Bourdieu, 1993:32). 
 
When talking about community development in general,  it is important to ask the question 
who is representing the community? What is meant by “the community”?  As there seems to 
be a tendency to ignore the complex relations, to deny or ignore legitimacy and gender, class 
or caste politics (Cleaver, 1999; Kapoor, 2002; Briggs, 2005, Guijt et al., 1998), in community 
development it is important to identify who are the actors, how are they related, how is the 
power structure, who are the intended beneficiaries, the users and managers of the resource 
in question (Kumar, 2005). 
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5.4 Community development in Nepal in stages 
 
Throughout Nepal one may find many community organisations that have evolved from local 
or endogenous institutions and are usually rooted in cultural, traditional, and voluntary 
organisations.  They contribute to community service and are organised by a well-recognised 
and valued group in society. Some have existed for generations while others have a more 
temporary function. These community organisations, along with kinship and household 
networks, formed the foundation of local power relationships; their networks   remained 
largely segmented and localised. “There is usually an upper class of  the land owning nobility, 
politicians, urban administrators or elite, and an underclass consisting of wage labourers, 
petty traders, marginal and poor farmers, landless of rural Nepal” (Mishra, 2007: 19). 
 In order to understand community development it is important to look first at the 
history of community development in Nepal. This development can be divided into four 
stages – the period before 1955, the period between 1955 and 1974, the period between 
1975 and 1993, and finally, the post 1993 era. 
 
5.4.1 Before 1955 
 
Before the unification of the state Nepal, the place consisted of scattered, isolated 
communities. These communities remained, even after unification, quite autonomous due to 
inaccessibility and remoteness of many areas in this mountainous country. In these 
communities local leaders carried out development or service delivery activities, often 
supported by groups locally formed organisations. Many of these organisations also had a 
religious background, either Hindu or Buddhist which made them rather exclusive, especially 
when they were based on a single ethnicity or caste or even a family.36  
These linguistic ethnic and caste group affiliations were historically the only bases for 
the formation and nurturing of social organisations. These leaders were usually influential 
persons and often well-to-do. They donated land or resources to temples. They spent money 
on temple construction, building bridges, rest places, and so on, to gain religious merit, 
and/or local support. This donation would eventually benefit the family in a spiritual way but 
it would also provide prestige (nam khumaune: literally: earn a name) in the community. 
Respect or prestige is important in Nepali society. Status quo in Nepal is reinforced by 
religious attitudes, rules for conduct and morality and by social institutions such as the caste 
or marriage system. A guthi is such an organisation of the Newars in the Kathmandu valley. 
Guthis are religious, charity trusts, mostly established with land grants of religious elites. 
Guthis have unmistakably been borrowed from India since Licchavi times, but they have been 
reshaped and reformatted, at least partly, in local terms to adjust to a different social 
structure (Toffin, 2005). Membership provided and still provides a deeper meaning to the 
lives of Newar people. Membership is normally inherited within the family, from father to 
son. Guthi originally meant the specific ‘land given to a temple’ (Regmi, 1978), but it has 
come to mean the group responsible for managing temple lands and other assets, and more 
generally in association with temple and funeral related social responsibilities. The activities 
of these localised institutions, however, were never associated with development or bikas.  
                                                 
36 
 See also Biggs et al., 2004 for an extensive study on community organisations in Nepal. 
 
 130 
 
At that time, there were other organisations in society, such as the ones dealing with sharing 
seasonal work, including mutual labour exchange groups for planting, weeding, harvesting, 
usually on a rotating basis, like Parma 37.  
So called mother's groups play a particular role in Nepal. Mother's groups or Ama Samuhas 
are perhaps one of the most common traditional voluntary organisations in Nepal. They first 
started with the Gurung of Western Nepal. As most of the Gurung men used to join  the 
British Army, and later the Indian Army, over the last two centuries, Gurung women formed 
mother's groups to support each other, but also to sing, dance, and organise cultural 
activities in the evenings. One of the most well-known activities they perform is to welcome 
returnee Lahures (returnee British or Indian Army Men) and guest visitors. These Lahures 
and guest visitors donate money to the Aama Samuha. The collected money is used to build 
walking trails, temples, etc. This type of fund raising is still popular in many Gurung villages.  
 
5.4.2 1955 -1974: Central government planning 
 
In 1955 Nepal began with central development planning. The major community 
development efforts from this period were Compulsory Savings Schemes, state-driven 
Cooperative Movement and a Back-to-Village National campaign. These efforts failed due to 
lack of community ownership feeling, dominance by state and privileged families plus a lack 
of transparency and accountability (Human Development Report, 2001). Nevertheless, it laid 
the foundation for future group-based approaches. This way many Nepalese learned the 
basics of official, legalised cooperation-based activities. 
 In the early 1970s self-help groups and users’ groups were promoted to maintain 
public resources such as drinking water, irrigation, forests, and roads. These groups consisted 
of Brahmin and Chettri men, and decisions were made by them.  
 Also functional groups were set up, such as (male) farmers groups. Due to limited 
scope and a focus on a single sector, these groups had little capacity to deal with human 
poverty. Although it was criticised for its inadequate focus on the most deprived in society, 
lack of ownership, lack of transparency and accountability, this functional group approach is 
still popular with government agencies today.  
 
5.4.3 1975 – 1990: A focus on poor and women 
 
Limitations of the sectoral approach to poverty reduction asked for a need for a more pro-
poor and multidimensional methodology. In the early 1980s targeted social mobilisation 
approaches, such as Small Farmer Development Programme (SFDP) and Production Credit for 
Rural Women (PCRW), were launched. The small farmers and women were targeted with 
access to resources such as credit, the capacity of outreach line agencies was improved. 
Women in particular were separated as a special focus group under the Women in 
Development Approach (WID). Since 1975, when women were declared as an ‘issue’ in 
development, the Women in Development (WID) approach was embraced (Acharya, 2003). 
Women started to be seen as producers; their direct role in food production, hence in 
development, began to be recognised.  
                                                 
37 
 Parma is an informal institution of reciprocal labour exchange, in practice this is often harvesting and   
planting together in Nepal. 
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 Many external agencies set about using community groups to facilitate their 
development intervention: farmers groups, road maintenance groups, vegetable growers 
associations, women groups, forest user groups, credit and saving groups. This approach is 
very popular among governments and NGOs  to date. Most people in rural areas are a 
member of one of these groups or locally based organisations. In my interviews people 
revealed that they are usually a member of several groups: a women’s group, a community 
forestry group, a saving group, or a health group. In the Ninth Development Plan (1997 – 
2002) the Nepalese government emphasised the implementation of development 
interventions through these local groups or organisations, whether endogenous or externally 
initiated. 
 Also in Nepal, as a result of the failure of formal, donor-driven top-down 
development interventions, there has been an increase in seeing the possibilities of building 
upon endogenous or traditional community organisations, in an attempt to produce more 
sustainable and equitable development strategies. 
 
5.5 Community forestry and farmer managed irrigation  
 
Much of the thinking and discussion of community development comes from the study of 
institutions for common property management, such as water users groups, forestry groups, 
and farmers associations (Olstrom, 1990; Uphoff, 1992b; Platteau, 2004). Farmer managed 
irrigation and community forestry sectors and their community organisations have a long 
history in Nepal. They have been long accepted in Nepalese communities in such a way that 
they have been more or less embedded within local society, or in other words they have 
become vested with legitimacy by local communities for a long time. Community forestry 
and farmer-managed irrigation systems have been portrayed as Nepal’s successes in 
development to the outside world. 
 
5.5.1 Community forestry groups 
 
Bharkhore Forest is located in Siwalaya VDC, Parbat district. All households in ward 
1 and 3 are recogniszed users of this forest. The group of users is ethnically and 
economically heterogeneous, but the main occupation is subsistence agriculture.  
Historically the forest was managed under a state appointed tax collection system, 
until 1957 when the forest was nationalised. As a national forest the resources 
were depleted. In 1978 the villagers appointed a watchman to prevent further 
degradation of the forest. After abolishment of the Panchayat system under the 
new community forestry policy the forest was officially handed over to a forest 
users group in 1993. The district forestry office has assisted with formulation of a 
committee, a plan and a constitution. 
The users committee consists of representatives of different settlements, whereby 
women are given preference, but caste and ethnicity or wealth is not considered. 
(Acharya, 2002) 
 
Community forests have been important sources of basic needs for rural households in 
Nepal. Forests have provided firewood, timber, fodder, roofing and various non-timber 
products such as ferns, medicinal herbs and mushrooms. Particularly  for the poor and 
people with little or no land, they have contributed critically to their livelihoods.  Today, for 
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instance, firewood is still the most important source (and for many only source) of rural 
household energy, and is still largely gathered, not purchased (Agarwal, 2001; CBS, 2012). 
 As forest provides many benefits, it has attracted various interested parties, varying 
from small households, private enterprises to the government. In Nepal over 20% is 
managed under the umbrella of community forestry (Shrestha and McManus, 2007). 
Community forest management in Nepal takes place in various forms: by traditional 
institutions, or community organisations newly established by the government and 
international non-governmental organisations.   
 In the hills several communities have a history of relatively high local autonomy and 
therefore were used to manage their forests, mostly under some kind of feudal arrangement. 
During the period that the Ranas’ or other powerful families ruled Nepal, they considered 
the forests as their private property and used it exclusively for their private benefits. 
Government appointed forest inspectors to control the forest use (Nightingale, 2006). 
 In 1957 under the National Forest Act the forests were nationalised, all community 
land was converted into state land. This measure had a negative effect on the forest because 
local people resorted to quickly removing forest products fearing that the government might 
close forests permanently (Shrestha and Mc Manus, 2007). 
 Nightingale (2006) reports that many people were not happy when forests were 
nationalised in 1957: 
 
“But, what we didn't like is that after the Rastriya ban (National forest) was 
formed, no one protected the forest and there was a lot of loss”. (interview with a 
Thakuri man (in Nightingale, 2006:8) 
 
By the 1970s when the forest resources were almost depleted a crisis was called for and local 
communities, but also the government, was forced to take measures, especially in the form 
of involving local users in managing forestry resources.  
Many organisations claim the initiation of community forestry in Nepal, while in fact, 
it is in many cases local leaders, local functionaries who had influential power, often 
government representatives or government protégées (Timsina and Paudel, 2002; 
Wakiyama, 2004) who mobilised villagers to protect the forests. The villagers were obliged to 
contribute or support as a member living in a community.  Some communities have formed 
themselves a group to protect and manage their forests (Acharya and Gentle, 2005). 
 
In the 1980s and early 1990s forest user groups (FUGs) were initiated as part of a community 
forestry (CF) programme promoted by the Nepalese government and donor agencies. It was 
a big policy shift, allowing forest user groups to be the unit for managing community forests. 
The Forest Act, 1993, further strengthened the FUGs by giving them legal status and more 
autonomy to mobilise funds and other resources. Community forestry gathered pace in the 
1990s because it dovetailed perfectly with grassroots democracy and local self-governance. 
As a result, requests to hand over forests to communities have increased rapidly (Biggs et al, 
2004). Community forestry today forms one of the central themes of many rural 
development programmes (Winrock, 2002). In 2005 there were over 14,000 registered 
CFUGs nationwide, with several thousand more groups reportedly awaiting certification 
(Department of Forestry –DoF- , 2005).  
 Still conservation is the key focus of DFO and utilisation of forests for livelihood 
purposes gets little attention (Shrestha and Mc Manus, 2007; Nightingale, 2005; 2006; 
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Wakiyama, 2004). The current approach of NGOs is a more supporting and facilitating one: 
local people are encouraged to get involved in planning for a more flexible use of the forest 
resource, in order to serve their livelihoods (Yadav et al. 2003). 
 
The notion of ‘community’ in community forestry is difficult. It indicates a group of people 
living in a certain geographical area. Sometimes is referred to a whole village development 
committee (VDC)38, sometimes to a ward, or to a hamlet or neighbourhood (tol). And, they 
sometimes cross administrative boundaries at DDC, VDC and ward levels, depending on the 
location of the forest. Initially the communities were defined by the local panchayat 
administrative unit, and community forestry took place through local political structures 
(Winrock, 2002). People who lived in the proximity of the panchayat were automatically 
included in the community and given user rights, those outside the border were excluded 
from access to the forest, even if they were traditionally using the forest. After restoration of 
democracy efforts in 1990s, increasing the term community was replaced by ‘users group’ 
(Shrestha and McManus, 2007), indicating a broader group of users, although there is still an 
emphasis on geographical boundaries (Wakiyama, 2004). There is no guarantee that all users 
will be included in a users group. There are difficulties identifying and deciding who is 
included as a forest user (Wakiyama, 2004) and exclusion of users takes place (Agarwal, 
2001). Property distribution, of land and thus forests, is always contested, and likely to be 
claimed by village leaders or local elites Li (1996). Nightingale (2005; 2006) reported that 
higher caste people were particularly happy with the concept of community forestry, 
because they can now control the forests. 
 When community forestry was introduced, managed by a community forest users, 
committee lower caste people where not happy even though they could see resources 
regenerating under community forestry. Nightingale (2005; 2006) reports that lower caste 
men and women from Sangkhola, regretted the loss of the National forest system because 
under that system they had found it easier to transgress the rules and avoid paying for key 
resources. For them, resources were ‘easier’ to get under the national forest because they 
did not have go through a whole committee with higher caste people, they only had to deal 
with the forestry government official. (Nightingale, 2006) 
 
From several studies it is clear that many people use the community forest for different 
purposes. A study by Richards et al., 2003 showed that the mid wealthy people use mostly 
on community forests for wood, while the poorest households collect mostly grass and 
fodder in the forests. Gender relations continue to be important in defining control over 
resources and the division of labour both within households and communities. Women use 
the forest to collect fuel wood, litter, or leaf and fodder for animals, and meet their 
household needs. Women have expertise in local biomass resources including their 
properties as fuels. Women can differentiate between those fuel-wood species which burn 
fast with high heat, those which burn at a slow speed with low heat and those that smoke 
(Kelkar, 1995). 
 Men on the other hand are more preoccupied with construction timber and wood for 
agricultural implements (Yadav et al, 2003). A study conducted in rural hilly areas of Nepal 
indicated that women, especially from high caste Hindu families, were solely responsible for 
collecting, storing and cooking with firewood, but men cut the wood to be used as firewood, 
                                                 
38 
 The Village Development Committee is the smallest administrative unit in Nepal. A VDC is divided in 
wards, usually 5- 9 wards. 
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as women are considered not to be strong enough. Among minority ethnic groups, such as 
Tamangs and Rais, there is more work sharing at the household level and men were also 
involved in collecting and cooking with firewood. Among the low caste groups such as Kami 
and Sarki, both men and women are involved in managing the household firewood system 
(Mahat, 2006). The same study found that women are involved in stealing firewood from 
private forests since they did not have access to community forests. As a result they had 
concerns with the risks associated with stealing firewood (e.g breaking their legs, financial 
penalties etc.) (Mahat, 2006). 
   
The rich are less dependent on common forests since they often have either private land 
with trees or do not need income from the forest (Dev et al., 2003). While the rich favour 
conservation of the forest, the poor users are most interested in maintaining a regular supply 
of forest products from the community forest to sustain their livelihoods. In interviews, it 
emerged that the poorer household members could not afford to buy firewood as it is very 
expensive, so they have no choice but to continue to use the community forest to obtain 
firewood. The FUG record book shows that it is by and large the poor households who have 
paid the most fines for illegally using the forest (Timisina, 2003). The poor and landless often 
depend on the forest to support income-generating activities such as firewood selling, 
alcohol-distillation, charcoal for blacksmithing etc. (Dev et al. (2003) . Their livelihoods are 
vulnerable, they are often poorly educated, food deficient and exposed to poor 
communication within the village and with external organisations. They tend to be less 
involved in user groups and excluded from social activities. Many report a distinction 
between poor and rich groups in society (Richards et al., 2003; Yadav et al., 2003) and Dev et 
al. (2003).  Others stress that caste relations are central to how power operates within the 
community forestry user- group (Bhatta and al. 2007, Krause, 1988, Nightingale 2002 a.o; 
Wakiyama, 2004).  
There is considerable evidence that the poor and marginalised of the community  lose 
out to the local elites who wield far more power and tend to get the bulk of the benefits. The 
only existing rule regarding social inclusion is that the community forest users’ executive 
committee must include 33% women.   
Different users have different needs and as such need different types of support 
(Banjade, et al., 2003). Several authors (Shrestha and Mc Manus, 2007; Li, 1996) indicate that 
the role of the government and NGOs in community forestry is debatable. (Springate-
Baginski et al., 2001) suggest that with gender and equity policies the state has had a positive 
influence on inclusion of women. But the same author says that there is not much support 
for the poor in contribution for their livelihood. Nightingale (2006) describes with her study 
on Pipledi Forest Users Group that men and women have different views on the role of the 
state. 
 High caste men are keen to emphasise their appreciation of the DFO in initiating the 
FUG. Women express their lack of understanding of the formal part but stress their role in 
conserving the forest and in management of forest products. Lower caste men, Kami in this 
case, stress ignorance, claim innocence because they cannot read or write the official 
documents. This gives them an opening for bypassing rules set by the FUG and DFO 
(Nightingale, 2005; 2006). 
 Usually the high caste men in the user-group have an interest in cultivating a strong 
relationship with the DFO staff.  Historically such relationships have been useful to them and 
many see connections with government employees as a potential source of jobs, support in 
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local disputes and other intangible benefits that may receive later.  One way in which they 
seek to gain favour is by demonstrating that they are educated and ‘developed’ (Pigg 1996).  
Most often they do this by invoking understandings of scientific forestry and deferring to 
expertise when arguing for particular management strategies. Yet the high-caste men, by 
appealing to their trust and understanding of the DFO’s forestry practices, are able to assert 
their superior right to control the user-group (Nightingale 2005; 2006).  
 Brahmin and Chettri men do not need to prove (to anyone ‘outside’) that they are the 
rightful managers of the forest, their literacy skills, high- caste status and gender ensure that 
claim under local cultural norms (Nightingale 2005; 2006).  The women in contrast generally 
have few direct dealings with DFO staff and have a greater need to emphasise their 
knowledge and thus claim to manage the forest in part because they have become largely 
marginalised from the committee management process (Nightingale 2002).  Many women 
stated that women’s influence on the user committees has deteriorated over time as the 
(male) leaders have become more entrenched and disputes between political parties have 
taken precedence over other alliances and issues within the group (Nightingale, 2006). 
 
Timsina (2003) describes a case on forestry groups in Dolakha: 
 
“In introducing community forestry policy the government has stimulated changes 
in social relations between different groups: women and Dalits are purposively 
requested to sit in the FUG. However, major control over the implementation of 
community forestry policy at the local level still lies with the village élite, and only 
patchy elements of social justice accrue to the poor and marginalised (2003:241).  
 
In a study conducted by Dev and Adhikari (2007) it became clear that in 12 out of 14 FUGs 
decision-making was dominated by the privileged, rich and educated, the involvement of 
illiterate, low caste, women was negligible.  
 
5.5.2 Farmer managed irrigation schemes or water user groups 
 
An analysis of farmer managed irrigation schemes provided information similar to dynamics 
of community forestry. This is described below.   
This part of the study is largely based on literature and field visits to irrigation 
schemes and information collected in the period 1993 – 1996 when I worked over 3 years for 
the Western regional Irrigation Directorate in Nepal to support and train water user groups 
(WUGs). Information was obtained mainly through frequent field visits and talks with village 
men and women, in addition to conversations with government and NGO staff involved in 
the irrigation sector. This information is supplemented by existing case studies and literature 
findings. 
 The department of Irrigation was founded in 1952 with support from India. After 
1950, systems were increasingly converted to ‘community-managed irrigation systems’ due 
to political developments, and this provided an entry for new farmers as users of the 
systems, or expansion of existing households. Only in 1970s did FMIS gain official recognition 
by the state in policies and plans. At the end of the 1990s, several other agencies became 
involved in irrigation, including the department of agriculture, local development but also 
NGOs (Pradhan, 2000; 1998). 
Almost 70% of the irrigated area in Nepal is managed by farmers, in so called Farmer 
Managed Irrigation Systems. In fact Nepal is famous for its thousands of farmer managed 
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irrigation systems (Martin and Yoder, 1986).  
Farmers have built and managed some of the FMIS by themselves for centuries. 
These schemes are found in diverse environments and apply a wide range of technologies to 
use different water sources for the production of several crops, but mainly rice. For 
generations’ groups of farmers with adjacent landholdings worked together to construct 
water diversions, dig canals and to transport water to their fields for growing irrigated crops, 
mainly rice. Individual farmers in hilly areas, on their own, can seldom get surface water for 
irrigation. Construction and maintenance of the structures to divert, convey and distribute 
water requires investment and hard work of a group of farmers.  For a group of farmers to 
accomplish the various irrigation management activities, their efforts must be organised. 
Therefore one usually needs an organisation of a group of farmers or an institution for the 
development and operation of irrigation systems. 
In many new irrigation systems the formation of water users associations were made 
mandatory. Farmer managed irrigation system are considered potentially a cost-effective 
alternative to government run systems through which to expand and intensify irrigation 
development and improve performance of irrigated agriculture. Indeed farmer managed 
organisations produced measurable improvements in system performance and efficiency 
(Uphoff and Wijayaratna, 2000).  Irrigation has contributed to increased yields, and changing 
cropping patterns (Plusquellec, 2002).  
In history these endogenous or local ‘farmer managed’ systems were based on rules 
set by the feudal lords and their fiefs. They had more to do with the feudal relationship than 
with other local social relationships. The role of the state was never entirely absent. 
Traditional systems were built with grants from the king or other feudal lords. Development 
of irrigated area probably occurred during the past two centuries under 
guidance/supervision of birta and jagir grant holders (Shivakoti, et al., 1997). These grant 
holders were able to mobilise tenants, slave labour, capital and land to build irrigation 
systems. The 17th century edict of King Ram Shah mandated water resource conflicts to be 
settled at community level (Pradhan, 2000). In practice local tax collectors and landlords built 
most of the older systems. They were built to improve their own production of their land. 
Although the old influential families may no longer occupy their formal governmental 
positions, they and their descendants still play an important role in current systems. (Poudel, 
2000) 
 Guthis were also traditional community organisations that developed irrigation 
systems to increase the production on their temple land-holdings. Farmers felt obliged to 
comply with the wishes of the religious leaders. It is not easy for ordinary farmers to rebel 
against the interest of the leaders of such charitable trusts, whose authority is religiously 
strengthened.  
 The influence of feudal elites such as mukhiyas (former revenue collectors in the hills) 
is still big in the community level conflict resolution process. These local power structures 
and customary practices are decisive in water use negotiation process (Upreti, 2001; Pun, 
2001).  
 Over the years both political and economic linkages have become more complex, 
diversified, fragmented and contested. In particular the earlier strong inter-linkage of 
political and economic aspects within a patron-client relationship, between feudal rulers and 
his dependents, have been dissolved, and now involve more political and economic agents of 
different kinds. Further, there is an increasing influence of foreign and international actors, 
government and non-governmental agencies on Nepal’s policies and programmes, and an 
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increasing presence of such donor run projects in small localities.  As a result irrigation 
systems are changed, new institutions are set up or old ones are transformed, and rights and 
duties concerning water are redefined.  
FMIS irrigation systems are located mostly in the hills of Nepal and show a high 
degree of organisational and managerial inputs, both of which become essential when there 
is not much capital available for construction and of the canals. Over time, these local 
irrigation organisations have developed their own rules and regulations regarding resource 
mobilisation, water allocation, system maintenance, conflict resolution, property rights in 
water. Irrigation is a natural resource or a common resource system, and implicitly also a 
social system. The water right is a dynamic concept and changes over time due to season, 
cropping patterns, social structure and power relations (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan, 2002; 
Benda-Beckmann, et. al., 1996). 
The water from irrigation systems is not only used for irrigation. Families use the 
water for washing, bathing and cleaning but also a large amount for watering livestock (Van 
Etten et al., 2002).   
 The diversity in water use is increasing, with the introduction of micro-hydro and 
modern water mills. Users of ghatta (traditional water mill) and micro hydro owners demand 
changes in the existing water rules, in which irrigations gets priority. The ghatta and micro 
hydro owners want an equal share, but often lose out against irrigation users (Bhattarai et al, 
2002).  
 
Differences in wealth, gender, caste, ethnic background, political orientations allow for 
different access to resources. Singh (2001) states that ‘might is right’ is prevailing. According 
to him “it is clear that this way the more vulnerable people who have little bargaining power 
will usually lose out. In practice this means women and people from the lower caste, such as 
the Sarki or Kami people, who have little or no land, have less income, are less educated and 
so on” (Singh, 2001:130). 
 There is a difference among the more wealthy and poor. The distribution of benefits 
from irrigation development is more or less proportional to land distribution, which is often 
highly unequal (van Etten, J. van Koppen, B. Pun, S., 2002). Farm households that gained 
access to irrigation benefit considerably (Van Etten et al., 2002), whereby there is inequality 
among water users. “The better-off dominated in the Water Users Association Committees” 
(Van Etten et all., 2002:17). “The more powerful farmers got away with more quantities and 
continued to fight about even the small amounts of water that small farmers needed on their 
small plots” (Van Etten, van Koppen and Pun, 2002: 25) 
 
Often the benefits and burdens of irrigation are gender-biased. In a newly established 
irrigation scheme, Andikhola FMIS women’s tasks in the family farm increased more than 
men’s because tasks traditionally handled by women, such as weeding, transplanting and 
harvesting, increased when rain-fed agriculture was replaced by irrigation (van Etten et al. , 
2002). 
 Irrigation is often assumed to be a male task but many women are also involved and 
interested in irrigation. In the irrigation sector men dominate the scene with male engineers 
and constructors. Furthermore men are decision-makers in water user committees (Meinzen-
Dick and Zwarteveen, 1998; Zwarteveen, 2006). Women are generally excluded from 
informal and formal fora in which rules and practices about water distribution are set and 
implemented. Some practices, such as night irrigation are a problem for women, so they are 
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excluded from water at those times (Koppen et al., 2001). Women do use irrigation systems, 
if not formally included then informally. There are reports of water stealing (Zwarteveen, 
2006) and observations of water use in irrigation systems by women for livestock, washing, 
kitchen gardens (personal observation, 1994). Women often expressed a desire not to be 
included in official committees; they showed reluctance in taking part in water user meetings 
when I worked in the irrigation sector (personal communication, 1995). 
Imposing a quota for women or Dalits in water users groups is a step forward towards 
inclusion of a diversity of users but does not guarantee that their needs are addressed. This 
rule of compulsory participation of women, or any vulnerable group, does not make sense, 
when those women have in fact no interest or time or capabilities to participate in the 
organisations (Zwarteveen, 2006). 
 Women, who are generally without landownership titles can not gain their own 
independent water rights. Although women irrigated alone or jointly with their husbands, 
water shares were commonly registered in their husbands’ names. Husbands also arranged 
transactions like the renting out or selling of water shares. Women were often uninformed 
about the number of shares and transactions made. While in one- third of the sample 
households women participated in maintenance activities, their contributions were typically 
registered in their husbands’ names (Van Etten et al., 2002). 
 
Not only gender issues play a role in irrigation management, ethnicity and caste too 
influence community organisations such as FMIS. When I worked in irrigation in the Western 
Region the water user committees were predominantly male and Brahmin dominated, 
Janajatis en lower castes had little access to irrigated land and were traditionally not 
involved in decision-making in water distribution. Irrigation development risks being biased 
towards those who already own land. FMIS are not necessarily more equitable or efficient 
then government managed systems. Water rights are formed and influenced by power 
structures and social relationships, as well as other rights. In fact these seemingly 
participatory institutions can exclude significant sections in a society (Agarwal, 2009; 2001). 
Participatory exclusion, as Agarwal calls it, affects women, Janajatis and lower caste groups, 
in forest user groups but also in water users associations and this exclusion  extends into 
other arenas too, such as village councils. 
 People do not isolate irrigation from other social processes and relationships. 
Changes in the political structure or administration of villages may be as important for 
irrigation as changes in irrigation infrastructure or organisation itself. Shifts in political power 
have a great impact on actual water rights (von Benda-Beckmann et al., 1998) Water 
disputes often do not stand in isolation but are connected to other conflicts, in which a wide 
range of institutions might be involved. 
 
It is shown everywhere that local communities at different stages in history appropriated 
state regulations and rights. What were considered external rules over time became internal 
rules of the community, and were incorporated into the existing body of regulations. Under 
influence of government and NGO interference in farmer managed irrigation systems certain 
rules and regulations have been changed or added. The opposition between so called 
customary rules and laws and state law becomes blurred, because the regulations are being 
adapted over time (Pradhan et al. 2000; Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan, 2002).  
 Customary laws and state laws all have weaknesses if it comes to water rights. There 
are diverse customary systems. They differ in the extent to which women may have land 
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rights and may inherit land. This has consequences for their water rights. Also ethnic groups 
have been incorporated into the state Nepal in different ways and at different times, this has 
consequences for land and water rules and regulations.  Water rights are linked to land rights 
and are a source of power.  People from higher caste tend to have better access to higher 
political authorities and as such to access and decision-making related to water rights (Van 
der Schaaf, 2000).  
 The introduction of a new irrigation system or the extension of a canal by supply- led 
development intervention generally does not advocate principles of democracy, equity and 
social cohesion. More often than not, they are supporting unequal power structures within a 
community and ultimately they often fail for social reasons (Upreti, 2001). Even if a project is 
set up with the intention to contribute to poverty alleviation, as was the case with Andhi 
Khola by the United Mission to Nepal (UMN), thinking they could use irrigation differently so 
that it would in fact benefit the poorest of the poor. They strived for irrigation development 
in which landless people, as well as landowners, would benefit equally, nevertheless the 
benefits of the project went mainly to the rich households. (van Etten et al. 2002). 
Villagers are not just passive victims in this process. It is found that people do resist, 
are not always passive subjects, dominated by the state actors and powerful elite. People do 
resist unequal power relations, although this might not always be obvious. People get 
benefits in unorthodox ways. There are reports of water stealing or unlawful water use 
(Zwarteveen, 2006), ‘unruly’ practices in forest use (Timsina, 2003).  
 
5.6 The post-1990 community development era in Nepal 
 
The focus of development interventions has changed over the years. Infrastructure and 
agricultural technologies were the major focus until recently. Since mid 1990s institutional 
development, transformation of administrative, as well as technical skills has been the main 
emphasis. Increasingly attention for the different livelihoods of users and equity issues do 
ask for attention from service providers. Ideas have changed from project structure and 
content (community, development, integrated rural development, basic need) to a focus on 
process approach (from technology transfer to an emphasis on participation, negotiation and 
empowerment). From 1990 onwards significant changes in community development took 
place: the deprived were considered partners in development rather than passive recipients; 
social mobilisation was considered by the government and NGOs as a good tool for poverty 
reduction. Development interventions became more people-centred and holistic. 
 Mobilisation of local resources but also decentralisation of decision-making, self-
governance and people’s empowerment were aims to be achieved through community 
organisations (Shrestha, 2004). Rights-based approach to development is now a popular 
strategy, in particular used by NGOs to reduce local communities' dependency on aid by 
improving government capacity. In the rights-based approach community members are 
encouraged to fight for their human rights, but are also addressed in their responsibility to 
meet their (local) obligations.  
 On a large scale local or village-based social mobilisers were appointed and trained to 
reach people. Still the focus on poverty in this time remains narrow as it focused mainly on 
material deprivation, on basic needs and income, not on reducing vulnerability and 
powerlessness, exclusion and the marginal conditions people live in. This is also the period 
that Farmer Field Schools were introduced, which fitted the philosophy at that time: FFS was 
participatory, treating farmers as active partners in development. 
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 National NGOs mushroomed in this period after 1990, many using a group approach 
to reduce poverty.  These NGOs were assumed less hierarchical than the government, more 
flexible. Still their reach was limited and the organisations often failed to include the 
marginalised or deprived in society. Many of their programmes evolved in isolation, and 
parallel to those of the local government, due to poor communication and coordination. As 
one interviewee said: “The NGOs do their own thing. They do not coordinate with us. 
Sometimes I get informed about some of their activities in our district, but usually I get to 
know by chance” (District agricultural development office chief, 2009). 
 Also, uncertain sources of funding made NGO interventions often unsustainable and 
donor-driven. This was confirmed by NGO staff in an interview (2009) in Kathmandu: “We 
are dependent on donors for funding. If we have no funds, we have no programme”. 
 
Post 1990 traditional institutions such as the guthi are still very active in many Newar rural 
settlements, especially among Maharjan farmers and other associated agriculturist castes 
(Toffin, 2005). But in most cases, especially in urban areas, guthis are on the verge of 
disappearing. The general collapse of such local organisations can be explained by a series of 
interrelated factors. In the first place, through the increased mobility of people urbanisation 
contributes to a diminished social cohesion. As a matter of fact, the local organisations such 
as guthi depend above all on fixity and proximity of residence. A recession in religious 
concern and interest can also be mentioned. People today devote less time and money to 
rituals, and become reluctant to attend to their ritual duties and traditional obligations. 
Westernisation and modernisation of lifestyles, and the development of new media like 
television and video, even in rural settings, have altered attitudes and opened up a large part 
of the population to newer horizons and more materialist values, widely different from the 
old socio-religious order (Toffin, 2005). Religion is not rejected, but the constraints of 
modern life and salaried work have reduced it to a less central position than it has 
traditionally occupied.  
 The method of financing charitable and religious institutions itself has changed. Since 
the downfall of the Rana regime in 1951, the state practice of “making land endowments to 
temples or other religious and charitable institutions has become obsolete”(Regmi 1978: 55). 
People still contribute for religious purposes, to construct a new temple, for instance, or to 
perform a special ceremony, but they do this mostly by money subscriptions, and no longer 
by establishing endowments of private lands under the guthi system. New individualistic and 
egalitarian concerns have multiplied these conflicts, and do not incline the people to 
reconstruct or join new associations. 
  
Having observed the successful cooperation and fund raising capacities of mothers´ groups, 
many INGOs and NGOs have formed and promoted Ama Samuha groups across the country 
among different caste and ethnic groups. 
 In recent years, especially after the democracy movement of 1990, some caste and 
ethnic groups (Adivasi, Gurung, Kirat and many more) have formed, what Biggs et al. (2004) 
call Modernised Indigenous Groups (MIGs) for social, legal, political and economic advance-
ment, especially in reaction to their awakening to exclusionary and socially threatening 
activities by other caste, ethnic and political groups against them. Most of these groups have 
multiple functions.39 
                                                 
39 
  For more information see the website of National Foundation for Development of Indigenous 
Nationalities, http://www.nfdin.gov.np/ 
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 Todays’ community development differs significantly from historical ways. In the past 
it was people’s obligations to contribute to community management of resources, now it can 
be considered their right to use and manage their community or common property 
resources. In today’s community development usually efficiency and an equity principle is 
introduced. 
 
Over the past decades, community development have gradually changed. Initially it was 
predominantly based on patron-client relations, whereby the (powerful) land owner decided 
what needed to be done and other villagers followed instructions and  fulfilled obligations. 
This principle has changed over the years, even if patron-client relations are still strong in 
Nepalese society, people got more options to break free from patron obligations, e.g. 
through education, migration, livelihood diversification. In time land ownership altered. 
Large landownership remains but these days more people have a chance to buy land and 
claim land rights. In addition more communal resources are managed by community groups 
such as FUGs or water users groups. In the past community development was directed by the 
government, but increasingly more stakeholders got involved, like NGOs and the private 
sector. The political situation has changed from a ruling family, kingship to a republic. The 
Maoist movement has had a strong impact. The Maoists have take measures to include  the 
more socially and economically disadvantaged in society in processes of political discussion 
and policy formation. The voices of previously silent groups have been made more audible. 
Nowadays caste, gender and ethnicity are under scrutiny, but in Nepalese society  
increasingly political party membership is becoming a social tool to classify, distinguish, and 
divide people in society. This fact has not been dealt with yet and it needs further study. 
 
5.7 The changing face of Farmer Field Schools 
 
FFS took place in local settings as described above, in situations similar to farmer-managed 
irrigation schemes or community forestry areas. The community development approach of 
the 1970s, like that of FFS today, tended to view 'community' as a homogeneous group of 
people, living in the same geographical area, with common interests.  
When for this research I was going through the literature, studying the above described  
case-studies, and digging into the memory of my own experience I realised that my point of 
view on community development, and on community organisations in particular, was rather 
naïve and restricted. I did not question the concept of ‘community’ when I worked for FAO.  
I then assumed that community organisations functioned in an equilibrium, before 
they were disturbed by outside factors such as, state policies, migration, globalisation.  I 
assumed that local communities were harmonious and all would have the same opportunity 
to participate and that each could raise their voice and be involved in decision-making. I 
never questioned caste, ethnicity or gender issues, ignored power dynamics and assumed 
that people who were not present in community meetings simply were preoccupied with 
other things. This vision of participatory development through communities is romanticised. 
 In the FFS we see similar patterns as in the forest users groups and farmer-managed 
irrigation systems. Existing community groups, such as farmer associations, or new groups 
are shaped into a FFS group by an external force: district officer or NGO staff. The formal 
aspect of registration with the VDC or DDC, selection of a name, assigning positions of 
secretary and president got much emphasis in the FFS project. Usually the existing power 
relations remain in place, inequalities are not challenged: not by the users themselves, not 
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by the external agent. There was a tendency for FFS facilitators, mostly Brahmin men, to 
favour those who are already powerful and articulate, and who already enjoy a greater 
capacity to act and to engage with bureaucracies. Men from upper castes have the social 
connections, the education, the style, language and presentation (i.e. individual social and 
cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1990; 1993). 
 
In 2002 I wrote an article with Stephen Biggs enthusiastically describing how many IPM FFS 
groups continued their activities, that the groups remained active (Westendorp and Biggs, 
2003). In 2008 however, a master student (Humagain, 2008) reported that 80% of the groups 
were not active anymore.  During my field research in 2009 I observed the same trend. Most 
groups had been registered but were not actively involved in follow-up activities. In Kavre 
district 68 many groups were still together out of 261 (DADO staff, interview, 2009). These 
groups were generally an earlier established farmers group, under the government 
guidelines of 1993, when it was decided that agricultural activities were done under the so 
called Group Approach (Agriculture Perspective Plan, 2005). Only FFS groups that had 
continuously received support from service providers functioned well, other groups had 
dissolved. 
 
As stated earlier, the groups that were formed under the FFS project were either existing 
groups or newly formed. Either way we have observed that mainly the higher caste men, so 
called 'model farmers' and village leaders took part in the first FFS. This phenomenon can 
also be translated as ‘courtesy bias’. The fact that we used the local leaders to get the project 
going, to get support from the leaders meant that we from FAO could find access to the 
community. These people were typically the persons that extension workers or FFS trainers 
were already familiar with, or they were the people that were usually approached with a 
new intervention in a village. The local leaders played an important role in setting up FFS. 
More often than not we saw these leaders leave after a few sessions. The direct incentive of 
the FFS was not interesting for them. When leaders discovered that there was not much to 
gain except knowledge that was usually irrelevant to them, they left the training. However, 
they acknowledged that they shared a vested interest that their village performed well, 
because it contributed to their prestige too, and they encouraged others to take part. Over 
the years we saw more women, more ethnic minorities; more young farmers take part in FFS. 
In fact, nowadays the majority of FFS participants are female. This is partly caused by the 
imposed quote of the government of 33% participation of women in groups, such as farmers 
groups. For women it was often the first time they had got such an intensive, season-long 
agricultural training. For most women it was the first time to learn together in a group and 
get attention from the agricultural extension officer. In contrast to water users groups, where 
women were often not interested in sitting in meetings (Zwarteveen, 2006), women said 
they enjoyed the weekly FFS sessions (interviews, 2002; 2009). The women seemed more 
committed learners in FFS than the men. Most women remained active in groups when there 
was a kind of saving and credit system established (Humagain, 2008). 
   
Overall the institutionalisation of these groups in a formal way was not successful. In 
particular groups that had been formed just for the purpose of FFS stopped  existing after the 
season-long training. Most groups were dissolved. Why? First of all it was naive to assume 
that groups would remain functional after FFS to work on their own development. It is an 
over simplification of reality. Most FFS farmers were already active in other groups. Farmers 
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took part in FFS but in their daily life they were involved in many interactions, which were 
equally or more important than FFS. Many farmers did not feel a need to stay in the group 
after FFS training. At the same time there might be many individuals who felt uncomfortable 
to work in the groups that the agricultural extension officer or FFS facilitator had formed. 
Differences in interests or relations among people were not acknowledged. 
 For example when an FFS group consisted of women-only there were frictions 
experienced among the women from different castes, ethnic background or age. Dalit 
women from Yamdi (Kavre district) told me that they took part in a FFS with only women, but 
they did not like it. 
 
We were only two Dalit women and felt overpowered and dominated by the 
Bhramin and Chettri women. They made us feel small and stupid during FFS. They 
behaved as if they were superior and knew more than we did. I enjoyed learning 
about agriculture, but next time we should be with more Dalit women. I prefer not 
to be in a group with only Dalit women, because then the Brahmins will laugh at 
us again and we will still be a separate group. I prefer to be in a mixed group with 
women from different castes in equal proportions, I mean quite a few Dalit 
women, quite a few Brahmin women and quite a few women from Janajatis or 
other castes (Yamdi, interview Dalit women, 2009) 
 
Apart from gender differences, it appeared that overall higher caste people are dominant in 
FFS groups, whereas lower castes and landless people were largely excluded from FFS 
participation. In the interviews in 2009, Dalits said that they did not know FFS took place in 
their village. Information sharing is important to get the marginalised groups included in 
projects such as FFS, and is a simple example where lower caste frequently feels excluded: 
‘the elite do not share information voluntarily’ (Platteau, 2004). In Chapter 6 these issues will 
be further elaborated. 
 
There was blindness to the socio-historical context, the social relations and institutions have 
not been considered. In the FFS project there was much emphasis on the establishment of 
groups, formal registration, in other words, a technical approach to participation and 
community development (Li, 2006; 2007). The establishment of new functional groups like 
FFS, might also obscure the actual activities undertaken by individuals and other well- 
established local institutions, such as parma or ama samuha (see above).  
 There was little recognition of the diversified livelihoods, interests (see Chapter 6 and 
7), motivation, nor of the fact that people were already involved in other institutions or 
organisations. As one of the (male) farmers explained; “I am a member of the forest users 
group, the vegetable producers group, the drinking water association, the saving and credit 
group, the road construction committee. Also during the rice season I take part in 
community planting, weeding and harvesting through parma”. (Kavre, interview July, 2009). 
Another woman said: “I am involved in the mother and child health care group, the forest 
users group, the water users group, the mother group, the literacy club etc. Additionally she 
said she worked with some people on maintenance of the local temple”. (Sindhupalchowk, 
interview July, 2009). These remarks show the involvement of people in multiple 
organisations and institutions, be it formal or informal. Women and men have different 
networks as one DADO officer explains: 
 
For example men gather in tea shops every morning and evening. There they 
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arrange labourers for field work (mela40, khetala41 etc.) and share their worries. 
They discuss their plan to sell or purchase animals and goods, they arrange loans. 
Women are not part of this. Women on the other hand leave in the morning to 
collect grass or do field work, like parma or organise festivals, like mela. Men and 
women use their own networks to arrange, for instance, carrying manure to the 
field, harvesting crops, help neighbours on festive occasions. (DADO officer, Kavre, 
interview, 2009) 
 
A focus on establishment of groups is a simplification of the multiple interactions and 
relations with which people are involved. This technical approach towards community 
participation has little to do with the principle of participation to increase decision-making of 
individuals in their own development. It seems an establishment of institutions that ‘mirror 
bureaucratic structures’ (Cleaver, 2006b:788).  
While the project emphasises collective action, community development and 
empowerment, the approach taken remains largely concerned with formal procedures and 
efficiency. There is lack of understanding of ‘deeper determinants of technical and social 
change’ (Gurung and Biggs, 2010). 
 
In the field we also observed gender differences in dealing with group mobilisation. In an 
interview in Kavre with a DADO extension worker said: 
 
 “We learnt in the FFS that mostly men kept information to themselves. When we 
tell someone about training, a tour or another opportunity they do not share it 
with others. They showed no interest to move the group forward, but they were 
focused on getting an income, a job or off-farm work. Women usually share the 
information they received and keep groups together. They also conduct more 
activities together such as harvesting, planting, collecting fodder.”(Kavre, 
interview, August 2009)  
 
Women’s groups are often headed by men. As one lady in Yamdi explained:  
 
“We women cannot read and write and when you are an official group you have to 
register, go to offices and so on. Men are better equipped to help us, they can do 
this for our women’s group. Without the men I think we might never have become 
a registered group. (Yamdi, interview, 2009). 
 
Women in Sindhupalchowk confirmed this. 
 
”Now we have not many men in our village left, we also have no contact with 
DADO. We do not know the new people there, they do not know us. We do not go 
there (Sindhupalchowk, interview, 2009) 
 
From the interviews it became clear that uneducated women or lower caste people have less 
access to information, feel restricted to be involved in decision-making, in report writing or 
making a written action plan. They feel not confident to vist an office and officially register a 
group at the district or village council. 
 
                                                 
40
  Mela means festival in Nepali but is also used to indicate working together, e.g. planting rice or millet. 
41
  Khetala are farm labourers in Nepali 
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Over the years I have observed more Farmer Field Schools that were organised for a single 
caste or ethnic group, which reduced caste or status tensions. In particular FFS conducted by 
farmer-trainers were more likely to contain members of the same caste or ethnic group. 
Examples are FFS for only Tharus in the central terai region, or an all-Muslim FFS in the area 
near Nepalganj. 
 
We have managed to organise a FFS with only Tharus and that has made a great 
difference. I am a Tharu and speak the local language, I come from this area and 
know the circumstances but I also know the people and people know me. When 
the DADO gave me the opportunity to conduct an FFS it opened doors for my 
community that would have remained closed if only DADO sirs would have done 
the FFS training. The DADO sirs are Brahmin and do not speak Tharu. (Farmer 
trainer, Kailali district, interview 2002) 
 
5.8 Conclusion 
 
Community centred rural development approaches have had a significant impact on shifting 
discourses and practices with positive effects for communities. Yet they are not free from 
problems. Critical to any success is an appropriate and accurate representation of rural 
community actors, their needs and relations. Community development strategies cannot 
provide blue prints for development. Community development is a dynamic process with 
local, national and global actors. It involves continuous negotiation and contestation over 
resources with the discursive framing of community, context and representation of 
community at the heart of the debate. 
Rural Nepalese society operates through principles of hierarchy, human 
interdependence, and action through personal relationship and social networks.  It is 
through these individual, hierarchal interdependency relationships that goods and services 
are negotiated and exchanged. Members in communities are linked together through 
kinship, caste and other institutions, persons negotiate or manipulate their multiple 
connections in order to gain access to resources and services. Within any given social context 
of a local community there is likely to be a distinction between elites and others. That is 
people with privileges and power, people who have a vested interest in maintaining their 
status quo (Sharma, 2003). This pattern can be simple but it can also be more complex 
because of gender, caste, ethnicity, education, changing patterns of patronage, land 
ownership and employment. In Nepal there is a history of hierarchical boundaries and 
marginalising of certain groups in society, such as women, lower castes or ethnic minorities 
in this social process.  
 
I am convinced that FFS can contribute to community development, but a few considerations 
must be taken into account:  
- Communities are not static and homogenous entities, and cannot be defined 
as a geographical area alone; 
- Power dynamics and socio-historical forces create inequality within the 
‘community’ 
- Multiple actors and stakeholders play a role in communities and their power 
positions are changing over time; 
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- The social setting is changing and becomes less rigid, giving more room for 
manoeuvre and change.  
- People are involved in several formal and informal institutional organisations 
and networks. FFS project staff and facilitators must critically question 
whether it makes sense to keep the group in tact without additional support? 
Farmer field schools need to employ a flexible approach where there is room for manoeuvre 
to include people who do not fit the formal requirements for participation.   
 
From our research and this case study on community development in Nepal we learnt that in 
Nepal community participation and development is not a new concept (Biggs et al., 2004). In 
fact in most village communities there are several community institutions or organisations. 
Before the inception of FFS there were already many community development initiatives in 
Nepal, following several paradigms, in particular community forestry and farmers-managed-
irrigation projects are popular. Like irrigation and forestry FFS is not just a technical 
intervention but a process that takes place at multiple societal and organisational levels 
through time and place in a dynamic socio-political and economic context, coloured by 
history.  
The government of Nepal uses community organisations to manage natural 
resources, but evidently people in the villages are active in shaping these institutions and 
using them to their own prevail. Our research has shown (see Chapters 6 and 7) that through 
community projects including FFS, and despite set-backs in equality empowerment does take 
place. Women have indeed gained decision-making power; Janajatis get more opportunities 
to join in development activities such as FFS. The poor are increasingly learning the rules of 
the development game and challenging exclusion, but they need to be informed about 
external interventions. 
 Another important conclusion is that for FFS to be effective, the target ‘community’ is 
not necessarily the geographically defined ward or village community, but preferably the 
social group of participants who constitute a self-defined community of interest, whether by 
ways of caste or ethnic affiliation or by gender. Rather than equity, it is social familiarity or 
cohesion that creates the necessary basis for collaboration in Farmer Field Schools and 
afterwards.  
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Chapter 6 From Agriculture to Rural Development:  
The Contribution of Farmer Field Schools in Nepal  
 
" The mission found that particularly in Cambodia, China, 
Indonesia, Nepal and Vietnam, the Programme 
had: a)  demonstrated an approach to farmer learning 
and innovation which clearly recognises the farmer as 
decision- maker and lays the basis for continued learning 
and for wider participation in society; b) enabled 
farmers to increase their incomes from rice, while 
adopting more environmentally friendly and healthy 
farming practices (i.e. drastically reducing or eliminating 
the use of pesticides, in particular insecticides); c)  laid a 
basis for strong national Community IPM programmes, 
supported by Government and more importantly, 
mobilising the joint initiative of farmers". (FAO, Executive 
Summary, 2001: 8) 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
On the basis of a survey in 2002 (REGARD, 2002) and a mid-term evaluation by FAO in 2001 
the project team concluded that FFS was successful, basically because yields had increased 
and pesticide use had been reduced. At first as a programme officer I was pleased with the 
results, because it fitted with the objectives defined in the project documents and my Terms 
of Reference for the job. The results were in- line with the planned results of the project, in 
fact even exceeded the expectations. The positive evaluation provided the necessary 
arguments to renew funding for a second phase of the project, which was eventually 
granted by the Norwegian funding agency NORAD42 (see Chapter 4).  
Meanwhile, I had become a university lecturer on rural development, gender, and 
social inclusion. So, despite these positive reports, I started questioning the results. Has FFS 
indeed contributed to long term changes in agriculture and rural development in Nepal? Was 
FFS a project with a clear start and an end or is FFS a developmental process that continues 
after the intervention?   
In Chapter 4 I introduced the concept of Farmer Field Schools. In this chapter I will 
describe how FFS has contributed to agriculture and how FFS has evolved and become 
embedded in the institutional setting of Nepal. I will portray the different actors that play a 
role, elaborate their views and objectives, their role in construction of the concept of FFS. 
Over the years FFS trainers have changed, the content of FFS have changed, and also the 
composition of the groups of participants themselves has evolved. These changes took place 
alongside prevailing paradigm shifts in development studies, changes in the context such as 
                                                 
42 
 Consequently the Support to the National IPM in Nepal (UTF/NEP/055/NEP) programme was launched 
with technical support from FAO:  
“In 2003 the Government of the Kingdom of Norway agreed to provide a grant totalling US$1,284,444 
for the "Support to the National Integrated Pest Management (IPM) Programme" in Nepal. The main 
objective of this programme was "to contribute to sustainable broad-based poverty reduction and food 
security while contributing to environmental protection".(from: NORAD Inception Report 2009: 1) 
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out-migration and political upheaval, but also as a result of enhanced insights in FFS 
implementation.  
When the Farmer Field Schools started in Nepal as part of the FAO Integrated Pest 
Management project in 1997, this was also the year that the Maoists declared the People’s 
Revolution. FFS began in a period that was characterised by rapid socio-political changes in 
society.  
 
I will show that FFS has contributed to changes in agricultural production from yield increase 
and changing agronomic practices to rural development. For this analysis I have used data 
from field notes from 1997 and 1998, the survey conducted by REGARD in 2002 (N= 424 FFS 
farmers from 10 districts), supplemented with interviews conducted by myself as part of my 
regular FAO IPM programme officer’s duties from 1997 to 2002. As a programme officer I 
was able to guide the REGARD team in their survey. The information from 2009 is based on 
interviews (N=147) and 14 focus group discussions which I conducted in the period between 
June 2009 and December 2009 from 5 districts (see Chapter 1 for more details). Additionally 
I have used data collected on FFS participants (caste, age, sex, education, land ownership, 
crops) from the District Agricultural Development Office in Kavre from 1997 to 2007 (N=400). 
FFS started in the mid hills and the plains or terai. The survey data from 2002 cover the terai 
and some districts in the mid hills. The interviews and FGD in 2009 took place in the mid hills. 
Kavre district and its FFS participants have been included in the research in 2002 and 2009. 
Although the situation of farmers in the terai differs from the mid hills, the data collected can 
be compared with the argument that what matters here is that they are all smallholder 
farmers (around 0.3-1.0 ha) who all received a similar type of FFS training with set 
government recommendations. Also the FFS participants in the terai were mostly migrants 
from the mid hills so they shared a socio-economic history. The main difference can be found 
in cropping patterns (see Chapter 2.6), but data in this research are only compared when 
they concern the same crop, mostly rice. When I discuss other crops, such as vegetables, this 
is indicated in the text. Actually each Farmer Field School had its own peculiarities, not only 
as a result of location but also due to its socio-cultural context, such as ethnicity or caste. 
Even within the mid hills or within the terai there can be large differences. The data collected 
for this research provides a general picture and does not account for situational differences. 
FFS has challenged ideologies of top-down technology transfer and has become 
institutionalised as a new way of working with farmers in a participatory way, respecting 
farmers as partners in development, contributing to capacity building leading to better 
informed decision-making skills. FFS facilitated a closer collaboration of extensionists with 
famers through a more practical orientation of trainers and extension workers. FFS has 
contributed to a process in which women have become more valued actors in agriculture. 
FFS is not just a technical intervention but a process that takes place at multiple levels 
through time and space, in a dynamic socio-economic, political context. 
 
6.2 The start of FFS in Nepal and the impact on agriculture and farmers’ 
knowledge 
 
Despite the fact that pest problems were used as a reason to introduce FFS in Nepal, in 
contrast to Indonesia, Vietnam, and other countries in Asia, poor pest management and in 
particular misuse of pesticides was not yet a significant problem and certainly not the main 
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problem in agricultural production for Nepalese farmers. Pesticide misuse is merely a 
problem in pocket areas. Pesticide use is heavily concentrated in the cultivation of 
commercial vegetables, mustard and cotton, and more intensively in the terai, Kathmandu 
valley and its surrounding areas (Jha and Regmi, 2009). In rural areas most farmers farm in a 
traditional way, with no or very limited use of pesticides, because they are poor and cannot 
afford inputs, because they do not have much information about inputs and because inputs 
are basically not available (Adhikari, 2002). Farmers training needs were more on improving 
agronomic practices, such as spacing between plants, weeding and fertiliser management.  
Following the example of neighbouring Asian countries, the first Farmer Field Schools 
were organised in rice-based farming systems. Rice is the preferred staple food of the 
Nepalese people. Of all cultivated land, 47% is used for paddy production (MoAC, 2010). 72% 
of rice is grown under rain-fed condition, of which 70% is in lowland (terai) and 9% in the 
mid-hills (MoAC, 2010; Pokhrel, 1997). The first two years FFS were conducted in rice only, in 
irrigated as well as rain-fed rice, early as well as main season (monsoon) production. 
There are three words in Nepal to indicate rice: dhaan - the rice crop, the unhusked 
grain ; chamal - rice after harvest, the white rice; bhaat- boiled rice, the meal. Rice is not just 
a crop, it is also used as a metaphor for food in Nepal. If people have not eaten rice, despite 
having eaten other food, they just did not have a proper meal. Rice is important in everyday 
life of Nepalese. Conversations usually contain the question: have you had rice, have you 
eaten yet?  
In Nepal the government has a vested interest in agricultural development. Thus in 
Nepal the FFS emphasis was to increase agricultural production, to improve farming in 
general. Consequently the curriculum had a strong emphasis on improving agronomic 
practices. Field visits in the period 1997 – 2009 confirmed this feature. Standard curriculum 
of a FFS contained the following topics: seedbed preparation, planting distance and density 
(number of seedlings per hill), fertiliser application practices (timing and quantity), weeding 
(timing), water management, seed collection and selection, varietal selection and also 
knowledge about natural enemies and insect pests and their management, disease 
management.   
  
To date, over 60,000 (Braun and Duveskog, 2008) Nepalese farmers have graduated from 
season-long FFS training. Participation in FFS has always involved a considerable cost in terms 
of time (season-long, weekly sessions, daily field observations). Despite these costs, millions 
of farmers decided to participate. It is clear that many farmers thought that participation in 
the FFS was worthwhile (Bartlett, 2002). A large majority of individuals showed interest and 
willingness to allocate working days to attend IPM training in FFS (Atreya, 2007). 
In Nepal, like elsewhere in Asia (Chapter 4), the FFS project initially set out to equip 
farmers with more knowledge and to contribute to concrete outputs such as yield increase 
and pesticide reduction. “The desired outcome of IPM FFS is an improvement in farmers’ 
knowledge and decision-making capacity which is expected to lead to a change in input mix 
and practices used leading to yield increase, lower pesticide use and ultimately, higher farm 
profits” (David and Asamoah, 2011: 213). In fact, in 2002 and again in the interviews in 2009 
farmers confirmed that they experienced an increase in yield and income (see table 6.1). This 
did not have a big impact on the overall agricultural production of the country. As the FAO 
programme officer expressed: “IPM does not contribute significantly to increased production 
of Nepal’s agricultural sector” (Kathmandu, interview 2009). In fact, the average yields in a 
district or region have increased little over the years; the production increase was achieved 
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mainly through expansion of cropping area (Pandey et al., 2009). Yet, the yield as indicated 
by FFS farmers is higher than the national average. In 2009/10, even with good and timely 
rains, the average rice yield in Nepal was 2.9 tons per hectare (t/ha) (MoAC, 2010) as 
compared with the yield of FFS farmers (N=424) in 2002 of almost 3.6 t/ha (REGARD, 2002) 
and as much as 3.7 in 2009 (N=147) (interviews, 2009). 
 
Table 6.1 Yield and income data from FFS farmers 
 Rice Yield (ton/ha) Income from 
agriculture (NRs/yr) 
199743 3.21 29.440 
2002 (N=424) 3.58 35.660 
2009 (N=147) 3.69 52.000 
Source: own research 
 
The practice of pesticide reduction was reported by farmers in 2002. Similarly, Upadhyaya 
(2003) reported that the use of pesticides in rice decreased by 40% in almost all national IPM 
programme areas in Nepal. The frequency of pesticide applications by farmers  decreased 
after attendance at FFS. These findings rely on case studies and individual FFS reports which 
mainly focus on the rice agro-ecosystem (Jha and Regmi, 2009). An increase in rice yield does 
not translate immediately to a higher income, because rice is mainly a staple crop and only 
sold by farmers who produce an excess in rice. Vegetable production on the other hand leads 
usually to more income, because most vegetables are sold on the market. Pandey et al. 
(2009) observed that while the production value from other crops increased by nearly two 
times, there was an almost threefold increase in production value (income) from vegetables 
during the 1995 to 2004. Vegetable expansion was primarily due to the high vegetable 
consumption by an increased population, a favourable price and also the effects of the 20-
year Agriculture Perspective Plan (Pandey et al., 2009). 
FFS has been used as a vehicle to expand vegetable production. In 2006/2007 there 
were 221 FFS focusing on vegetables compared to 131 FFS focusing on rice (Poudel, 2007). 
This way FFS has contributed to a diversification in crop production, especially vegetables 
such as cauliflower, tomato, and cucurbits, but also potato. During the field visits in 2009 I 
observed that all of the 23 FFS villages I visited had introduced vegetable production.  
 
Although the emphasis remained on rice, in 1999 the project expanded with FFS in 
vegetables, in particular tomato, potato, cauliflower and cucumber. Training of FFS facilitators 
was not easy because we faced many problems with insect pests and diseases. We learnt 
that especially pest (insects as well as diseases) management in vegetables is not as simple 
as in rice. The agro-ecosystem of vegetables is often not well-balanced and the crops are 
susceptible to many pests and diseases because they are not part of an ancient 
agroecological system in Asia (Braun et al., 2000). This is confirmed by Elske van de Fliert who 
had a similar experience in Asia and Latin America: “Integrated pest management seems 
easy for wet tropical agro-ecosystems with crops such as rice or mixed cropping systems 
favouring (relative) diversity of the ecosystem. However, a more difficult situation, when it 
comes to ecological balance, is usually found in introduced crops with a more artificial 
ecosystem, such as vegetables” (Van de Fliert, 1997: 3).   
 
                                                 
43
  Reported by REGARD 2002 and confirmed in interviews with PPD staff in 2002 and 2009. 
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Despite more difficult growing conditions several district agricultural offices have introduced 
vegetable production through the FFS. In Kavre, for instance, the DADO has promoted 
cauliflower and potato production in many villages that had previously only food crops such 
as rice, millet and maize. 
While MoAC might want to see results in terms of yield increase and adoption of 
commercial vegetable production, FFS was designed as a capacity-building investment to 
improve farmers’ knowledge, and decision-making skills, leading to broader development 
(Van den Berg, 2004).  
An increase in yield and income is relatively easy to measure or observe, but changes 
in knowledge is more complicated to prove. In the field I asked farmers what they had learnt 
from FFS. In 2002 and 2009 all farmers responded positively to this question. 
 
Farmers gained knowledge of insect pests and natural enemies in order to recognise and 
conserve beneficial insects and work towards a sustainable agro-ecosystem. In 2002 and 
2009 farmers expressed that they had learnt to value insects that were not harmful to their 
crops, they learnt to recognise natural enemies such as wasps. Also they learnt that crops 
have a natural capacity to compensate for insect damage and that spraying is normally not 
necessary. As farmers said: “less still-born calves, due to less pesticide use” (Lalitpur, 
interview 2002). They also said: “Our calves do not die so often anymore since we spray less, 
and our straw is cleaner” (Bhaktapur, interview, female farmer, 2002). 
As one farmer, in Kavre district reported in 2002:  
 
We are directly involved in the learning activities of FFS sessions. For instance, 
we observe with the trainer the problems of seedlings in the nursery, for 
example, need of water (what are symptoms of deficiency of water), need of 
nutrients and need of fertilisers, attack of insects and diseases, etc. We 
discussed these observations in the group, analyse the issues in the groups and 
decide what to do for experimentation to solve the problems. (FFS male farmer, 
Kavre, 2002) 
 
In a similar way another farmer in Kavre explained how he learnt about pest and natural 
enemies or ‘friends of the farmer’ as he called them: 
 
In FFS sessions we learnt to observe insects and diseases in growing crops; we 
used to discuss to find out whether they were harmful or beneficial insects, for 
instance, we also used to rear the insects in an insect zoo, we learnt about their 
life cycles, we used to observe their characters, for example, whether they eat 
the crops or not. By continuous observation of their behaviour it became easier 
to decide whether they were harmful or beneficial insects. We got less afraid of 
insects because we saw that they were not all harmful.... Moreover, we used to 
see the result of active experimentation, for example, use of local pesticides, like 
cow urine, on the insects and used to see whether they can control the pests or 
not. (FFS male farmer, Kavre, 2002) 
 
A fellow male farmer said: 
 
After seeing the effect of botanical pesticides on the insects and diseases  we 
conceptualised that botanical pesticides prepared by local plant materials can also 
control the insects. (interview Kavre, 2002) 
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FFS farmers sprayed less pesticide in 2002; their applications were reduced by 50% (REGARD, 
2002), and in the cases they did spray they used less hazardous products. As farmers 
recognised more diseases, fungicide use on potato and tomato increased in particular. In 
addition after FFS more farmers bought micronutrients and vitamin mixtures (e.g. multiplex) 
for their crop, in particular in vegetable production. In 2002 an increase of 40% was reported 
(REGARD, 2002). Farmers wanted alternatives for pesticides.  
  
In 2002 83 % of farmers said that they experienced better health. 79 % of the FFS farmers 
said that the costs for medical care were reduced, but could not tell by how much (REGARD, 
2002). They just said: ´we get ill less often, we have fewer headaches, and so we need fewer 
medicines’. With a reduction in pesticide and medical costs, in combination with an 
increased yield farmers said that their income had increased as a result of FFS (Interviews, 
2002).   
 
Regarding agronomic practices farmers learnt to reduce the number of seedlings per rice hill 
(from 9-10 per hill to 3-5), optimal spacing between plants, fertiliser application according to 
the need of the plant (growth stage related). All these practices were government 
recommendations.   
Increased space between plants, reduced number of seedlings per hill led to more 
vigorous growth in 2002 and ultimately more harvest. Interviews with the farmers in 2009 
revealed that number of seedlings per hill in rice and the spacing of plants was the best 
gained knowledge:  
 
We had a habit of using more than 10 seedlings at a place while transplanting 
the rice but then we saw the result on FFS learning plot that yield was not less 
between transplanting of 2-3 seedlings and more than 10 seedlings at a place. 
After FFS training we used 2-3 seedlings per hill while transplanting rice and that 
practice has saved us more than ten times the amount of seed”. (Bhaktapur, FFS 
women farmers group, 2009) 
 
The farmers were also encouraged to use or test (government recommended) rice varieties 
that would give higher yields. Several farmers changed from a local variety of rice to 
improved varieties, especially Mansuli and Radha. Also farmers said they had diversified 
more, in rice they were planting more varieties to spread risk, but also because they use 
different varieties for different purposes: local for consumption and straw production, high 
yielding varieties like Mansuli for sale and consumption. Furthermore, farmers said they had 
enhanced their skills to select varieties from a high yielding area and applied this practice 
after FFS.  
 After FFS farmers used less chemical fertiliser and followed more the recommended 
dosage as given by the government. In 2009 there was a slight overall increase of chemical 
fertiliser use, but this was mainly due to an expansion of vegetable production (PPD staff 
interview, 2009).  
 
In FFS training farmers learnt to apply chemical fertiliser in a more balanced way, at stages 
when the crop needs it most. This has led to a 20% reduction of fertiliser use in the rice 
seedbed   (REGARD survey 2002). Farmers have replaced plain urea application with more 
composite fertilisers with urea, potassium and phosphorus. Farmers learnt to apply fertiliser 
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on a more regular basis based on the need and growth stage of the plant (REGARD, 2002:14). 
General practice of farmers was to apply only basal fertiliser, and then just urea. In FFS 
farmers learnt to reduce the basal dosage and to practice top dressing at different stages. 
The governmental recommendation was to do it three weeks and six weeks after 
transplanting. Farmers also learnt to apply DAP instead of urea only. ‘Traditionally farmers 
did not apply P or K in their basal dosage, since they were unaware of the need for additional 
elements’ (REGARD, 2002:15). This government recommended method promoted chemical 
fertiliser instead of farmyard manure because it is easier to calculate a specific dosage of 
nutrients per crop.  
 
Despite carefully planned curricula and procedures farmer knowledge and skills gained from 
FFS evolved over the years. The responses from farmers in 2002 were different from 2009, as 
you can see below in Table 6.2 Over time farmers said they had forgotten or found some 
knowledge not as relevant as in 200244. 
 
Table 6.2 Knowledge and skills farmers gained in FFS 
 
Farmers’ FFS knowledge in 2002 (N=424) Farmers’ FFS knowledge in 2009 (N=147) 
- To reduce the number of seedlings per hill 
in rice  
- To increase the space between lines/plants 
(planting distance). 
- Knowledge on dangers pesticide use  
- Reduced use of pesticides 
- Change from hazardous pesticides to less 
harmful pesticide 
- To apply chemical fertiliser in a more 
balanced way, less fertiliser but at the right 
growth stages 
- Better understanding of balance in agro-
ecosystem  
- Recognition of pest and natural enemies 
- To recognise disease symptoms 
 
- To reduce the number of seedlings 
per hill in rice. 
- To increase the space between 
lines/plants (planting distance) 
- Knowledge on dangers pesticide use 
- Reduced use of pesticides  
- Change from hazardous pesticides to 
less harmful pesticide 
- To apply chemical fertiliser in a more 
balanced way, but cannot relate this 
to growth stages.  
- General knowledge that insects were 
important but could not recall details.  
 
 Source: own research 2009 and REGARD, 2002 
 
In 2009, the farmers in Kavre district admitted that they had resorted back to an increased 
use of pesticides.  
 
“My neighbours spray and then I also feel I have to spray. I am not confident 
anymore as I was just after FFS” (male farmer, Kavre, 2009). Besides peer pressure, 
also time and labour were used as a reason for not adopting some alternatives like 
bio-pesticides in 2009. “Preparing bio-pesticides is time consuming and a labour-
                                                 
44
   18 of the farmers interviewed in 2009 had taken part in the survey in 2002, but not all. It would have 
been more precise if all the farmers who responded had been questioned in 2002 and then again in 
2009, but this was logistically not feasible. Still the responses give an impression of the overall trend 
that farmers apply a selection of skills and knowledge gained in FFS. It should be noted that most of 
the officers (20 out of 24) and NGO staff (15 out of 19) interviewed had been involved in FFS from the 
start in 1998. 
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intensive task. It is easy to buy ready-made pesticides” (Female farmer, Kavre, 
2009). 
 
In 2009 in Tanahun district FFS participants learnt how to make tea from neem45 leaves. 
When I asked how many participants of one FFS group in Tanahun prepared bio-pesticides 
after the FFS training, only 3 out of 30 members said they had used the local pesticides after 
FFS training. According to them the main reason for not adopting new knowledge is due to 
the fact that it means more work, e.g. it is time consuming.  
 
“It is time consuming and we need more labour to make bio-pesticides from local 
plant materials; it is easier to buy chemical pesticides from the shop. In the 
emergency cases, when we see lots of harmful insects, it isn’t possible to prepare 
the local pesticides”. (Male farmer, Satrasayphant, interview, Tanahun, 2009) 
 
This observation is supported by Dormon (2006) in his PhD dissertation about management 
of cocoa pests and diseases in Ghana. He reported that the main reason for not adopting 
IPM practices by cocoa farmers is due to the high labour demand of the learnt practices. 
Even though the entry point of many FFS is pest management, the information 
related to the insects is not all used by the participants. In 2009, farmers told me that they 
learnt to recognise some insect damage and some pests, and they learnt that some insects 
are natural enemies. But this knowledge is not used much in farming they said.”We forgot 
most of these insect cycles” (Sindhupalchowk, female farmer, 2009)  
Also the simulation trials, in which insect damage and recovery capacity of plants is 
studied, are a bit difficult to understand according to the majority of the farmers (82%) in 
2009. The key message farmers got in relation to pest management is more or less 
summarised by this farmer’s remark: “We know now that not all insects are pests and that 
we should not spray strong pesticides” (male farmer, Kavre, 2009). 
In 2002 farmers learnt that the fertiliser application was related to growth stages of 
the crop, but in 2009 farmers did not recall this knowledge. In particular women said that 
they did not adopt technologies that were too technical, like fertiliser calculations. Nor did 
they follow practices that were too labour intensive, like observing the fields on a regular 
basis and preparing pesticide alternatives. Women stressed that many aspects were too 
technical, too difficult such as simulation trials, or fertiliser application related to a certain 
growth stage and fertiliser calculations. 
 
 “We did a lot of measuring in FFS. But we do not know why” (Sindhupalchowk, 
female farmer, interview, 2009) 
 
“We do not remember about diseases. We do not know what to do with diseases” 
(Kavre, female farmer, interview, 2009) 
 
For women the key learning point was the fact that they could get a yield increase with less 
seedlings, or a larger planting distance. 
 
In all FFS basically a kind of standard curriculum is offered. To all farmers in a certain context, 
similar information or knowledge is presented. Not all information or knowledge is applied in 
                                                 
45
  Azadirachta indica, a common tree found in South Asia, called Neem or Wonder tree because of its 
medicinal qualities. 
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the same way by the participants. Looking at the social effects from a gender point of view or 
at household level it discloses that the impact of FFS is different for men and women. 
Women have different roles in livelihoods than men, there is differential access to resources, 
but also men and women use FFS skills and technology in a particular way.  
 For most women, in 2002 and 2009, FFS was the first training they had had in 
agriculture. For them this was a new and enlightening experience as they said. 
Conventionally agricultural training was reserved for men. FFS was the first time women 
received agricultural information from the DADO office. 
Interviews and FGD in 2009 revealed that, in contrast to men, women can recall all 
the details of the knowledge they gained in FFS training (even after 8 years): number of 
seedlings per hill, planting distance, times of weeding: all activities that are related to their 
duties in the farming system, in relation to food crops, especially rice and to some extent in 
maize. The women were keen to show their knowledge and proud to say that they still apply 
this in the field. In particular food crop production increased and households have benefited 
from their skills and knowledge gained in FFS. Generally the women admitted that they did 
not apply the knowledge and skills in vegetable production that they had learnt in FFS. Most 
women found vegetable production not beneficial: (I do not know where to sell, and ‘ how 
much can we eat’; ‘I gave up, it was too much work for too little output’; ‘I have no market 
access’ (interview with women in Kavre and Sindhupalchowk, 2009). “I do not have time for 
vegetable production, I am busy with rice and kodo (millet)” said one woman in Kavre (Kavre, 
interview, 2009). “I learnt about vegetables but I am alone so I do not know what to do with 
all the harvest, and I stopped” said another woman in a neighbouring village 
(Sindhupalchowk, interview, 2009). Another woman adds: “We eat little vegetables but after 
FFS I produced so much and did not know how to market them, so I stopped with the 
cauliflower production” (Kavre, interview, 2009). In the field I heard that in particular women 
expressed a need to increase the production of food crops and wanted to learn more about 
rice or millet production.  Even though vegetable production is kind of stimulated by the 
government, it is not something that all (female) farmers accepted and adopted passively. 
With increased responsibilities for women in agriculture, in particular food security, the 
production of vegetables in Kavre, Tanahun and Kaski had not expanded among women.  
Women use the information differently than men. Also the application of knowledge 
depends on the opportunities or availability of resources one has. As was confirmed by one 
Dalit woman: “I could not apply the knowledge I learnt on vegetables because my husband 
did not give me land to grow vegetables”. (interview, Yamdi, 2009). Men and women have 
different access to resources such as land and cash (see Chapter 2). Land in Nepal is usually 
registered in a man’s name and decisions regarding household expenses are made by men.  
 
With the trend of feminisation of agriculture (see Gartaula, 2011 and Chapter 2) women 
have taken up more responsibilities and tasks, even decisions that were previously assigned 
to men only. With restricted outside support or services it was observed that women have 
developed strong ties together. In all the villages (N=23) visited, the women gave the 
impression of  having close collaboration, especially among the same caste groups or ethnic 
communities. Even in multiple caste/ethnic societies the women worked together in close 
collaboration to produce food and to help each other in dire times. These FFS training 
sessions were not only used to learn new skills, but also to exchange gossip, share news; they 
were social happenings.  
 In rural villages women can even be seen to plough fields, but this is still rather 
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unusual. Also women have been involved in the last rites when for instance their father died 
and there was no male relative available to perform the religious rituals as part of the funeral 
ceremony (Sindupalchowk, female farmer, interview, 2009). Only, these are exceptional 
cases. Generally feminisation of agriculture in FFS areas means that women got more work 
and to some extent decision-making power. In terms of agronomic practices: women decided 
the cropping pattern and the timing of agronomic practices. Also women increasingly 
decided which variety to grow. “We cannot decide to buy or sell land but we can decide how 
to farm” (Kavre, female farmer, interview, 2009). 
 In FFS women use the information regarding rice production to improve their food 
production, to increase yields. It is their role to provide food for the family and in that role 
they have an interest in learning how to do this in an optimal way. Women shared common 
interests in FFS. The women who were interviewed all felt responsible for food production 
and were interested in working together with fellow women farmers to help each other to 
achieve this food production. Farming activities are often undertaken together by women: 
weeding, harvesting, and planting. FFS farmers, in particular women, said that the demand 
for labour increased after FFS: the new technologies (more frequent weeding, regular crop 
observations) are labour intensive. Almost all the respondents said that they increased the 
frequency of weeding in the fields.  
 
FFS has an impact on changes in gender relationships: Men increasingly appreciated 
women’s role in farming and valued their knowledge gained in FFS. Women were considered 
more important actors in agriculture and taken seriously by agricultural public service staff. 
Women have become more valued actors in agricultural production. In 2002 World 
Education staff informed that female Farmer Field School graduates were in high demand as 
agricultural labourers, because of their increased knowledge and skills (World Education staff 
member, interview, Kathmandu, 2002) 
 While women have benefitted from FFS, especially in their role as food providers, men 
have shown a decrease in interest in FFS participation over the years. Men, generally, 
displayed less interest in skills to improve food production, but wanted to use FFS to increase 
income through cash crop, such as vegetable production, or to get a chance for off-farm 
labour. Men proved to be more interested in non-farming activities, or at least income 
generation. This reflects their role as ‘breadwinner’. The expectations from society are that 
men should provide an income for the family.  
 Many men who had participated in FFS tried to use the training to get a better 
connection with the outside world, the world beyond their village community. Quite a few (8 
in Kavre district) have become farmer trainers. Several men have used the FFS training 
certificate to get a job abroad, mainly in Malaysia and Arabic states, as casual labour. Also 
men have used the opportunity to become a farmer trainer and get employment with local 
NGOs. In interviews men could not really recall the information provided in FFS, related to 
crop production, especially food crops. 
 An exception were small groups of young, educated men (20 – 25 years) who had taken 
an interest in working in commercial vegetable production in Bhaktapur, Kavre and Tanahun. 
In particular in areas that were within a day´s travelling from the district headquarter or 
other markets, young men have become increasingly involved in vegetable production, such 
as tomato, potato and cauliflower. They are creative, innovative and started to experiment 
with different cash crops. In this way ginger production increased after FFS. The young men 
interviewed said that cash crop production offered them a better alternative than migration; 
 158 
 
`We can make more money with pleasant work here in vegetable production than if we went 
to Arab or Malaysia`(Kavre, interview, 2009). Young male farmers in Bhaktapur district said 
they were only interested in taking part in FFS if they ‘could develop entrepreneurial skills in 
the training `(Bhaktapur, interview male farmer, 2009) or: “When we learn about 
marketing”(Bhaktapur, interview male farmer, 2009). 
 FFSs with a focus on food crops are more effective with women involvement. FFS 
training on vegetable production is more appropriate for young educated male farmers with 
an interest in cash production. 
 
The farmers, men in particular, felt more comfortable than before they participated in FFS, 
to go to the DADO office and ask for more support. This was also confirmed by DADO 
officers who saw an increase of (male) farmers coming to their office to ask for services or 
other inputs. Women too, showed more interest and confidence in discussing agricultural 
issues with technicians, during field visits in their village, but women did not make the move 
to go to the office to talk to government officials. 
 
6.3 Participants in Farmer Field School training 
 
The kind of participants in FFS has evolved over time. If we compare the information 
collected in 1999, when FFS started, with the survey of 2002 (REGARD, 2002) and the data 
collected in 2009 we can see that the general characteristics of FFS participants have 
changed (see Table 6.3). 
 
Table 6.3 FFS participants’ characteristics 
 1999 2002 2009 
Landowners All (N=389) All (N=424) All (N=147) 
Gender/sex Male (95%) and 5% 
female 
Male (70%) and 
female (30%) but 
majority male  
Majority women (60%), 
and 40% men 
Caste 
(predominantly) 
Brahmin Brahmin/Chettri Brahmin/Chettri with 
some Janajatis and 
sometimes 1-2 Dalits 
Education SLC and higher 
education 
SLC and literate 
(Janajati or elderly 
women >40 yr) 
Mostly literate, some 
illiterate (esp. elderly 
women) and some young 
SLC graduates 
Main occupation Farming and off-farm 
occupations, village 
leaders 
farming farming 
Age 25-40 18-45 Young around 18-20 and 
35-45 
Drop-out  Many drop-outs, few 
people participate in 
entire FFS season-long 
training 
Few drop outs Few drop outs 
Willingness to 
pay for FFS 
yes yes no 
Source: own research 
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One of the noticeable characteristics of FFS participants is the fact that they all own land. 
This means that FFS participants are not a real representation of the rural population, 
because the national statistics indicated that about 77% of the population owns land (CBS, 
2002; ADB, 2009). While it is not explicitly mentioned in the project documents, in practice 
landless farmers or labourers are excluded from participation in FFS. These criteria were 
followed based on the assumption of DADO and PPD staff, which was that only farmers who 
owned land would invest in their fields and could practice technologies introduced in FFS 
(interviews with DADO and PPD staff, 2002 and 2009). 
 Additionally, the majority of the participants in FFS are educated.  
 
At the start in 1997 and 1998 FFS farmers were male and well-educated (field visit notes 
1998). In 1999 the number of female participants had increased: 21% as opposed to 79% 
male (Galvan and Soehardi, 1999). 
 In 2002 61 % (N= 259 out of N=424) had SLC (school leaving certificate) or higher 
education, 29% (N=123 out of N=424) was literate and their age was between 25 and 45 
years (REGARD, 2002). These data were confirmed by statistics kept in the DADO office in 
Kavre on FFS (total participants N=400). Among 400 FFS participants, 90% (N=360 out of 
N=400) was educated or literate in 2009. There was a decline in participants with SLC or 
higher education. In 2007 only 24 out of 58 had higher education or SLC in Kavre, 29 persons 
were literate and 5 illiterate. In 2009 in certain pocket areas the participation of SLC 
graduates had increased (N= 39 out of N=50, 78% participants). (DADO Kavre, 2009)  
 In 2009 in several villages I heard that young boys and girls, from Brahmin, Chettri or 
Newar communities, who had just obtained their SLC (School Leaving Certificate) took part in 
FFS because they had time on their hands, while waiting for their next education to start 
after the summer or rainy season. They were requested by their parents or the extension 
officer to participate in FFS, but they frankly admitted they were in FFS as an obligation and 
they were not interested in agriculture, let alone planning to use the knowledge and skills 
learnt in FFS. They wanted to go to further education and move on to non-farm jobs. As in 
other rural areas the new generation looked for more diverse jobs than just farming. “My 
brother told me to take part. He did not have time and so he obliged me to be in the FFS. I 
did the training but have no interest in farming, I want to go to Kathmandu for study” (Yamdi, 
young female SLC graduate, interview, 2009). 
 Most FFS have been conducted in ‘pocket areas’ (Chapter 2), usually more than once, 
whereby the first participants were male and from upper caste, in subsequent FFS 
participants were predominantly female or high school graduates46, and if there was a large 
Janajati community the ‘ethnic minorities and illiterate women would take part in a second 
round of Farmer Field Schools’ (Focus group discussion with male and female farmers Sanga, 
Kavre 2009) (See Chapter 7.4). 
 Janajati or ethnic minorities are increasingly taking part in FFS. In Kavre district out of 
199 FFS 6 consisted mainly of JJanajatis: Tamang, Rai, Danuwar or Majhi (DADO, 2009), 
whereby since 2005 there are more JJanajati participants. There are not many mixed FFS 
registered with Brahmin and Janajati. 
 
In the early days of FFS, 1998-2001, most participants were usually the village or farmer 
leaders with whom the district agricultural staff was already familiar, such as the VDC leader 
                                                 
46  
 School leavers certificate holders: SLC graduates 
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or progressive or ‘model’ farmers, the so called elite. These men were easy for   the 
predominantly male FFS staff to approach, as they were already familiar with these 
individuals from earlier contacts or interventions (see Chapter 4 and 5). This way it is easy to 
explain why people belonging to a certain caste feel more comfortable interacting with 
people from the same caste. This trend can also be seen as a so-called 'courtesy bias' which 
is a common phenomenon in development projects, to please the leaders in society, to get 
their approval and get an entry point in their community. With their support it was easier to 
continue the project and to introduce the project and to include non-elites or more 
marginalised people.   
 During the season-long implementation of FFS it became difficult to keep the attention 
of these so called elite farmers; most of them had other duties (employment, business and 
politics) and interests. FFS participation meant intensive weekly sessions, obligations that did 
not appeal to them. Also the financial incentives were below expectations (actually none) for 
many selected trainees. The dropout rate was high and adoption of the FFS techniques low.  
 In 2000 we decided to introduce a better selection system for the FFS, because we 
wanted to attract ‘real farmers’ who wanted to learn about farming. We did not want 
‘opportunistic’ men in our training that would neither apply the technology offered, nor use 
the knowledge. We wanted people to complete the entire season-long training. We 
introduced an intensive selection process, with potential participants through selection 
meetings in which basically an entire village (men and women) took part. At least, that is 
what we thought at the time, later I discovered that Janajatis and lower caste people were 
excluded from these sessions. In these gatherings a PRA map was created from the village, 
semi-structured interviews were done and a cropping calendar was made. Through these 
methods, farmers could indicate farm opportunities and problems for a specific crop. We 
also conducted a gender analysis with the villagers (men and women), in which we discussed 
the labour activities related to rice or any other crop that would get the focus in FFS. In this 
gender analysis all villagers were invited to discuss the different roles and responsibilities 
men and women had in relation to this crop. The debates were loud and interesting and a 
session usually ended with a conclusion by the community that women take a large part of 
the workload and responsibilities in most crops and as a result more women were selected 
to be the participants in FFS. Soon FFS facilitators discovered that women were anyway more 
committed participants than most men, and the facilitators encouraged more women to 
participate in FFS.  
 This process coincided with an effort by the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives at 
that time to include women more in their agricultural services. The Ministry imposed a 33% 
quota of women participants in farmer training. This move was influenced by the Women in 
Development a paradigm that was influential in the development scene in those days. As a 
result of these parallel societal and institutional shifts, in 2000 more and more women 
participated in FFS, mostly from the higher caste. In 2009 it was found that the majority of 
FFS participants (N=88 out of N= 147, 60%) were women (this research and DADO 
registration in Kavre, 2009). These women are not a homogenous group, but belong mainly 
to the Bhramin Chettri caste. Generally, participants from FFS are mainly from the upper 
caste: Brahmin, Chettri. In the Kathmandu valley Newari participants dominate the FFS. In 
Kavre district, out of 400 participants 50% belonged to the Brahmin/Chettri47. From the 
perspective of caste composition, hardly any lower caste people had taken part in FFS: in 
                                                 
47
  Source: field data registered at DADO Kavre, 2009. 
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Kavre district only 5 (1.2%) out of 400 participants were of lower caste origin. Dalits were 
generally not invited and Dalits said they mostly do not have land, or are poor and cannot 
afford the time to attend training. They usually do not receive the information either, 
because lower caste people usually live at the edge of a village and are not in the inner circle 
where information regarding agricultural services is circulated. Neither do most Brahmin 
extensionists venture into these lower caste quarters (Chapter 2 and 5).  
FFS claims to have a participatory approach, in principle everyone who is involved in 
farming can participate. This is explicitly mentioned in project documents and supported by 
the government, FAO and NGOs. Still, not all individuals have equal opportunities to take 
part in FFS. Some are excluded because they do not belong to the social group that is 
dominant in the village. Some could not take part because they are not educated. While 
some people feel inferior and think that agricultural training is not something they can take 
part in. 
In Kushadevigaun the men in the village said that people from the Dalit community 
were not interested in taking part in FFS because they were involved in off-farm labour, 
mostly construction, and not interested in learning about farming practices. The men from 
the Dalit community however, said that they were interested but that they did not have land 
to practice the agricultural skills as learned in FFs. The Dalit women said they had never 
heard about FFS but would like to get FFS training if an opportunity would arise. 
Participation of the poorest section in society is problematic. The poorest can simply 
not take the risk, and do not have the time to sit leisurely in a training of which they are not 
even sure it will benefit them. Women too expressed that they could not always attend the 
FFS session because they had other duties such as planting rice, cooking food or preparing 
children to go to school. “I cannot go to the FFS which starts at 7 am because I have to 
prepare food and get the children ready to go to school” (female farmer, Kavre interview July 
2009). Also lack of education excludes people from taking part in the FFS. “Sir asked people 
who can read and write to be in the FFS” - is an often heard statement (Tanahun, interview, 
2009). 
 While 90% out of N=400 farmers in FFS were literate and educated, there is a recent 
trend towards inclusion of more illiterate, in particularly elderly women (age >40) from 
Brahmin/Chettri or Janajati. From 2005 onwards in several FFS training groups illiterate 
women and/or Janajati have been included, usually around 5-6 persons (Data from DADO 
Kavre, 2009)  
 
Almost all farmers interviewed in 2002 (97%, N=411 out of N=424) were willing to pay for FFS 
(REGARD, 2002). They did not say how much, but it is in contrast to general beliefs that 
farmers only participate if there is a financial ‘incentive’. In those early years of FFS people in 
rural areas were really interested in participating in FFS and to get more services from the 
government and NGOs in general. In 2009 the system changed. Funding became 
decentralised and at VDC level people got more authority in the use of government budgets. 
Farmers gained more direct influence and access to other projects and FFS had lost its 
popularity, its uniqueness. Farmers said they liked FFS but did not care to pay for its training 
courses. A DADO officer Kavre:  
 
“We can distribute the budget now according to our own interest, and so if we 
want we can conduct more FFS. However the small irrigation project is more 
popular, so we implement more of the irrigation projects. The reason is that for 
the small scale irrigation a full sum of 50.000 rupees is available and that is nice 
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for the farmers (and somehow for us). It is more lucrative than FFS training.” 
(Kavre, focus group discussion DADO office, 2009) 
 
These developments were not anticipated in 1997 when agriculture was still considered the 
key to growth and development in Nepal. We had not expected a decline in interest in 
farming among youth, nor did we anticipate a feminisation of agriculture. 
 
6.4 Curriculum changes 
 
In the beginning the project was much focused on expansion of FFS and food crop 
production (read: rice). Slowly the content of the training changed leading to more 
diversified farm practices (read: vegetables). In more recent years compost and soil 
conservation became an important topic in FFS. 
Over the years the curriculum of FFS was slightly adapted as you can see in Table 6.4. 
 
Table 6.4 Curriculum changes between 1997 and 2009 
 
Curriculum at start 
in 1997 
2002 2009 
AESA48 with 
elaborate coloured 
drawings 
AESA with simple drawings and mostly with 
written information 
Simple AESA, less 
time taken for 
drawings 
Ice breakers, 
energizers, songs 
Games in every session as standard procedure Games and songs 
mostly left out 
Weekly special 
topics, often by 
invited subject 
matter specialist 
from DADO 
Every week a special topic done by facilitator and 
sometimes subject matter specialist from DADO. 
This was dealt with in a particular way: questions 
related to the topic were distributed among 
subgroups. Answers were presented and 
discussed in plenary 
Once a month special 
topic by subject 
matter specialist  or 
FFS facilitator 
Key topics Integrated pest management Crop management 
Source: own research 2002 and 2009 
 
The changes mentioned in table 6.4 are just a few observed changes, learnt from interviews 
with farmers and FFS staff. Overall the curriculum became less technical. The core activity 
from FFS, the Agro-Eco-System Analysis, was often carried out in simpler forms than in the 
early years of FFS, while it remained the key activity in FFS. Teams went to the field and 
collected data, but this was usually implemented by a few key individuals who could read 
and write. In 2009 in many FFS groups I observed that the plants were not drawn anymore. 
According to some of the trainers “this was too  time-consuming” (DADO FFS trainer, 
interview, Kavre, 2009). Also the games and songs took up too much time, said the trainers. I 
am aware that many trainers left out the singing or games because they found them useless, 
felt embarrassed to facilitate these activities or were often running out of time, while 
farmers valued these exercises very much. I know that many FFS facilitators felt 
                                                 
48 
    AESA stands for Agro-Eco System Analysis. In Farmer Field School session this is a core activity in which 
FFS farmers go in subgroups to the cropping field observe the plants in two plots: one with improved 
practice (usually government recommendations) and one with regular farmers’ practice. A colour 
drawing illustrates the differences between those two plots. 
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uncomfortable doing participatory exercises as they were not entirely clear about its purpose 
and rather gave a short lecture on a technical topic. They somehow preferred to give a 
lecture, also because they thought that this would gain them more respect from farmers. At 
the same time the participants in FFS had changed and with fewer well-educated people it is 
likely that FFS facilitators resorted to a simpler version of FFS training. Still FFS was more 
participatory than any other activity that agricultural staff had previously conducted. In fact 
FFS farmers’ participation became normal procedure in agricultural extension and research, 
and a closer collaboration with farmers was established.   
When the programme expanded, the facilitators or FFS trainers changed. The 
responsibility was first with the plant protection officers, based at PPD, regional offices or in 
DADO, Kathmandu. After a few years most FFS were conducted by JT49 or JTAs, with help 
from farmer trainers. In the NGO sector the FFS were conducted by field staff from local 
NGOs or CBOs. In 2009 it was mostly farmer trainers who conduct FFS, with monitoring by 
DADO staff or local NGO staff. 
In 2000 for the first time farmers were trained to become trainers, farmer trainers, to 
conduct Farmer Field School in their area. This move was done to be more efficient with 
funds (farmer trainers are cheaper than government officers), to expand or scale-up the 
programme. Additionally farmer trainers are considered closer to the practice of farming and 
have local knowledge, and can speak a local language (see Chapter 4 and 5 and 8). On the 
website of the FAO, which reports on the current status and successes of FFS, it is written 
that: 
  In Nepal, in the area of agricultural extension, Farmer to Farmer Extension, 
based on FFS approach, has been adopted as an extension tool for rural 
development and the transfer of agricultural technologies. (FAO Regional 
Vegetable IPM Programme in Asia, 2011) 
 
Hom Prasad is such a farmer trainer: 
 
Hom Prasad Neupane 50+ is a farmer in Sunsari district, Baklaure VDC ward no. 8. 
He took part in the first series of Farmer Field School in Nepal, which were 
organised as part of the training of trainers for assistenat plant protection officers 
in April-June 1998. 
Initially he was very skeptical about FFS: 
o Season-long (“Why do we have to give so much time for a training on 
rice?”) 
o No daily allowance (“We used to get some money to take art in a 
training, where is our incentive now?”) 
o IPM in Rice (“What can we learn about rice that we have grown for 
many generations?”) 
However, during the season he really started to enjoy the training and realized 
that through this new approach he acutlaly learnt a lot more then he had ever 
done before. And not only he and his fellow farmers in the FFS, even other 
members in the community regretted not having taken part in the FFS. 
After graduation he wanted to continue with FFS activities. When in 2000 the 
opportunity arose to take part in a course for farmer trainers he joint. Since then 
he has been organising farmer fieldschools in his own and neighbouring 
communities. The advantage is that he can communicate in their language, he is 
available anytime and he canadapt the curriculum to the local needs. (End-of-
                                                 
49 
   JT stands for Junior Technician, JTA for Junior Technical Assistant. 
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Assignment Report Westendorp, 2002) 
 
The employment of farmer trainers had an impact on Farmer Field School curriculum, 
because the farmers who had become trainers did not have the technical education like the 
DADO or NGO staff. Often the farmer trainers invite DADO staff to give a session on a 
technical topic. 
 In fact it was these farmer trainers who moved to more remote areas, at higher 
altitude or further from the main road, in areas where only local languages were spoken, 
where more ethnic minority groups reside. This was not always appreciated by staff from 
Kathmandu. One farmer trainer told me that he was criticised by staff from the Plant 
Protection Directorate in Kathmandu:  
 
“Why you go so far away. It is difficult for us to visit and do the monitoring of your 
FFS” (interview, Kathmandu, officer, 2009).  
 
Since 2005 the government of Nepal has been encouraging social inclusion of ethnic 
minorities and lower caste people. Still many male Brahmin government officers have 
difficulties appreciating interaction with Janajatis or Dalits.  
 
“The Janajatis are so backward” (interview, officer, Kavre, 2009). “The people from 
this ethnic group are uncivilised” (interview, officer, Tanahun, 2009). Or: “Dalits 
are dirty and uneducated” (interview, officer, Lalitpur, 2009),”Dalits are backward, 
they are laggards” (interview, officer,  Dhading, 2009); “I find it difficult to work 
with Dalits” (interview, officer, Bhaktapur, 2009).  
 
6.5 Organisations involved in FFS 
 
In Nepal FFS started as a project, with a given procedure or framework to follow, with rules 
imposed by the donor and intervening agency such as Ministry of Agriculture, the District 
Agriculture Development Office and Plant Protection Directorate.  FFS as a project was 
established by FAO and the Nepalese government with funding from Australia. Soon other 
organisations became engaged in FFS. 
 
At this point I prefer to speak of actors rather than stakeholders, because the term actor 
implies more active involvement than the term stakeholder which indicates having a stake or 
interest in FFS. Actors are conscious and unconscious social agents (Cleaver, 2002) who are 
deeply embedded in FFS. Actors’ behaviour is embedded in structures and networks of 
relations; shaped by routine and practices; restricted/influenced by social norms, values and 
institutional constraints (Long, 2001). In line with Long, actors have ‘the capacity to process 
their and others’ experiences and to act upon them’ (2001:49). Thus actors do not 
necessarily have a rational pre-determined objective to participate. Their 'stakes’ are 
outcomes of interaction and negotiation processes, usually not rigidly set or predetermined 
claims to an output or outcome. 
 
Several organisations have adopted the so called ‘FFS approach’, they have taken up FFS in 
their regular activities (see also Chapter 8). A Farmer Field School has become a familiar 
concept among farmers, policymakers and donors, even if they have not been part of a FFS 
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project they have an idea what FFS contains, it is accepted as an institution. 
Institutionalisation is a fact when people talk about FFS after a project has been completed 
or when people know what FFS means when they have not even taken part in FFS. FFS has in 
fact become part of regular jargon in the rural development sector in Nepal. Some of the 
main characteristics of these organisations are described below, starting with the donor who 
is the main funding agency of FFS. 
 
AUSAID 
 In 1997 the donor for the FFS project was the Australian bilateral funding agency: AUSAID. 
AUSAID’s objectives were to increase income of the rural poor by a) increasing agricultural 
productivity b) non-farm income generation activities and c) sustainable natural resource 
management. The Farmer Field School fitted directly with the aim to increase agricultural 
productivity through sustainable natural resource use.50 In 2001 AUSAID stopped funding 
FFS for reasons unclear to me and NORAD took over. 
 
NORAD 
NORAD, the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, is the bilateral development 
agency of the Norwegian government. The first activities in Nepal were funded with AUSAID, 
in 2003 NORAD became the main donor of FFS. It is not very clear where the project fits into 
NORAD’s development policy. Around this time, NORAD became involved in ‘good 
governance’ in particular they played a role in peace building and negotiation with Maoist 
and government parties. Discussions with FAO showed that within FAO there is no clear idea 
what makes NORAD fund their FFS project. “Probably something related to good 
governance” said the for FFS responsible FAO officer in Bangkok” (email exchange, 2009). It is 
not mentioned on the NORAD website. 
NORAD gives the fund to FAO for implementation.  FAO allocates funds to the Plant 
Protection Directorate of the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (MoAC). When asked 
why NORAD does not give funds directly to the Ministry of Agriculture, a representative of 
NORAD said: “we prefer to work multilateral with FAO” and he did not want to elaborate 
further (conversation with NORAD programme officer, July 2002).   
 
 FAO 
The FAO has a long-standing relation with the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives in 
Nepal. Among the UN agencies, FAO was the first one to start field level work in Nepal in 
1951. Between 1967 and 2009, some 180 projects and programmes covering various aspects 
of agriculture such as policies and legislations, crop diversification, dairy farming, small 
farmer development, aquaculture, community and leasehold forestry development, 
marketing and post-harvest management were implemented in the country. 
 FAO is a so called technical agency, providing technical assistance. FAO’s existence in 
Nepal depends on the collaboration with the government of Nepal. The number of projects 
is considered an indicator of success.   The FAO representative expected funding to increase 
after 2007.: “We need more projects, we are lacking behind in Asia” (FAO representative 
interview 2007). The current view of FAO in Nepal is given on its website: 
 
                                                 
50  
AUSAID website http://www.ausaid.gov.au/publications/pdf/ruralstrategy.pdf, accessed 04.01.2010 
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FAO technical cooperation programmes will continue to assist the Government in 
an integrated approach to address its immediate priorities through capacity 
building, institutional improvement, food security-related issues, agriculture and 
rural development.  FAO, www.fao.org/world/nepal accessed 4.1.10 
 
The Nepalese Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives 
The Ministry  of Agriculture and Cooperatives (MoAC) has the following vision:  
 
To improve the standard of living of the people through sustainable agricultural 
growth by transforming the subsistence farming system to a competitive and 
commercialised one.  
 
To achieve this vision they have formulated the following mission:  
 
To promote knowledge based farming by transferring modern agricultural 
technologies through mass media communication and developing effective linkage 
between research and extension system.  (Website Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives, www.moac.gov.np Nepal, accessed 06.01.2010) 
 
MoAC has as a main guideline the Agricultural Perspective Plan (APP) (See Chapter 2).  The 
APP considers agricultural growth as the key to poverty reduction. The APP stressed the need 
to diversify agricultural production on the basis of geographical location and 
commercialisation of agro-products.  
Government policies have changed over the last 20 -30 years (see Chapter 2). Farmer 
field schools could fit in with the ‘group approach’ and provided an alternative extension, 
more participatory method for the agricultural sector (Chapter 2). 
 
When in 1997 the Farmer Field Schools were introduced the national policy makers 
recognised the fact that agriculture-led growth strategy was the only option for overall 
economic development in Nepal. FFS fitted in the national plan (Eighth Plan (1992-1997) that 
emphasised that the sector's most urgent tasks are to provide food for a growing population. 
Farmer field schools were seen as a means to contribute to food security and agricultural 
development. 
Agricultural extension services in 1997 in Nepal were top-down and focused on 
technology transfer approaches. This technology transfer approach relied almost exclusively 
on research station based standard recommendations often neglecting the diversity of rural 
livelihoods and the socio economic circumstances at local level. Farmer Field School 
promised to be a different and more effective approach. Among the staff at the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Cooperatives (MoAC) this awareness was present: “a more participatory 
approach to agricultural development was needed” (MoAC, interview 2009, Kathmandu). As 
one agriculture officer said: “FFS came at the right time and at the right place” (Department 
of Agriculture, interview 2009, Kathmandu).  
 
The Plant Protection Directorate (PPD) 
The Plant Protection Directorate or PPD is the main implementing agency of the Farmer Field 
School programme. The Plant Protection Directorate (PPD) of Department of Agriculture 
(DOA) undertakes general pest control methods and new programmes on pest control 
management such as integrated pest management under which the FFS is the main 
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component. The major emphasis at present is on FFS in rice, cash crops such as tea and 
vegetables. The programme started with FFS in rice and FFS is being gradually replicated in 
other crops such as vegetables, fruits and potato. The Tenth Five-year Plan officially 
recognised the need for FFS, in particular to disseminate the national pest control strategy. 
The Agricultural Perspective Plan (1997-2017) has also highlighted on the need for FFS as a 
primary plant protection measure for farmers. In Nepal, APP has duly recognised IPM as one 
of the priority agenda for sustainable agriculture.    
The PPD allocates funds and gives the main responsibility to the district agricultural 
offices for implementation of FFS. In the DADOS it is then usually the plant protection officer 
who is in charge of FFS. He might be assisted by other officers, JTs or farmer trainers.  
In 2000 and 2001 the Nepalese Government started to allocate local budget through 
the District Agricultural Development Offices (DADO) or Village Development Committees 
(VDCs) for farmers field schools. In 2001 30% of the FFS were locally funded. In 2009 there 
was little local fund used for FFS. Although decentralisation of budget responsibility gave 
more freedom to DADOs to allocate budget for FFS, the fund was often used for other 
projects such as small scale irrigation. “Farmers demand more irrigation projects” said a 
DADO officer in Kavre (interview 2009). He continued explaining: With the small irrigation 
projects farmers, as a group, get a lot of money immediately in their hands, plus they can 
build an infrastructure that suits them, with FFS it is training and they have less faith in direct 
benefits”(interview, 2009) 
 
When FFS started in Nepal the donor trend was to promote government and NGO 
collaboration. Due to previous partnership links in other countries-, World Education was 
selected in Nepal. In fact in Indonesia the FFS started with World Education and FAO staff 
working on an adult-learning approach to agricultural extension. The collaboration with CARE 
began in other countries, in particular in Bangladesh and because of its success it was 
extended to Nepal. Historical ties, earlier experience and international personal relationship 
started the NGO-GO collaboration on FFS in Nepal. 
FFS had NGO involvement from the start, albeit reluctantly, because the government 
officers in 1997 were not keen to give work (=money) out of their hands and were often 
jealous of their NGO counterparts, who had usually higher salaries. In 2009 DADO chiefs 
complained about lack of coordination or poor communication from the NGO side: “We 
hardly keep track of the NGO activities, they involve us when they need us. Most of the time 
we only hear about their activities when they are already wrapping up their projects” 
(Kathmandu, interview 2009) 
 
World Education 
Besides the government institutions, NGOs (both national and international) are involved in 
FFS. In the first phase these were two international NGOs: World Education and Care Nepal. 
Via World Education 9 local NGOs  were involved  in carrying out field schools in 12 districts 
in 2002. World Education’s work focus is on education and it linked FFS to its literacy 
programme with rural women, as is explained on their website: 
 
Farmer Field Schools in Nepal - The Next Generation (2002 - 2005)  
The reality for young women and out-of-school youth in rural Nepal is that 
agriculture is a major focus of their lives. Over 82% of Nepal's population is 
supported by agriculture. Rapid population growth has meant that although 
agricultural production is increasing, levels of malnutrition are still rising. World 
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Education is working with older girls graduating from its Girls Access to Education 
(GATE) Program and out-of-school youth in its Brighter Futures Program by linking 
them to Farmer Field Schools (FFS). World Education works with its nine NGO 
partners to identify girls and out-of-school youth who have not entered school or 
who have dropped out. If a community is interested, they form groups of parents 
and daughters or youth interested in attending a FFS. At the end of the season, 
girls, out-of-school youth, and their parents share what they have learned with the 
community through a Farmer Field Day. This is their opportunity to show (and 
show off to) the rest of the community. Farmers can proudly share what they have 
learned with their families, neighbours, friends and peers. Through sharing, they 
also recall the whole Farmer Field School experience and reinforce their own 
learning. 
http://www.worlded.org/WEIInternet/index.cfm accessed 15.01.2010 
 
In 2008/2009 World Education was not really a major player in FFS anymore; they had not 
received much funding through FAO from NORAD. In 2009, most of their FFS staff had been 
laid off; only one Master trainer was left. However, in 2009 they were still implementing FFS 
on a small scale and applying for more funding for expansion of FFS.  
 
CARE Nepal  
Besides World Education, CARE was a major player in FFS in Nepal. CARE’s mother 
organisation is based in the United States. CARE is a well-established NGO in Nepal and one 
of the few that are working in agriculture. CARE began working in Nepal in 1978. The early 
focus was on improving infrastructure in remote areas and agriculture extension activities. 
Today, its programmes are wide-ranging and promote equitable and sustainable livelihood by 
addressing the causes, rather than the symptoms of poverty and social injustice. CARE places 
special emphasis on involving women, Dalits (people from "low caste" groups) and landless 
groups in local development processes. It maintains formal and informal partnership at 
multiple levels: with local NGOs, government agencies, communities, civil society groups, 
federations, networks and the private sector. CARE Nepal is currently working in partnership 
with over 80 local NGOs, 10 different networks and approximately 1,000 community based 
organisations. (CARE Nepal website, www.care etc accessed 4.01.10). 
CARE has changed its mandate and is presently no longer implementing FFS. Former 
FFS staff in CARE were no longer available  and the new staff at CARE did not know anything 
about FFS (interview Kathmandu, July 2009). 
 
CARITAS 
Currently Caritas Nepal is a major actor in implementing FFS. Caritas, established in Nepal in 
1990, is a social development/relief organisation, with its headquarters in New Zealand, 
operating under the auspices of the Roman Catholic Church in Nepal as its social arm. Caritas 
Nepal tries to spread the love of caritas by working in solidarity with the poor, marginalised 
people of Nepal with a mission to empower them to overcome poverty and realise basic 
human rights and social justice and to provide relief to those suffering from disasters and 
conflict. The main programme areas of Caritas Nepal currently are: Improving Food Security 
of Rural Households through Sustainable Agriculture; Building Sustainable Peace; 
Cooperatives and Micro Enterprises, and so on. Caritas Nepal carries out its work in the field 
through partnership with selected local Their work on FFS is explained on their website:  
 
“This programme is aimed at building the capacity of farmers (men and women) 
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through Farmer Field Schools which provide them with training to acquire organic 
farming and integrated pest management (IPM) skills. The production of rice in 
the target areas has increased by 50% over the project period. Other stakeholders 
in the programme are the 20 cooperatives and NGO partners whose capacity for 
promoting sustainable agriculture is being built.  
(http://www.caritasnepal.org/eng/introduction.php accessed 15.01.2010) 
 
CARITAS gets some funds from FAO but mainly implements projects with own funding. This 
makes them a more interesting partner then for instance, for World Education who despite 
several efforts to get funding from other sources, remained dependent on implementing FFS 
with funds allocated by FAO. Interview with World Education staff revealed that they are 
disappointed that they have not been included in the current phase of FFS with FAO. They 
feel they have been sidelined. “Because we do not have close contacts with PPD staff or FAO 
staff we do not get FFS” (World Education interview, Kathmandu, 2009). 
The fact that so many organisations are interested in FFS is a sign that the FFS fitted 
the needs of the organisations that are responsible for managing agricultural interventions: 
government departments, NGOs, and donor agencies. Development interventions are driven 
by the needs of organisations, to a) maintain its exigency and b) the need for organisations to 
maintain relationships (Mosse, 2005). These two reasons are interlinked and also apply in 
Nepal in the case of the Farmer Field School project. 
Without projects an organisation like the FAO could close its office. “The excellent 
relationship we have with the government, we need to maintain, this is important for our 
organisation (FAO staff, interview, 2009). The Plant Protection Directorate needed the 
integrated pest management project in order to keep up with new developments and to 
improve its services to the farmers. The old approach was literally outdated and needed a 
new impulse. The IPM Farmer Field School provided this stimulus. The FAO needs to sustain 
its relationship with the Ministry of Agriculture and other government agricultural services, 
since its mandate is to work with national governments. The government of Nepal wants to 
retain relationships with the FAO to supplement their budgets and to get additional benefits 
like training. With limited public funds and low salaries, government organisation are more 
often than not interested in collaborating with an agency like FAO, just simply because it 
provides extra financial space. Working with the FAO means that the Plant Protection 
Directorate (PPD) is able to afford extra vehicles, fuel costs, computers, trips abroad, and 
more funds for staff training. All legitimate reasons for the government to sign a contract 
with the FAO for a new project. 
 
“The Nepalese authorities in the Ministry of Agriculture had heard that the FFS 
was a popular new extension approach in Asia, and Nepal wanted to be part of 
this network, they too wanted to participate in an international programme”. 
(Kathmandu, interview former IPM deputy coordinator, 2009) 
 
Organisations are likely to be supportive or interested in a project or approach when they 
have a shared interest or a common principle (Mosse, 2005. Cleaver, 2001). Farmers’ 
participation can be such a principle. The concept of participation - an ambiguous concept in 
itself (see Chapter 1) – might have provided the common agenda for all actors involved in the 
FFS Programme. This vagueness is required to conceal ideological difference, to allow 
compromise and to build coalitions. This was also the case in Nepal, where all FFS actors in 
Nepal, despite their different interests, agreed that farmers’ participation was important and 
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would be the leading element in the new way of work in the agricultural sector. It is a 
politically useful concept; it lacks clarity and can as such be accepted by many. In fact, no one 
contests the need for participation. In order to persuade, simplicity, unity is needed, for this 
the concept of participation is suitable. Food security is another one of such concepts that 
many organisations involved in FFS share: CARE, Caritas, Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperation, FAO. Food security is not specifically defined by these organisations. This 
ambiguity provides room for manoeuvre. Participation and food security forge coalitions 
necessary to advance the FFS.   
Likewise more keywords that are attached to FFS fitted in with the fashion of 
development jargon at that time and suited the vocabulary in the agricultural policy 
documents: participatory, sustainable, local knowledge, farmer groups, and food security. 
These are all words, concepts that made the FFS attractive for the FAO, MoAC, NGOs such as 
Care Nepal and World Education, and donors like NORAD. 
 
After the FAO IPM project started with FFS many organisations followed. It became an 
extremely popular intervention. It is usually difficult to get support for a new project. 
However, once this project got started it was easy to find more support. When word got 
round that the FFS was part of a regional programme with funding from the Netherlands and 
Australian government other donors such as NORAD were happy to step in. Funding from 
other respected partners is almost a guarantee that the “project” works well. With a field 
visit, showing enthusiastic farmers, I could easily sell the project in 2002 for more funding to 
NORAD. During this field visit NORAD staff said they wanted to support Nepal as focus 
country. The FFS fitted into their current development themes: de-centralisation, sustainable 
rural livelihoods, farmer participation, environmental protection, non-formal education. They 
saw advantages in the fact that the FFS was supported by both Maoists and government.  
All kind of training or group work with farmers in Nepal were suddenly called Farmer 
Field Schools. This varied from a short training in an irrigation project to a long-term (a year 
or longer) intervention, including agricultural skills training but also marketing and e.g. 
income-generation. This could be a FFS in tea or rice, but also solely on a topic like soil 
nutrient management, such as Helvetas, a Swiss NGO does. Some organisations focused on 
special aspects, like disease management, which was the case with FFS run by CIP 
(International Potato Centre) in Nepal . The national potato research and improvement 
program  adopted the FFS program51 in 1999. 
 Several international, national and local actors have been involved in FFS, have 
shaped FFS, have adopted FFS in their programmes. FFS has become a familiar concept in 
Nepal among several organisations and individuals, among all classes and across the rural-
urban divide, institutionalisation has happened. With so many organisations or actors 
involved, - see Table 6.552 - it is clear that there will be many different objectives and views 
on FFS. When I interviewed people different views about FFS came up: 
 
The FAO representative said: “FFS is a forum to train farmers to produce organic 
                                                 
51   For a description of the FFS programme started in 1999 in the potato development section of the 
government of Nepal see Hidalgo, Campilan and Lama (2000). The rice based FFS approach had to be 
adapted so it could be applied to potato seed and disease problems. This involved amongst other 
things, making it a multi- season programme as integrated disease management requires a longer time 
frame. An evaluation of the FFS in potatoes was undertaken in 2002 (Ojha and Lama, 2002)  
 
52   I did not specify local NGOs because that would make the overview too complex 
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goods” (Kathmandu, interview, 2009) 
Another FAO expert: “FFS is an entry point to organise marketing of agricultural 
products”. (Kathmandu, interview, 2009) 
While an FAO programme officer stressed: “FFS leads to group solidarity and can 
contribute to the current peace-building process”. (Kathmandu, interview, 2009) 
The CARE programme officer stated that the FFS is the ideal method to introduce 
and transfer new technologies. (Kathmandu, interview, 2002) 
World Education, on the other hand, sees the FFS as a follow up activity for women 
groups where they can practice their recently mastered literacy skills. (Kathmandu, 
interview, 2002). 
 
Table 6.5 shows the major actors with their different objectives in FFS: 
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Table 6.5 Major actors, different objectives and clients in FFS  
Actor  Key objective 
organisation in Nepal 
Role in FFS FFS objective Immediate 
clients 
NORAD Good governance & 
bio-diversity 
conservation 
Funding  Government of 
Nepal 
FAO Food security Technical assistance, 
fund distribution 
Agricultural 
production, 
Technology transfer, 
extension method, 
integrated pest 
management 
Government of 
Nepal 
MoAC Agricultural growth Coordination, policy 
making 
Agriculture 
production, food 
security 
farmers 
PPD Plant protection or 
pest management. 
Fund distribution, 
implementation, 
content or curriculum 
development 
Technology transfer, 
pest management 
Farmers 
District 
Agricultural 
Development 
office (DADO) 
Implementation of 
APP 
Implementation Agriculture 
production, food 
security 
Farmers 
National 
Agricultural 
Research 
Council 
Research Implementation FFS Research, innovations Farmers 
CARITAS Food security 
Organic farming 
implementation Technology transfer, 
food security 
Poor 
marginalized 
farmers (men 
and women) 
World Education Adult learning, non 
formal education, 
literacy programmes 
Fund distribution to 
local NGOs, technical 
assistance 
Women 
empowerment, post-
literacy programmes 
Rural women, 
just literate 
CARE Food security and 
improvement 
situation socially 
excluded, poor 
vulnerable groups 
Fund distribution to 
local NGOs, technical 
assistance 
Technology transfer, 
food security 
Marginalised 
rural men and 
women, Dalits 
Local NGOs  Context specific Implementation FFS  Context specific 
Farmers  Participants in FFS Agriculture 
production, food 
security, cash 
production, knowledge 
generation 
Household 
members 
Source: own research, 2009 
 
As is shown in the table 6.5 above the major actors at national level have different strategies 
and objectives with their work in Nepal. They also have different client groups for which they 
provide their services, whereby the government targets farmers in general, most NGOs work 
with better specified beneficiaries and in particular focus on more vulnerable groups in 
society, like women or ethnic minorities or Dalits. For instance, World Education is working 
with older girls who were not enrolled in school, the ‘Girls Access to Education’ (GATE) 
Program and linked them to Farmer Field Schools to practice their literacy with agricultural 
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training.  
FFS must fit in with research of NARC, must focus on pest management for PPD, and 
be part of food security and working with socially excluded for CARE. If one considers that 
not only over 50 district agricultural development offices, but also over 20 local NGOs are 
involved in the implementation, all small organisations with its own mandate, objectives and 
strategies, it is obvious that there is no single direction which FFS follows. The local NGOs 
have not been specified in Table 6.5 because they operate in a locally specific context, 
strongly influenced by their funding agency.  
I will not go into detail regarding the different applications of FFS, but just show that 
there is no single approach to FFS. Among the key actors in our project there are different 
ideas on what FFS actually entails or what FFS is meant for: extension, plant protection, crop 
management, research (see Chapter 4).  
The reasons for these different objectives are: mandate of their organisation, the 
development philosophy an organisation wants to follow, the professional education and 
experience people in organisations have, the socio-cultural, historical, political and economic 
environment they operate in. Also it reflects peoples’ personal motivation, expertise and 
power. It is normal in projects or programmes that actors have different views on a key 
concept such as FFS and that they construct the idea of FFS in their own way. These different 
dynamics affect implementation. 
FFS arrangements are not only determined by official rules and regulations but are 
shaped as well by cultural, social and political processes. FAO project staff might have 
developed rules or steps to follow in FFS, but local norms determine who will be the 
participants or leaders in an FFS, which behaviour is expected from FFS facilitators and 
influences determine the extent that wider believes or traditions are adopted or imposed on 
actors. FFS in Nepal varies in the Far Western terai from the mid hills. In one village the 
farmers might be interested in finding a solution to their weed problem, in another they 
might want to get more production from their local beaten rice. The socially constructed 
characteristics vary over place and time. In some villages Tamang are in a majority and in 
another Brahmins determine the course. In a Muslim community they determine different 
rules or have different norms than in a Hindu or Buddhist community. Organisations and 
individuals shaped FFS in various ways. FFS evolved through different practices, and became 
structured by context specific social norms and cultural factors or cognitive institutions 
(Scott, 1995; Munir, 2002) and other circumstances. The outcome is thus not so much a 
result of planned and predictable steps, but more a result with unintended outcomes, a 
result of a dynamic interaction. 
 Even if each actor has a rather different kind of commitment or objective with FFS, 
they can come together in a productive ‘campaign’, like expansion or promotion of FFS. In 
Nepal all actors together have created FFS to become a popular concept that has stimulated 
farmers’ participation in the agricultural sector. Even though differences occur, differences 
also evolve or disappear FFS became a process through interaction and over time.  
 
These changes in FFS need to be seen in the light of other transformations in the country; 
such as budget cuts in the agricultural service sector, decentralisation of government and 
NGO responsibilities, pressure from Maoists in the rural areas, migration from rural to urban 
areas, decreased interest in farming by the youth, feminisation of farming and globalisation 
(see chapter 2). In addition many farming systems have changed from purely subsistence to 
semi-commercial with production of cash crops. Livelihoods have changed from farm-based 
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to a mixture of farming, off- farming and non-farming, this process already started  in 2002, 
but  increased in 2009 (MoAC, 2010).  
 
6.6 Conclusion 
 
Farmer Field Schools were introduced in Nepal as an integrated pest management project in 
1997 with concrete output oriented goals: agricultural development through an increase in 
agricultural production and a reduction of pesticide use. This was a government policy and 
the government used FFS as a vehicle to first improve rice production and then introduce 
vegetables and expand the vegetable production area. Over the years FFS expanded its 
regional coverage, and over 60,000 farmers received training.  
FFS was initially a project conducted mainly by the Nepalese government, in 
particular the Plant Protection Directorate but along the way more and more actors became 
involved. Each with their own agenda and objectives (see Chapter 1 on a discussion of the 
assumptions). Despite their different concerns and sometimes even conflicting stakes 
between organisations such friction did not lead to the demise of FFS, on the contrary. It 
provided a variety of perceptions of the role of FFS (Chapter 4) and its participants (see 
Tables 6.4; 6.5; 4.2 and 4.3) which led to the expansion of the approach and 
institutionalisation of the concept.  
FFS started off as a project, with a clear start, written documents in which the 
duration was indicated, starting in 1997 and ending in 2002, but in fact with this project a 
process of change was set in motion (see also chapter 4). In villages where FFS was 
conducted 8 years or longer ago, we still see that farmers continue with some of the 
practices that they learnt in FFS training. Farmers applied some of the agronomic practices 
that were introduced in FFS to their own purposes and objectives, even if it might not be 
exactly the way project planners had envisaged it in their documents. 
Farmers developed new skills, changed their cropping patterns, diversified rice 
farming with vegetable production, and changed their agronomic practices of weeding, 
pesticide and fertiliser application, and spacing between plants). Yields increased, pesticide 
use was reduced. FFS thus contributed to agricultural development, but increased knowledge 
also led to improved practices and better informed decision-making skills of farmers and 
their households, increasingly also including the women.  
 Farmers made their own choices, their own decisions, whereby men and women 
clearly exposed different interests and needs. Although in the project farmers were treated 
as a homogenous group, it became clear that men and women used FFS in different ways 
and to different purposes. People might not actively resist but use the system in a way that 
suits them (Gellner, 2008). 
A woman who took part in an FFS said that she did not like the new planting distance 
that she was supposed to do in FFS. She wanted to plant her rice more densely: “I want more 
straw, so I plan my rice close together, with high density. Actually I do not care if Sir says 
otherwise” (interview, Tanahun, 2009).  
 Women were interested in FFS participation to learn about farming and to contribute 
to food security in their family. Women did not adopt technologies that proved to be too 
labour-intensive such as preparing alternative means for pesticides, additional weeding and 
regular field observations. The technical aspects of FFS that were concerned with simulation 
trials or fertiliser calculations were too difficult women said in interviews. Women are 
especially interested in labour-saving and cost saving technologies, such as the use of less 
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seedlings and larger planting distance. These practices they adopted easily and still apply 
after 8 years.  
Men, on the other hand were interested in using FFS to increase their livelihood 
options, to get a job opportunity or to earn income. The young generation is generally not 
interested in a future in farming, with some exceptions. Some young men want to learn 
about commercial agriculture, as a source of income. 
Clearly FFS was not an end in itself any more, and the training that farmers received 
led to capacity-building and a wider process of rural development. Over the years FFS 
developed and the intended outcomes became more process oriented, such as farmer’s 
empowerment (Chapter 7) and capacity-building. With its focus on participation FFS gave an 
enormous input to agricultural extension, moving away from the top-down and purely 
technology transfer approach. Over the years FFS changed. The content of the training 
changed, not dramatically but some elements disappeared and some were added. Budget 
cuts in the agricultural service sector, decentralisation of government and NGO 
responsibilities led to an increase in say over funding at village level, resulting in a decrease 
in FFS training, because when given a choice villagers wanted road construction or irrigation 
facilities rather than training. FFS remains to be a technical intervention tool of the 
government, but it has also been embedded in rural Nepal becoming a developmental 
process that takes place at multiple levels through time and place in a dynamic socio-culture, 
economic and political context.  
In the country many farming systems changed from purely subsistence to semi-
commercial with production of cash crops. Livelihoods changed from farm-based to a 
mixture of farming, off- farming and non-farming. 
 In addition the composition of the FFS groups changed. Initially it is observed that a 
courtesy bias took place: the privileged, village leaders, high caste and higher educated men 
were invited to take part in FFS. Later more women and Janajatis were included, and 
occasionally a Dalit individual. These changes should be seen in the light of the involvement 
of a variety of actors, but also as a result of the changing context of Nepal and influenced by 
globally changing development paradigms. The war, out-migration of men, and female 
emancipation lead to a feminisation of agriculture. The Women in Development movement, 
a government policy of the 1990s lead to an increased participation of women in FFS. 
General patterns of access and control to resources like micro credit, land changed, in 
particular in favour of women (CBS, 2002; CBS 2012). The more recent democratisation 
processes in Nepal led to the inclusion of more Janajati and occasionally a few Dalit farmer 
participants in FFS. The participatory processes, the group discussions, the discovery-learning 
approach have encouraged farmers to raise their voice, a trend that fitted with the political 
changes after the turn of the century, allowing FFS to provide a medium for a more 
democratic governance process. FFS gave women’s participation in agricultural extension a 
boost. It can do the same for Janajatis and Dalits but not if FFS focuses only on the powerful 
ones (Chapter 5). 
Apart from programmatic and internal changes within FFS, contextual changes also 
added to the developmental role of FFS. These are addressed in Chapter 7. 
 
 
  
 176 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 177 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
The Contribution of Farmer Field Schools to the 
Empowerment of Farmers                     
 
 
  
  
 178 
 
Chapter7 The Contribution of Farmer Field Schools to the         
Empowerment of Farmers 
 
 Empowerment means that I am 
able to do most things myself; I 
feel empowered because I can now 
buy a lipstick without my 
husband’s permission (Female 
farmers in group discussion, 
Sanga, 2009) 
 
7.1 Introduction: Empowerment, FFS, and farmers’ experiences 
 
Initially in Farmer Field Schools the focus was on integrated pest management and yield 
increase. Later, one of the objectives of Farmer Field Schools became farmer’s 
empowerment.  As Peter Ooi and others state: “Farmer field schools are vehicles for 
empowerment of farmers” (Ooi, 1998; Pontius et al, 2002; Bartlett 2004; Hounkonnou et al., 
2006).  De Jager in his PhD thesis (2007:147) declares that it is not clear what the impact of 
FFS is on empowerment: ‘”a comprehensive impact assessment still needs to be done on 
broader development impacts of FFS such as on empowerment”. 
In this chapter I will elaborate on empowerment in relation to FFS. Empowerment is 
an often debated concept in the academic world but in development practice it seems to be 
used without discussion, assuming that it is always a ‘good’ thing and having a positive 
impact on farmers. I will first look at the concept of power in empowerment, and then I will 
discuss different scientific definitions of the word empowerment. After this theoretical 
elaboration I examine  what empowerment actually means in practice,  from the 
perspectives and experiences of the men and women who have participated in FFS over the 
last decade in Nepal. Since farmers are not a homogenous group and women and men have 
different roles in agriculture in Nepal they have different views on empowerment. Such a 
gendered study adds significantly to our understanding of empowerment through FFS.  
 Instead of attempting to locate, measure or label agency (see Mosedale, 2005; 
Malhotra et al., 2002), I try to understand how farmers in Nepal as a result of FFS can put 
agency in practice, that leads to empowerment. I will demonstrate that empowerment 
should be regarded as a process of change at different levels, from individual to institutional, 
an interaction between resources and agency, related to the transformation of power 
relations and the increased ability to make choices previously denied to male and female 
farmers, following Kabeer (2001) and Batliwala (1994).  It will become evident that 
empowerment in practice is rather different from what development policy makers and FFS 
facilitators understand it to be.   
 
7.2 Understanding power in empowerment 
 
To understand the process and outcome of empowerment one must examine the key word 
‘power’. In fact what is power? In dictionaries power is defined as the ability to act, strength 
and force. The often used definition of Max Weber sees power as the chance that an 
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individual in a social relationship can achieve his or her own will, even against the resistance 
of others.  Marx believed that power in society is finite, in other words that there is only so 
much of it, and that it can only be held by one person or group at a time, or the zero-sum 
model. Power as a limited good: a gain by one is the loss of others. Traditional social science 
emphasised power as influence and control, often treating power as a commodity or 
structure divorced from human action (Lips, 1991). A zero-sum conception of power means 
that power will remain in the hands of the powerful unless they give it up.It neglects the way 
power is experienced in most human interactions. 
 Foucault considered power as relational and not as a total form of domination (Mills, 
2003: 47).  According to Foucault power is real and emerges from the domain of collective 
interaction (Mills, 2003). His views on power have been adopted by many social scientists 
(Giddens, 1984; Wolf, 1998; VeneKlasen et al., 2007) who defining power in relational terms 
as the capacity to influence the behaviour of other people.  Foucault (1980) rejected the idea 
that power is a trait of any particular individuals or groups; rather it is spread and exercised 
through the whole society (in Mills, 2003). Power is not simply what the dominant party has 
and the oppressed lack. Power is relational and strategic. It is something the dominant but 
also the marginalised in society can exert. “Between every point of a social body, between a 
man and a woman, between members of a family, between a master and his pupil, between 
everyone who knows and everyone who does not, there exist relations of power which are 
not purely and simply a projection of the sovereign’s great power over the individual” 
(Foucault 1980a: 187).  I believe that Foucault only wants us to think beyond the obvious, 
that there is power everywhere, also in unexpected places. That people exercise more 
resistance to oppression than one would imagine. Scott (1990) elaborated on this idea, and 
suggested that we need to add to the analysis the behaviour of the powerless and the 
powerful when they are in groups with their equals.  Then one can observe  what Scott calls 
a ‘hidden transcript’,  that is a critique of power spoken behind the back of the dominant’ 
(Scott, 1990: xi). Thus we must analyse the total relations of power, their hidden, as well as 
their public, representations.  
Foucault has been criticised for “downplaying agency”(Mills, 2003:47) and not 
indicating how hierarchies of gender, caste, and ethnicity influence webs of power (Bradley, 
2007). On the other hand, some feminists seem to feel quite favourable towards the work of 
Foucault, because they have found “in his work a way of thinking about the forms of power 
relations between men and women which do not fit neatly into the types of relations 
conventionally described within theorisations of power, which tend to focus on the role of 
the State, ideology or patriarchy.” (Thornborrow, 2002 in Sarah Mills, 2003: 34). 
 Giddens allows us to explore how women and men experience differences in power. 
With his structuration theory (Giddens, 1982, 1984, 2006) he introduced the link between 
social structures and human action. Giddens (2006) considers power to be situated in 
transformative capacity.  Since transformations occur through social relations, power can be 
related to rules and resources. He argues (2006:135) that one needs to consider action in the 
context of structure and vice versa. Structure is an active process of structuration by actors in 
time and among spaces. Actors produce structures and actors’ actions are influenced by 
structure, by rules and resources.  These rules and resources  can be employed by groups 
and or individuals to achieve their ends and he explains for instance,  gender inequality as 
the differences in the status, power and prestige women and men have in groups, 
collectivities and societies. 
 In distinguishing types of power, I have found a useful framework in relation to 
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empowerment in Rowland (1997) and VeneKlasen and Miller (2007) who have defined four 
categories of power: 
1. Power over, meaning the power to make something, somebody or a group 
of people do something because they have less power. Usually this happens 
in a negative way such as restrictive control, punishing and denial of access. 
2. Power to, enabling an individual or a group of people to do something due 
to a person’s potential to shape his/her life and world. It also refers to 
organisation’s potential to shape the world. 
3. Power with: strength due to collective action, mass based on mutual 
support, solidarity and collaboration. It occurs when people are 
cooperating with other, it also refers to organisations forming networks or 
alliances. 
4. Power within: personal strength, self-confidence. 
 
In other words, empowerment is not simply about giving power to people; people already 
have power (power within). For Mosedale (2005) empowerment starts with ‘power within’. 
“One needs first Power Within: self-esteem and self-confidence. In a sense all power starts 
from here, such assets are necessary before anything else can be achieved (Mosedale, 
2005:250). 
 
Another classification is proposed by Gaventa (2006) and Lukes (1974) who make a 
distinction between visible, invisible and hidden power. Visible power is the measures one 
can observe, formal rules and public decision-making or formal institutions. Hidden power is 
related to political agenda setting and decision-making over resources. Invisible power is 
found in the ideologies, the habits, norms and values that people have. These three 
dimensions of power (Gaventa, 2006; Lukes, 1974) different forms of power, together with 
the four types of power identified by Rowland (1997) and VeneKlasen and Miller (2007) can 
help explain the different perspectives of scientists and practitioners on empowerment. 
These three dimensions are compared to an ‘iceberg’: what you see is not all there is (Mayo, 
2004: 41). 
Focussing on processes of change, Kabeer (1999) proposes an alternative way of 
thinking about power: the ability to make choices (1999: 436) which can be determined by 
all different forms of power (power over, power within, power to, power with) and in the 
different dimensions. As power does not exist in isolation nor is it inherent in individuals, 
power and power relationships can change. Power as in empowerment should therefore be 
considered as something fluid, relational that can occur in different forms and dimensions. If 
empowerment is regarded a process of change, it requires a transformation of ideologies, 
the invisible power dimension (Mayo, 2004). 
 Despite the fact that the view on power has evolved from power being an asset to 
power being a process and relational, in many conceptualisations of empowerment by 
development practitioners ‘power’ is still considered an asset. Although slowly changing,  the 
practitioners’ discourse on empowerment seems to be lagging behind the academic 
discource on power. Below I will briefly show how the academic views have evolved. 
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7.3 Empowerment as a concept 
 
First of all, empowerment is a word one does not come across in a basic English course at 
High School. It is a term that I only became familiar with when I started working in 
international development. Searching the internet, www.empowerment.com (accessed 20th 
March 2010) is not very helpful: the site showed a picture of a monkey on a bicycle. In the 
field of human interaction the term empowerment sounds pretentious, and has a 
connotation of ‘knowing what is best for others’. Still empowerment is an interesting concept 
that is worth debating, having a positive connotation for most: to gain strength, to get power, 
to become independent, and so on. 
 Bartlett (2004) compares empowerment with the taste of a mango or the feeling of 
snow, suggesting that empowerment is something almost everybody will recognise, but 
almost nobody can describe. There is no universal agreement; the experience is contextual 
and unique to each individual. Yet, sociologically some observations can (and should) be 
made. 
 Empowerment as a concept was introduced in the domain of development in the 
1980s and became popular in the 1990s. Similar trends in the conceptualisation of 
empowerment can be observed with wider approaches to development. For example, earlier 
explanations were associated with the basic needs approach in development and the shift 
from a top-down technocratic approach to a call for popular involvement.   
 More recently, the World Bank linked empowerment to poverty reduction and better 
service delivery: Empowerment is the expansion of assets and capabilities of poor people to 
participate in, negotiate with, influence, control, and hold accountable institutions that affect 
their lives (World Bank, 2002a). ‘Empowerment of the poor’ became a popular slogan, 
replacing the earlier top-down and material well-being approach. Today, the word is found 
documented in over 1,800 World Bank aided projects (Alsop and Heinsohn, 2005). Whilst 
welcoming the increased attention for the need for participation of the poor themselves, the 
World Bank agenda with its neo-liberal intentions (Li, 2007) does not lead to transformation 
of power dynamics nor  does it address the so-called invisible power dimension that keep 
people in poverty. 
 
In the development literature the definitions of empowerment emphasise broadly three 
issues: 1) increased access and control over resources; 2) the individual’s agency and own 
potential to achieve change; 3) a transformation of power relations. Some examples are 
given below.  
The IFAD definition of empowerment is a technical one: access to productive 
resources and the capacity to participate in decisions that affect the least privileged (IFAD, 
1995).53 Others define it in terms of the expansion of assets and capabilities of poor people 
to participate in, negotiate with, influence, control, and hold accountable institutions that 
affect their lives. (Narayan, 2002:14; 2005:5). 
These definitions inform an approach that many development organisations follow: 
the provision of credit, and/or seedlings and income-generating activities, assuming that 
                                                 
53
 The definition used by the International Fund for Agricultural Development includes both access to 
productive resources and the capacity to participate in decisions that affect the least privileged 
(Popular Coalition to Eradicate Hunger and Poverty 1995). In World Bank publication, Empowerment 
and Poverty Reduction: A Sourcebook, 2002:11. 
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increased access to resources will be empowering by and in itself. As one NGO staff member 
in Nepal explained: “We give the women seedlings of citrus trees. This will empower them”. 
(Kavre, interview, 2009). And another NGO representative: “We provide women with training 
to learn income generating skills, so they can earn their own living” (Kavre, interview 2009). 
Empowerment is here seen as having knowledge and skills providing power over something, 
creating visible power. 
Others consider control over resources combined with capabilities of the individual 
agency as an important aspect of empowerment, such as Sen: “Empowerment is the process 
of gaining power, both control over external resources, and growth in inner self-confidence 
and capability” (Sen, 1997:6) And Chambers: “Empowerment means that people, especially 
poorer people, are enabled to take more control over their lives, and secure a better 
livelihood with ownership and control of productive assets as one key element” (Chambers, 
1993:11). 
This approach to empowerment, in particular the focus on individual agency, is 
popular among local NGOs in Nepal. One NGO member talked about ‘personal and social 
advocacy’: 
 “Utilising a self-help instructional model to increase literacy, girl's education, small 
business development, skilled trainings, personal and social advocacy, our organisation has 
been empowering more than 50 women in various districts of Nepal to help them take 
charge of their lives” (Kavre, interview, 2009) 
The individual strength or ability is stressed by several sources, sometimes linked to 
the right based approach, for instance by DFID and others: 
Empowerment means individuals acquiring the power to think and act freely, exercise 
choice, and to fulfil their potential as full and equal members of society (DFID 2000). Or: 
“Empowerment should lead to the liberation of both men and women where each can 
become whole beings irrespective of gender and collectively use their potential to construct 
a more humane society for all” (Akhtar 1992 quoted in Batliwala 1994:131). And again: “True 
empowerment is not a condition which can be bestowed by one group on another but is, 
rather, an on-going process by which the disempowered seek to fulfil their own needs and 
preserve their own rights” (Swift and Levin 1987:84). 
These definitions of empowerment stress the aspect of ‘power within’ people, and 
try to address aspects of hidden power. 
 Some academics and development practitioners believe that empowerment is about 
gaining control or changing the structural context in which actors live. For example: The 
development of the ability and capacity to cope constructively with the forces that 
undermine and hinder coping; the achievement of some reasonable control over one's 
destiny (Pinderhughes, 1983). Or:  
Empowerment is about the creation of political, legal, socio-cultural and economic 
environment that would facilitate, encourage and enable the powerless (i.e. the poor) to 
influence policies, decisions, actions on their behalf (Sharma, 2003). 
“At a personal level, empowerment refers to the process whereby people are enabled 
to gain the resources that help them to live in optimal conditions, in ways that they would 
choose. While these resources are partly psychological, they are also educational, economic 
and political. People can have self-confidence, self-esteem and the knowledge necessary to 
influence their environment but be disempowered by the community or political system in 
which they live”(Bolaffi et al. 2003: 85). 
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In these definitions of empowerment the visible dimension of power, but more 
specifically the hidden power dimension, is emphasised, linked to ‘power to’, power over and 
power within. 
 
In FFS empowerment is also viewed as farmers gaining control over their own lives. As John 
Pontius et al. (2002: 3) wrote in an overview of the history and status of FFS activities in Asia: 
“[e]mpowerment reflects the developmental process whereby farmers become able to 
identify factors that inhibit their control over their lives and the means to resolve those 
issues”. Experiential learning introduced in the FFS facilitates this process. FFS practitioners 
(Ooi, 1998; Pontius et al., 2002; Bartlett, 2004) assume that this process of discovery or 
experiential learning continues after FFS and that farmers practice this in other crops than 
the ones practiced in FFS, and even take it further into their daily existence, solving problems 
in their community and social life.  
Power in this definition is considered as an ‘asset’ and not as something relational. 
The key dimension of power considered by FFS policy-makers is the visible dimension; there 
is no attention for agenda setting or conditions of access and control over resources at 
household level, the hidden power dimension. The invisible power dimension, required for 
real transformation is not addressed in FFS. 
 
Batliwala and others emphasise that real empowerment can only take place when there is a 
change in the structure, a transformation of unequal power relations:  
Empowerment is the process of challenging existing power relations and of gaining 
greater control over the sources of power (Batliwala 1994);“Empowerment is the process of 
awareness and capacity-building leading to greater decision-making power and control, and 
to transformative action” (Karl, 1995:14); and empowerment is about freedom to choose 
and achieve different outcomes (Sen 1999). 
 Some authors include the element of poverty and social exclusion: “Empowerment 
expresses the idea that disadvantaged and poor people increase their ‘freedom of choice 
and bargaining power in relation to … more powerful groups” (Adnan et al, 1992, in Neefjes 
2000: 100) or “Empowerment … refers to the expansion in people’s ability to make strategic 
life choices in a context where this ability was previously denied  them” (Kabeer 1999: 436). 
And: “Empowerment is the process of awareness and capacity-building, which increases the 
participation and decision-making power of citizens and may potentially lead to 
transformative action which will change opportunity structures to an inclusive and equalising 
direction” (Andersen and Siim, 2004:2). 
 For me empowerment is the interaction between access and control over resources, 
exercising agency, expanding the room for manoeuvre in an institutional setting, leading to 
transformation of power relations, addressing all three dimensions of power. 
 
All these different definitions reflect different positions and objectives of individuals and 
organisations and they might change over time, following new insights, often based on 
academic debates. In the early years the ‘power’ in empowerment was seen as an asset, a 
resource and only in the 1990s it was considered as social relational. This is reflected in the 
later views on empowerment, including UNDP’s changed definition of empowerment. In 
1998 the organisation defined empowerment as: “full participation of people in the decisions 
and processes that shape their lives” (UNDP 1998: 8). Then empowerment was viewed in the 
context of policies and programmes designed to strengthen people's capacity to respond to 
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their needs and priorities. Civil society organisations were seen as mediators for people's 
empowerment through a focus on strengthening these mediating structures. At that time in 
the academic world, definitions of empowerment were already revised and issues of power 
relations were given importance. As is often the case, the academic world is ahead of the 
development agencies, using renewed insights and redefining concepts. Then in 2004 UNDP 
defines empowerment “as the process of transforming existing power relations and of 
gaining greater control over the sources of power.” (UNDP, 2004: 12). This interpretation is 
also very similar to UNDP’s approach to human development which is defined as “creating an 
environment where people can develop their full potential and lead productive, creative lives 
in accordance with their needs and interest ... to be able to participate in the life of the 
community” (UNDP 2004: 1). In 1998 UNDP considered empowerment as a process 
facilitated by ‘outsiders’ related to capacity-building, enhancing participation in decision-
making. In 2004 the organisation considered changes in power relations, thus structural 
transformation, and people’s own role as a key to empowerment. 
 This discussion makes clear that there are many definitions and that there is no 
agreement on the concept. I agree with Zimmerman (1984) that a single definition of 
empowerment may make attempts to achieve it prescription-like, or in a technical way, 
contradicting the very concept of empowerment. This vagueness of the word empowerment 
has an advantage “so it gives us breathing space to work it out in action terms before we 
have to pin ourselves down to what it means “(Batliwala, 1993: 48). But Rowland (1995: 105) 
correctly suggests: “The concept of `empowerment’, if it is used precisely and deliberately, 
can help to focus thought, planning, and action in development. However, when its use is 
careless, deliberately vague, or sloganising, it risks becoming degraded and valueless.” 
 
Empowerment cannot be fully understood if the process of disempowerment is not analysed 
(Kabeer, 2001). Empowerment is a process in which those who have been denied choice 
acquire the ability to make choices, in other words a process of change, from a situation in 
which people were disempowered. Kabeer (2001) distinguishes between two choices: 
strategic life choices, those which represent valued ways of ‘being and doing’, and the other 
more everyday choices which follow once the first choices have been made.  These choices 
can be evaluated in their transformative potential, the extent to which these choices have 
the prospect for challenging and destabilising social inequalities and the extent to which they 
merely express and reproduce these inequalities. I agree with Kabeer’s position that: “power 
operates not only through constraints on people’s ability to make choice, but also through 
their preferences and values and hence the choices that they may make” (Kabeer, 2001: 25).  
She identifies different levels of change. Empowerment can reflect change at: 
 Deeper levels: structural relations of caste/gender/class (invisible power); 
 Intermediate levels: institutional rules and resources (hidden power); and 
 Immediate levels: individual resources, agency and achievements (ibid.:27). 
To be meaningful empowerment must ultimately encompass individual, organisational and 
structural or institutional levels. 
 Batliwala (1993) defined this process of change as a transformation of the relation of 
power between individuals and social groups, transforming social power in three critical 
ways, by: 
 
1. Challenging the ideologies that justify social inequality (such as gender and 
caste); 
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2. Changing prevailing patterns of access and control over economic, natural 
and   intellectual resources; and 
3. Transforming the institutions and structures that reinforce and sustain 
existing power structures (such as family, state, education, church, media 
and market). 
 
I agree with both Batliwala and Kabeer that empowerment is relational and should be 
regarded a process of social transformation that must encompasses individual, institutional 
and structural levels. 
 In my discussion of the question whether or how FFS contributes to empowerment in 
a way as foreseen by FFS policymakers, by applying the experiential learning approach 
leading to a process of power changes, I follow Kabeer’s model of empowerment (2001). 
Naila Kabeer uses the following three elements: Resources (means) – agency (process) – 
achievements (outcome). 
 In this formula, agency is the key concept, because it concerns the individual, the 
subject of empowerment. I see these elements linked, not in a linear way but in a cyclical 
movement, a continuous process, whereby the outcome influences the resources and so on. 
In many occasions a change in achievements (ends) brings about a further change in the 
means or resources of empowerment. How we precisely define empowerment within our 
projects will depend upon the specific individuals and contexts involved (Bailey, 1992). I see 
this process taking place in a given context. Agency is a concept that is context dependent. 
We are all influenced by the social contexts (structures, institutions, rules, norms) in which 
we find ourselves, but we are not simply determined by these contexts, we also help in 
shaping them. The institutional environment or context shapes the opportunities people 
have. A woman can travel by bus to go to the city, but in Nepalese society she is expected to 
stay at home or travel with a male family member. It is not the woman’s agency but the 
context that constrains her if she wants to go shopping (Long, 2001). 
 Instead of attempting to locate, measure or label agency, I try to understand how 
farmers in Nepal as a result of FFS can put agency in practice, that leads to empowerment. 
 
7.4 Contextualisation of access to resources and gender 
 
Empowerment entails a change in terms of which resources are acquired as much as an 
increased chance to access the resources. The terms on which people gain access to and 
decision-making over resources are as important as the resources themselves when the issue 
of empowerment is being considered. Access and control over these resources are 
influenced by contextual circumstances. These contexts can be social, cultural but also 
historical. Access may be conditional on highly clientelist forms of dependency relationships 
or extremely exploitative conditions of work based on historically inherited associations or it 
may be achieved in ways which offer dignity and a sense of self-esteem.   
 In Nepal access to resources and exercising agency is influenced by the cultural history 
of patron-client relationships, Hindu beliefs, caste and ethnic differentiation and 
discrimination, but also strong patriarchal norms and values. Also current social changes such 
as male outmigration, the rise of the Maoist movement, the feminisation of agriculture, 
democratisation of education, and urbanisation have an impact on agency and control over 
resources. 
 186 
 
 Economic factors also influence the availability of resources. People with more 
financial capital have more assets, such as land. Access to land is important in determining 
farming opportunities and FFS participation. Only farmers who have access to land are 
eligible participants in FFS; although not always explicited, land ownership is a criterion for 
participant selection. For most people in rural Nepal land tenure arrangements are 
historically linked to feudalism, clientelism and patronage (see Chapter 2). Land ownership is 
skewed, with 7.5% of farmers still owning nearly a third of the farming area at least another 
10% of rural households have absolutely no home or land at all (half a million rural 
households) (DFID, 2010).  
 Patriarchy or caste influence the access and control over resources by certain groups. 
In Nepal it is mostly men who own land, who inherit assets such as the parental house and 
land. While women traditionally own little or no land particulary legally recorded, this is 
suddenly changing with an introduced waiver of registration fees when land is recorded in 
the name of a woman. This policy change made it lucrative for men  to register land in a 
female household member’s name, thereby expanding the household assets. The proportion 
of such transactions doubled in 2008. Uptake may reflect a genuine change in attitudes, but 
may also reflect use of a fortuitous new mechanism for families to contribute to cover up the 
total size of properties (DFID, 2010). Some FFS women interviewees said that nowadays they 
have more access to resources such as land: “I also got land rights from my husband and 
mother and father- in- law” (Juna, 38, Sindhupalchowk, interview, 2009). It is hard to tell if 
this is a result from FFS participation, but it is clear that FFS participation took place at a time 
that women started gaining access to important resources such as land. 
 Caste and ethnicity, particularly in the terai, strongly correlate with levels of 
landholding and landlessness; high castes own more and rent in less. By agro-ecological zone, 
inequity in ownership is greatest in the terai mostly populated by Dalits, one of Nepal’s 
poorest ethnic groups. Here most large holdings are found and most outright landlessness 
exists. According to the last government census 1.3 million out of 4.2 million families in 
Nepal did not own land in 200154.With an estimated four members per family, the estimated 
landless population was 5.5 million people - out of a population of 21 million, or 26 percent - 
mostly members of the Dalit and other terai communities. According to the local NGO Dalit 
Welfare Organisation, 15 percent of Dalits living in the western hills of Nepal and 44 percent 
of those in terai were landless, out of six million Dalits nationwide in 2009. 
 Finally, the recent socio-political situation also triggered new roles for women. In 
Sindhupalchowk women reported: 
 
“We learnt everything that men also can do. We can also carry dead bodies, when 
men are not there to do this. Our men have left for various reasons: for the 
Maoists, for the army, for jobs outside this village, some went abroad: Iraq, Israel, 
Korea. 
 
We are not embarrassed to do men’s work when they return. In fact men do not 
do much work here. We can tell them what to do, but they are not doing it. Also 
when they come from their work they do not want to do anything at home.”. 
(Pipalgaun, interview, 2009) 
 
                                                 
54
  Census 2011 land ownership data were not released at the time of writing, June 2012. 
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In most Farmer Field School project documents and in discussions with project staff farmers 
are depicted as a homogenous group irrespective of gender. However, in practice men and 
women in Nepal have different tasks and responsibilities in farming. Women and men have 
unequal access to resources and are affected by policies and measures in different ways 
(Joshi, 2000). These differences are well described in an early study by Acharya and Bennett 
(1981), and still confirmed by later authors such as Indra Majupuria (2007). Individuals face 
differences in access and control of resources such as land and capital, but also education 
whereby men traditionally dominate women, and elderly women have a different social 
position than younger women. Joshi (2000: 250) found: “Nepal’s patriarchal culture restricts 
women so much that they have few decision-making roles inside or outside the household”.  
The low status of women, systems of patrilineal decent, patri-local residence and rules of 
inheritance interact to isolate and subordinate women throughout the country. 
Many women mentioned that they are busy during the day with preparing food for 
the family members, preparing kids to go to school and make sure the children do their 
homework. Women are occupied with domestic chores and farm work. Still many find time 
to attend FFS. “We wake up earlier to finish our duties so we can go to the FFS” says Rani 
(interview, 2009). 
 Nepalese women are still less mobile than men; women often have little say in what 
they want to do. The extended family and the farm is where their activities take place. Men, 
on the other hand, are usually the ones who move into public spaces to take part in 
community activities or local politics. In the case when there are several projects taking place 
man can order their wives to take part in their place. Narayan Parajuli said: “My younger 
sister had to take part in FFS, because I had no time. I was involved in the establishment of a 
drinking water tank at that time “( interview 2009, Yamdi, Kavre district). 
 
Gender issues are “interwoven systematically into the basic social structure of Nepalese 
society, as are other traditional values” (UNDP HDR 2004: 31- 32). Not only gender but also 
caste and ethnicity are part of a complex, interlinked, deeply hierarchical social structure that 
forms the basis for social exclusion and poverty in Nepal (Bennett and Gajurel, 2006). 
 Data from Kavre’s DADO of 19 FFS  (conducted over a period of 1999 to 2009) with a 
total of 144 male and 336 female participants reveal that 50% belong to Brahmin/Chettrie 
whereby most are from Brahmin origin (36%). Four out of these 19 FFS consist of Janajati 
participants only: Tamang or Danuwar. The total of Janajati participants over this  10 year 
period was almost 33%. The Dalit participants were less than 3%. The remaining 14% 
consisted of Newar.55 
 In several places there have been changes in the participants of FFS. In Sanga, for 
instance, I observed in the first FFS batch of 1998 mainly male Brahmin participants, in the 
second FFS of 2002 mainly women, belonging to the higher caste, while in the most recent 
FFS in that same village in 2005 the participants belonged to the Janajatis. These changes 
also reflect a change in the political environment: first males from higher castes were the 
target group, then women as a result of the international and national Women in 
Development (WID) policy, and nowadays there is more national and international attention 
for ethnic issues and social inclusion of minorities. 
                                                 
55
      Although some claim that Newari belong to the Janajati, in my research I do not elaborate on this 
discussion. In the research areas Newari people did not belong to an ethnic minority, in fact were 
mostly a privileged group. 
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Among the 153 interviewees, only 5 were from Salit caste (See chapter 2 for more 
information on caste). Dalits and other poor citizens hardly participate in the FFS, due to 
several reasons, such as not being invited to the FFS training, having no farm land, no 
education, no time, or  living far from the training site. If a Dalit farmer does not take part in 
the FFS, this is not in the first place because he cannot do the exercises, but because the 
community relations, the context, constraints his participation, not his agency. Lower caste 
and/or poor people need to work and so have no time to take training courses like FFS. This 
was confirmed by Bishwakarma, a Dalit in Kavre (interview, 2009):  
 
“Even if we had known about FFS, my wife and I have no time for such training, we 
have to work all day to meet our needs.” 
 
In a study among 40 participants in Kavre, 20 male and 20 female (Regmi, 2010) most men 
said that their family expected them to participate. It was tradition that men in the families 
took part in agricultural extension activities. Also 35 of these 40 farmers said that men were 
free to participate and did not need permission from the household or family, while women 
were considered too busy to take part due to household duties. Also women, according to 
this study, needed permission from the other household members before they could 
participate in an agricultural training. Only if other women also were taking part, and if they 
could combine it with household roles, women might get permission. 
 Gender and caste determine access to education in Nepal. Education is important in 
FFS. It is often a criterion to become a FFS participant. Most agricultural technicians 
expressed a preference to work with educated farmers. If one has the ambition to become a 
farmer trainer it is crucial to be able to read and write. Information from the Kavre DADO 
showed that out of 19 FFS, only in 2 FFS were there  many participants who were just 
literate, which means they can read a simple short text and write their own name. These 2 
FFS groups consisted of women only, one with Brahmin women and one with Janajati 
women. As women are often less educated or have less chances to go to school in Nepal, 
they have less chance to become a farmer trainer. Uneducated elderly women have fewer 
chances to participate in FFS, educated men or young boys and girls usually accompany them 
and take the lead in field activities and discussions. 
 As mentioned by FFS facilitators, mostly participants who have a low level of 
education cannot actively participate in the learning process. During the sessions, the 
participants have to make notes, make drawings on paper and engage in minor calculations – 
activities that demand a minimum level of literacy and education. FFS facilitators in Tanahun 
said: “The level of education of farmers is one of the important factors for actively involving 
in the learning activities during FFS sessions”. “The level of education of participant farmers 
is also an  important factor for active learning and developing expertise of the participant 
farmers” (Tanahun, group interview, 2009). 
 However, considering all these issues was beyond the scope of this research. As 
gender is at the basis of all forms of discrimination and a fundamental ordering principle, I 
have focused on empowerment and gender rather than on the differences between the 
different social categories of women and men in this study. 
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7.5 Farmers’ perceptions of empowerment 
 
As empowerment very much reflects a personal experience or feeling I asked farmers 
themselves to define empowerment. I talked with men and women who did not participate 
in FFS and men and women, who did, to see if participation in FFS had an impact on their 
view on empowerment. Then I compared this with the way it is defined by the Farmer Field 
School trainers, junior technicians or agricultural extension workers who facilitate FFS. 
 In the summer of 2008 and 2009, together with VHL Master students Ramesh 
Humagain, Nalini Lamichhane, Rabindra Sapkota, I  conducted semi-structured interviews 
(SSI) with 79 farmers (42 women and 37 men) who had not taken part in FFS (later referred 
to as non-FFS farmers). These farmers came from places where they did not have a Farmer 
Field School. 
 We used the same SSI key words in interviews with 74 farmers (54 women and 20 men) 
who had completed FFS training (later referred to as: FFS farmers). I compared these two 
groups to obtain an insight of the difference FFS participation makes in farmers’ perceptions 
of empowerment. Additionally, I conducted five focus group discussions with respectively 
district agricultural office staff (twice), and with junior technicians (three times). I had two 
focus group discussions with NGO FFS trainers. They were all men, because the DADO and 
the local NGO office are dominated by men and there was no female staff present. They all 
had been involved in FFS. Furthermore I consulted FFS project documents.  
 
7.5.1 Findings 
 
Initially I expected that farmers would be unfamiliar with the word ‘empowerment’, since it is 
a word mostly used by well-educated Nepali. Also it sounds quite ‘formal’ in Sanskrit: 
sashaktikaran, too sophisticated in my view for farmers. But how wrong my assumption was, 
how prejudiced I proved to be when it appeared that 95% of the farmers interviewed were 
familiar with the word and had clear ideas about its meaning. 
 
Perceptions of empowerment of women with/without FFS 
 
In lively interviews women explained their views on empowerment. In the table below (1) 
the data collected from women who had taken part in FFS and women who had never 
attended FFS are presented. 
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Table 7.1 Empowerment according women farmers with/without FFS 
 
Empowerment is… Non-FFS 
Women 
N=42 
% Empowerment is… FFS women  
N=54 
% 
Awareness 17 41 Awareness through 
education 
4 7 
Self-reliant, strong 7   17 Self-confidence, ability 13 24 
Women 
development 
5 12 Speak 4 7 
All in household in 
good condition 
4 10 Take part in decision-
making 
2 4 
Express own feeling 3 7 To involve in groups 
and development work 
22 41 
Free, can move from 
home 
1 2 Give women strength, 
ability and freedom 
2 4 
Do not know 5 12 enable those who are 
unable 
2 4 
   Unite all 3 6 
Total 42 100  54 100 
Source: Research data 2008 and 2009 
 
For women who never took part in FFS, empowerment meant mostly awareness or being 
self-reliant. With awareness they meant: becoming aware of gender inequalities. Some 
added: empowerment means women’s development and self-reliance. Ten out of 42 women 
specifically emphasised ‘women’: “women awareness, women development, give women 
freedom”. For them empowerment is a term associated in particular with women. They 
explained that women were often targeted for empowerment by NGOs but also by the 
governments’ Women Development Office. Most of their activities were about raising 
awareness. Generally speaking, women without FFS experience see empowerment as 
increasing individual strength, personal growing. This is line with Mosedale who states that 
“One needs first Power Within: self-esteem and self confidence. In a sense all power starts 
from here, such assets are necessary before anything else can be achieved (Mosedale, 
2005:250). 
 Women who took part in FFS mainly considered self-confidence and involvement in 
work and group activities as empowerment. In Sindhupalchowk a group of FFS women said: 
“We learnt to give an answer. We learnt to become less shy, we learnt to interact with 
JT/DADO”. (Pipalgaun, interview, 2009) 
 Some women also mentioned an increase in mobility as empowerment: 
 
“My husband encouraged me to participate in FFS, now I have no hesitation in 
attending training, tours and community meeting.” (Kavre, female farmer, 
interview 2008)  
 
Collective action is one aspect that has been encouraged by FFS participation through the 
weekly group sessions. Many women mentioned group work as their perception of 
empowerment. They said that they achieved empowerment through group work or 
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collective activities. They explained that through the weekly group sessions they felt 
increased social support and solidarity. Bartlett (2004) calls this the social capital route to 
empowerment. In a case study from Bangladesh, as in Nepal, social capital has contributed 
to empowerment rather than individual strength. 
 
I expected that there would be a difference between older and younger women, that age 
would be a factor of difference regarding their vision on empowerment, but there was not 
much significant difference.  Women from all ages talked about self-reliance and group 
activities. It must be noted though that women in the age 20-27 talked a bit more about 
decision-making than the older or younger women.  
A woman aged 22 said: 
 
 “Taking part in decision-making, and reaching decision-making position”.  
 
Another woman, aged 27 stated that: “Able to make a decision is empowerment”.   
Women who said they do not know what to say about empowerment were all older than 40 
and illiterate. Women from the Janajati community, in particular Tamang, mentioned that 
FFS participation “enabled those who are unable”. During interviews in Kavre district 2008 
and 2009Newari women talked about “uniting all”. 
 
Perceptions of empowerment of men with/without FFS  
 
In interviews with men (37 without FFS and 22 with FFS experience) the answers were 
different from the women’s responses, as shown in table 7.2. 
 
Table 7.2 Ideas of men with/without FFS regarding empowerment 
Empowerment is… Non-FFS 
Men N=37 
% Empowerment is… FFS men  
N=20 
% 
Group action for 
society, active in 
social work 
20 54 Group action for 
society, active in social 
work 
8 40 
Self-development, 
Self-confidence and 
decision-making 
power 
9 24 Self development 3 15 
To use power and 
knowledge for 
positive change 
4 11 Realise people’s 
needs; enable those 
who are unable 
4 20 
Awareness of 
development 
2  5 Full awareness thru 
education 
2 10 
Do not know 2  5 Put balance between 
men and women 
1 5 
   Unite all 1 5 
   Speak 1 5 
Total 37 100%  20 100% 
Source: Research data 2008 and 2009 
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Men who did not take part in FFS considered empowerment mainly as being active in social 
work or as one said: ‘group action in society’, or even stronger: ‘to move the group with 
unity’. From the answers of men in rural areas it is clear that their idea of empowerment is 
far more focused on individual contributions to social development, on action outside the 
household. There is not much difference between men with or without FFS experience. 
Men and women from the Newari community talked about ‘unity’ in relation to 
empowerment. One Newari man said:”Every Janajati should be united to save the nation” 
(Lalitpur, interview, 2009). A Newari woman expressed: “Empowerment means to be in unity 
for national development” (Kavre, interview, 2009). And another woman said: ”All Nepalese 
should feel unity for national development” (Kavre, interview, 2009). Several Newari villagers 
talked about the exclusion of Janajatis, but it must be noted that the Newaris, in particular in 
the area around Kathmandu and in the research areas, are not a marginalised group. In fact 
they are the most educated in these areas. Bennett (2006) explained that the Newar ethnic 
group members who live in the Kathmandu valley, are close to the circle where the power is 
and are often treated well in comparison with other ethnic groups.  
 
After FFS participation the women´s view on empowerment seems to shift in the direction of 
the men´s view on empowerment. Their focus on group work and social activities for 
development has increased. More than men, women look at personal development when 
they talk about empowerment: involvement in decision-making, becoming self-sufficient and 
able, becoming self-confident, and taking initiative.   
 When I asked farmers about how they experienced empowerment as a result of FFS 
participation women mentioned the group work and the collective singing or speaking in 
front of others (18/54 = 33%); the actions they were not used to before. Through FFS they 
were breaking with their habitual shy behaviour in public. Women gained self-confidence, 
gained a voice in the weekly group sessions, as a result of the social space, the FFS team 
spirit and solidarity that was provided in the meetings. Indeed, this ‘social capital route’ of 
empowerment is rather different from the ‘human capital ‘route that men follow in 
empowerment in Nepal (Bartlett, 2005). For almost all the women taking part in FFS it was 
their first time in participating in an agricultural training, which was previously considered a 
men's business. Until recently agricultural technicians only approached men for agricultural 
training or demonstrations. Women also expressed that they now felt more appreciated as a 
partner in farming. “My husband wants to know what I think about agriculture, since I have 
taken part in FFS. Also my in-laws respect my new skills and knowledge” (interview, Kavre, 
2009). 
For men speaking and group involvement was also important, but less explicit than 
for women. The men who talked about gaining confidence through presenting and singing 
were mostly younger than 20 years. One Dalit man said: “FFS gives a chance to unknown 
people” implying that he had felt excluded before. 
 
Sunmaya Karki can explain elaborately what she learnt in FFS eight years ago. They had also 
fun she says. Their group consisted mainly of women and they have registered as a group. 
They meet occasionally. Their leader was a Brahmin man. He could read and write plus he 
had the contacts with the government offices, so he is better suitable than any of the 
women, she says. He is also free to move and visit Kathmandu, while most women were 
home-bound (Kavre, interview 2009). This phenomenon I have observed often: women in 
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groups requesting men to do their book-keeping or be the leader and maintain contacts with 
the outside world, not challenging the status quo, the established relations, but using the 
established labour division to their benefit. 
 Most women mentioned that family support was a prerequisite for empowerment, 
while for men this does not seem an issue. These examples illustrate the level of 
empowerment that Kabeer (2001) calls the immediate level, there is not much evidence of 
change related to intermediate or deeper levels. FFS affects daily life choices for women 
related to farming. FFS does not address strategic choices (Kabeer, 2001), but some 
participants indicate changes in their relationships which might be influenced by FFS 
participation. 
 In some cases FFS participants reported changes in relationships with their husband, 
in-laws or other community members. Some mentioned that they will treat their children 
differently than they themselves had experienced. These changes are illustrated by the 
following answers to my question whether FFS participation had made a change: 
 
“In the time before FFS my father and mother in-law treated me as domestic 
helper these days that is changed and  the relationship with my husband is good, 
he does not deny what I do.”(female farmer, Lalitpur 2008) 
 
“These days the relationship with father and mother in-law has improved. I  treat 
my son and daughter equally with food, education and other things” (female 
farmer, Kavre, 2009) 
 
“The relationship with all family members has changed these days, my husband 
helps me in household work, I treat my son and daughter equally”. (female farmer,  
Kaski, 2009) 
 
“My relation with my husband and father- and mother in-law have changed; I get 
more freedom, I am free to participate in group and social activities.”( female 
farmer,Tanahun, 45) 
 
“Yes, previously  permission had to be obtained  from husband to do something 
but these days I can do it on my own. I treat my son and daughter equally. I live in 
a different family from my parents-in-law. The relationship is good. (female farmer, 
Kaski, 2009) 
 
“Yes, previously my husband decided everything in the farm, these days he takes 
my idea to make a decision. I also got land rights from my husband.” (female 
farmer, Tanahun, 2008) 
 
A few women said that their husbands took advice from them. This was a new 
experience for them, and it meant that their newly acquired skills in FFS were 
valued. "Yes, my husband always takes advice from me" (female farmer, Kaski, 
2009). 
 
Many FFS trainees stressed that these days (in contrast to the recent past!) they send both 
boys and girls to school. This is a break with tradition when usually boys got preference in  
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attending  school. “We treat son and daughter equally in education and health” (female 
farmer, Lalitpur, 2009). 
 
If we apply the theory of Kabeer (2001) on these results regarding the linkage between 
resources, agency and outcome, it is evident that an increase in knowledge and social capital 
leads to an increase in agency and capabilities. Through participation in FFS men and 
particularly women expand their framework of information, knowledge and analysis. It 
enlarges their room for manoeuvre, their space for negotiation. They get involved in a 
process that enables them to discover new options, new possibilities and eventually make 
better informed decisions in farming. 
This process, however, does not take place independently of its structural and 
institutional context. For women in particular this process took place in the group they were 
in with FFS. They felt safe, secure and confident to act in a group with like-minded people 
with whom they interacted on a regular basis in the weekly FFS sessions. The social space 
and solidarity that was provided in the group contributed to their empowerment, also in the 
wider society. This was also found by Bartlettt (2005) among women who took part in FFS in 
Bangladesh. 
 Yet, when we look at individual cases (below) we learn that empowerment is not a 
simple formula as described by Kabeer, but a complex and a multi-dimensional process, 
influenced by the institutional context in which it takes place. 
 
Laxmi’s case 
Laxmi is a married woman with two children. She is 37 years old, Brahmin. She took part in 
FFS 7 years ago and was an enthusiastic member. The government trainer liked her, admired 
her enthusiasm, her learning attitude and asked her to become a farmer trainer. “Initially I 
had no idea about becoming trainer, but when people asked me a lot about problems they 
faced in the field I became encouraged. I felt it is my responsibility to share my knowledge 
with others. And I really enjoy learning about agriculture. Sewa is euta dharma ho: (giving 
service is a part of faith/religion) so I help people”. There were more men who also became 
farmer trainer, but eventually they all moved abroad in search for work. 
 Laxmi completed another FFS as a trainer (July 2009). The FFS was difficult this time: 
the (all Brahmin men) farmers used a lot of pesticide and the crop (cucumber) failed due to 
hailstorm and insect pests. Still she smiles confidently and says: “It was a good learning 
opportunity for me”. 
Initially her husband was not happy with her being a farmer trainer. She said that the 
whole village gossiped about her: “She had become arrogant, she was too proud”. The 
villagers, in particular the women, accused her for not helping their village, just helping 
others. But Laxmi did not let her work get disturbed by them. She encouraged her husband 
to come and see her in action. She invited him on the last day, the field day when FFS 
participants show other farmers and officials what they have learnt. They usually dance and 
sing songs and make a nice show. Laxmi said: “I just pretended not to know how to use the 
camera, how to play the cassette. So I asked help from my husband”. He came along, 
operated her camera and music player as she had requested. This way he observed her 
performance and was convinced that she was doing a good job, (...that she was not playing 
with other men.) Her husband is supportive that’s why she can do this work, as long as she 
does not neglect her duties as mother and housewife. 
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 For the other women in her village she conducted a Farmer Field School in her free 
time. Now they respect her too, she says, because they learnt a lot and profited from their 
new skills. Laxmi is happy that she has had this opportunity; she has more chances in life 
than her mother she says. In her turn she also wants to give more opportunities to her 
children. She has not been to school herself, but her own daughter is going, just like their 
son. 
 Laxmi’s decision-making power related to income and children’s education has 
increased, but still her husband is the main breadwinner and makes the final decisions in her 
household. She feels treated equally by her husband and respected in her role in her 
household, in that sense the power dynamics at household level are transformed to some 
extent. 
With the use of new skills and relationship with government offices she has gained a 
higher status, respect. But has it changed power relations as Batliwala refers to? She has 
more access and control over intellectual and natural resources than before FFS. She has 
proven that she, as uneducated woman, can give FFS training, and thereby challenged the 
prevalent dominant feeling that only male FFS participants can become good farmer trainers. 
Still the higher government officials do not appreciate her (please shut your mouth about FFS 
today’ when asked to attend a district meeting). According to an informant the male 
government officers are jealous of her popularity. She is highly appreciated by women 
farmers in her district. 
 
Laxmi has power within due to several aspects – her willpower, knowledge, a character that 
does not give up easily. Being a Brahmin gave her the connection with the trainer, and 
acceptance in other Brahmin communities where she has conducted FFS. She has convincing 
power; she can influence her husband and the other villagers. She has to fulfil certain 
gendered tasks, but there is room for manoeuvre. The roles she has as a woman and as a 
Brahmin are not rigid, they have changed. She is allowed to work, her mobility has increased 
for instance. 
 Can we say that Laxmi is empowered? With the use of new skills and relationship with 
government offices she has gained a higher status, respect. But has it changed power 
relations as Batliwala refers to? She has more access and control over intellectual and natural 
resources then before FFS. She has proven that she, as uneducated woman, can give FFS 
training, and thereby challenged the prevalent dominant feeling that only male FFS 
participants can become good farmer trainers. In line with the Women in Development 
paradigm the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives is happy with more women 
involvement. Still the higher government officials in Tanahun and surroundings do not 
appreciate her; “Please shut your mouth about FFS today” is whispered in her ears when she 
is asked to attend a district meeting). According to an informant the male government 
officers are jealous of her popularity. She is highly appreciated by women farmers in her 
district. 
 Laxmi’s decision-making power related to income and children’s education has 
increased, but still her husband is the main breadwinner and makes the final decisions in her 
household. Laxmi can make more decisions regarding farming than before her FFS training. 
She feels treated equally by her husband and respected in her role in her household, in that 
sense the power structures at household level are transformed to some extent. She can 
make choices which were previously denied to her (historically, culturally). She can conduct 
training in Tanahun district and earn some income, but only if it does not affect her duties at 
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home. She can buy a sari without asking permission from her husband. Laxmi is still tied in 
her role as mother and wife. Her own ideas might have changed but the external forces have 
remained more or less untouched by her participation in FFS. The prevailing pattern of 
access and control over resources have been slightly changed in her advantage, structures 
and ideologies determined by patriarchy and religion have not been transformed, just got a 
little bit stirred perhaps, but one way or the other changes have been set in motion. If not 
directly for Laxmi, her daughter might be able to get more choices in life, thanks to Laxmi’s 
pioneering work. 
 
Govinda’s case 
Govinda is a Brahmin man, married; age 42 and he completed his SLC years ago. He lived in 
Kavre, in a remote village, 4 hours by bus from the district capital on a road that is not 
accessible during rainy season. There was no money to continue his education and he joined 
his father and mother on the farm. He is married and has two children, a son and a girl who 
both go to boarding school. They have a small farm, and two cows. His wife is mainly doing 
the farm work. Govinda is always keen to take part in government agriculture training or 
NGO training because he hopes this will give him new opportunities, preferably give him the 
possibility to move outside his farm. When there was FFS, 5 years ago, he took part and he 
grabbed the opportunity to become a farmer trainer. Now he is occasionally employed by a 
local NGO to conduct FFS, while his wife is doing the farm work. 
 He conducted 2 FFS so far. One FFS took place in the neighbouring village and one in 
his own village both in cauliflower. He is well respected in his village because this new crop 
brought a lot of change in his community: they started commercial vegetable production and 
increased their income. In particular young men (20-30 years) took up the agro-business. 
 Govinda got confidence and feels powerful because he is a man from the upper caste 
and is part of an influential network in his village. He has knowledge of farming; he received 
several trainings on agriculture. He is often contacted by DADO as a resource person or 
model farmer. Also education gave him power. 
 
Can we say the Govinda is empowered? Govinda has the knowledge and skills to be a good 
farmer and after FFS became a farmer trainer. Does Govinda have the ability to make choices 
previously denied to him? FFS participation gave him more knowledge about farming, but 
because he used the opportunity to become a farmer trainer, he left active involvement in 
farming. This work earned him a little income and prestige. He has the network and good 
relation with government officers from the district agriculture office. The local politicians 
respect him in his village. Due to his work with local farmers in particular Maoists respect 
him, and that is quite useful in this remote area where Maoists are in control. 
 The context he lives in, a remote village with limited facilities and little contact with 
the outside world restricts his opportunities to get more assignments. His network is limited, 
and consists mainly of government contacts in DADO and although he can conduct FFS 
training, when the government does not allocate financial resources for training he is left 
jobless, which in practice turns out to be most of the time. Living in a remote rural village 
created his feeling of disempowerment. He has little chance to contact other service 
providers. The location he lives is still remote and rarely visited by government officers or 
NGO workers. Still increased prestige, respect and capability are rewards after FFS, and can 
be considered empowerment. When Govinda got a job as farmer trainer, his wife’s workload 
increased: “I cannot help her anymore with agricultural work”. 
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He has had a few opportunities to earn an income as farmer trainer, but because he 
has left farming, he has become more vulnerable due to making himself dependent on 
income from the limited opportunities giving FFS. There is limited shift in power relations: 
the government has given him authority to train farmers, a task that was earlier limited to 
government officials, but the government decides when and where. Govinda has no control 
over his income; in fact he has somehow become more vulnerable and more dependent on 
the government for income. 
 In the same area young farmers, from different castes and ethnic groups have 
invested in farming. They have become skilful commercial farmers, selling ginger, vegetables 
and potatoes. They have direct links with traders and do not depend on DADO for advice. In 
an interview in 2009 they told me that they learnt a lot by doing. They have contacts with 
UNDP and are involved in VDC governance activities. 
 Govinda’s choice to leave agriculture and become more dependent of trainer’s 
income has not really increased but diverted his options. It has not improved his autonomy. 
He has challenged the ideology that farmers cannot become trainers, but in his household he 
maintains gender inequality conditions (or even made the situation worse) by increasing his 
wife’s workload. 
 Govinda is using his old network (upper caste government officers) while in the area a 
new network has been established with young progressive new farmers from different caste 
and ethnic backgrounds. He does not make optimal use of his resources and agency, e.g. get 
actively involved in farming, work closely with the young dynamic guys in his village on cash 
crop production rather he waits passively for the next government officer to drink tea in his 
house. With the young generation, he could join forces and challenge prevailing ideologies 
for instance regarding the established caste, state and market structures. 
 
The case of Maya and Devi 
Devi and Maya are from the same village: in a remote hilly area, far from the main road, in 
Kavre district. Devi has just completed high school and Maya is uneducated. Devi is a Chettri 
girl in her early twenties and about to move for further studies to Kathmandu. Maya is a Dalit 
woman, 38 and married with four children. Devi received information about FFS, but Maya 
did not hear about it. In the village we meet the two communities separately. First the 
Brahmin/Chettrie group explains about the FFS and how it was organised. The 
Brahmin/Chettri community explains about their farming system and how they faced 
difficulties in the revolution period: “We were afraid of the Maoists, we used to hide for 
them”.  
 According to Devi and other Brahmin and Chettri persons sitting in the group: “Dalits 
are not interested in learning, we called them for the FFS but they did not come”. Speaking 
with the Dalit community on the other hand, they are genuinely surprised to hear that there 
was a FFS in their village: they did not know! The Brahmin NGO trainer did not inform the 
Dalit community in this village. As a result Maya and others could not attend, the whole Dalit 
community felt excluded. They would have liked to attend FFS training; they are keen to learn 
new farming techniques. The NGO trainer had difficulties finding participants in the 
Brahmin/Chettri community among the adults, so he mobilised the youth. Devi as a girl had 
to attend as her parents told her too. Her brother who is 2 years older was free to refuse 
participation in the FFS. After the FFS almost all participants went to study or work and most 
left the village. In a discussion unanimously they said that they were not interested in 
farming and that the training was fun but useless for them. They did not practice any of the 
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newly acquired skills in farming. Devi did not challenge but mainly confirmed prevailing 
ideologies. 
 Maya is a woman from the Dalit community, living on top of a hill, in Kavre, far from 
the main road. For drinking water she had to walk 2 hours to this main road, until recently. Of 
late a drinking water tank has been built in their village, with assistance from an NGO. Five 
years ago she heard by accident - while collecting water - that there was a FFS in the village 
near the main road. Although this is not her village and she has to walk 2 hours just to get 
there she was determinant to participate. She took part with another Dalit woman, and 
learnt a lot about a new crop for her: cauliflower. However, being the only Dalits in a group 
dominated by high caste women she and her friend felt uncomfortable in the FFS. A few 
Brahmin women, who gave her and her friend an inferior feeling, however, dominated the 
FFS: they knew everything and Maya felt stupid. Still she enjoyed learning new skills. Now 
after the training it is difficult to apply these skills because due to lack of land and water they 
cannot grow vegetables.  
The men and women in the Dalit community in her village stress that they want to 
take part in training or group activities such as FFS but not in isolation. They want to mix with 
other castes, but they do not want to be a small minority so upper castes can dominate 
them. Maya and her community (Dalit) members explain that things have gone better 
recently. During the Maoist struggle they got support from the Maoists. ‘The movement gave 
us Dalits a voice’. They were not afraid of them, but were hopeful that the Maoist would 
make things better for Dalits. Now they realise that Maoists have sided with other politicians 
in Kathmandu and that they have to fend for themselves. “The Maoists helped us to raise our 
voice but now we have to use this voice and our joint forces to change the situation for 
Dalits”. The drinking water tank was built by an NGO who wanted to support lower caste 
people. 
 What about Maya, the Dalit woman who took FFS trainer: is she empowered? She 
gained new skills and knowledge but cannot put them to good use because of lack of water 
and land. At home her husband decides what to plant and that is not cauliflower but maize 
or millet. In the community she still feels inferior due to dominance by Brahmin women in 
her training. In fact she still has little power or choice. Lack of resources and an oppressing 
social structure of relationships hinder a transformation in her situation. 
 Evidently empowerment in practice is rather different from what development policy 
makers understand it to be. 
 
7.6 Empowerment according to Farmer Field School facilitators and 
extension staff 
 
Interviews with FFS facilitators showed a gap between them and farmers in respect to their 
view on empowerment. In focus group discussion with respectively 8 and 13 JTs (junior 
technicians) from the District Agricultural Development Office (DADO), they mainly talked 
about empowerment as an achievement or outcome when: “women dare to speak or raise 
their voice” or “when women are not afraid to say their name”56. They also often express 
                                                 
56
      In Nepal women traditionally do not mention their name to anyone, they are called mother of..., the 
sister of.or the wife of, women are given a title according to their role or position in the family. This can 
be kanchi (youngest daughter), maili (second daughter) etc.  My husband did not even know his 
mother’s and his older sister’s names. 
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empowerment in terms of ‘doing what they (read: farmers) have been told or taught” or 
“when farmers follow what they have learnt from us”, “when they adapt the technology 
introduced to them”. FFS facilitators see empowerment as an outcome that can be bestowed 
by them, in the sense of ‘power to’. 
 All FFS facilitators have observed a change among farmers who participated in FFS, 
especially among women. This is illustrated with the following remark: 
 
"When I meet women who have participated in FFS they approach me with a lot 
of questions related to farming, they are not shy to ask for advice or seeds or 
other information. This is not the case when I visit women farmers who have not 
been in FFS. They are more shy and do not talk about agriculture at all with me.” 
(Kavre, district officer DADO, interview July 2008) 
 
According to the facilitators FFS leads to empowerment, through the field experiments, the 
trials. The FFS trainers and extension staff consider empowerment as a good or commodity 
that they provide to the farmers. They assume that they enable farmers to improve their 
lives. Unlike farmers who mainly see empowerment as a process that affects their own lives, 
or that occurs when they are involved in social work, or in groups interact with others, FFS 
trainers talk about empowerment in terms of the product of technology transfer (resources) 
or a behavioural change (agency) that they have observed among farmers. Among the 
farmers only a minority of women mentioned that improved access to seeds and technology 
has contributed to their empowerment.  
 
In 2003 in a conference where several key players in FFS like policy-makers, NGOs, FAO staff, 
FFS facilitators came together, empowerment was discussed in relation to FFS (CIP-UPWARD, 
2003). During this conference, the participants concluded that knowledge is associated with 
empowerment. In the FFS learning activities, weekly meetings in the fields where farmers 
improve their observational capabilities, data analysis and decision-making skills. The 
technical and practical knowledge the participants gain in the learning activities increase 
their confidence which is seen as a form of empowerment. In this conference participants 
concluded that through experimentation the learners become empowered, they learn how 
to work together, become able to identify problems and able to solve local problems 
systematically (idem). What farmers actually learn through the FFS experiential learning 
platform that is seen as empowerment are the following skills (Adapted from CIP-UPWARD, 
2003): 
 
1. To strengthen the problem-solving capacity and skills in order to address 
the problems and identify opportunities that are important to them; 
2. To generate and manage knowledge and understanding for their individual 
and community needs; 
3. To strengthen critical thinking capacity and identifying options and risks in 
decision-making; 
4. To enhance confidence in the learning process; 
5. To enhance capacity to experiment, and to test and adapt principles, 
guidelines, and practices according to their interests. 
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FFS is used as a process tool for empowerment not only by involving farmers in a set of 
learning steps for improved farm production, productivity and sustainability but also to 
empower farmers via their collective forum whereby they can discuss exiting problems, 
share experiences and co-develop plans for future work for their welfare (CIP-UPWARD, 
2003). 
 
The perception of empowerment as a good delivered, resembles what is referred to as the 
‘rendering technical’ (Li, 2007) of a social process, providing a technical solution for a 
complex social problem disregarding the wider historical, cultural or political context. In FFS 
this boils down to a procedure of following a sequence of guidelines: first discovery learning 
about integrated pest management and crop management. When farmers are skilled in the 
problem-solving techniques, they are taken through a follow-up trajectory in which 
community development problems are addressed in a similar fashion. In training sessions 
such as those in IPM FFS, they are guided through the following steps: identification of the 
problems, listing the possibilities based upon previous experiences or theories, conducting 
experiments, drawing conclusions, and taking informed decisions (FAO staff, Bangkok, 
interview, 2002). 
 In Nepal also empowerment in FFS is addressed in a technical way: with participatory 
planning according to a set of top-down pre-defined steps, with action research also through 
a sequence of clearly set pre-determined steps. Also FFS groups were encouraged to register 
as an established organisation, as if registration was a prerequisite for collective action and 
empowerment.   
FFS does not address the existing structural inequalities in a community, FFS does not 
discuss relations between higher caste and lower caste, between men and women. Still, by 
making a conscious selection of predominantly upper caste or women in FFS, the project 
does affect social relations. The actions of FFS practitioners do not take place in a vacuum. 
‘Empowerment’ is thus approached as a technical, neutral tool, or an asset that FFS 
participants can be taught to use, that they can learn to ‘own’.  Consequently, gender 
differentiation, experiences of women as different from men and the relevance of 
institutional structures that surround the poor and disempowered farmers who for a long 
time were excluded from participation, were not addressed. 
FFS programme officers or experts see empowerment as a way to mobilise groups and 
establish a forum for collective action. The following statement from an international NGO 
programme officer is revealing: “We consider FFS as an important means to empowerment, 
in the way that the FFS provides a solid and necessary basis for future group formation 
through the processes of discussion and the need to come to consensus. We see that some 
groups have matured into actual community development groups that can take responsibility 
for community development activities e.g. infrastructure, education, health care, etc. 
However, by far the most groups just continue with the income-generating activities. (e-mail 
communication, October 2009 with ADDA57)   
 The programme officer’s perception that FFS can be a vehicle for empowerment 
through collective action was confirmed by the perception of a local NGO in Nepal: 
 
                                                 
57
  ADDA: Agricultural Development Denmark Asia, an international NGO. 
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“To provide skills, to uplift the lower community, is empowerment. We do this 
with self-mobilisation of saving and conducting regular meetings by a Dalit women 
group.” (Oct 2009, RIMS58) 
 
From a neo-liberal point of view, empowerment can lead to more autonomy of farmers (Rose 
and Miller, 1992). In an environment where service delivery is limited due to difficult 
topography and limited resources, FFS can indeed contribute to farmers becoming self-
reliant and in charge of their own development. This is a view that is supported by several 
FFS facilitators and DADO staff. 
 Interestingly FFS farmers have not become more autonomous, but are demanding 
more servicesfrom the government, in particular DADO. In Tanahun and in Kavre agricultural 
staff confirmed this: 
 
“These days more farmers come to our office to demand mini-kits, seeds or 
training”(FGD Tanahun, 2009). Or: “we see an increase in farmers who come to 
our office. They want more services, they feel more confident to demand 
resources from us, e.g. fertiliser or extension.”(FGD, Kavre, 2009) 
 
7.7 Discussion and conclusion 
 
‘Empowering’ farmers has become a frequently mentioned ambition of development 
interventions, similiarly the case of Farmer Field Schools. Empowerment is an often debated 
concept in the academia but in development practice it seems to be used without much 
debate, assuming that it is always a ‘good‘ thing,  having a positive impact on people in the 
target group. In the FFS programme too it was assumed that everybody had the same 
understanding of the concept of empowerment.  
This research provides evidence that empowerment is a process that challenges our 
assumptions about the way things are and can be. Male and female FFS participants confirm 
that they experience empowerment, but not in the way FFS technicians and policymakers 
have planned.   
Data showed that male and female farmers differ in their perceptions of 
empowerment and there is a big gap between policy makers, FFS facilitators and the  farmers 
regarding their perception of empowerment and how it can strengthen individual or 
collective action. 
Power, as the key element of empowerment is mostly considered an asset, by 
practitioners, while in academic debates power is no longer seen as a thing but a relational 
concept. This change in academic discussions slowly permeated the empowerment 
discussion. In Farmer Field Schools power is still mainly seen as an asset, and empowerment 
is mainly regarded as a tool.  Most facilitators see empowerment as an instrument, to 
achieve increased production and more autonomous farmers, who can manage their own 
development, who can act autonomously. We have described this perception of power as a 
case of ‘power to’, as opposed to other forms of power such as ‘power within’ or ‘power 
with’.  
                                                 
58
  RIMS: Resource Identification Management Systems, a local NGO. 
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Interviews confirmed that empowerment is a complex, multi-faceted process, which 
is not easy to quantify or measure. Through participation in FFS men and in particular 
women expand their framework of information, knowledge and analysis. It enlarges their 
room for manoeuvre, their negotiation space. They get involved in a process that enables 
them to discover new options, new possibilities and eventually make better informed 
decisions in farming. An increase in knowledge, skills and income can be important for 
change. But training by itself does not automatically lead to empowerment. For women 
gaining voice in a group, the social cohesion and common solidarity provide the space for 
empowerment.  
 If we compare the different views of empowerment of men and women with and 
without FFS experience we see that women, who had not taken part in FFS are more focused 
on building awareness and self-confidence, whereas FFS women focus on group activities as 
well as individual growth. 
Especially women that have experienced empowerment say that. Through FFS 
women in Nepal have gained confidence and access to resources such as knowledge and 
skills concerning farming as well as land. Several female farmers replied that they can now 
make choices which were previously denied to them historically and/or culturally. They 
added that this was not the result of the process of discovery learning in FFS as it is assumed 
by policy-makers, but due to their group participation, collective singing and presenting, and 
their capacity to speak in public. 
Their responses reflect the traditional role of men and women in Nepal, which is for 
women mainly centered around the household. Where women all said that family support is 
a prerequisite for empowerment, men do not mentioned this at all.  The men seem unaware 
of this fact, or take family support for granted.  For women empowerment seems to be a 
process of expansion of their comfort zone. They have become more skilled and confident in 
farming, an area in which they were already active but in which they have gained more 
control over production processes. 
 Among the men there is not much difference between FFS participants and non-FFS 
participants in terms of their definition of empowerment. In both cases, men’s definition of 
empowerment is more related to involvement in improvement of the society, on their 
actions outside the household. The men interviewed see empowerment more in terms of 
‘doing something good for society’ through collective action. 
 It is clear that neither male and female farmers, nor FFS trainers see empowerment in 
terms of strategic life choices, critical thinking, increased decision-making, in identifying and 
addressing factors that restrain their lives as it is indicated in the FFS documents by the 
project designers. None of the FFS facilitators seemed aware of the wider objective of 
‘discovery learning’, its link with addressing problems felt in the lives of male and female 
farmers in Nepal.  
None of the farmers talked about solving problems they face, perhaps becoming self-
reliant comes closest to the definition that FFS policy makers defined. In short, 
empowerment, as defined by FFS project designers, is not based on male and female 
farmers’ real life practices, experiences and perceptions in Nepal. Also empowerment cannot 
be bestowed by a third party (Mosedale, 2005: 244). Rather those who would become 
empowered must claim it through action in their personal and institutional environment. 
Development agencies, such as DADO or FAO cannot empower farmers. Agencies involved in 
FFS may be able to create conditions favourable to empowerment but they cannot make it 
happen. 
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Initially empowerment was considered to be achieved through improved access to resources, 
later the focus was on increased capabilities of farmers and strengthening their agency. A 
more radical view is that empowerment is only achieved when a transformation of power 
relations has taken place. The acquirement of resources alone is not empowerment; it is 
necessary to consider what people can do with these resources, i.e. the process or agency 
they exercise and specific historical, socio-cultural and political contexts. Empowerment is a 
process in which several actors are involved in FFS itself but also others such as state 
institutions, the Maoist movement, international and local NGOs, that together shape the 
conditions for farmers’ empowerment and rural transformation. 
 Empowerment in FFS means also applying a ‘forward-looking’ strategy, identifying 
ways in which FFS participants can enhance their empowerment, e.g. networking with 
relevant agencies and other groups in society, practicing application of discovery-learning on 
societal issues such as discrimination, social exclusion, to provide multiple options, enhance 
men and women’s sense of choice and empowerment. In FFS more attention can be paid to 
identifying and addressing factors that restrain people’s lives, and proactively working on 
improving conditions to facilitate strategic life choices. When this is beyond the scope of FFS, 
collaboration with other agencies or linking farmers with other organisations might be an 
option. 
 
FFS has evidently offered opportunities to women through agricultural training that were 
previously denied to them. It has become an accepted norm for women to take part in 
agricultural extension activities. FFS does not address other inequalities between men and 
women, let alone certain social exclusion aspects in society. By initially inviting mostly higher 
caste farmers to take part in FFS, hierarchical relations between castes were reinforced. Even 
though the context is now changing and the political environment demands more attention 
for vulnerable and previously excluded groups (see Chapter 6), the FFS project often 
reinforces existing social class divisions and still fails to take seriously into account diversity 
and difference in terms of caste, income, land, ethnicity, gender, age, and education. 
Even if FFS does not address social conditions that cause inequality, discrimination or 
social exclusion, other changes in Nepal created a modification in the context in which FFS 
takes place. Increased outmigration away from rural areas, urbanisation, and the 
feminisation of agriculture, together with  government policy demands for an increase of 
female participation in development, and the rise of the Maoist movement have encouraged 
Dalits and Janajatis to raise their voice. These circumstances have created better 
opportunities for women, as well as for Janajatis and Dalits.  In rural areas, such previously 
ignored groups have now become more vocal, demanding justice, requesting more support 
from the government, and also demanding inclusion in FFS.   
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Chapter 8  Farmer Field School as Governance Tool 
 
Traditionally there was a patron-client 
relationship between government 
staff and farmers. This is gradually 
changing. There is more pressure 
from farmers on government officers 
to perform. (DADO agricultural 
extension officer, Kavre, 2009) 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
The above statement from government staff exemplifies the changes in the relationship 
between farmers and government agencies, changes that can be related to the impact of FFS 
but also to a transformed social political context. Increasingly government officers expressed 
that they were engaging in new relationships with the farmers to whom they were supposed 
to provide technical service. These new relations between the state and its citizens have also 
been recognised by others (Cornwall and Gaventa, 2001) and this trend has implications for 
projects that promote a participatory approach such as the Farmer Field Schools. The 
challenges inherent in the implementation of FFS will be discussed in this chapter.  
 After my reading and reflection on FFS (see chapter 1) I started wondering whether 
FFS really was a participatory intervention addressing farmers’ needs, improving farmers’ 
situation, empowering farmers and contributing to agricultural development and food 
security or whether it was it more close to being a governance tool? Can it be that the 
Nepalese government embraced FFS because it was a means to impose their agenda for 
agricultural development? Is it that interventions like FFS are used as a tool of state power, a 
means to control farmers, an expression of sovereignty (see Hardt and Negri, 2000). 
 In Chapter 7 I discussed the impact of FFS on the empowerment of farmers, the so-
called target group of the project. Empowerment was defined as a relational and context 
specific concept. If empowerment is considered a relational concept, what role do the 
implementing organisations play in the empowerment of male and female farmers? What 
implication does it have for the governance of rural development? 
In my research, several Nepalese government officers defined empowerment as the 
state “when farmers implement what we tell them to do”. This remark indicates a “rendering 
technical” (Li, 2007: 12) of the problem of implementing FFS with empowerment as a 
technical fix, but it also illustrates that some government officers see FFS as a forum for the 
government to control farmers, in ”attempts to constitute a governable subject” (Li, 1999: 
295). 
 In fact the Nepalese government, but also NGOs involved in FFS apply a rather 
technocratic approach to empowerment, as well as to participation and development in 
general, and assume that well-defined plans, farmers’ participation, empowerment and 
other development objectives are products that can be rationally transmitted to farmers to 
produce desired outcomes. Rendering technical is here a form of depoliticisation or ‘anti 
politics move’ (Ferguson, 1994), as it ignores the social and historical context and personal 
experience in favour of a formal, politically neutral approach.  Projects serve as an 
instrument to depoliticise development issues, transforming social and economic relations 
into ‘technical’ problems that could then be ‘solved’ through bureaucratic intervention 
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(Ferguson, 1994). These institutional actors consider development and empowerment as a 
process that can be directed in a certain way. Instead the actors involved in FFS make 
decisions through social, deliberative processes that are inherently political (Büscher, 2010). 
Project management strategies which detach interventions from historical, social and 
political context, or bend these realities into the discipline-bound logics of diagnosis and 
prescription (whether in education, irrigation, health or agriculture), do not achieve their 
stated objectives (Long, 2001). 
 
In this chapter I will explain that there are several indications that FFS is used as an 
instrument and part of governance in a complex setting, and with unexpected outcomes. The 
government, NGOs but also male and female farmers exercise power and together they play 
an active role in shaping the outcomes of FFS. 
 I want to show that the FFS project was implemented differently from its plan, that 
governance is a construct of different actors, a conglomeration of different actions, of 
different actors each with their own agenda and strategies. These actors do not act in a 
vacuum but are influenced by the institutional setting in which they move as part of a 
political process. Politics are here defined as the social, deliberative process with which 
actors make decisions that determine social and public outcomes (Büscher, 2010).  
In this study I consider governance as the process whereby elements in society wield 
power and authority, and influence and enact policies and decision concerning public life, 
and economic and social development59, with special focus on the Farmer Field Schools. 
Governance is a broader notion than government, whose principle elements include the 
constitution, legislation, administration and judiciary system. Governance involves 
interaction between formal and informal institutions, between the state and those of civil 
society. Since governance is the process of decision-making and the process by which 
decisions are implemented, an analysis of governance focuses on the formal and informal 
actors involved in decision-making and implementing the decisions made and the formal and 
informal structures that have been set in place to arrive at and implement the decision. 
 
8.2 FFS as a technical project 
 
FFS was set up as a project to support farmers. Interestingly, the status of farmers as the 
target group of intended beneficiaries was not described in the project documents, but it 
was simply stated that farmers had low agricultural production outputs and were in need of 
new technologies and capacities (National IPM Programme Inception Report 2003; 2009). 
 To support these farmers a project was developed with a technical approach. FAO 
stresses on its website (www.fao.org) that it is not an aid agency but it undertakes ‘technical 
cooperation’ projects (TCPs). FFS was such a TCP project through the Plant Protection 
Directorate (PPD). FAO emphasises the technical expertise of its personnel as a principle 
attribute (Crewe and Harrison, 1998). I was also one of those technical experts (see Chapter 
3) with technical advice and assistance as my key tasks. The FAO stresses its normative 
function providing guidance through collection and dissemination of information. The theory 
of value free neutrality is central to this and associated with the technical advice (Crewe and 
Harrison, 1998).  
                                                 
59
  Governance Working Group, 1996: source www.gdrc.org, accessed, 13 September 2011 
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 Despite acknowledging a need for addressing the increased complexity of 
development, and recognition of less controllable problems, governments and international 
organisations still try to use rational planning and management techniques to control 
development interventions. In order to reach our own project goals of FFS rather than 
encouraging experimentation, flexible and social learning that are crucial to assist intended 
beneficiaries in achieving their goals (Rondinelli, 1993) we focused on achieving the set 
targets as formulated in the project plans. “The language of economy permeates FAO 
documents” (Crewe and Harrison, 1998:37 and many neo-classical concepts are accepted 
“with little sense of the problems entailed by them” (ibid: 37). 
 When we started with FFS in 1997 we went through the traditional project cycle steps 
of feasibility, planning and wrote a comprehensive, well structured project document. The 
project document was a result of a rather technology-driven approach towards 
development, whereby logical frameworks formed the basis of all the activities to take place. 
In the FFS project documents (FAO, 2003; 2009) there are clear plans and detailed 
descriptions of expected, measurable outputs: the number of farmers trained, the number of 
FFS groups established, reduction of pesticide use in percentage, yield increase in 
percentage. The ideas are neatly presented in logical frameworks and budgets. A logframe, 
as it is usually called, summarises the objectives of a project and the activities designed to 
achieve them, as well as the critical assumptions that underlie the progression to project 
goals. The logframe is developed by (international) FAO staff in collaboration with Nepalese 
government staff from the Plant Protection Directorate. The logframe also specifies the 
indicators to be used to monitor the project inputs, outputs, impacts and outcomes. 
Examples from projected outputs (FAO, 2003; 2009) are: 
 
1. A cadre of qualified facilitators for rice IPM is established 
2. An enhanced ability of FFS trainers and farmers to identify and 
respond to new field problems 
3. An internal monitoring and evaluation system is established 
4. A cadre of qualified farmer trainers for rice FFS is established 
5. Improved coordination and symbiosis among IPM and FFS 
institutions 
6. Existing and newly established IPM farmer clubs/groups actively 
engaged in continuing relevant and well-designed action 
research and group learning activities 
7. Enhanced coordination with local, national, regional and 
international institutions and resource persons to provide 
technical support 
 
Indicators for the outputs are for instance the number of master trainers60 trained, the 
number of farmers participating in FFS, number of farmers who have conducted action 
research, number of farmer trainers registered, numbers of FFS groups or farmers 
associations registered with the District Development office. For me as a programme officer 
these indicators provided a set of clear targets.  
Although these project documents guided us through the implementation of the 
                                                 
60 
 A senior trainer, who has participated in a training of trainers and subsequently trains other staff to 
become a FFS facilitator or trainer, is called a master trainer. 
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project, the outcomes differed (Grindle, 1980).  Several outcomes did not turn out the way 
they were written in the project documents. Initially the project focused on outputs, 
concrete measureable results like yield increase or pesticide reduction. Outputs were 
defined as direct product of the project activities. Later it was realised that FFS led to 
outcomes which are more difficult to verify and often contain more qualitative attributes 
such as farmers’ empowerment (Bartlett, 2002). Outcomes are usually defined as the effects 
or changes that occur, that are a result of the project, but are also influenced by other 
factors. There is no blue print for development (Grillo and Stirrat, 1997), the involvement of 
many different actors in a dynamic context shows that “development is a multi-faceted, multi 
vocal process, and a complex site of contestation” (Grillo and Stirrat, 1997: viii). The logical 
framework and traditional project cycle are useful tools, but could be better used if it ‘was 
acknowledged that projects are carried out by people working in a social context’ (Biggs and 
Smith, 1998: 1748) and political environment. 
 Policy makers or decision-makers in development have scope to influence or shape 
interventions but the circumstances in which they are placed affect the dynamics and 
process of decision-making and can lead to a range of possible outcomes (Grindle and 
Thomas, 1989).  
 The coordination between institutions was not enhanced as planned, farmers’ groups 
did not function as anticipated and monitoring and evaluation remained weak during the 
project duration (Sitaula et al., 2006). This discrepancy between a plan and the final result of 
a project is not unusual as most interventions work out another way as foreseen (Grindle and 
Thomas, 1989; Ferguson, 1994; Malpas and Wickham, 1995). Decision-making, agenda 
setting and implementation take place in a dynamic institutional setting, in which many 
actors are involved each with their own agenda and strategies. It needs to be acknowledged 
that projects are carried out by people working in social contexts, with all the features of 
social relationships that are present in human interactions “We recognise that deeper issues, 
such as the broader political setting and the nature of institutional power structure in which 
projects exist, always affect the nature and content of projects” (Biggs and Smith 1998: 
1749). 
 
8.3 Governmentality 
 
To grasp the motivation and practice associated with these relations, and the power implied 
in them, in this chapter I draw upon the concept of ‘governmentality’. Governmentality is a 
concept originally developed by Foucault (Mills, 2003) and applied to development 
bureaucracies by Rose (1996), Ferguson (1994), Agrawal (2005), Escobar (1995), Li (2007) and 
others. Governmentality refers in broad terms to the ways in which society is made 
governable; it refers to an analysis of political power (Rose and Miller, 1992). 
Governmentality is the analysis of ‘who can govern and who is governed’ but also the means 
by which that ‘shaping of someone else’s activities’ is achieved (Foucault, 1991 in Mills, 
2003:47). It includes the techniques and procedures which are designed to govern the 
conduct of both individuals and populations at every level not just the administrative or 
political level. Foucault applies the notion of power as the ability “to structure the possible 
field of action of others” (Foucault, 1984 in Wolf: 1990:586). Foucault regarded the ‘order’ of 
development as a form of governmentality (Foucault, 1991 in Lewis and Mosse, 2006).  
From the perspective of governmentality, the role of NGOs and civil society in shaping 
and carrying out governance functions is not a matter of power transfer from the 
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government to non-state actors (Rose and Mills, 1992). Rather, it is an expression of a 
changing rationale of the government, a strategy by which civil society is redefined from a 
passive object of government to be acted upon into an entity that is both an object and a 
subject of government. The practice of governmentality is not fixed, different ‘modes of 
governmentality’ occur, in response to changing political ideologies, changing social and 
economic circumstances.  Foucault’s idea of governmentality was also applied by Li's study of 
a World Bank project in Indonesia (2007). She showed how international organisations 
through national government agencies are concerned with ensuring that the behaviour of its 
citizens conforms to a ‘right’ way of doing things, which will lead to a very specific set of 
goals. This can also result in forcing farmers to adopt practices that farmers are not in need 
of, but what the government thinks that the country at large needs. A typical example is the 
attempt to focus IPM FFS on rice in Vietnam because the Vietnamese government is keen to 
improve rice exports, while farmers feel that rice does not pay and are waiting for 
government support in the production of fruits, vegetables and other higher value products 
(Linh, 2001).  
Governmentality refers to the attempt to shape human conduct by designed methods 
and plans, by governance tools (Rose and Miller, 1992). Assuming that the concern of 
government is the well-being of the entire population, the government requires special 
means, since it cannot regulate and coerce each person individually. Rather the government 
(and not the state exclusively, but in partnership with NGOs, donors and other authorities) 
sets conditions “artificially arranging things so that people, following only their own self-
interest, “will do as they ought” (Li, 2007: 5). Government operates by configuring desires, 
habits, aspirations and beliefs. Power exercised at macro level, is influenced by powers 
exercised at micro level; the state is dependent on its citizens and vice versa. Individuals, by 
their own means or with support from others, play their own role in cooperation, 
negotiation, resistance or in any other ways interact to fulfill their own interests and 
aspirations (Wolf, 1990; Lewis and Mosse, 2006). 
This attempt to the conduct of conduct can be applied to FFS too. Farmer field 
schools crystallise into institutions, they form individual behaviour, act as a frame of 
reference for the perception and evaluation of things (Li, 2006; 2007).   
In terms of governmentality over the years the Nepalese government shifted some of 
its responsibilities to NGOs and civil society organisations. When the FFS project started the 
donor insisted on collaboration between NGOs and the government. This involvement of 
various actors has caused opportunities and friction from the start (Chapter 6). One of the 
reasons that FFS did not evolve as planned, is the involvement of many actors. 
 
8.4 Governance actors 
 
Government is one of the actors in governance. Other actors involved vary depending on the 
level of the public intervention at stake. In FFS these are international institutions like the 
NORAD, FAO, NGOs like CARE, World Education. At national and sub-national scales in Nepal 
these actors may include sub-divisions or departments of MoAC, DADO, influential land 
lords, farmers associations, village leaders, cooperatives, national NGOs, research institutes, 
religious leaders, banks and credit unions, political parties, the Maoists etc.  
In chapter 4 and 6 we saw that the various actors involved in FFS have different 
objectives and interests. Several actors implement FFS in different ways, there are different 
practices.   FFS can have a research focus, used as tool for vegetable production promotion, 
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or can be a forum for adult-learning. FFS as part of the CIP potato programme focused on 
disease control, World Education organised FFS as part of a post-literacy programme, DADO 
Kavre tried to promote cauliflower production in rural areas. DADO organised FFS with 
mainly Brahmin participants, CARE included more Janajati and Dalits in FFS. Within the Plant 
Protection Directorate some staff wanted to focus on insects, others on pest management or 
research (Kathmandu, interview, 2009). 
These actors did not act in isolation but are subject to several influences. One of them 
is the forces of international development paradigms. (See Chapter 4 and 6). Additionally 
political developments, migration and socio-economic changes have influenced FFS (see 
Chapter 2 and 4). 
 
At the start of the project it seemed quite straightforward. The government, in particular PPD 
and DADO (under guidance of MoAC), but also NGOs decided: where to conduct FFS, whom 
to train, the content of the curriculum, choice of crop and so on. In line with national policy 
DADO decided which crops to grow in certain pocket areas, in line with their donor policy 
NGOs decided to focus on illiterate women and Dalits. At first sight it seemed indeed that 
these organisations imposed their own agenda on men and women farmers in the field. But 
is it really that simple or straightforward?  
There is critique from practitioners that the Farmer Field School is not really demand-
driven, due to government’s forcing their own agenda upon their people. This could be in-
line with the governmentality argument, or conduct of conduct (Li, 2007). Governmentality 
has often a negative connotation associated with force.  
Dhital, a government officer is an example of a person who voiced this criticism: “We 
in the government decide what is good for the farmers” (Kathmandu, July 2009). And Sita 
(NGO staff) said: “FFS is used by our government to impose their ideas, and to force farmers 
to produce more for the country. It is not clear to me and my colleagues how they 
incorporate farmers’ needs and interests” (Kathmandu, August 2009). Do organisations have 
so much power over (VeneKlasen and Miller, 2007) farmers in their target areas? 
  
MoAC but also FAO follows certain criteria for the selection of farmers for the FFS project 
sites. The directions from FAO technical staff are illustrated with excerpts from an interview. 
(Kathmandu, July 2009) 
 
“First we discuss with stakeholders (read: DADO, sometimes DDC), which service 
centre, which wards to select, then we talk to the farmers and verify the 
information we got from the district and the service centers. 
We have to get them […..government officers] from the very beginning, we should 
not have them not knowing from the beginning. From the start the government 
has to take responsibilities. In a participatory way we are acting therefore we are 
inviting the chief of the service centre, because they know about the area.” 
 
Question: For the new project phase (mid 2009 to start) what are your selection criteria for 
the farmers or beneficiaries? 
 
“We are talking about high value crops, so farmers who already grow them can 
participate in the project. They need to have irrigation, they need to be organised 
in an association, and then we want to work with them.  We can link production, 
marketing etc. we link with the World Bank irrigation project because they have 
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irrigation associations”  
“Thus we look if:  
- Priority crops are there, which should not be rice 
- Irrigation is there 
- Pesticide use/misuse, what kind of pesticide they are using 
- Willingness of the farmers; are they willing to cooperate, all criteria go if they are 
not willing” 
“Everyone says they are willing, but are they inside also really willing, are they 
willing to participate?”(FAO, Kathmandu, interview, 2009) 
 
The selection of a certain crop is mostly determined by government and documented in their 
policies, and not on request of farmers. The government but also NGOs decided: where to 
conduct FFS, whom to train, the content of the curriculum, choice of crop and so on. (See 
Chapter 6)  
 
NGOs got involved in FFS for various reasons (see Chapter 4 and 6). The Nepalese 
government shifted some of its responsibilities to NGOs and civil society organisations. The 
NGOs became part of FFS because it was part of a global governance trend (Nebelung, 1991). 
In time of globalisation and increased international networks and responsibilities, 
governments need to collaborate more with NGOs (Duffield, 2001; 2002). This fashion I also 
observed in Nepal which was confirmed by a study I undertook for the Deutsche 
Entwicklungsdienst (DED) in 1994 on NGO cooperation61.  Since the 1990s indeed in Nepal 
there are more NGOs, international and local, that take over roles previously undertaken by 
the government. 
Sometimes NGOs also have certain reasons to work with the government, as is 
illustrated by the words of an NGO staff member: 
 
“If DADO is motivated all other partners will also be motivated, then it is good to 
work together. Be aware that there is also often hidden expectation. IDE (an NGO) 
wants to show (their funders) USAID that they have good collaboration with 
DADO, this increases their chance for more funds. USAID wants to see smooth 
cooperation with the government from NGO side.  I have observed that IDE takes 
always ex-DADO staff for employment. They do this because this guarantees 
better collaboration with government in the future in the districts” (Tanahun, 
NGO staff interview 2010) 
 
There are sometimes conflicts between the government and NGOs regarding roles and 
responsibilities. NGOs have to work within a given framework of the government which 
inevitably limits their room for manoeuvre. They have been given a certain mandate, 
allocated certain districts or regions where they can work and get certain procedural 
instructions from the government.  
There were reports on awkward collaboration efforts between local NGOs and 
government staff. There was mistrust on both sides: 
A DADO chief said: 
 
 “NGO does not like working with the governmentt only at some stage they ask us 
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 Westendorp, A. (1994) Possibilities for Deutsche Entwicklungsdienst Nepal to collaborate with NGOs – 
an inventory of experiences of other international agencies and NGOs, internal report for DED Nepal. 
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to come and observe but at a late stage.  This does not stay in the system”. 
(Tanahun, interview, 2009).  
 
Hereby he referred to remaining in 'the system' that NGOs action is not sustainable if it is not 
linked to government activities. NGOs are donor dependent organisations and might not last, 
because if they do not get 'outside funding' they cease to exist. While according to 
government staff, the government remains always in place, the government system is there 
to stay. (Kathmandu and Tanahun, interviews, 2009) 
 
NGO personnel expressed doubts about working with the government: 
 
 “Government staff only want to work with us if they get extra money or training 
or other benefits. They are never genuinely interested in working with us NGO 
staff for the benefit of the country, it is always related to personal 
interests”(Kathmandu, interview, 2009) 
 
There are differences observed between collaboration between NGOs at district and central 
level. Generally there is more close collaboration at district level, especially when NGO staff 
like their government counterparts, have received agricultural education at Rampur, the one 
and only (government) University for Agriculture and Animals Science (IAAS). In Nepal, 
Rampur graduates feel affiliated with each other and one of the first questions when people 
in the agricultural sector meet each other is: Which batch are you from? Referring to the year 
one has graduated from Rampur IAAS. Several staff in the government, CARITAS and CARE 
have studied at IAAS and worked either for the government before or after their NGO career. 
 
There are many constraints in collaboration especially because of differences in 
administrative procedures, finances, leadership and ownership of the collaboration, but also 
different attitudes towards the FFS, working with farmers in general. Administratively the FFS 
remains in the Department of Plant Protection, the first professionals associated with IPM 
were entomologists, who feel that they are the owners of the programme. Although the FFS 
agenda is expanding with staff from extension, research and NGOs, there remains tension 
between the different organisations. Government agencies and staff look at NGO staff with 
envy due to the salary they receive, and NGO staff continues to regard government 
personnel as bureaucratic, corrupt, and associated with government politics. In an interview 
with one NGO, a staff member said: “Government officers only work if they get more money 
or daily allowance, otherwise they do not want to work “ (Kathmandu, interview 2009) 
 
Another NGO staff member said: 
 
“They (government staff) always expect incentives from the NGO,. Synergic 
planning we can do, but they always look for money. We need to collaborate with 
them and when we have no incentives to give we just promise them that we will 
try to get more money for them in future projects” (Tanahun, interview 2009) 
 
A third NGO officer explained why he preferred to work for an NGO: 
 
 “I like working for an NGO. There are several reasons: Good salary, the working 
environment is pleasant, you consult directly with scientist, there is less hierarchy, 
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there is a learning environment. My father is a teacher and he was disappointed 
when I went to Lumle as JT62. He wanted me to learn more. In the government 
office I would get a job in sewa kendra63 (agricultural service centre), with local 
people and the learning environment was less. So I was happy when I could join 
an NGO “(Kathmandu, NGO staff, interview 2009) 
 
Government agencies are generally reluctant to work with NGOs as these organisations often 
act as recipients rather than donors. Additionally they compete for support from the 
population in the rural areas.  Reputation and legitimacy (upon which governance depends) 
are scarce resources, which governments have to share with other organisations active in the 
same field. Success is fragile and failure will create political problems which governments 
want to avoid (Li, 1999; Mosse, 2005) 
 
CARITAS realises that collaboration with government agencies is crucial for the sustainability 
of its programme. As one officer said:  
 
“We work together with the government, because in the long-run we will need 
each other. CARITAS has involved government Master trainers to train their own 
staff on FFS. We work a lot with government organisations; we want a smooth 
cooperation with the government” (Kathmandu, CARITAS staff, interview 2009). 
 
At the same time CARITAS is also aware of the weaknesses of the government. As the 
programme officer told me: “NGOs work more conscientiously than government officers. 
Government officers are not able to implement effectively, they have little money and 
different attitude”(Kathmandu, interview CARITAS programme officer, 2009) 
Among the NGOs there has been a shift: CARE had lost interest in FFS (Kathmandu, CARE 
staff interview, 2009), and CARITAS has become a major player. World Education expressed a 
high interest but has little influence in the entire project because it operates only on a very 
small scale due to small fund allocation for FFS. In an interview with World Education staff 
they expressed the problems with getting funds for FFS: “It is stressful to raise money all the 
time, to keep everything going. I am on the 3rd proposal for FFS in three months” 
(Kathmandu, interview with NGO staff 2009).  
 They also showed their dissatisfaction with their current relationship with PPD:  
 
“All donors want to put money through the government these days. Nobody wants 
to fund private or NGO system anymore. Everybody thinks by putting money 
through the government makes them stronger. World Education and CARE do not 
get on with government coordinators of the FFS IPM programme and therefore do 
not get funding”. And:  
“All new FAO project money goes to Chitwan, Jhapa, Barsa not to where there is a 
real need. Only money is allocated for 20 FFS for all the NGOs. That is not even a 
token gesture. We have to do all the reporting etc. it is too much work in return 
for little funding.  The coordination we had with PPD and FAO regarding FFS 7-8 
years ago is no more”. (Kathmandu World Education, interview 2009) 
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 Junior technician in a government office. In Lumle there is a government-run agricultural research 
centre. 
63
    Agriculture service centre, that covers a few villages or VDCs (see Chapter 2) 
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It became obvious from the above information that the involvement of different actors in FFS 
created a dynamic situation with ever evolving relationships and interaction.  
 
8.5 Changing views on farmers 
 
A closer look at FFS reveals how the state not only sees the farmers as objects but also  seeks 
to govern the farmers or rural population, however, this view has changed over the years.
 Generally in the eyes of the state, as well as FFS actors in Nepal, the majority of 
farmers are subsistence farmers who produce for their own consumption, who face lack of 
irrigation, lack of adequate technology and skill manpower (World Bank, 2011b), and who 
are ignorant (World Vision International Nepal, 2009). The picture below confirms this 
stereotypical view: the male farmer with a simple hoe and the women in the shadow of her 
husband, carrying a heavy load.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.1 Traditional picture of farmers in Nepal64 
 
Farmers, but also households and communities are treated as a black box, assuming a 
uniformity that does not exist (see Chapter 5 and 6).  
 
Over the years in Nepal a shift took place from the sovereign state to a state that has more 
concern about its population (Gellner, 2008). While the state holds nominal power and 
controls most of the public resources disbursed at district level, village leaders and farmers 
are increasingly able to exert power. In particular with the democratic movement in the 
1990s and the removal of the panchayat system, the government started to focus more on 
citizen concerns. In 1997 government officers acted as patrons, and farmers did what they 
said. Farmers in those days expected the government to look after them. Government staff 
were considered ‘all-knowing’ and farmers were seen as ignorant and stupid. In 2009 most 
farmers still considered agricultural extension officers as knowledgeable, but farmers are 
more aware that they have rights and they realised that they could demand services. 
Increasingly they request services from the government. It was reported that today farmers 
frequently come to the DADO office and ask for inputs or advice.  
 
In FFS too, farmers were encouraged to become critical thinkers and through a process of 
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  Source: Developmentart (2006) available at: http// developmentart.com (accessed 18.03.2012) 
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discovery-learning in FFS training make informed-decision regarding field management. The 
discussions that were part of FFS made farmers more confident and vocal. The traditional 
working relations have changed; famers have become subjects rather than just objects. 
 
 “I used to tell farmers what to do. In the FFS training of trainers I learnt that as far 
as possible I try to facilitate. Never try to teach a farmer”. (interview government 
staff, july 2009)  
“Farmers come to our office to ask for FFS” (Tanahun DADO office, FGD 2009, 
August).  
“Increasingly farmers come to me to ask for FFS. Farmer trainer: “I have too many 
requests from farmers to get FFS in their village, I cannot meet their demand”. 
(Kavre district, August 2009)  
 
Although it happened on a small-scale it is a sign that farmers feel more confident to 
approach the officers. The environment has changed. It is nowadays naïve to consider the 
government or NGOs as the actors who can decide everything and regard the farmers as 
passive beneficiaries or oppressed citizens rather than subjects who are actively involved in 
co-shaping rural development. 
A DADO chief explained: “Traditionally there was a patron-client relationship between 
government staff and farmers. This is gradually changing. There is more pressure from 
farmers on government officers to perform. There is a general feeling among government 
staff that farmers do not trust them very much, or that they do not respect them well. He 
continued: we should give some good planning and programmes to farmers, but we should 
really implement it and we should stick to this, then the farmers will also believe us/trust us 
(biswas garchha)”.(Kathmandu, Interview 2009) 
In 2009 during my interviews the agricultural sector was involved in a change from a 
top-down to a demand driven service. In this approach government officials wait for farmers 
to ask for assistance rather than impose. Also government staff asks for more inputs from 
farmers, especially knowledge and labour participation. Farmers’ knowledge is valued. Most 
farmers had difficulties adjusting to this system as shows the interview (Kavre, focus group 
discussion, August 2009) below:  
 
“Government official: you can ask us for advice, this is for free. We are ready to come. We 
have motorbikes, cars, we can come to you. We have different facilities.  
Before the government told you what to do. But nowadays we work for you, you 
pay tax, we earn salaries from your tax. Now you can demand our services. 
 
Farmers: “Before sir called us and we came for the training. He did not tell us we could 
demand his services.” 
 
Government official: “You have to give us work. We are ready to serve you”.  
Farmers; “ We also did not go or call you. We did not know, we had no knowledge. We are 
surprised that we could call sir from the office”.    
 
Farmer: ”It is a bit easier if we know the sir, but when the former JT got transferred we did 
not know who to call. Our people are not there. Also we go to the office and then 
there is nobody there”. 
The officer: “The government is yours, as well as mine”.  
Farmer: We have no idea how to make the government ours. Our work is rice, we have no 
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knowledge. (Still after FFS the farmers feel like that the officer sighs to me).  
The officer says: “You exaggerate you have received training. There are more remote areas 
where they have never had training or service, like Jumla Humla”. 
 
Farmers: “Now you say to us: we have not called us, you blame us for not calling you.  
If we do not have a person that we do not know, no aphno manche then we will 
not get information or seeds when we ask it in DADO”.  
Agricultural government officer: “No you have to come in a group and demand seeds”. 
Farmers: “We did not know that we have to come in a group to demand inputs”. 
 
The situation became a bit uncomfortable; the government official showed in this interview 
that he is fed up with complaints from farmers. The farmers conclude:  “you guys eat salary, 
we eat rice. We have hardship, you are lucky”.(Kavre, focus group discussion 2009) 
 
A new element in the relationship between communities, their elected representatives and 
the state is the on-going policy of decentralisation. The extension of state power to the 
periphery and to provide a more responsive and locally accountable administration is 
encouraged by the World Bank and UNDP.  In 2009 we saw that village development 
committees (VDCs) got more power as part of the decentralisation of government decision-
making and as such more influence in the use of funds for FFS. DADO also got more 
responsibilities, among which allocation of funds to the villages 
In interviews it seemed that DADO and farmers’ interest in FFS has decreased over 
the years. As some officers and FFS trainers said: “FFS are high input, low output 
interventions for us”. Generally the respondents were positive about decentralisation; 
“There is more money at VDC level” (Kavre, interview 2009). Still respondents were 
concerned about misuse of funds at local level. In discussion with communities during 
fieldwork, people expressed strong and generally critical views about their relationship and 
interactions with government.  
The relations between government and farmers have changed in the decentralisation 
process but also influenced by the Maoist movement, and FFS has contributed to this 
process.  
 
For Maoists farmers are key producers of food for the nation, and they are mostly 
considered proletariat, especially the small holders or landless. Among the Maoists who 
called for class struggle, fight against imperialists and feudalists and  “power to the people”, 
Farmer Field Schools were at first seen as tools to encourage farmers to organise 
themselves, to increase self-belief,  plus increase food production to feed the population. 
For the Maoist movement in Nepal the focus in FFS on farmers (or proletariat) who learn to 
think critically, who learn to question government and other interventions, who get involved 
in ‘informed decision-making’  appealed in 2002. There are examples that FFS farmers 
became more vocal and assertive, claimed more support from government offices and other 
service providers. Some of the FFS farmers became Maoist party members or district leaders 
(e.g. in Mahadevsthan VDC, Kavre district). But generally in the field Maoists in FFS 
encouraged farmers to learn well and to focus on improving food security of the nation. One 
Maoist leader pressed in a FFS session:  
 
“Please farmers learn new technologies and increase the food production. You are 
the future feeders of our nation” (Kavre, interview, 2009). 
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8.6 FFS and structural power 
 
There is a great deal of interaction between different actors.  A continuous process of 
negotiation, bargaining, reaching agreements, resistance among all actors takes place. 
Underlying these process are complex power dynamics. Power exists in every relationship. 
Power is not a tangible thing to be possessed or measured, but sets of relationships that 
change, circumstances that alter;  the sites of power relations are not singular but multiple, 
overlapping and concurrent (Foucault, 1988 in Mills, 2003; Li, 2007). 
The concept of power is one that is often taken for granted, yet one that is at the root 
of governance, empowerment and theories on participation of groups or individuals. 
Regardless of its ‘fuzziness’, ‘power’ can be seen as a driving force behind the exclusion of 
certain groups in society, in the relations of dominance and subordination existing between 
certain groups and between individuals, and in the potential for certain people to exhibit 
agency and to ask for social change. This can be clearly to observe relations of dominance 
like patron-client or Bahun-Dalit, but usually there are more complex webs of relationships 
and more imperceptible power dynamics. It can be argued that power acts on the individual 
at multiple levels, and that it can be a force impeding individuals’ actions and potentials. 
There are several ways to look at power. Earlier I explained the different forms: power to, 
power over, power with, power within in relation to empowerment (Chapter 7). Eric Wolf 
(Wolf, 1990:587) applied a notion of power that structures the political economy introducing 
the term of ‘structural power’. His model on the levels at which power operates can be 
helpful in understanding governance and the forces that impede and those that can promote 
empowerment and farmers’ participation. 
 
Wolf identified four modes of power related to his concerns with political economy, modes 
of production, and deployment of social labour (Wolf 1999; 1990). Wolf based his theory on 
Pierre Bourdieu and Michel Foucault. Power is, according to Wolf, an aspect of all relations 
among people. Eric Wolf’s conceptualisation of the relationship between ideas and power 
and, in particular, of the interconnectedness between what he identifies as the ‘four 
modalities of power’, can be a theoretically helpful starting point in thinking of governance 
and farmer’s empowerment in the Nepalese context. These four ways in which power is 
woven into social relations are (Wolf, 1990: 586): (1) power of potency or capabilities 
characterised by a particular individual (power within); (2) interactional power or the power 
of an ego to impose its will on social action upon another (power over); (3) tactical or 
organisational power, where individuals circumscribe the actions of others, or the control of 
contexts in which capabilities and interactional potential can be exhibited; (4) structural 
power, if powerful enough, that organises the settings and specifies the direction and 
distribution of energy flow. Structural power controls behaviour and access to resources 
(Wolf, 1990). Structural power is derived from Foucault’s concept of “governmentality” and 
“shapes the social field of action so as to render some kinds of behaviour possible, while 
making others less possible or impossible” (Wolf, 1990:587). Additional to the relational and 
instrumental view of Foucault, Wolf looks at cultural aspects and ideologies, following 
Bourdieu (1990). 
In ascending order of inclusiveness these modes represent the potency of individuals, 
the social interactions of groups, tactical power, and structural power (Wolf 1990). In this 
scheme the four modalities are not mutually exclusive; they interact in complex ways. But for 
Wolf structural power is most important, for it relies on the other modes of power to 
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account for the deployment of power within a social field, it works to the advantage of those 
who hold it. When does a situation occur where the settings have been changed, a direction 
is given to a certain flow of energy/ when does structural power occur? These four 
modalities of Wolf can help uncover how dominant ideologies affect the agency, autonomy, 
and ability of social actors to access and make use of power.   
Wolf's first two modes of power, individual and group, are variations of Weber's idea 
of power as an attribute of a person's potency or capacity in power relations to impose their 
will on others. The potency of an individual or capabilities can be based on the social and/or 
economic position of a person, his or her health status, knowledge, and control over 
resources. FFS was initiated by a powerful leader. Despite initial reluctance to get an FFS 
programme started in Nepal (see Chapter 1 and 4) the PPD chief in 1997, played a key role in 
getting things started. He saw perspective in the Farmer Field School. The PPD chief 
welcomed the IPM programme because he realised that the plant protection needed a new 
impulse and the Farmer Field School could provide this. Hereby the notion was implied that 
the Farmer Field School was purely an integrated pest management approach. He was happy 
to be linked to a UN project, which would guarantee funding, and prestige. He was able to 
mould policy, even in times that his directorate was fully focused on spraying calendars and 
conventional pest management. He created support for the FFS programme, he assured that 
expansion happened nationwide and that all PPD staff got trained before any other staff of 
the MoAC.  When FAO strongly recommended starting on a small-scale in a few districts, he 
ignored their advice and launched FFS in almost all the districts in Nepal. But he was not 
acting in a vacuum. It is to be noted that the PPD bureaucracy was not a coherent whole, but 
included officials with diverse views, whose interactions constantly reproduced and modified 
PPDS practices. The chief was influenced by many of his colleagues; he is part of many 
relationships, within his directorate, the department of agriculture, FAO. Not only in his 
professional sphere, also in his private life is he engaged in relationships. He also has a family 
that puts pressure on him. At one stage this pressure led him to employ his cousin in the 
programme. One officer told me:  
 
“Our Chief started the IPM programme. Immediately in the beginning of the 
project he gave a job to his cousin. But after a couple of years there seem to be 
some friction between them. Now they are not in touch with each other anymore. 
He said to me I do not get in touch with him anymore. We manipulate each other: 
if I do him a favour he has to do me a favour” (Kathmandu, department of 
agriculture officer, interview July 2009) 
 
It should be noted that this particular person was a male, belonging to the Brahmin caste, 
with affiliations to the ruling political party at that time, all aspects that had played a role in 
him getting into his position as decision-maker in the first place.  
Projects need many supporters in order to come into existence. Therefore powerful 
leaders are needed to persuade others.  With others (Bartlett 2005; Biggs and Smith, 1998; 
Mosse, 1999, 2005) I recognise that the views and actions of a few people can be crucial to 
the progress of our work: a village elder, a director of a department, a programme manager 
from the donor agency, a driven expert. Lipsky (2010) emphasises that leading individuals are 
not simply devices in the process, but rather have substantial ability to mould policy 
outcomes. In the case of the FFS programme these leading bureaucracies were found in the 
committed and active deputy IPM leader at the plant protection directorate, the charismatic 
leader of World education and the committed programme officer at CARE Nepal (Bartlett, 
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2005). Those who work in these institutions influenced the practical implementation of the 
FFS programme and produced an outcome that suited them. These people have the ability to 
make things happen, or to obstruct them. We also know that the opinions of these people 
are based on personal interests and value judgement probably even more often as they are 
based on economic considerations. If we want key decision-makers to promote a particular 
intervention we need to be equipped with technical and financial information plus an 
understanding of what drives these people. We need to understand their hopes and fears, 
their motivations, their affiliations and connections, their past experience and aspirations 
(Bartlett, 2005). 
The capability of an individual to impose his will on someone else is often related to 
power people derive from the societal or structural position he/she has and the resources 
he/she possesses, including knowledge and symbolic capital. The FAO officer is male from 
the higher caste, which gives him by birth already more symbolic capital than the Janajati 
woman who is the secretary in his office. With his educational degree, earned in India he has 
more knowledge and advantages on the job market than the peon who is uneducated. This 
particular FAO officer has a high position in the hierarchy of the organisation and can 
influence the FFS programme. He controls the budget and can allocate resources in areas he 
feels important. He can make lower staff, such as his secretary or peon, work for him, to 
collect data, write letters or simply demand a cup of tea. He can select his own district for 
FFS implementation and influence the project outline. 
Powerful people in privileged positions can influence decision-making, they have 
considerable scope to shape and influence development processes, but there are several 
factors that influence their room for manoeuvre and the outcome of the decision-making or 
implementation process (Grindle and Thomas, 1989). 
Interplay between the power and interests, but also beliefs of various actors 
contribute to the emergence of contradictions between project plans and practice. In a 
situation involving more than one person or organisations, issues of interpersonal and inter-
organisational power relations arise.   
 
When we look at the different relations we see a complexity of power dynamics, influenced 
by socio-cultural, economic and political factors. People who are seemingly powerful might 
be vulnerable at the same time. For instance if we consider the FAO officer who is in charge 
of the financial resources and the entire FFS programme run by the government, he is 
powerful and susceptible at the same time. The FAO officer has power because he is in the 
position to decide what to do with the fund, whom to involve, where to start the project, in 
which districts with which stakeholders. He has high status because he is from the FAO, he 
can decide about financial matters, but at the same time he feels weak because the donor 
and the entire FAO leave him in charge and they ‘lean back and watch’ (Kathmandu, FAO 
staff, interview, 2009). On the other hand he feels powerless, he has a short-term contract , is 
dependent on the donor and the good will or collaboration of the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives. This is shown by his remark: (interview, 2009):  
 
“I had a hard struggle to get money for FFS. Even government, who used to fund 
FFS  a few years ago, has now mainly FFS funded with donor money. 
Donor and FAO representative are just sitting back and waiting for the results”.  
He also feels pressure to prove that this is a good project. “Nowadays donors are 
not interest in funding FFS: they think it is not sustainable.” We need to convince 
donors that it is a good project and that we need further funding”. (Kathmandu, 
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interview July 2009) 
 
Besides these official relations, the FAO officer is influenced by informal relations, or hidden 
agendas, which can explain why he selected his ‘home district’ for a pilot project. As one 
officer in PPD said: “The FAO sir selected his own district, even though it is not a good FFS 
district, they are not really active there with FFS” (Kathmandu, PPD, interview July 2009) 
In Nepal people in government, but also in NGO positions, act on the basis of 
approval from their community, rather than on the basis of professional performance (Bose, 
1991). Rather than representing the interests of Nepal as a whole, people who are elected or 
appointed to positions of power tend to exercise that power to benefit the interests of the 
group that installed them in their post. People with relatives in positions of power and 
influence expect those individuals to direct resources (public spending, jobs, contracts) 
towards the interest of the family or kin, rather than to the country as whole (see Chapter 2).  
Individual and interactional power of individuals is context dependent and subject to change. 
Traditional views and attitudes but also historically established practices (see Chapter 
2) still have some bearing on daily practices: aphno manche (nepotism, appointing people 
you know, linking only with your ‘own people’), patron-client relations, chakari (paying 
money to get a job or favour), albeit in slightly changed forms.  
An example of personal favours is given by the process of the allocation of funds to 
the district agricultural offices. From 1997 – 2002 funds for FFS were disbursed to district 
agricultural offices by the PPD. This was mainly decided by one person, the deputy IPM 
officer in PPD. Usually this was done on the basis of funds available and on personal 
relationships: “ We will look at the number of districts that can conduct and want to conduct 
FFS, then we divide the fund: give 2-3 FFS each. However, I will not give any money to 
Sindhupalchowk because the officer in charge of FFS is not active” (personal communication 
PPD staff, 2001). And: “In Danusha the officer is nice and active so I will give him more funds” 
(Kavre, personal communication PPD staff, 2001). 
Chakari was common practice in the time of the Rana’s to get a position in the 
government, but nowadays chakari can still be applied in many ways to force a favour from 
someone.  
Some government officers explained what chakari means in their profession:  
 
“Nowadays, one of my peons is doing chakari to me. Actually he is not that good 
and nobody cares about him. Even the boss doesn’t offer him any work. You know 
that if there is no work, definitely there is not any profit for him. He thinks that I 
am very new and I don't know any bad comments about him, that’s why he looks 
at me for opportunities ” (Tanahun, interview July 2009) 
 
And:  
“One of my JT always loves to go to the field and every time he brings something 
(vegetables, oranges, seedlings, potato etc.) from the farmers for us. We, as our 
family lives in Kathmandu, always love these things without paying. Because of his 
good chakari everybody likes to recommend him to be sent to the field. On the 
other hand he is also making good money Rupees 700 per day with the field 
allowance. (Kavre, interview, July 2009) 
 
Or:   
“Chakari are hidden but a well- known facts: Most of the Dado or farm chiefs are 
 222 
 
giving cash or goods (good quality rice, fruits, potatoes, fuel), whatever they have 
in their district, to the  central level authorities as chakari. (Chitwan, interview, 
August 2009) 
 
Chakari takes place at all levels:  
 
“Farmers also do chakari for us if they want to get something good  from us like 
money for irrigation, revolving fund etc . If so, they might even  kill a cock when 
we visit their home.” (Kavre, interview, August 2009) 
 
People derive power of potency or capacities from the position they hold, the resources (like 
knowledge, money) they have, but also from connections they have. From all the interviews 
conducted with officers it is clear that personal relationships play a role in getting a position, 
getting a role in a project, receiving budget or fund request approval. “If you don’t have 
these personal relationship then your chances are nil or limited”. (Kathmandu, interviews 
with NGO and government staff, 2009 and 2010) 
As one official from the government said: 
 
“I tried to get an IPM adviser post in FAO but with no luck, because”  as she says 
“ none of my people are there anymore (Kathmandu, interview 2009)” “In fact I 
am worried: I am out of the FAO circle, I do not know anyone anymore. Not in 
touch, I do not have my name on FFS network lists anymore.”(Kathmandu, 
interview, 2009) 
 
These relationships can be based on several factors; the fact that people followed the same 
education (“We went to Rampur together“), that they are relatives, from the same village or 
district, have the same political party or views, have a background with the same discipline 
(plant protection, social scientist). There is not a clear-cut demarcation. Sometimes a relative 
might be helpful in getting a job or sometimes relatives avoid contact because they do not 
want to fulfil social obligations. “My sister has left for the USA, and she never visits us 
because she does not want to feel obliged to give us presents, money or jobs” (Kathmandu, 
Interview with government officer, 2009) 
 For a long time it was mainly men from higher castes who got powerful positions and 
acquired most resources, but due to donor pressure and the Maoist movement this is 
changing. Some Brahmins feel discriminated these days: 
 
“Nowadays we are discriminated against. We cannot get a government post any 
more; we have to compete with Dalits and Janajaties who are favoured. I feel it is 
not fair.” (Government officer, Kathmandu,2009) 
 
The third and fourth modes of power, as indicated by Wolf, tactical and structural, are 
extensions of the first two modes. Tactical power occurs when the practices of some agents 
in political fields and arenas circumscribe and give opposition to the practices of other 
agents. Tactical power is much linked with individual’s agency. Structural power happens 
when agents in political fields and arenas organise the settings in which political processes 
occur, so are able to direct the flow of power strategically (Wolf, 1999; 1990). 
Tactical or organisational power was often observed in FFS. Many PPD staff was 
interested in expanding their mandate and using FFS as an extension tool, but this is being 
 223 
 
blocked by other directorate staff or by the department of agriculture. Within PPD there are 
conflicts of interests: some divisions or staff members are interested in promoting the use of 
pesticides, other want to stimulate application of integrated pest management. Even 
collaboration with general agricultural extension staff is complicated. Agriculture extension is 
a separate directorate within the department of agriculture and staff are reluctant to adopt 
an approach from the plant protection directorate in a domain that they consider as theirs. 
Despite the fact that within the MoAC it is generally expressed that Farmer Field 
School would be a good approach for agricultural extension, this has not been put into 
practice. FFS is still mainly considered a pest control or integrated pest management tool. 
Many vegetable production officers and agricultural extension officers at department and 
district level have been trained in a Training of Trainers to conduct FFS in an effort to broaden 
the scope and scaling up of FFS. Also the current FAO officer in charge of FFS is a great 
promoter of a more holistic approach in FFS.  
FAO: “Focus has been on pest management, but we have to move beyond plant production. 
IPM does not contribute significantly to production of Nepal’s agricultural sector.” 
(Kathmandu, interview, 2009) 
However it is difficult to get this materialised. As FFS started in PPD it remains seen as 
a PPD activity. The first trainees and also foreign trainers came with a plant protection 
background. Also key leaders in PPD and FFS are focused on plant protection, in a very 
technical sense. An agricultural staff member acknowledges this problem:  
 
“FFS is an extension approach, but it is not nationally accepted due to professional 
clash. The extension staff always says: it is the responsibility of the plant 
protection staff. This is the case at PPD level as well as district level”. (Kathmandu, 
MoAC officer, September 2009)   
 
Even after inclusion in the FFS project, several agricultural extension staff and DADO staff 
from other disciplines besdies plant protection, quietly resist FFS as an extension approach. 
After the training of trainers they just do not get involved in FFS or give the responsibility to 
someone else, a junior technician or a farmer trainer.  
This resistance is not just among staff from other disciplines, many women in DADO 
refuse to go into the field to conduct FFS. Women who were trained to become FFS facilitator 
often use excuses as not being able to go to the field due to household responsibilities. “Yes I 
was trained to facilitate FFS, but with my children it is difficult to go to the field (female 
officer Chitwan, interview 2009). And: My in-laws do not like it when I do field work (female 
officer, Kaski, interview 2009). Or: I would like to do FFS, but I cannot ride a motorbike and 
do not know how to go to the field, so now I do office work”(female officer, Kathmandu, 
interview 2009). 
 
Structural power goes beyond the organisational, is more linked to the institutional and 
happens when agents in political fields and arenas organise the settings in which political 
processes occur, so are able to direct the flow of power strategically. Structural power 
happens when relationships modify and ideologies change. 
Structural power is not easy to achieve, and not easy to facilitated by external forces.  
In order to achieve structural power an analysis of the current power dynamics is crucial, 
whereby the three dimensions:  visible, invisible and hidden by Gaventa (2006) are useful in 
particular to locate invisible power.  
Structural power can translate into a combination of visible (observable decision-
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making), invisible (shaping meaning and what is acceptable)and hidden (setting of the 
political agenda) power, which in turn affects the individual, interactional, and organisational 
modalities of power. 
NORAD and FAO exercise visible power when they determine the size of the budget, 
the reporting guidelines for FFS. DADO officers show authority when they decide the crops 
and the sites for FFS. Visible power can be observed in the explicit inclusion or exclusion or 
marginalisation of certain groups that is institutionalised and legitimised in policy making 
and laws, like the government imposed quota of 33% for women participants in group 
activities of FFS. 
Hidden power, or the setting of the (political) agenda, refers to ways in which 
powerful groups control access to positions and resources, decision-making processes. In this 
case, the processes of exclusion and marginalisation are not as apparent as in the case of 
visible power because they are usually not rendered public through policies – instead, these 
dynamics operate on multiple levels and rely on existing factors, both material and 
ideological, and relations that already limit subordinate groups’ access to the public arena. 
These relations can be institutional, determined by caste or ethnicity, whereby lower castes 
or ethnic minorities are excluded from decision-making in the political domain. This can be 
determined by gender roles, where women can be subordinated as a result of patriarchy. In 
Nepal hidden power is often shaped by personal relations or in terms of nepotism, aphno 
manche, the employment of “own people” (see Chapter 2).  
 
Considering hidden and invisible power can help explain why even when policies are put in 
place to change clear and obvious aspects of inequality, access to such power is not always 
given to those targeted by such policies, even if lower caste people or women are granted 
special rights as citizens, they might not benefit. For example, when the law was changed 
and kamaiyas (lower caste who were forced into slavery for many generations in Nepal, in 
particular in the terai) were given freedom, because slavery was officially abolished, many 
kamaiyas becamet worse off. They no longer had a land lord to protect them, to give them 
employment and food or salary, nor did they have a shelter. The views, beliefs, regarding 
kamaiyas had not changed. 
In a similar way when women were granted official land rights, by a government 
policy amendment, many women did not benefit. It was often the husband or male family 
member who used the opportunity to put land in her name but under his control. It was a 
measure to appropriate more land for himself than is officially allowed by the state.  
Patriarchal ideas maintained the status quo of women in relation to land ownership. The 
hidden agenda of the government to impose these laws can be international approval or 
economic efficiency, while invisible power can be manifested ideas or norms and values of 
roles and dominant social groups. 
On the one hand, the effects of ‘hidden power’, or the way the political agenda is set 
and what issues take central stage in political discussions, can affect how such policies are 
implemented at the local level or how local actors can dismiss their relevance. On the other 
hand, the effects of ‘invisible power’, or of the ideological boundaries, give legitimacy to 
rejection of policies or maintenance of inequality and serve to reinforce the status quo – thus 
imposing limitations on individual actors and often leading to their internalisation of a 
inferior, subordinate position. In this form of power, people may be unaware of their rights, 
their ability to speak out, and may come to see various forms of power or domination over 
them as ‘natural’, or at least unchangeable. Dalits might consider it ‘natural’ that they are at 
 225 
 
the lower ranks in society, women might consider it ‘normal’ that they are dominated by 
their husbands.  
Experiences of inequality, social exclusion and poverty are often rooted in historically 
established beliefs about – culturally and socially acquired outlooks on, race, caste, ethnicity, 
gender, age and so on. Such historical views are not easily changed. In fact historical 
dispositions inform current practice, current practice reinforce views and attitudes 
(Moncrieffe, 2006). In interviews I came across some of such dispositions or internalised 
(negative) self-image of accepted superior or inferior position: 
 
“I am a Dalit, probably because I did something wrong in my former life” (Kavre, 
interview 2009) 
 
“As a woman I should not complain. It is my duty to cook rice and daal, do dishes, 
wash clothes, collect firewood, collect fodder from the jungle, milk the cow, cut 
grass, ‘lipne65’ our house, care for the children, the in-laws, my husband, do puja66 
day-in-day-out. This is what is expected of a woman. If I would neglect my duties I 
am not a good wife or mother and this might have repercussions, which I accept. 
This is my fate” (Tanahun, interview 2009) 
 
Others maintain certain dispositions about people. For instance one agricultural extension 
officer tried to describe to me what a person from the Magar population looks like: 
 
“They (Magar) are kind of backward. They are not like us (Brahmin), they are 
lathaa -dumb” (Kavre, interview 2009) 
 
Dalits are often depicted as dirty, backward: 
 
“They are dressed a bit scruffy, not very clean and speak with rude words”(NGO 
worker, Pokhara, interview 2009) 
 
But also people from higher castes are described with biases, as one remark shows: 
 
“The people from higher castes try to dominate us” (Janajati farmer Tanahun, 
interview 2009) 
 
“They (Brahmins) use us as kotala (plough labourer), they use us as labourers, 
they consider us as inferior” (Dalit Kavre, interview 2009) 
 
To change these views and to strengthen the capacities of marganised people in society is a 
complex task. An example of this complexity can be read below, which is an example of an 
NGO’s attempt to change the setting and give more resources and power to Dalits.  
 
A local NGO installed a drinking water system in Yamdi a remote village, high 
above the Tibet – Kathmandu highway. This village has a large Brahmin and Dalit 
settlement. Prejudices exist in this location: “Brahmin’s are clever and suppress us 
Dalits” and “Dalits are not interested in changing their status, getting education or 
learning new skills” (Kavre, interview with Brahmin and Dalit villagers, 2009). The 
                                                 
65
  Maintain the walls and floors in and outside the house with a mud/manure mixture. 
66
  Religious rituals, usually Hindu or Buddhist in Nepal. 
 226 
 
drinking water system was to benefit Dalits in the first place, therefore the NGO 
put as requirement that the drinking water committee should be formed by Dalits. 
The chairman and secretary are now Dalit men. The other members are Brahmins. 
The NGO was pleased that the Dalits were in decision-making positions. They 
went ahead with the project and installed the water tank. The NGO called their 
project a great success and an example for other VDCs. However, little did they 
know that the Dalits in the committee could not attain anything in meetings that 
they were in no position to make real decisions, and worse than that many of 
them could not even get much access to drinking water. First of all the Brahmins 
forced them to build the tank in the area were the upper caste people live, far 
from the Dalit community. Then at every meeting the Brahmins, who would turn 
up in majority, blocked any proposals put forward by Dalits. The Brahmin 
community was constantly resisting and creating problems. They caused troubles 
with water supply to the Dalits, and irritated them with lots of discussion and 
refusing any agreements during meetings. (Field notes, August 2009) 
 
With donation or resources and giving official responsibilities visible power relations were 
moving in favour of the Dalits. The hidden agenda of the NGO might have been to attract 
more financial support from foreign donors. Ultimately however, invisible norms about 
values, norms and rights in the society created tensions and hampered smooth operation of 
the drinking water system. 
 
Like all organisational cultures Nepal’s bureaucracy is not exempt from socio-cultural 
influences of the larger society (Gurung and Biggs, 2010). Caste, gender ideologies permeate 
and underscore this ethos and consequently wield considerable influence on organisational 
practice.  For instance relatively few women are represented in the agricultural offices and in 
the National IPM programme of FFS in Nepal. It is normal to find societal norms and practice 
of patriarchy and caste permeating the organisational culture in particular of the 
governmental organisations that implement FFS.  
Traditional views and habits are persistent but not static. This was shown by a remark 
by a Brahmin DADO chief who took part in FFS training of trainers: 
 
“I was used to going to a training course for the financial allowance. My fellow 
colleagues and I were not used to planting rice or getting our hands dirty, it was 
not prestigious. But in the training we became proud to grow our own rice. 
Becoming dirty was the new status that got admiration” (Training of trainers, 
conversation with government officers, 1997) 
 
Wolf’s (1990) notion of structural power seems to be a useful concept to apply to the 
governance of FFS. To what extent has FFS had an impact on changing the institutional 
setting? Which strategy has been effective in changing visible, invisible and hidden power 
dynamics?  
 There are a couple of strategies that are key to FFS, and could be called instruments 
or tools of governance (Li, 2007), which I have selected to study through the lens of 
structural power: the application of a participatory approach, group mobilisation and the 
employment of farmer trainers.  Did these strategies induce structural change? And: how did 
this occur? 
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8.7 Structural power and FFS participatory approach  
 
The participatory approach was a key strategy to be followed in the FFS. How does the 
concept of structural power help us to understand the dynamics of participation in FFS?  
First of all ‘participation’ is a concept that is popular among government agencies, as 
well as NGOs. It is a concept that provides a ‘shared agenda’ among donors, NGOS and 
government and therefore easy to pursue (Mosse, 2005). In FFS farmers’ participation was 
introduced in a technical way as part of the compulsory steps to follow in FFS. With groups of 
farmers containing 25 individuals, activities in sub-groups, discussions with a certain set of 
questions, tasks in field work, responsibility given to farmers to collect data, participation 
was instructed to FFS trainers in a technical way, with clearly written guidelines. 
Nevertheless, it was a new approach and a different way of working for government officers, 
who were used to talking to individual, so called model farmers. It was also new to have 
discussions with farmers or let farmers work in sub-groups, the conventional extension 
approach was more a lecture or a demonstration to farmers.  This way participation got 
institutionalised and accepted as the new way. This participatory approach changed the 
settings, changed the agricultural extension approach of DADO. 
Before FFS agriculture extension took place in traditional top-down fashion, with the 
all-knowing extension officers explaining new technologies to a selected group of farmers or 
a few model farmers. The role of the farmers was a passive one: listening to the message of 
the extension worker and adopting proposed changes, new farming practices or 
technologies. Farmers who took part in conventional agricultural extension were usually 
educated male Brahmins, who owned land. In FFS the group of farmers was not selected by 
the agricultural extension worker, but the communities themselves decided who would take 
part. Initially it were the same male Bahun, educated privileged farmers who were selected 
for FFS, but gradually the composition of participants changed (see Chapter 6), and became 
more diverse. Then in the FFS training farmers were encouraged to discuss in small groups, to 
question or debate with each other, to think critically. The extension officer got more a 
facilitator’s role in this process. In the field they practised discovery-learning and problem-
solving skills that would lead farmers to take informed decisions regarding farming practices. 
No longer were the extension workers telling farmers what to do. 
Initially farmers’ participation was not a topic on the agenda of plant protection staff.  
Farmers got instructions, were told what to do. Farmers felt obliged to fulfill obligations 
towards government officers and often expressed a certain fear: 
 
“We had always fear to cut the goat” or “We always had to cut chickens” 
(Interviews, 2002, 2009).  
 
Despite the fact that the plant protection staff was trained in a conventional way, and used to 
talk to farmers about calendar spraying, pesticide use, threshold levels, they were ready to 
work on the FFS approach. They were happy to talk about integrated pest management and 
the FFS, using a vocabulary such as farmers’ participation and learning about natural 
enemies and pests.  This was not purely due to a quick mentality shift or attitude change, or 
acknowledgment of a need for farmer training and a more participatory approach. They were 
instructed by their superiors to conduct participatory farmers training using the FFS 
approach. Certainly government staffs were made to believe that a more participatory 
approach in working with farmers was needed, but it was not until they started practicing it 
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that they experienced that it made their job more fun and their efforts more effective: 
 
 “I used to think that farmers were stupid and ignorant. Since the FFS project, I 
now always think of farmers as a tank of knowledge gained from experience and 
try to learn from them in order to make my service efficient and effective” 
(interview government staff, july 2009) 
 
 For PPD staff one of the reasons they feel that the FFS was successful is because they 
became more respected by farmers. Before they had to explain about thresholds, which was 
quite difficult, or they were called for a pest outbreak but  they could often not avoid that 
the damage was already done. The participatory approach to FFS was more enjoyable and 
gave them more job satisfaction.  
In the old days talking with farmers was not considered status-enhancing but after 
FFS interaction with farmers was valued more. Also the international donor community 
appreciated this shift: “It is good to see these government officers talking with farmers as if 
they are equal” (conversation with NORAD staff 2002).  
Farming in Nepal is seen as a dirty job in particular by (government, Brahmin) officers. 
During FFS training of trainers we tried to change farm practices into something positive, into 
hands-on training. In the training of trainers the government officers felt they got 
brainwashed. As a result their attitude towards working with farmers changed.  
 
“I was brainwashed in Jhumka during first IPM TOT (integrated pest management 
training of trainers), I liked it very much. It lasted four months; we did got no 
bhatta (daily allowance), lots of practical work and long days. We all became real 
good friends. Farmers learnt digging out the problems in their field, they learnt to 
talk. But also the officers learnt to talk with farmers. I never had such a pleasant 
training as in Jhumka” ( “Before FFS I found half an hour talking with farmers too 
long, now a day is still too short.” (DADO Chief, Kathmandu, interview 2009) 
 
In FFS we realised in the training of trainers that government staff, who were mainly male 
from higher caste, were not used to physical labour, in fact turned up their noses at field 
work. The following statement by one senior government officer said (Jhumka, 1998, July) 
was confirmed by other government officers:  
 
“We had no idea how to plant rice, we were reluctant to go into the paddy field, 
and we did not want to get dirty. The facilitators forced us and said it was part of 
their training. So we planted our own rice, we watched it grow, we weeded the 
fields and we got very proud. We were proud to show it to our superiors when 
they came to visit. Planting rice also increased our credibility with farmers. I am 
glad I have done the training and went into the mud”. 
 
Another officer said:  
 
“For us a government job was working in the office and occasionally visiting 
farmers in their houses, but never did I expect to go into their actual fields. When I 
had to do this in the FFS training it was new to me, a big challenge, but also 
enjoyable” (1998, July). DADO staff: I gained more respect from farmers when I 
went to the field, but also my friends in NGOs started to appreciate my work more 
when I went on field visits. (Kavre, interview, 2009).  
 229 
 
 
The DADO Chief said: 
 
“We were used to training being only theoretical and bhatta but this training was 
different. We had to do our own work. We felt uneasy in the beginning. Also 
farmers felt this way, they did not get any bhatta, any money, but they learnt a lot. 
We also taught people how to speak, how to work. We learnt so much by doing 
practical work, discovery learning. We learnt a lot how to control brown plant 
hopper”. (Kathmandu, interview, 2009) 
 
We did not learn much in Rampur (BSc agr. campus), we learnt more in this 
training-of-trainers’ course. After this I also had confidence I could run the 
training-of-trainers or FFS. I conducted a training-of-trainers and refresher course 
in Nepalganj.” (DADO Chief, Kavre, 2009) 
 
In 2004 the deputy IPM programme coordinator concluded:  
 
“In the beginning there were doubts on the success of the program as there was 
generalised pre conceived thinking that government agricultural officers do not 
work in the field with their own hands. However, it was proven that officers 
showed their capabilities in field work.”(PPD and FAO, 2004:5) 
 
Structural power took place when institutional change and ideological and attitude change 
occurred. A participatory approach became an acceptable way of working with farmers and a 
new philosophy for government extension workers. Howerver ideological barriers prevented 
inclusion of all sections of society in FFS. 
 
8.7.1 Social exclusion 
 
In Chapter 6 it became clear that not everyone was able to take part in FFS. It was not just 
lack of education, time or no access to land that explains social exclusion. It is the history, 
politics, prevailing ideologies (such as based on patriarchy, Hinduism, ethnicity, political 
affiliation such as Maoism) and power relationships, which explain social exclusion 
processes. 
There was clear evidence of social exclusion in certain villages: some people were 
consciously invited some were not informed. But on other occasions or in some areas 
exclusion happened in a more subtle way, through indirect discrimination. 
 
In interviews and discussions it became obvious that FFS trainers and officers, but also village 
leaders played an important role in participant selection.  
Some (male and female) participants said in interviews that the officer had told them 
to come; they felt they had an obligation to attend. This is related to their past, to historical 
events, from the times that citizens felt obliged to follow orders from government officers.  
In most villages visited in 2002 and 2009 there are Brahmin (male) landlords or village 
leaders: from our research we noticed14 out of 17 villages had Brahmin leaders in  2008, 
2009. In the minds of lower caste people upper caste individuals have manipulated 
government programmes in collaboration with government staff (Kavre, Tanahun, Bhaktapur, 
Sindhupalchowk, farmers -interviews 2008, 2009).  But this conflict is not limited to 
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Brahmin/Chettries and lower caste people. In other villages too I have observed and talked to 
dominant groups and groups that felt excluded. In Kavre district Tamang people live uphill 
and are distant from resources such as irrigation but also far from the centre of the village 
where information regarding training opportunities appear. In Dapcha the participants were 
all from the central ward in the VDC, they all belonged to the Newar community. This had 
created tensions with the Tamang (Janajati) population who  live in other wards, further from 
the centre, more on the higher hills, and who were not invited to take part in the FFS. During 
a focus group discussion a Tamang man expressed his anger about being excluded from FFS 
training (and other DADO and development activities) and said he was interested to learn 
about agriculture just like his village brothers. His confidence was brought about partly by 
alcohol. The Newari participants reacted with embarrassment and statements like: “Oh well 
people from his ethnicity are like that” (implying: they drink and behave uncivilized). The 
Newari people explained that they were educated and the agents that brought development 
to their village, would eventually also benefit the other ethnic groups.  
In the neighbouring village Syampathi, the selection process was done differently: the 
VDC leader had chosen two people from each ward to take part in FFS training. As a result 
there were Tamang, Newari, Brahmin participants. It was not clear if there were also Dalits in 
this FFS. At any rate the selection was done in such a way that people from different wards 
felt represented. Groups that were composed of such a diverse group from different 
locations usually fell apart after FFS (Humagain, 2008). (See Chapter 5) 
 Government officers admit that they usually go to the leader farmers that they have 
worked with for years, or generations. “We work with farmers with whom we have a long-
standing relationship” (DADO Kavre, interview July 2009). And: “We go first to the village 
leaders, when they are helpful the whole village will cooperate” (DADO Tanahun, interview 
2009). Especially in the first FFS, it was mostly the so called elite farmers who were 
approached, who took part in the training and as a result benefitted. However, after the first 
FFS, in the same area often another FFS was conducted and this time round other farmers 
got a chance to learn in FFS (see Chapter 6). Masaki noticed: (2007:115) the officers turned 
to the elite in first instance, but that is not necessarily a bad thing. “We should not assume 
that elites want to exploit or suppress” (ibid.: 64). Like Masaki (2007) I have observed that 
most of these elite farmers are not necessarily oppressing people, they also want others in 
the villages to benefit from development interventions. Many of these leading farmers feel 
that it is their obligation to help others in their village. Like one farmer said: “I help my 
people to get development”. (Kavre, interview , 2009). Many Brahmin leaders see themselves 
as generous benefactors, helping the poor and uneducated.  
Farmers too have potency and use power due to their extensive knowledge of an 
area, or his relations with influential people. As one extension officer said: “ I need to have a 
good relationship with the farmers in this area, because if they are unhappy I will have 
trouble. He was referring to an area where many Maoists are living (Kavre, interview, 2009).  
Another DADO officer said: “I need to talk to this leader farmer because he is important, he 
knows many people. If he agrees with our project, all other people in his village will too”. 
(Kavre, interview, 2009). 
 
A number of government officials still considered FFS as an intervention in the old-style that 
depicts local people in need of guidance from outside agencies, such as DADO or agric-
service centres. Along this line they invite people to attend FFS. In fact they often instructed 
people to come. 
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 When asked in Tanahun, a group of eight Gurung women unanimously said: “Sir 
asked us to come” (Tanahun, interview, 2009) 
 
The same replies came from women in Sindhupalchowk and men and women in Kavre. In the 
past it were men who were invited by the extension officer, but in 2009 more women were 
called by the sir (being a JT or government officer that does not seem to make a difference, 
any (male) representative of the government or NGO is referred to as ‘sir’. 
In Sunthan people responded: 
 
“We do not know why we actually took part. We thought we can learn from 
agriculture, so we just joined FFS, we do not know why. Probably because this was 
a chance to learn something. Agriculture is our work. The Officer from DADO/JT 
came and organised a meeting with everybody. 25 people in a group learned 
about cauliflower. It was very pleasant, we had fun, we learnt a lot from the DADO 
person. We felt like family together”(Kavre, interview 2009). 
 
Feminisation of agriculture has been addressed in chapters 2 and 6. As a result of their 
increased responsibility and visibility in agriculture women are more targeted as 
beneficiaries or participants in agricultural interventions such as FFS. This way patriarchal 
expectations of women, to provide unpaid care, is perpetuated not only in respect to the 
domestic space but also in respect to national food security or agricultural production. 
  
The selection procedure of FFS participants might have happened in a top-down manner, but 
it also offers an arena to which farmers react and resist decisions taken. Sometimes women 
just sat in FFS session without talking or fully participation. Others left early on the grounds 
that they were busy with their household work, or they were not feeling well, drawing on the 
myth that women are prone to get sick, that they are weak. Sometimes people send other 
family members and now and again they just did not turn up. Ordinary people are not 
entirely submissive to its external forces (Masaki, 2007:3). They had way to subtly and 
unobtrusively renegotiate power relations by virtue of their underprivileged positions that 
also served as ‘structural properties’, using limitations and opportunities arising in their day-
to-day lives.  
Progressively more people are not only selected because they are powerful landlords 
or traditional village leaders, or contact farmers, but because they are political leaders. 
Nowadays it is not plausible to ignore local elected leaders while forming FFS groups. One 
official said: “It is part and parcel of the democracy or the new politics of our country” 
(Kathmandu, interview August 2009) 
 With the Maoist movement gaining power (Chapter 2) NGO staff and government 
staff feel compelled to include more people who were Maoist supporters in their FFS. So  one 
government officer said that he wanted to keep good relations with farmers in Paanchkhal 
and Mahadevstan in Kavre district “because they are strong Maoist leaders” (interview Kavre,  
2002) 
World education staffs admit that it is not easy to select the right individuals  for FFS: 
 
 “It is difficult to select right persons for FFS: the men who take the decisions, the 
leaders, or the daughters-in-law who do all the work?” (Kathmandu, interview 
August 2009) 
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8.8 Group formation 
 
Another aspect of FFS that is a typical feature of the programme is the formation of groups. 
This was in-line with the government policy, where the ‘group approach’ was promoted in 
the APP.  As was reported by PPD and FAO (2004) that the FFS group can “solve their 
problems by using local knowledge and resources” (2004:50).  And: “the emphasis is on 
strengthening self-reliance and group interactions among farmers, therefore the 
sustainability of the FFS approach in  the hand of the farmers rather than the government 
institutions”(2004:2). Group mobilisation can also be considered part of governmentality, as 
a governance tool. 
Rose et al. (2006:85) call the process of group formation ‘responsibilisation’ whereby 
the groups formed get the responsibility to plan and find their own destiny, to solve their 
own problems, to work towards autonomy. Thus the task of the government shifted towards 
the community. The increased popularity of social capital or group building, and community 
development, can be best understood in the light of economic liberalisation and public-
sector restructuring Ben Fine (1999).  As Fine puts it, the slogan of development agencies has 
become “Developmental state is dead — long live social capital!” Group mobilisation is a 
result of programmes such as ‘structural adjustment’ that have reduced governments’ 
budget for public expenditure and redefined the state’s responsibilities for government 
services (Fine, 1999).  
Group formation, or as Nebelung calls it the 'mobilisation' approach (1991: 263), is a 
widely practiced strategy, where so far no common understanding has been evolved about 
its goal, it theoretical and practical implications and the potential obstacles (263) “Group 
cohesion is not created around an idea of 'solidarity' but around materialistic views” 
(Nebelung, 1991: 274) (see Chapter 5 for more on group dynamics). This is confirmed by 
Cleaver (2006, 2001a, 2002) who warns against group mobilisation without considering 
existing (non) formal institutions and other contextual dynamics.  
 
In Nepal the group approach became popular and official government policy in the 1990s 
(APROSC & John Mellor Associates, 1995) and is often regarded a method to empower 
people, but also as a way to give responsibility to communities for their own development. In 
interviews and group discussions it became clear that most people are involved in several 
groups: road committee, forest users, mother and health group, mother savings group and 
so on. Working with groups is an example of a ‘shared agenda’ among NGOs and government 
agencies. The MoAC promoted a group approach and so did INGOs and local NGOs, albeit for 
different reasons.  They all found common ground in working with groups as happened in the 
FFS. Several NGOs work with established groups. After FFS they continue with the group with 
other activities. World Education, for instance,had built literacy groups with women. After 
the literacy classes the same groups got FFS training. After FFS they continued with another 
activity. CARE had vegetable growers groups and worked with the same groups on FFS. After 
FFS they continued with income-generating activities in some communities. CARITAS links 
FFS farmers groups with existing farmers’ cooperatives. CARITAS' idea is that this will increase 
the sustainability of the FFS group and at the same time will guarantee marketing of the 
vegetables they learn to produce in FFS. (Kathmandu, interview 2009) 
Prior to starting the training FFS groups of about 25 people are formed. These groups 
first receive FFS training and afterwards are expected to act collectively to work on 
‘development of their own communities’. Usually the FFS groups registered with the VDC as 
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CBO. In some communities the groups did indeed register and continued to meet and work 
on community activities, such as irrigation (Lamichane, 2008), but this was usually the case 
when follow-up support was given by either the government or by an NGO. In most places 
however, the groups dissolved after FFS, (Humagain, 2008). 
 Many groups expressed that they wanted more services from the government; they 
expected a continuation of support after FFS. Several groups were left disappointed. Their 
newly established close link with the government officer was something they expected to 
intensify. Rather than taking action to initiate new activities themselves many farmers were 
waiting for “sir” to come back and help them move on. This is not unusual, people generally 
want more services from the government or expect NGOs to fulfill their promises (de Vries, 
2007) 
Group mobilisation can be a governance tool, but citizens are not simple passive 
beneficiaries. If people do not want to stay in groups or farmers associations, these groups 
dissolve. Group members do not just duly follow instructions of agriculture production, but 
have their own ideas about the interpretation of the instructions. In FFS it was hoped or 
assumed that groups would remain active, solve community problems and work on collective 
empowerment, but in most cases this did not happen (See Chapter 5). Groups disintegrate 
when activities do not pay off materially or socially. Also people left the group when they did 
not feel comfortable, where there was no social cohesion. Participants left FFS groups due to 
caste, ethnic, gender, age, educational differences. Ideological barriers and social viability are 
often underestimated in group mobilisation (Rankin, 2001). Groups that were not newly 
established for FFS, but already existed as vegetable growers group or farmers group, are 
more likely to remain active after FFS training. FFS where mostly women take part are more 
liable to remain functional in FFS groups then Farmer Field Schools with mostly with male 
members. For most women FFS was the first agricultural training they got, and they 
remained active in the FFS to support each other.  
To summarise, the group approach was not a new strategy for development 
organisations in Nepal. It was already part of the government policy and FFS  worked with 
groups but did not necessarily change the setting or direction of farmers groups. Most 
groups dissolved after FFS activities were terminated. In the case of group formation 
structural power did not occur, when most groups dissolved after FFS. There was no 
institutional or ideological change.  
 
8.9 Employment of farmer-trainers 
 
A further instrument that can be considered part of a governmentality strategy in the FFS 
project was the introduction of the concept of farmers’ trainers, farmers that are trained to 
become FFS facilitators. Like group mobilisation this is a way for organisations to work more 
cost-efficiently with farmers. From another point of view it can be seen as a way to give more 
responsibility to farmers, or decentralise decision-making, but also to incorporate more local 
knowledge and concerns in FFS was by introducing the concept of farmer trainers. This 
strategy was received by farmers and officials with mixed feelings. An official explains: “The 
extensive employment of farmer trainers to conduct FFS has its advantages and 
disadvantages. The key advantages are that it is relatively cheap to expand the FFS, or up-
scale FFS. Moreover, local farmers speak local languages, know the people and their 
circumstances better than government or NGO trainers” (Kavre, interview 2009).  Another 
officer states: “The quality of FFS is lower when conducted by farmer trainers than when FFS 
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is run by government officers”. (Kavre, interview 2009) 
 
Also from the farmer trainers point of view there are troubles reported, as is illustrated by a 
farmer trainer, employed by NGOS, as well as government officers: 
 
“Some people do not join FFS because they say; it is only for A ’s advantage, she 
earns money. Others do not think they can learn anything new (join generation) or 
do feel they do not get any financial incentive to join.” (Bhaktapur, female farmer 
trainer, interview, 2009) 
 
Now there is virus disease in tomato, the farmers are worried and have lost 
interest in FFS because there seemed to be no solution. I am worried, how to keep 
the group together. (Bhaktapur, female farmer trainer, interview, 2009) 
 
Shiva is another farmer trainer and worried “I really do not know how to handle disease in 
tomato, I do not have the knowledge”.  
Devi, a farmer trainer in Tanahun: 
 
“I did not know how to address problems in cucurbit, so the whole crop was lost 
due to pest and diseases. I learnt a lot, but the farmers were disappointed.” 
(Damauli, interview, 2009) 
 
The concept of farmer trainers was readily adopted by the government, in particular because 
it was cost-effective, much cheaper than employing government officers to run FFS. But the 
quality of the FFS is questioned by some. Both farmers and government staff have doubts 
about the quality of FFS run by farmer trainers. The possibility of accepting farmers training 
other farmers is influenced by history, international forces and prevailing cultural norms and 
values or ideologies, whereby decades of feudalism patron-client relations, patriarchy and 
Hinduism have a big impact in Nepal. The institutional setting is as such that government 
officers still claim and receive more respect, but the situation is changing and increasingly 
the role of farmers training other farmers is accepted. Structural power occurred. 
Increasingly people believe in the capacity and strengths of farmer trainers and in their 
ability to train other fellow farmers. The recruitment of farmer trainers has brought about a 
change in traditional thinking and practice of agricultural extension. 
 
8.10 Conclusion 
 
By looking at FFS from a governance perspective, I moved away from the usual assessment of 
FFS on farming practices or agricultural development. The ‘governance’ lens sheds light on 
the role of the implementing agencies and decision-making processes, and gives greater 
recognition of the complexity of implementing effective development interventions in which 
FFS farmers as subject play an active role. There are several indications that the state 
(donors, government and NGOs) use FFS and the FFS project as a governance tool: the 
project plan is defined by the Nepalese government and FAO with measurable objectives, 
strategies and budget allocations. There is a purposeful selection of the place where to 
conduct FFS, and the definition of the target group or intended beneficiaries. There is careful 
selection of FFS trainers, the content of the training is determined a priority by government 
agencies (mainly DADO, PPD) and NGOs, and selection of the crop is decided by the district 
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agricultural office. These all seem  measures to control the project pathway.  
 Still the FFS project did not work out as planned; the careful engineering of the 
project steps and strategy did not prevent the prevalence of unexpected outcomes.  
 
First of all the involvement of various actors with their various roles and interests in FFS, 
different practices construct FFS and the project as a whole in many ways. Their interactions 
and (sometimes conflicting) interests guarantee a complex web of relations and inherent 
power dynamics. 
Applying Wolf’s model of structural power I showed that several governance 
instruments were applied to give direction to FFS. The involvement of NGOs, the group 
approach, guidelines for a participatory approach, employment of farmer trainers were 
examples of tools used in FFS. However, just the tools did not provide a change of the 
setting, a social transformation, a change in power dynamics. These long-term or structural 
changes occurred only when ideologies, values changed and invisible power was addressed.  
It can be argued that FFS is being used as governance tool, giving responsibilities to 
farmers for their own development, solving their own problems. Group mobilisation and the 
use of farmer-trainers are some other examples of a shift of responsibility for service delivery 
from the state to farmers themselves. FFS changed the institutional setting to some extent; it 
gave room for farmers’ participation, which was not common practice in conventional 
agricultural extension. Participation was introduced in a formal way by the FFS project, but 
became an acceptable way of working with farmers by government officers and NGO alike, 
and farmers appreciated this new way of interacting with extension agents. The attitude and 
ideology of both farmers and agricultural technicians or extension workers changed. A 
participatory way of working became accepted practice.  
Nonetheless it became clear that these strategies cannot simply be forced upon 
farmers and can only be employed with collaboration of the farmers who are meant to 
benefit from FFS. The state might push, but other actors and the institutional environment 
resist, collaborate, and determine the space for manoeuvre. While FFS is part of a measure 
of the state to influence behaviour of its citizens and a strategy to achieve increased 
agricultural production, the farmers for whom FFS is intended, influence the implementation 
of this intervention. Farmers are far from the passive victims depicted in project documents, 
but they exercise their agency and increasingly raise their voice. 
 Additionally the analysis showed that ideologies of caste, patriarchy, ethnic belonging 
but also historically evolved relations and ideas affect agency and the ability of social actors 
like farmers and project staff to make use of power. 
 
The context in which actors operate, but also the actors themselves are subject to change. 
For instance, farmers who were traditionally trapped in patronage systems and mainly 
considered as tax payers are nowadays more respected as clients who can claim services. 
Formal and informal institutions, such as ethnic identity, caste solidarity or gender roles have 
obtained an inherent function in FFS agenda setting. Prestige, belonging, or other aspects of 
symbolical capital play a role. Power is woven into social relations at different levels starting 
from individual potency, to group interaction and structural or institutional levels. 
Farmers stressed that they liked the FFS, it provided them with a forum to discuss 
agricultural problems they face, they learned about ways to improve their agricultural 
production. They claimed that through FFS their relationship with the government improved. 
Rather than control over farmers, FFS facilitated interaction. It became a popular approach 
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that was applied by many organisations, and expanded in many areas by which numerous 
farmers enjoyed participation.  
Governmentality as a concept is helpful to analyse governance strategies. For getting 
a better understanding of governance and rural transformation, a change in relationships 
among actors and their ideologies, the notion of structural power is more useful.  
 FFS has been institutionalised (Chapter 6), facilitated empowerment (Chapter 7) and 
as a project it has contributed to the long-term process of rural development by promoting a 
positive view on farmers as actors in development, generating the appreciation of more 
interaction with male and female farmers in a dynamic setting where historical traditions and 
widespread views on caste, gender, and religion keep affecting the agency of actors.  
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Chapter 9  Conclusion 
 
“If Bhagwan does not help us we 
have to do it ourselves” (female 
farmer, Sindhupalchowk, interview 
2009) 
 
 
9.1 Methodological reflections 
 
This has been a longitudinal research project during which a great variety of methods have 
been used, from a survey providing quantitative data using statistical analysis, to flexibly 
designed semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions and observations providing 
more qualitative data. Like the FFS project I myself have evolved over the years, and so have 
the methods I applied. My position as an insider in Nepalese society and in FFS through my 
previous work and life in Nepal has provided me with unique opportunities to deepen my 
understanding of the data collected. If I had known at the onset of the project in 1997 and 
during the survey in 2002 that I would use all the data for a PhD research, I could have tried 
to follow and interview the same farmers over the years.  
Unfortunately this was not the case. There was no linear planning for this research in 
1997 and I faced uncertainties and unexpected situations, which led to unexpected 
outcomes. This, however, is not unusual in research. The large amount of information 
gathered for this study spans more than a decade, providing a rich source of new knowledge 
that hopefully contributes to a better insight in the practice of development interventions 
such as FFS and its role in rural development in Nepal.  
 The notion of a developmental problem being ‘rendered technical’ (Ferguson, 1994; 
Li, 2007) has provided inspiration for this study. Because of my experience with teaching 
Gender and Development courses and working with men and women in Nepal I realised that 
this notion still lacks a gender dimension. With gender I refer to the socially constructed roles 
and behaviours of and expectations regarding women and men in society. The nature of 
gender relations is not easy to grasp in its full complexity. Gender relations are revealed not 
only in the division of labour and resources between women and men, but also in ideas and 
representations – the ascription to women and men of different abilities, attitudes, desires, 
personality traits, behaviour patterns, and so on.  
In this thesis I have used gender as an ordering principle and I have not elaborated on 
gender relations, which was beyond the scope of this study. I was particularly interested in 
the different experiences of men and women in applying agricultural skills learnt from FFs 
and their different experiences with empowerment.  
 Now, coming to the end of this thesis, there remain many topics that require further 
investigation. Rather than closing my research, I feel that I have only just started and that I 
have gained better insight into what issues need further study, such as gender relations 
associated with governance and changing caste-related power dynamics in Nepal and 
elsewhere. But to conclude this thesis let me first account for the answers to the three 
research questions. 
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9.2 Answering the research questions 
 
The quote at the beginning of this final chapter is a remark from a female farmer in the mid 
hills of Nepal who was interviewed during the course of this research. She expressed 
disillusionment with the sources of support she previously counted on, like Bhagwan, God; 
her faith in religion, but also in the government - who was until recently considered a 
representative of the God or goddess in Nepal - has been shaken. Together with many other 
women in her village she took development in their own hands.  This woman was not an 
exception among the respondents in this study.  
 The contrast between the remark of the young male farmer in Chapter 1 and this 
woman’s words encompasses the changes taking place in rural Nepal: On the one hand the 
younger generation who has lost interest in farming (with some exceptions) and, on the 
other hand, the women who have increasingly taken responsibilities in agriculture. The role 
of the state, historically confined to government agencies has made room for a governance 
of multiple actors including NGOs. The government was previously considered to be looking 
after its citizens whereby farmers were treated as duty-bearers, but this also has changed. 
Farmers have become more aware, more vocal; they are demanding services and claiming 
their right. Within this dynamic setting the Farmer Field School (FFS) project took place 
which was the subject of this research.  
 
This thesis is based on both the practice of doing development through the FAO financed FFS 
project in the 1990s and the subsequent study of development in Nepal in which FFS was 
instrumental. The objective of this research was to look if FFS had lived up to its promises 
and contributed to agricultural development and the empowerment of farmers.  I tried to get 
a better understanding of the process of rural transformation over the last decade, the 
power play of actors at multiple institutional and societal levels, and the political-economic 
and social changes that have taken place during this period.  In this research I have reflected 
upon the practice of ‘doing development’ through my active involvement and leading 
position in the implementation of FFS in Nepal in the 1990s,  the way FFS as a tool for 
development became embedded in Nepalese governmental structure and institutional 
setting, and how it contributed to social change over the last 15 years. With my study I 
provide insights into FFS as a development tool for the benefit of both development 
practitioners and scholars.  I have used the Farmer Field School as a case, but the conclusions 
may be applicable to other interventions in the agricultural sector. 
 
The three main research questions that followed from the research objective were:  
3) What is the contribution of Farmer Field Schools in rural development 
4) How did Farmer Field Schools contribute to the empowerment of male and female 
farmers and rural transformation in the long-term? 
5) How did FFS become embedded in the Nepalese governmental structure and for who 
is the Farmer Field School a tool of governance in Nepal? 
 
In the chapters 4 to 8 partial answers to these questions have been given. In this concluding 
chapter these answers are brought together. Additionally, I will reflect on the theory and 
methodology used in this research. This chapter and this thesis conclude with some final 
considerations regarding the future of FFS in Nepal.  
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1. What is the contribution of Farmer Field Schools in rural development? 
 
Development or transformation is a complex social process in which intended beneficiaries 
often have different objectives than project planners. Drawing from the experience of the 
Farmer Field School project as a carefully planned intervention, this research demonstrates 
how change came largely as an unintended result of people’s actions in a dynamic socio-
economic environment, rather than as an outcome of strategic planning. 
 Farmer Field Schools were introduced in Nepal as an integrated pest management 
project in 1997 with concrete output oriented goals: the increase of agricultural production 
and pesticide use reduction. This was a government policy and the government used FFS as a 
vehicle to introduce vegetables and expand the vegetable production area. Over the years 
many farmers, increasingly also women received training. FFS was initially a project 
conducted mainly by the Nepalese government, in particular the Plant Protection Directorate 
but along the way more and more actors became involved, each with their own agenda and 
objectives. They all constructed FFS in a way, despite their different concerns and sometimes 
even conflicting interests. Yet, the resulting friction (Tsing, 2004) between organisations did 
not lead to destruction. On the contrary, it provided a variety of justifications to promote 
Farmer Field Schools, leading to the expansion of the approach and the institutionalisation of 
the concept - as long as the actors involved could implement FFS in a technocratic and non-
political way, somehow finding some common ground. Vaguely used concepts such as 
participation served the purpose of finding common ground. . 
 
FFS started as a project with a clear objective and written documents in which the duration 
was indicated, from 1997 to 2002. In villages where FFS was conducted eight or more years 
ago we still see that farmers continue with some of the practices that they  learnt in FFS 
training. FFS  started as a project but generated a continuous process of change.  As often is 
the case, there are several positive and some negative outcomes. Although it might not be 
exactly the way project planners had proposed in their documents, a fact is that farmers do 
still apply some of the agronomic practices that were introduced in FFS. Farmers developed 
new skills, changed their cropping patterns, diversified with vegetable production, and 
changed their agronomic practices such as  in weeding, fertiliser application, and spacing 
between plants. Yields increased and pesticide use was reduced. Increased knowledge led to 
improved practices and better informed decision-making skills.  One can conclude that FFS 
indeed contributed to agricultural development in Nepal.  
For several reasons the FFS project management could not fully control project 
implementation and not everything went according to plan. First of all there are many 
different actors involved in the FFS programme, from the government to NGOs and farmers, 
all with their own agenda and strategies, and acting in a dynamic political-economic context.  
On the one hand farmers were educated in discovery-learning and critical thinking; on the 
other hand they were expected to adopt the new techniques that were introduced in FFS. 
We learnt that farmers are not helpless victims who adopted vegetable production or used 
fewer pesticides because they were being told to do so. Farmers made their own choices, 
their own decisions, whereby men and women clearly exposed different interests and needs.  
Practices that have been introduced were adapted, made suitable and were re-embedded in 
locally situated practices (Arce and Long, 2000). Moreover, although in the project farmers 
were treated as a homogenous group, I have given evidence that men and women used FFS 
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in different ways. 
Soon it became apparent that FFS was not an end in itself and that the training 
farmers received generated a process of capacity-building and rural development, not only 
involving farmers but also the technical staff themselves. Over the years FFS developed and 
the intended outcomes became more process oriented, such as farmer empowerment and 
capacity-building. With its focus on participation FFS gave a boost to agricultural extension in 
Nepal enabling it to move away from the conventional top-down and purely technology 
transfer approach. FFS facilitated a more practical orientation and a closer collaboration of 
trainers and extension workers with famers. Agricultural technicians changed their attitude 
towards farmers and they came to better appreciate their local knowledge and ideas, and 
started to accept farmers as partners in development, rather than citizens who have to be 
told or instructed what to do.  
The content of the training did not change dramatically, but the context did. Started as a 
technical intervention FFS evolved into a process that took place at multiple temporal and 
spatial levels in a dynamic socio-cultural, economic and political context. Also the 
composition of the FFS groups changed in the period of 1999-2002 and 2009 (See Chapter 6). 
Initially we could observe a courtesy bias  towards the rural elite, village leaders, high caste 
and well-educated men who were invited to take part in FFS. Recently more women, illiterate 
and Janajatis were included, and occasionally a token Dalit was allowed to participate in FFS. 
These changes should be seen in the light of the involvement of a variety of actors, but also 
as a result of the changing political-economic conditions of Nepal and the influence of 
globally changing development paradigms. The war, outmigration of men, and the 
emancipation of women lead to a feminisation of agriculture. The Women in Development 
movement, a government policy that demanded a compulsory participation of 33% women 
in agricultural activities and, simultaneously, the strong commitment shown by female 
farmers together resulted in an increased participation of women in FFS at the turn of this 
century.  
In practice FFS confirmed the national inequalities based on caste, landlessness. Dalits, 
who have little to no land, were excluded from taking part in FFS. They were usually not even 
informed about the training opportunities. Patterns of access and control to resources 
changed in particular in favour of women. The participatory processes, the group 
discussions, the discovery-learning approach has encouraged farmers to raise their voice, to 
think critically. This trend   coincided with the political changes.  Democratisation processes 
in Nepal gradually led to the inclusion of more Janajati and incidentally a few Dalits in FFS by 
2010 FFS thus provided a platform for a more democratic governance process.  
 
2. How did Farmer Field Schools contribute to the empowerment of male and female 
farmers and rural transformation in the long-term? 
 
In the FFS project power - being the key element of empowerment - is mostly considered an 
asset; hence empowerment is mainly regarded as an instrument. The FFS approach towards 
empowerment is a good example of the ‘rendering technical’ of a new problem. Rendering 
technical is a form of depoliticisation or an anti-politics move (Ferguson, 1994) as it ignores 
the social and historical context and personal experience in favour of formal, universally 
‘objective’ and neutral assessments. Li (2006: 6; 2007: 6-12) elaborates on the 
depoliticisation of development when a project is formatted in a way that perceives evident 
social, cultural or economic inequities as technical problems. The identified problem and the 
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chosen solutions are thus amenable to available forms of monitoring and evaluation, to 
measurement, calculation and audit. Development,and thus empowerment, generally have 
been conceived as merely technocratic, leaving social issues and politics out of the equation.   
Although I was aware of the socio-cultural and historical context of the FFS project in 
Nepal, I and the other Plant Protection Directorate and FAO project team members focused 
on the general objective of ‘educating the farmers’ by following specific steps in setting up 
the FFS training. I used project documents with elaborate logical frameworks as guidelines as 
a neutral way of reporting. Moreover, in the implementation of FFS in Nepal in the 1990s, 
evidently socially and economically relevant issues of caste and gender were not considered 
(see Chapters 6, 7, 8). 
At the start it was assumed by the project developers that if farmers would follow 
certain steps in discovery-learning they would go through a process of empowerment in a 
technical way. Most extension workers considered empowerment as a tool or  of ‘power to’ 
achieve increased production and produce more autonomous farmers who could manage 
their own development, who could act autonomously. Many agricultural technicians thought 
that farmers would become empowered just by doing what they ought to do when they 
adopted the technologies that had been introduced by the agricultural staff. 
If we apply the approach of Kabeer (1994), then in FFS empowerment is considered a 
result of gaining knowledge and improved capacity or agency to address problems through a 
discovery-learning process and through collective action. FFS in fact did increase the access 
to knowledge and skills related to crop management through enhancing discovery-learning 
and problem-solving skills in groups.  By repeatedly practising these skills male and female 
participants increased their self-confidence. The benefits in terms of empowerment seemed 
to be more apparent among women than among men. Most men went on with ‘business as 
usual’, while women clearly actively engaged with a change in their lives. Women 
experienced that their decision-making power regarding access to resources – particularly 
used in farming - had expanded. By acting in a group on a weekly basis they enlarged their 
social capital. Group cohesion and increased solidarity provided the social route to 
empowerment (Bartlett, 2004). 
 
I had assumed at the start of the project that the difference between men and women was a 
cultural matter and none of our concern but this assumption was challenged during the 
course of project implementation and particularly during my research. FFS offered 
opportunities to women who were previously denied access to them through agricultural 
training. It has now become accepted for women to take part in agricultural extension 
activities. FFS did not address other inequalities between men and women, let alone certain 
social exclusion mechanisms like caste and ethnicity.  By inviting mostly higher caste 
members to take part in FFS, caste hierarchies were reinforced by the project. Even though 
the context is changing and the political environment nowadays demands more attention to 
vulnerable and previously excluded groups (Chapters 2 and 6), the project has reinforced 
existing disparities and failed to take into account the diversity and difference in terms of 
caste, income, land ownership, ethnicity, gender, age, and education. 
Despite the fact that FFS did not address certain conditions in society producing 
inequality, discrimination and social exclusion, modifications of the wider social-economic 
and political conditions in Nepal did influence the performance of FFS. Over the last decade, 
labour outmigration away from the rural areas, the feminisation of agriculture, the 
government policy demanding an increase of women’s participation in development, and the 
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Maoist movement have encouraged Dalits and Janajatis to raise their voice. These 
circumstances have expanded the opportunities for women, Janajatis and Dalits.  In the rural 
areas previously ignored or marginalised groups demand justice, request more support from 
the government and also demand inclusion in FFS training. The men and women who had 
participated in FFS felt more confident to talk to officers and felt encouraged to speak up 
against government staff. FFS participants have expressed an interest in more services from 
the agricultural extension officers or DADO. Gradually more farmers realised that they had to 
take development into their own hands. They demanded more services.  Men increasingly 
visited DADO offices to demand mini-kits or other inputs and they asked for advice. Meeting 
agricultural technicians in their fields women too had started to ask them critical questions. 
FFS has thus started a process with unknown consequences, at a time when Nepal is in a 
political-economic flux. 
 
3. How did FFS become embedded in the Nepalese governmental structure and for who 
is the Farmer Field School a tool of governance? 
 
By looking at FFS from a governance perspective, I moved away from the usual assessment of 
FFS on farming practices or agricultural development. The governance lens, including a 
power analysis, sheds light on the role of the implementing agencies, the decision-making 
processes, and it gives greater recognition of the complexity of implementing effective 
development interventions.  
 From the start FFS was governed by the Nepalese state agencies together with FAO. 
Increasingly also local NGOs became involved, donors, government and NGOs used FFS as a 
governance tool: defining the project plan with concrete objectives, strategies and budget 
allocations. The locations where to conduct FFS, the target group and the intended 
beneficiaries, were purposefully selected. Also, the careful selection of FFS trainers and the 
content of the training were determined by government agencies (mainly DADO, PPD) and 
NGOs, and crop selection was decided upon by the district agricultural office. These all 
seemed measures to control the project’s pathway.  
But FFS in practice was far from a rational act or an example of Foucauldian 
governmentality. Governmentality as a concept is helpful to analyse governance strategies. 
For getting a better understanding of governance and rural transformation, a change in 
relationships among actors and their ideologies, the notion of structural power is more 
useful. The practices of different actors with different concerns and capacities, roles and 
interests in FFS were constructed differently by each Farmer Field School. Also, the Nepalese 
government and the NGOs involved in FFS did not have the same development objectives as 
the farmers themselves. Finally, the interactions between all actors in FFS exemplified a 
complex web of relationships and inherent power dynamics (Wolf, 1990). Some elements of 
these power dynamics might be visible in project documents, budgets, monitoring and 
evaluation guidelines, but the main part is hidden or invisible. The hidden agendas of the 
actors and the cultural norms that influence project management are not easy to detect. 
Actions take place and decisions are made in a specific socio-cultural and political context, 
influenced by historical events and not always based on an economic rationale.  
Strategies that are central to FFS, such as farmers’ participation, group formation and 
farmers-training-farmers, might be employed by the Nepalese state to make their farmers 
more governable. It can be argued that FFS is being used as governance tool, giving 
responsibilities to farmers for their own development, solving their own problems. Group 
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mobilisation and the use of farmer-trainers are examples of a shift of responsibilities for 
service delivery to farmers themselves. Nonetheless this research made clear that these 
strategies cannot simply be forced upon farmers.  
The context, but also the actors themselves, are subject to change. For instance, the 
farmers themselves who were traditionally trapped in the debt bondage of a patronage 
system and considered as merely tax payers are nowadays more respected as clients who can 
claim services from the government. Institutions based on ethnic identity, caste solidarity 
and gender have obtained a new function in designing rural transformation.  
 I have used the concept of structural power which occurred when FFS was instituted 
by the government in collaboration with NGOs. FFS changed the institutional setting to some 
extent, giving room for farmers’ participation which had not been acceptable before. On the 
other hand, FFS also kept access restricted to certain categories of farmers, namely mostly 
higher castes and male farmers, while women and Dalits remained excluded. The invisible 
power dynamics that maintained inequality between castes were not challenged. Gradually 
FFS enabled more interaction between farmers and officials, and created room for farmers to 
express their needs and desires. Farmers stated in interviews that they liked the FFS 
experience because it provided them with a forum to discuss the agricultural problems they 
faced as they learned about ways to improve their agricultural production. They claimed that 
through FFS their relationship with the government improved. Rather than exercising control 
over farmers, FFS moved toward a facilitating project. It became a popular approach that was 
adopted and applied by many organisations, and it expanded into many regions in Nepal.  
FFS has been institutionalised (Chapter 6), facilitated empowerment (Chapter 7) and 
as a project it has contributed to the long-term process of rural development by promoting a 
positive view on farmers as actors in development, generating the appreciation of more 
interaction with male and female farmers in a dynamic setting where historical traditions and 
widespread views on caste, gender, and religion keep affecting the agency of actors.  
Reflecting on the results of my study, what can we say about FFS in Nepal and in the 
wider context of global development? I will elaborate on my views in the following, last 
section of this thesis. 
 
9.3 Looking to the future and policy implications 
 
Technical interventions are seen as answers to agricultural problems. FFS have been applied 
to address complex problems that require a more inclusive socio-political approach. This 
thesis  suggests that FFS as a technical intervention should not be seen as independent from 
contextual dynamics, like ethnic and caste hierarchy, environmental changes, and the rapid 
cultural, social, and political changes that took place at the turn of this century in Nepal. Only 
then FFS as a project and as a process can be understood in its contribution to farming 
systems, livelihoods, and rural transformation. 
In rural areas most young people move away from farming to urban centres; they are 
no longer interested in working in agriculture (Gartaula, 2011). The men and (young) women 
who stay in agriculture do not wish to engage in food crop production but in earning money 
through cash crop farming. The richer ones, in particular higher caste men try to study 
abroad obtaining scholarships or using their social capital. Young women want to study and 
get jobs in the NGO sector, hospitals or in teaching at primary schools in Nepal.  
There is a chance that FFS will remain a strategy of the government and NGOs, 
probably more and more focusing on cash crops. If FFS becomes more focused on 
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commercial farming it is likely that more men than women will take part. Also, in a 
commercial environment people seem to be reluctant to spend a day per week in an FFS 
training session, so the structure of the training sessions will have to be adapted. It is likely 
that farmers who are interested in taking part in FFS would want to learn more about a 
commercial crop than only during one season, so their training might need to be extended 
throughout the whole year. Furthermore commercial-oriented farmers are interested in 
developing their marketing skills, so the FFS curriculum might need to be expanded by 
including more entrepreneurial oriented topics and networking skills. 
 The extension services in agriculture in Nepal will increasingly become privatised. 
Farmers will have to pay for agricultural services and indicate their demands and needs. This 
research has shown that - given the option - farmers would use government or other funding 
for the construction of infrastructure, like roads and irrigation. They are interested in training 
through a Farmer Field School, but it would not be their first priority in spending their 
money.  
Community power dynamics are likely to change in the coming decade. Caste 
discrimination will decrease, and ethnic minorities, as well as lower caste people, will 
increasingly demand participation in training, extension and group activities. Women will 
take a more active part in decision-making processes, especially in areas where men have 
moved out in search of jobs. The feminisation of agriculture is likely to continue as mostly 
women will be left with the task to look after feeding the family.  
The Maoist movement has supported FFS. The Maoists saw FFS as a tool to teach 
farmers improved technologies and to increase national food production. The previously 
marginalised Janajatis and Dalits have been encouraged to raise their voice. However, the 
Maoists also want a centrally governed nation-state, with little room for participatory 
discussion forums such as FFS. They want FFS to technically support farmers to increase their 
farm production, but they do not support farmers to become critical thinkers.  Increasingly 
people are aware of inequalities; ethnic revival, social inclusion, caste discussions are part of 
daily news topics. Migrants contribute to inclusion of the rural population in a rapidly 
globalising world bringing in new ideas and material.  
The new FFS project phase that has already started, aims to seek access to the global 
market with a focus on cash crop production, market linkages, and capable farmers. Yet 
again, FFS in this new phase neglects the notion of a changed social political environment 
with a demand for more equity. There may be a risk that FFS then again is rendered 
technical, as a governance tool severed from the real life experiences and expectations of the 
farmers for a more democratic development in Nepal.  
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Summary 
 
This thesis argues that Farmer Field Schools in Nepal contributed to agriculture and rural 
development and to gendered empowerment. The Nepalese government, but also NGOs 
involved in FFS applied a rather technocratic approach towards development (Li, 1999) and 
assumed that will well-defined plans, agricultural development and other objectives are 
products that can be rationally transmitted to farmers to produce desired outcomes. They 
considered development as a product that could be delivered to the farmers.  This 
technocratic approach did not address political (Ferguson, 1998) and economic inequities or 
gender differences of farmers. Neither did it incorporate the multi-rationality of actors 
involved in the intervention (Grillo and Stirrat, 1997; Büscher, 2010).  
 Drawing on the experience of active involvement in FFS at the start of the project in 
1997, and consequently by collecting data during a mid-term project evaluation in 2002 and 
as a part of a PhD research project in 2009 this has become a longitudinal study of the 
institutional, social-cultural and political changes that have taken place during more than a 
decade. I have collected measurable data such as yield increase and I used survey data from 
2002 and 2009. I have also collected qualitative information through Focus Group 
Discussions and in-depth individual semi-structured interviews with male and female 
farmers, project staff and government officials and NGO staff. Additionally I have gathered 
information from relevant project documentation and participatory observation among a 
wide range of actors in and around FFS. By looking at the different stages of FFS in Nepal, I 
reflect on its contribution to rural transformation and gendered empowerment. 
 The Farmer Field School was first developed in 1989 Indonesia as a response to 
problems associated with the failure of the Green Revolution and particularly with the 
misuse of pesticides. FFS follows a participatory approach to agricultural extension and 
research, and aims to bring about change in rural areas. FFS has been implemented all over 
the world by various organisations. FFS was introduced in Nepal as an integrated pest 
management project in 1997 with concrete output oriented goals: the increase of 
agricultural production and the reduction of pesticide use. Despite the on-going debate on 
the impact of FFS, this thesis shows a rather consistently positive picture of short- and 
medium–term impact, with farmers able to improve their yield, reduced pesticide use and a 
better balanced fertilizer application system. 
 Changing donor paradigms as well as a growing insight that farmers’ realities and 
needs were different and more complex than initially assumed during the planning of the 
project, made FFS more outcome and process oriented, focusing on empowerment and 
capacity-building of farmers.  After more than a decade FFS indeed did contribute to rural 
development in Nepal not so much because of careful project planning, but rather in a 
complex way with largely unintended consequences, embedded in a socio-cultural context. 
 When FFS started it was designed as a project, with a clear start, written documents 
in which the project duration was indicated, starting in 1997 and ending in 2002. I found that 
ten years after FFS was conducted, farmers still continued with some of the practices they 
learned in their FFS training. FFS has developed from a project into a continuous process of 
change. Although it might not be exactly the way project planners had envisaged in their 
documents, a fact is that farmers still apply agronomic practices as introduced in FFS. 
Farming practices have changed, yields increased. Fewer pesticides are used, less rice 
seedlings are planted per hill, and so on. Also more farmers started with vegetable 
production. For many women FFS was the first training in agriculture they received. It 
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contributed to an increase in their knowledge and skills, boosted their confidence in 
participation in community events and speaking in public. Women appeared to be interested 
to participate in FFS to learn about farming and to contribute to the food security of their 
family. Men, on the other hand, were interested to use FFS to increase their livelihood 
options, to widen job opportunities or to earn a better income. 
 At the turn of the century one of the objectives of FFS shifted from integrated pest 
management and agricultural production to farmer’s empowerment. Farmer field schools 
are vehicles for empowerment of farmers (Ooi, 1998; Pontius et al, 2002).  Empowerment is 
an often debated concept in the academic world but in development practice it seems to be 
used without much debate, assuming that it is always a ‘good’ thing having a positive impact 
on farmers.  
 In the FFS programme it was assumed that everybody had the same understanding of 
the concept of empowerment. My data showed that male and female farmers differ in their 
view on empowerment and that there is a big gap between policy makers, FFS facilitators 
and female and male farmers regarding the perception of empowerment.  
This research showed that empowerment is a social process that challenges our assumptions 
about empowerment as a deliverable, a product. Men and women FFS participants said that 
they experienced empowerment, but not in the way FFS technicians and policymakers had 
planned it, going through a rationally designed set of steps: identifying a problem in the field, 
experimenting with a solution and drawing conclusions. Our survey showed that women 
without FFS experience saw empowerment as increased individual strength, personal 
growth, stretching their comfort zone. Women who took part in FFS mainly considered 
empowerment as self-confidence and involvement in work and group activities. Men’s idea 
of empowerment was much more focused on their capacity to contribute to the 
improvement of society, on action outside the household, which would contribute to their 
prestige. FFS trainers spoke about empowerment in terms of a result of technology transfer 
or a change in behaviour that they had facilitated among farmers. Apparently, FFS staff had a 
very technical and non-political approach towards empowerment, not based on male and 
female farmers’ realities in rural Nepal.   
Most FFS facilitators claimed that they could empower farmers and they did not 
consider farmers’ interest and agency. FFS facilitators did not see empowerment as a 
process that farmers themselves are actively part of. 
Interviews confirmed that empowerment is a complex, multi-faceted process, which 
is not easily quantified or measured, let alone regulated in a technical way. Through 
participation in FFS men and particularly women expanded their framework of information, 
knowledge and analysis. It enlarged their room for manoeuvre, their negotiation space. They 
got involved in a process that enabled them to discover new options, new possibilities and 
eventually make better informed decisions in farming.  
Several female farmers replied that they could now make choices which were 
previously denied to them for historical and cultural reasons. They said that this was not the 
result of the discovery learning in FFS like it was assumed by policy makers, but of the group 
participation, singing and presenting, their learning to speak in a group. Women gained 
confidence, gained a voice in the weekly group sessions, as a result of the social space, the 
FFS team spirit and solidarity that was provided in the meetings. This ‘social capital route’ of 
empowerment (Bartlett, 2005), is rather different from the ‘human capital’ route that men 
follow in empowerment in Nepal.  
 In this thesis I contend that FFS is ‘rendering technical’ (Li, 2007) a complex social, 
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cultural, economic and political process of rural development by defining empowerment as a 
non-political tool, an asset that FFS participants can be taught, that they can learn to ‘own’. 
Consequently, gender differentiation, experiences of women being different from men and 
institutional structures that surround the poor and disempowered Dalit farmers, keeping 
them in poverty and powerless, were not addressed. I consider empowerment as a process 
in which people strengthen their own power and capacities, and improve their position in 
society. Empowerment is a process in which several factors but also actors play a role. The 
actors within the FFS project but also external actors like the state, the Maoist movement, 
NGOs, and individual forces are involved. They all work together in changing constellations, 
in time and place.  
 An actor-oriented and contextual analysis of FFS, of how the actors implement FFS in 
the cultural, historical and political environment of Nepal at the turn of the century creates 
an understanding of state-society relations and governance issues. It provides an insight in 
decision-making processes and the power dynamics influenced by socio-cultural factors. A 
closer look at FFS reveals how the state seeks to govern the farmers, and the extent to which 
government agencies offer the means of empowerment to farmers. It also reveals how 
certain social categories in society remained excluded from participation until recently, 
especially women and Dalit. In project documents and interviews farmers are usually 
depicted as passive citizens, who are poor and in need of knowledge and new technologies. 
Farmers, on the other hand, consider the state as responsible to look after their well-being 
to a large extent, as care takers. But it is a rather simplified view to consider the government 
or NGOs as the actors or care-takers who can decide on behalf of farmers as passive 
beneficiaries or oppressed citizens. In this thesis I have described how relations between 
state and civil actors are subject to complex power dynamics. Power is woven into social 
relations at different levels (Wolf, 1999) starting from individual potency, to group 
interaction and structural or institutional levels.  
 The implementation of FFS took place in the context of a dynamic environment 
where major political and socio-economic changes took place. The contribution of FFS to the 
development of Nepal cannot be studied without reference to history and the wider social, 
political-economic conditions during the last decade. The year 1997 when the Farmer Field 
Schools were introduced in Nepal was also the time that the Maoists officially declared their 
revolution. When data were collected in 2002 as part of a mid-term evaluation for FAO and 
the donor AUSAID there was a revolution going on and there were heavy fights between 
Maoists, the army and civilians. Many men had fled their homes to escape the violence and 
to resist being taken by either the government or the Maoists army. In 2001 King Birendra 
and a large part of his Royal family were murdered and the political scene was in turmoil. 
Migration for jobs abroad was at a rise and female-headed households in rural villages had 
increased (Gartaula, 2011). In 2009 during the last series of interviews, Nepal was in a flux 
again; a federal government had been elected, the Maoists had become part of the 
government, but disputes remained. The interim constitution was developed with much 
attention on social exclusion of marginalized groups. These changing political-economic 
conditions of rural transformation have resulted in an increased awareness of ethnic 
diversity, rights claims by historically marginalised groups, and interventions to divert caste 
discrimination in the rural areas where FFS has been conducted. Despite these changes FFS 
project staff keep focused on a technical, non-political approach and continue to speak 
about yield increase, opening market linkages, cash crop opportunities, as if these local 
dynamics do not matter. 
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Samenvatting 
 
Dit proefschrift beargumenteert dat Farmer Field Schools (FFS) hebben bijgedragen aan de 
agrarische en rurale ontwikkeling en de empowerment van mannen en vrouwen in Nepal.  
 
De Nepalese overheid, maar ook NGO’s die betrokken zijn bij FFS, passen doorgaans een 
technocratische benadering toe ten aanzien van ontwikkeling (Li, 1999) waarbij ervan wordt 
uitgegaan dat een meer planmatige en rationele werkwijze kan worden aangereikt aan 
boeren om zo de gewenste ontwikkeling tot stand te brengen. Zij zien ontwikkeling dus als 
een product dat kan worden overgedragen aan boeren. Deze technocratische benadering 
houdt echter geen rekening met de politieke (Ferguson, 1994) en economische 
ongelijkheden en evenmin met de verschillen tussen mannen en vrouwen. Tevens wordt de 
veelzijdige rationaliteit van de bij het proces betrokken partijen onvoldoende in acht 
genomen (Grillo en Stirrat, 1997; Büscher, 2010). 
 
Mijn promotieonderzoek is een longitudinale studie van de institutionele, sociaal-culturele 
en politieke veranderingen, die gedurende vijftien jaren in Nepal hebben plaatsgevonden. De 
studie is geënt op mijn jarenlange ervaring en actieve betrokkenheid in FFS (vanaf het begin 
van het project in 1997), en tevens gebaseerd op data die door mij verzameld zijn gedurende 
een projectevaluatie (in 2002) en als onderdeel van dit promotieonderzoek (in 2009). Ik heb 
gegevens verzameld, ondermeer met betrekking tot opbrengstvermeerdering, en ik heb 
onderzoeksdata gebruikt uit de periode 2002 tot en met 2009. Ook heb ik kwalitatieve 
informatie verzameld afkomstig uit focus group discussies en afkomstig uit individuele semi-
gestructureerde interviews met boeren, met project stafleden, overheids- en NGO 
stafmedewerkers. Verder heb ik informatie toegevoegd van relevante projectdocumentatie, 
van eigen observaties en van observaties door een uitgebreide kring van betrokkenen binnen 
en buiten FFS. 
Door te kijken naar de verschillende ontwikkelingen van FFS in Nepal, reflecteer ik op 
de bijdrage van de FFS aan de agrarische en rurale veranderingen en aan de empowerment 
van mannen en vrouwen. 
 
De Farmer Field School is ontwikkeld in Indonesië als een antwoord op problemen, die 
gerelateerd waren aan het mislukken van de Green Revolution en in het bijzonder aan het 
verkeerd inzetten van chemische gewasbeschermingsmiddelen. FFS volgt een participatieve 
benadering met betrekking tot landbouwvoorlichting en onderzoek,  met als doel om de 
agrarische productie en rurale ontwikkeling te verbeteren.  
Over de hele wereld is FFS toegepast door een grote verscheidenheid van 
organisaties. FFS is in Nepal in 1997 geïntroduceerd als een geïntegreerd  
gewasbeschermingsprogramma met concrete einddoelen: verbetering van de agrarische 
productie en vermindering van het gebruik van gewasbeschermingsmiddelen. In weerwil van 
de doorlopende discussie over het nut van FFS schetst dit proefschrift een voornamelijk 
positief beeld van korte- en middellange termijneffecten op boeren, die in staat blijken hun 
agrarische productie te verhogen, het gebruik van chemische gewasbescherming te 
verminderen en te komen tot een beter gebalanceerde toepassing van meststoffen. 
FFS was ontworpen als een project met een duidelijk beginpunt, met geschreven 
documentatie waarin het projectverloop en de duur waren vastgelegd, startend in 1997 en 
eindigend in 2002. Een decennium later passen nog steeds vele boeren de 
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praktijkervaringen, opgedaan tijdens FFS trainingen, toe. Echter, dit doen zij niet precies op 
de manier die de projectontwikkelaars in hun plan hadden voorzien. FFS heeft zich 
ontwikkeld van een project met een duidelijk begin en einde naar een continue 
veranderingsproces. Het is hierbij een feit dat de boeren nog steeds de agronomische 
praktijken toepassen, die in de FFS zijn geïntroduceerd. Minder chemische 
gewasbeschermingsmiddelen zijn ingezet, minder rijst zaailingen worden er geplant, en de 
productiviteit is verhoogd. Ook zijn meer boeren begonnen met de teelt van groenten. Voor 
de meeste vrouwen was FFS de eerste landbouwtraining die zij kregen. Dit heeft bijgedragen 
aan de ontwikkeling van hun kennis en vaardigheden, en het versterkte hun zelfvertrouwen 
in deelname aan publieke bijeenkomsten en het spreken in het openbaar. Vrouwen bleken 
geïnteresseerd te zijn in deelname in het FFS programma om kennis op te doen omtrent 
landbouwtechnieken en om zo bij te dragen aan de voedselzekerheid voor hun familie. 
Mannen daarentegen waren geïnteresseerd om FFS te gebruiken om hun 
inkomensmogelijkheden te vergroten, hun werkgelegenheid te verbeteren en om een beter 
inkomen te verwerven. 
  
Veranderende donorparadigma’s, alsmede het voortschrijdende inzicht dat de realiteit en de 
wensen van de boeren anders en meer complex zijn dan in eerste instantie in het project 
waren aangenomen, hebben ertoe geleid dat de doelstellingen van FFS meer 
procesgeoriënteerd werden met een focus op capaciteitsversterking en empowerment van 
boeren. Ruim 10 jaar na beëindiging van FFS is het evident dat het project daadwerkelijk 
heeft bijgedragen aan de rurale ontwikkeling in Nepal. Echter dit is niet zozeer het resultaat 
van de planmatige uitvoering van het project, maar veeleer te beschouwen als een complex 
van grotendeels onbedoelde gevolgen die zich voltrokken in een sociaal culturele context.  
Rond de eeuwwisseling is een van de doelstellingen van FFS verschoven van 
geïntegreerde gewasbescherming en agrarische productie naar versterking van de 
capaciteiten van de boeren. Farmer Field Schools zijn instrumenten geworden voor de 
empowerment van boeren (Ooi, 1998; Pontius et al., 2002). Empowerment is een veelvuldig 
besproken concept in de academische wereld, maar in de praktijk wordt het veelal zonder 
discussie toegepast, in de veronderstelling dat het altijd een goede zaak is met een positief 
effect op boeren. 
In het FFS programma werd aangenomen dat iedereen hetzelfde verstaat onder het 
begrip empowerment. Mijn data laten echter zien dat mannelijke en vrouwelijke boeren zich 
anders verhouden tot het concept empowerment. Tevens is ten aanzien van empowerment 
sprake van een grote discrepantie tussen de opvattingen van vrouwelijke cq mannelijke 
boeren en de vooronderstellingen terzake van de beleidsambtenaren cq FFS project 
medewerkers.  
  
Mijn onderzoek toont aan dat empowerment een sociaal proces is, en dat onze aanname dat 
empowerment een leverbaar product is, ter discussie gesteld moet worden. Mannen en 
vrouwen, die deelnamen in FFS gaven aan dat ze empowerment hebben ervaren, maar niet 
zoals FFS deskundigen en beleidsmakers dit hadden voorzien. Empowerment werd door 
boeren niet ervaren door middel van een rationeel ontwikkeld stappenplan (bestaande uit 
probleemidentificatie in het veld, experimenterend met een oplossing en het daaruit 
trekken van conclusies). Het onderzoek laat zien dat met name vrouwen zonder FFS ervaring 
empowerment zagen als een versterking van individuele kracht, persoonlijke groei en 
uitbreiding van hun comfortzone. Vrouwen die hadden deelgenomen in FFS ervoeren 
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empowerment vooral als vergroting van zelfvertrouwen en betrokkenheid in werk en 
groepsactiviteiten. Onder mannen was het idee over empowerment veel meer gericht op 
hun capaciteit om bij te dragen aan de verbetering van hun gemeenschap, op acties die 
plaats vinden buiten het gezinsleven en die bijdragen aan verbetering van hun eigen 
prestige. Hier is nauwelijks onderscheid tussen mannen met en zonder FFS ervaring. 
FFS facilitatoren spraken over empowerment in termen van technologieadoptie en/of 
gedragsverandering; doelstellingen die zij als landbouwvoorlichters nastreefden. Bij aanvang 
van het project had het FFS personeel een erg technische en apolitieke benadering ten 
opzichte van empowerment, niet gebaseerd op de realiteit van mannelijke en vrouwelijke 
boeren onder rurale Nepalese omstandigheden. De meeste FFS facilitatoren claimen dat zij 
bij boeren empowerment teweeg konden brengen en namen de interesses en agenda’s van 
de boeren zelf niet mee in hun overwegingen. Zij zagen empowerment niet als een proces 
waarbij boeren zelf een actieve rol spelen. 
Interviews bevestigen dat empowerment een complex proces is met meerdere 
facetten, dat niet gemakkelijk te kwantificeren c.q. te meten is, en niet op een technische 
manier te sturen is. Door deelname in FFS hebben mannen en in het bijzonder vrouwen hun 
raamwerk van informatie, kennis en analysemethodieken vergroot. Het heeft hen ruimte 
gegeven om te manoeuvreren en hun onderhandelingscapaciteit vergroot. Zij zijn betrokken 
geraakt in een proces waarin zij nieuwe opties, nieuwe mogelijkheden kregen en waardoor 
zij uiteindelijk beter onderbouwde beslissingen konden nemen op het gebied van landbouw. 
Verschillende boerinnen onderstreepten dat zij nu keuzes kunnen maken die vroeger 
onmogelijk waren om historische en culturele redenen. Zij zeiden dat dit niet het resultaat 
was van het opdoen van technische kennis binnen FFS, zoals werd aangenomen door de 
beleidsmakers, maar door de groepsdeelname, het zingen en presenteren en door te leren 
discussiëren en hun mening te geven binnen een groep. Vrouwen kregen meer 
zelfvertrouwen, kregen een stem in wekelijkse groepsbijeenkomsten, als gevolg van de 
sociale ruimte, de teamgeest en solidariteit die werd geboden in de FFS bijeenkomsten. Deze 
“social capital route” van empowerment (Barlett, 2005), verschilt behoorlijk van de “human 
capital” route die mannen navolgen in Nepal. 
Ik zie empowerment als een proces dat mensen in staat stelt om hun eigen krachten 
te vergroten en hun positie binnen de maatschappij sterker te maken. Ik zie het als een 
proces waarbij vele factoren van invloed zijn maar waarbij ook meerdere actoren in Nepal 
een rol spelen, zoals de staat, de Maoistische beweging en individuele krachten. Zij werken 
samen in een altijd dynamische configuratie, die verandert door de tijd en verschilt per 
plaats. 
 
Een analyse van FFS met aandacht voor de deelnemers, de context, de historische 
achtergrond, de veranderende sociaal- culturele, politieke context van Nepal rond de 
eeuwwisseling, geeft meer inzicht in bestuursaspecten en sociale relaties, de verhouding 
tussen de staat en de gemeenschap. Het geeft een kijk in processen, die leiden tot 
beslissingen en machtsverhoudingen, die beïnvloed worden door sociaal-culturele factoren. 
Een diepere analyse van FFS onthult hoe de staat probeert om de boeren te besturen en 
biedt inzicht in de mate waarin de overheid middelen kan aanbieden om empowerment te 
bewerkstellingen bij boeren. Tevens wordt duidelijk hoe bepaalde sociale categorieën in de 
maatschappij tot recent uitgesloten bleven van deelname, in het bijzonder vrouwen en 
Dalits. 
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In projectdocumenten en interviews worden boeren gewoonlijk afgebeeld als 
passieve burgers, die arm zijn en behoefte hebben aan nieuwe kennis en moderne 
technologieën. Boeren, vanuit hun perspectief,  beschouwen de staat als zorgdrager, 
verantwoordelijk voor een groot deel voor hun welzijn. Het is echter een gesimplificeerde 
voorstelling van zaken dat de overheid (en NGO’s) beslissingen kunnen nemen uit naam van 
boeren als zijnde passief begunstigden of onderdrukte burgers. In dit proefschrift heb ik 
beschreven hoe de relaties tussen staat en de burgerlijke deelnemers onderworpen zijn aan 
complexe dynamische processen en machtsverhoudingen. Macht is een relationeel sociaal 
proces dat op diverse niveaus plaatsvindt (Wolf, 1999), beginnend bij individuele potentie 
tot aan groepsinteractie en op structurele en institutionele niveaus. 
 
De uitvoering van FFS vond plaats in een dynamische context, waarin grote politieke en 
sociaal economische veranderingen plaatsvonden. De bijdrage van FFS aan de ontwikkeling 
van Nepal kan niet bestudeerd worden zonder te refereren aan de geschiedenis en de brede 
sociaal-politieke en economische condities gedurende het laatste decennia  Het jaar 1997, 
waarin de Farmer Field School werd geïntroduceerd in Nepal was tevens de tijd waarin de 
Maoïsten hun revolutie officieel verklaarden. Toen in 2002 data werden verzameld met als 
doel om te komen tot een tussentijdse evaluatie voor FAO en de donor AUSAID, was de 
revolutie in volle gang en waren er heftige gevechten tussen Maoïsten, het leger en burgers. 
Veel mannen waren weggevlucht uit hun woonplaatsen om aan het geweld te ontsnappen 
en om te voorkomen dat zij werden opgepakt door de overheid of door het Maoïstische 
leger. In 2001 werden koning Birendra en een groot gedeelte van de Koninklijke familie 
vermoord. Het politieke landschap was onrustig. 
Migratie voor werk buiten Nepal nam toe en in rurale gebieden werden steeds meer 
huishoudens geleid door vrouwen (Gartaula, 2011). In 2009, gedurende de laatste sessie van 
interviews, bevond Nepal zich weer in een stroomversnelling; een federale overheid was 
gekozen, de Maoïsten waren onderdeel geworden van de regering, maar de uiteenlopende 
politieke meningsverschillen bleven bestaan. Een tijdelijke grondwet ging van kracht met 
veel aandacht voor sociale uitsluiting van gemarginaliseerde groepen. Deze veranderingen in 
de politiek- economische condities van de rurale transformatie hebben geresulteerd in een 
toenemend bewustzijn van etnische identiteit, het opeisen van rechten door historisch 
gemarginaliseerde groepen, en interventies om kastendiscriminatie te voorkomen. Dit had 
ook invloed op de rurale gebieden waar FFS plaatsvond. Ondanks deze veranderingen blijft 
de FFS projectleiding gefocust op een technisch, niet politieke benadering en blijft spreken 
over oogstvermeerdering, opening van nieuwe markten en het verbouwen van commercieel 
aantrekkelijke gewassen kansen, alsof deze lokale dynamiek geen rol speelt. 
 
In dit proefschrift toon ik aan dat een technocratische benadering  van rurale ontwikkeling, 
de complexe sociale, economische en politieke aspecten van het veranderingsproces worden 
genegeerd. In FFS wordt agrarische en rurale ontwikkeling alswel empowerment beschouwd 
als een apolitiek concept, iets dat mensen kunnen leren of zich eigen maken. Als gevolg 
hiervan zijn verschillen tussen mannen en vrouwen, kastenverhoudingen, lokale 
veranderingen en andere social and institutionele processen niet in acht genomen. 
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